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PREFACE
What does an organization expect from its managers, directors, and execu-
tives concerned with protection of assets from loss? It expects leadership,
analytical ability, relevant knowledge to solve problems, flexibility to con-
front new situations, and sufficient experience to enhance sound judgment.
At the core of that expectation is the need for effective action. 
Security Operations Management is written for practitioners, students,
and general managers who are involved with or interested in managing
security operations more effectively. The purpose of this book is not immod-
est: it seeks to bring order to the sometimes chaotic task of protecting peo-
ple, physical assets, intellectual property, and opportunity. It endeavors to
provide a structure to operate programs for the benefit of the organization,
and it wishes to relate such principles clearly and directly to readers. 
Security programs in the workplace are growing robustly, a develop-
ment that can be traced back several years. Meanwhile, security trade and
professional organizations have grown in numbers, specializations, and
aggregate membership in recent decades. Protection-related issues appear
regularly on board agendas, and security-related matters are covered in the
media on a daily basis. However, the actual number of security directors
and managers decreased in the late 1980s and 1990s. The need for security
programs and services did not decrease, but several managerial positions,
including security, declined in total numbers. Middle management positions
were squeezed by the impetus to create tighter, more cost-effective organiza-
tions.
This book is written with the implications of this trend in mind. It
explores both the problems and opportunities for protection management in
contemporary organizations, and the ways in which security operations
managers constantly must demonstrate their programs’ value. 
A curious feature of organizational security leadership is how little
effect it has had on undergraduate or graduate education within criminal
justice, economics, and business programs. This book seeks to integrate the
nascent but growing academic discipline of security management with the
more mature, directed studies encountered both in undergraduate and grad-
uate schools of business administration, as well as in academic programs in
criminal justice. Some of the book’s material is based on the academic frame-
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work of business school management courses—indeed, syllabi from general
management courses at leading schools of business administration were
evaluated in the preparation of the early chapters. Further, the book is writ-
ten within the context of the security management academic program at
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, a liberal arts institution focusing on
public service. John Jay was located briefly in its earliest days within Baruch
College, now a highly regarded business and public affairs–oriented liberal
arts institution whose library, like John Jays, was particularly helpful for this
volume. Hence, elements of criminal justice, business and public adminis-
tration have influenced some aspects of the content. 
This book also integrates many relevant papers from Security Journal
and criminal justice and business-oriented publications that have served as
primary sources for research on security operations management. Addition-
ally, findings and recommendations from academic/practitioner symposia,
sponsored by the American Society for Industrial Security, held at Webster
University in 1997, John Jay College the next year, and the University of
Nevada at Reno in 2000, have been incorporated into the text. 
xi
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SECURITY OPERATIONS 
IN THE MANAGEMENT 
ENVIRONMENT
Security management is ready and eligible to be
considered as a management science.
—Charles H. Davidson in 
Security Journal
To achieve optimal protective goals, security executives, directors, and man-
agers must operate successful programs. The origins of certain manage-
ment-related words clarify this objective. The word “operate,” for example,
is derived from the Latin operatus, the past participle of the verb “to work”;
hence, operations are concerned with exerting power or influence in order to
produce an effect. Security operations, therefore, are the processes whereby
the protective aims of the organization are to be achieved. Success does not
depend upon good intentions alone. Personal effort causes such desired
changes to occur. The security practitioner must assume correctly that his or
her appropriate involvement is consequential in achieving what needs to be
done.
Operating security programs is not easy. Protection is an inherent fac-
tor in success and continuity of an operation. Because of this, one might
assume—falsely—that efforts to protect assets would receive broad, largely
uncritical support from senior management and ownership. That’s not nec-
essarily so. A paradox exists within the workplace: freedom results in cre-
ativity, spontaneity, and economic development, while at the same time
making abuses within the organization easier to occur. Therefore, controls
that decrease the possibilities of loss are implemented. However, these same
controls may also decrease creativity and efficiency. The art of the security
practitioner is thus to encourage expression and achievement, while making
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the control mechanisms reasonably unburdensome to employees, visitors,
vendors, and the public at large so that the organization flourishes without
the appearance of constricting security operations.
This book considers the tasks of operating security loss prevention
programs in contemporary organizations. The principles involved are appli-
cable in for-profit and not-for-profit corporations and within government
units at all levels. Many of the organizational protective features are com-
mon to the concerns of general management. Indeed, security operations are
aspects within a broad management context. Therefore, the initial part of
this chapter will consider the concepts that have helped form management
practices in the 20th century and that are guiding it in the 21st.
ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGERS
To understand what a manager does, it is essential to consider the ways in
which organizations have evolved in modern public and private institu-
tions. Management must be rational in order to achieve long-term success.
Therefore, the creation of organizations and their successful achievement of
desired objectives must be understandable both to those within and outside
the organization. This is true for security departments as well as for every
other operating unit.
What Is an Organization?
The word “organization” is derived from the Greek organon, meaning organ,
tool, or instrument, and is akin to work. Organizations are composed of
groups of people bonded by a purpose: a systematic scheme to achieve mutu-
ally agreed-upon objectives. Typically, organizations might be divided into a
bifurcated scheme: administrators (leaders and planners) and functional
members (followers and processors). These roles may be interchangeable
according to different circumstances. Organizations are created, therefore, in
order to achieve objectives deemed desirable by leaders and planners of the
organization, by those who carry out tasks, or in some cases from both.
What Is a Manager or Director?
The word “manage” is derived from the Gaelic mano, related to hand, and
was related to the handling or training of a horse in graceful or studied
action. Thus, the word suggests the concept of controlling, directing, or cop-
ing with challenging and constantly diversifying circumstances. A manager
is a person who controls or directs an organization in a desired, purposeful
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direction. The title of director usually outranks that of manager and refers to
the person who directs the work of managers and their subordinates.
What Is a Security Manager?
Security is defined as the protection of assets from loss. Each word in this
definition carries its own implications. The word “protection” means to
cover or defend. The word “assets” encompasses numerous possibilities of
tangible and intangible resources of value. Clearly, cash and physical prop-
erty can be considered assets, but knowledge-related activities and the
opportunity to achieve a desired goal due to particular circumstances are
also assets. A security manager (or director) is a person who protects identi-
fied assets through personnel, procedures, and systems under his or her
control. The goal is to achieve objectives—agreed upon with senior manage-
ment—that also produce minimum reasonable encumbrances to overall
operations.
A POINT ABOUT TITLES
Titles within the organization can change according to fashion. For most of
the 20th century, the titles “president,” “executive,” “chief,” “director,”
“manager,” and others had specific meanings. They connoted a hierarchy
well understood by those within and outside the organization. Such a hier-
archy still exists, but title connotations may neither be clear nor consistent
and vary from one organization to another. Indeed, sometimes an executive
(or manager) creates new titles for structural or motivational purposes (see
Chapter 5). Thus, words like “deputy,” “associate,” “assistant,” “managing,”
“acting,” “senior,” and “junior” are parts of some titles that may serve to
provide the level of significance of the position.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF AN EXECUTIVE?
Executives and those with executive tasks—regardless of their titles—are
responsible for the planning and analysis of required programs. They are
further responsible for implementation of such programs. Ultimately, the
challenge to organizational leaders is to be effective in achieving or surpass-
ing the reasonably set goals of the organization. That is, they execute such
programs. Peter F. Drucker, a leading management consultant, argues that
the primary strategy of work is measured not in the brilliance of its concep-
tion, but in how well the desired goals were actually achieved. The nature of
work changes constantly, he observes.
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According to Drucker, “knowledge workers” are the human capital
through which objectives are achieved. Knowledge workers are members of
an organization whose effectiveness is realized though the use of informa-
tion often accessed and partially analyzed through technology. In The Effec-
tive Executive, Drucker posits that effectiveness is not simply necessary as a
managerial attribute, it is vital and can be learned through concerted effort,
leading to still greater effectiveness. Drucker writes:
I have called “executives” those knowledge workers, managers, or individual
professionals who are expected by virtue of their positions or their knowledge
to make decisions in the normal course of their work that have significant
impact on the performance and results of the whole. They are by no means a
majority of the knowledge workers. For knowledge work too, as in all areas,
there is unskilled work and routine. But they are a much larger proportion of
the total knowledge workforce than any organization chart ever reveals.1
The effective security executive or manager is a person who can iden-
tify the problems and opportunities facing the organization, plan to resolve
them, organize resources so that the mission may be successfully achieved,
deputize others to follow through on his or her behalf, and then supervise
the continuing operation. This is spelled out further in the next section.
WHAT IS THE STRATEGY OF MANAGEMENT?
Management refers to the way in which members of an organization make
key decisions on how goods and services are produced. Management can
also refer to the process by which such goals may be achieved.
Throughout contemporary organizations, the strategy of management
is accomplished via a process of identifying, analyzing, planning, organiz-
ing, deputizing, and supervising activities common to the attainment of
these goals. This process is systematic in that order and conduct is required
to achieve objectives by members of the organization. The manager sees to
this process in each link of the chain (see Box 1.1). Specifically, the concate-
nation of managerial tasks is as follows: 
1. Problem identification. The first organizational process step identi-
fies the need for desirable and required managerial action. This need
may be to commence a new program or initiative, to revise an old
one, to solve a problem, to seize an opportunity, to expand or con-
tract operations, or to handle still other options. The management
process begins by asking the question “What needs be accomplished
and why?” It then grapples with the clarified requirements that
emerge from the following stages.
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Box 1.1. The Security Management Process
Managers in modern organizations use a simple, logical process to achieve
desired goals. The problem or opportunity may differ in significance, and
the time required to adequately analyze and plan it also may vary. A major
problem or opportunity may require weeks or months to resolve, but the
sequence of events remains the same. Here’s an example:
Problem identification. Assume that the organization is expanding
and must create a new facility to achieve desired production. This new facil-
ity will require a security program to protect its assets. How will it be cre-
ated? Early in the process of planning for such a facility, the security director
collects pertinent information so that an optimal security program may be
designed. The size, condition, employment, production requirements, envi-
ronmental issues, potential problems, and other issues will be considered,
and the most problematic matters will be isolated. Then the director, often
aided by others, completes additional tasks until the program is fully imple-
mented. The process is as follows:
1. Analysis and planning. The security director might collect and ana-
lyze the following information about the new facility:
• Function of the new facility (what it does, its size and signifi-
cance)
• Site selection (for protective and risk-averse features of the
topography)
• Architectural and engineering involvement
• Local conditions where the facility is to be located (for example,
crime pattern)
• Local resources available (police, fire, emergency-oriented)
• Special security features likely to be required at such a facility
This process involves a fact-finding process in which the manager,
or a surrogate, visits the site to determine its potential risks and oppor-
tunities so that these may be incorporated into the formal plan. When as
much relevant data is collected as possible in the time available, the
planning team is ready to prepare the physical security plan for the new
facility. Planning for security measures needed by the facility once it
begins operating is also undertaken at this time. The manager then dis-
cusses the analysis and planning with senior management.
2. Organizing. The plan must now be accepted by relevant decision-
makers throughout the organization. Resources required for the
xxxxx
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Box 1.1. (Continued)
security program at the new facility are then mobilized. The steps
taken may include:
• Consulting with architectural and engineering personnel about
specific security design needs
• Issuing a request-for-proposal (RFP) for the system (Chapter 10) 
• Establishing qualified bidders for the security project
• Reviewing submissions and awarding the contract
• Supervising the project’s installation
• Assuring adequate training and support materials
• Testing the system under normal and adverse circumstances
At this point, a complex system has been created for the new
facility. Meanwhile, a security staff must be hired and procedures for
both security and non-security personnel must be prepared and
reviewed. The next step assures these goals are met.
3. Deputize. As the new security system is configured and the opera-
tional commencement for the new facility can be scheduled, a man-
ager must run the enduring, ongoing security program.
Consequently, someone is deputized to assume this responsibility on
behalf of management at headquarters. He or she will carry out the
earlier aspects of the plan through the commencement and subse-
quent routine operations of the new facility.
4. Supervise. The central manager’s time commitment for the new
facility gradually lessens as the deputy assumes control. That deputy
reports regularly on developments. The central manager maintains
quality control over the physical and procedural process involved in
creating the plan for the new facility.
5. Constant critical analysis and change. At this point, the managerial
process has been completed. The time it takes to complete the pro-
cess varies considerably depending on the particular problem to be
managed. It may take as little as a few hours by a single individual
or as much as months of concerted effort by a managerial team. The
process is dynamic; circumstances change constantly, often in ways
that could not have been anticipated early in the planning period
even by the most conscientious and rigorous planners. Therefore, the
manager must be prepared to constantly refine the plan to new cir-
cumstances, seizing fresh opportunities for further gains in program-
matic objectives whenever possible.
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2. Analyzing and planning. Analyzing is the process of separating
something into its constituent parts or basic principles. This allows
the nature of the whole issue to be examined methodically. To ana-
lyze a security problem, the practitioner seeks to collect all pertinent
information, which then becomes the basis of planning—or formu-
lating—a means to achieve the desirable goals. These are the critical
next parts of the managerial process. Wise managers do not proceed
generally to the next step in the sequence until the previous one is
reasonably completed. How much planning is enough? A manager is
never likely to have all the knowledge and facts necessary to com-
prehend every relevant facet to analyze fully and then plan compre-
hensively without ever looking back. Further, conditions change
constantly and create situations with which the manager must con-
tend. Yet at some point the analysis must be summarized when a rea-
sonable quantity of information has been collected and a plan for
action evolved. That process of working with finite knowledge and
resources is what is fascinating and challenging about the art and
method of management.
3. Organizing. After the need has been determined, its critical parts
have been identified, and a plan has been established to respond to
the need, resources must be organized—that is, created or accumu-
lated in order to achieve the objective. Money and personnel must be
committed. Technology and software strategies may be required and
must be allocated. Impediments must be resolved. Commitments
must be assured. Then the plan can be implemented by selecting
subordinate managers.
4. Deputizing. A manager does not achieve the objectives of the plan
solely by his or her actions: a manager works in the company of oth-
ers. In the management process, the problem has been analyzed and
a plan to deal with it has been agreed upon. Resources have been
committed firmly. Now the process of assuring that the plan
achieves its objectives is shared with persons who will follow
through—hopefully to realize the intended goals. Persons deputized
to achieve these ends on behalf of the planning managers are them-
selves managers who are now transferred the responsibility for
assuring that the plan will be carried out. The senior planning man-
ager is now free to supervise this person or persons.
5. Supervising. The planning manager next supervises the manager
who has been given responsibility for achieving the goals set by the
plan. Through this process, the manager can assure that goals are
reached in the face of constantly changing circumstances. Thus, the
principal manager is engaged in controlling the work of others and
the allocation of resources in pursuit of the desired objectives. The
supervising manager in the hierarchy remains available to critique,
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and supports and guides the manager deputized to carry out the
plan. The supervising manager now has time to concentrate on other
matters, such as identifying another need and planning its resolution
or supervising other operating programs.
6. Constant critical analysis and change. At this point, the planning
process has been completed from inception to realization. The
sequence may take as little as a few hours by a single individual
or as much as months of concentrated effort by a devoted mana-
gerial team. Such a team could include internal managers, con-
tract personnel, and independent consultants retained for the
project. However, although the program may be functional, the
process is never complete. Circumstances change constantly, often
in ways that could not have been anticipated even by the most
conscientious and rigorous planning process. Therefore, the man-
ager must refine the plan to fit the new circumstances, seizing
new opportunities for further gains in programmatic objectives
whenever possible.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN ORGANIZATIONS
Contemporary organizations of size and complexity must possess a perti-
nent structure to achieve operational success. Civilization is about 5,000
years old, but the industrial age arrived in Europe only in the 18th century,
arriving decades later in what would become the U.S. The demands of con-
stantly competing, expanding industrialization—coupled with expanding
urbanism—created pressures for greater effectiveness on organizations. This
process attracted the attention of seminal early observers who first described
evolving characteristics of the operational processes. These observations cre-
ated the basis for methodological observers who sought ways of improving
industrial output. Much later still, security practitioners emerged to protect
organizations in specific and distinctive ways.
The pivotal figures in this process may be divided into three catego-
ries: classical management theorists, scientific management proponents, and
some recent distinctive contributors to security management practices.
Classical Management Theorists
Industrialization flourished following principles of expediency and common
sense. In time, the processes of production came under analysis and improve-
ment. The first significant and comprehensive codification of management
principles was provided by a French mining engineer, Henri Fayol (1841–
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1925). He observed workplace processes, which he then categorized into log-
ical and distinct descriptives with broad applications and significance:
• Division of work. In an organization of any size, labor is divided
into specialized units to increase efficiency. Work within the orga-
nization tends to become increasingly specialized as the organiza-
tion grows in size.
• Hierarchy. Organizations disperse authority to managers and
employees according to their formal position, experience, and
training.
• Discipline. Good discipline exists when managers and workers
respect the rules governing activities of the organization.
• Unity of command. No individual normally should have more
than one supervisor. Work objectives concerning tasks should
relate rationally among supervisors and subordinates. (Fayol
derived this point from his observations of military structure.)
• Chain of command. Authority and communication should be
channeled from top to bottom in the organization. However, com-
munication should flow from bottom to top as well.
• Unity of direction. The tasks of an organization should be directed
toward definable and comprehensible goals under the leadership
of a competent manager.
• Subordination of interests. The goal of the organization should
take precedence over individual desires. When personal agendas
become paramount, the goals of the organization cannot be
achieved effectively.
• Remuneration. Pay and the total benefits package should be fair.
• Equity. Managers should be just and kind in dealing with subordi-
nates.
• Stability of tenure. Management should plan so that positions are
stable. Reduction of positions (downsizing; “rightsizing”) may be
necessary under times of market and production downturn, but
often the reduction of previously budgeted positions reflects the
failure to plan and execute wisely.
• Order. The workplace should be orderly.
• Initiative. Employees should be encouraged to show personal ini-
tiative when they have the opportunity to solve a problem.
• Teamwork. Managers should engender unity and harmony
among workers.
• Centralization. Power and authority are concentrated at the upper
levels of the organization. The advantages of centralization versus
decentralization are complex and may be regarded as a cyclical
phenomenon in management fashion; that is, despite a penchant
for centralization of organizational power, there may be times
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when production is best achieved by decentralization of planning
and much decision-making.
According to Fayol, all managerial activities can be divided into six
functions:
1. Technical (engineering, production, manufacture, adaptation)
2. Commercial (buying, selling, exchanging)
3. Financial (searching for an optimal use of capital)
4. Accounting (stock taking, balance sheets, cost analysis, statistical
control)
5. Managerial (goal-setting, analyzing and planning, organizing, depu-
tizing, supervising)
6. Security (protecting physical assets and personnel)
These six functions are always present, regardless of the complexity and
size of an organization. Thus, all organizational undertakings involve an inter-
linking of functions. Note that security is identified as one of these fundamen-
tal activities of general management. Fayol observed that the security function
“involves exposure identification, risk evaluation, risk control, and risk financ-
ing.”2 In a remarkably insightful observation for its time, he also added:
Quite frankly, the greatest danger to a firm lies in the loss of intellectual prop-
erty, a loss that the firm may attempt to prevent through patent protection,
trade-secret protection, signed agreements (nondisclosures) with key person-
nel, and access to its innermost secrets on a strictly “need to know” basis.
Fayol’s prescient views hold that security of know-how and opportunity
take precedence over physical assets, an opinion many contemporary secu-
rity practitioners readily agree with.
Fayol is regarded as a classical administrative theorist. Other pioneers
of his genre include Max Weber (1864–1920) and Chester Barnard (1886–
1961). Weber developed the term “bureaucracy,” which he described as the
most rational form of an organization.3 According to Weber, large-scale tasks
could be pursued by organizing human activity as follows:
1. Activities directed toward meeting organizational goals are constant
and officially assigned.
2. Activities are controlled through a hierarchical chain of authority.
3. A system of abstract rules ensures that all operations are treated
equally.
4. Bureaucratic officials remain emotionally uninvolved while fulfilling
their formal duties.
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Barnard, an executive for New Jersey Bell Telephone, emphasized that a
“cooperative system” generally is necessary for an organization to reach its
goals. In The Functions of the Executive, Barnard advanced a concept known
as acceptance theory, concluding that subordinates would assent to author-
ity from supervisors and managers when four conditions were met:
1. They could and did understand the communications they received.
2. They believed that the communication was consistent with the pur-
pose of the organization.
3. They believed that it was compatible with their own personal interest.
4. They were mentally and physically capable of complying with the
communication.4
Thus, Weber underscored the importance of managerial structures to
achieve desirable goals and Barnard espoused that the principle that defined
communications could result in acceptance of the desires of bureaucracies
by workers.
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT PROPONENTS
Exponents of scientific management seek to use data collection and analysis
to improve work performance. The costly and time-consuming efforts
required to save a few minutes or seconds might seem like a frivolous activ-
ity to some; however, improved techniques, when applied to a repetitive
process on a large scale, pay generous rewards over time by improving effi-
ciency. Furthermore, the same process of job analysis could offer improve-
ments in safety and work comfort.
Frederick W. Taylor (1856–1915) was a self-taught engineer who had
become chief engineer of a steel company by the age of 28. His impressive
early climb up the career ladder was related to his ability to study work sci-
entifically and then to apply the results directly. His contributions had enor-
mous influences on the workplace throughout the 20th century.5 Taylor’s
principles are summarized as follows:
1. Determine what’s important in a task. Managers must observe and
analyze each aspect of a task to determine the most economical way
to put that process into general operation. The use of time studies
helps to establish what works best.
Example: Federal Express couriers delivering or picking up
packages knock on a door before ringing the bell. Their studies have
revealed that customers respond faster to the knock-first-then-ring
sequence. Perhaps regular FedEx customers are conditioned to faster
response because they know who is at the door. Similarly, security
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officers responding to an incident can be more productive and thor-
ough by following a form that sequentially prompts them to collect
the essential facts about the event.
2. Select personnel scientifically. Taylor believed that all individuals
were not created equal. Training could help modify differences in
behavior and performance, but still some persons would be more
effective than others in performing the same tasks. It stands to rea-
son, therefore, that operations will be improved when managers
concentrate on selecting only those who show the best capacity to
perform the job required.
Example: An organization may determine that its security per-
sonnel must write clear, cogent reports of incidents. Therefore, a pre-
employment (vetting) test may be designed to ascertain how
saliently candidates for employment express themselves on paper.
3. Offer financial incentives. Selecting the right worker for the right
task does not by itself assure optimal effectiveness. Workers need
motivation, and hourly pay and benefits alone may not be sufficient
to achieve that goal. Taylor ascertained that providing a differential
piece-rate form of incentive can produce higher worker output than
what would ordinarily be expected.
Example: The manager of an investigative department pro-
vides incentive payments for those staff investigators who are able to
complete more investigations than the baseline expectation. Quality
control assures that such investigations meet or exceed expected
standards of quality for the assignments undertaken so that investi-
gators seeking to achieve additional payments may not sacrifice
standards to achieve higher benefits.
4. Employ functional foremanship. Taylor argued that responsibility
should be divided between managers and workers. Managers pri-
marily would plan, direct, and evaluate the work; the individual
worker was responsible for completing the designated tasks. This
permitted a worker to take orders from a functional foreman regard-
less of the stage of work because all manager-foremen would under-
stand the same work processes.
Example: Assume that a new security supervisor replaces
another normally responsible for a work unit. The goals of the work-
ers being supervised are identical. Since procedures to achieve these
objectives are understood by all workers, a new supervisor reason-
ably should be able to achieve the same objectives with the workers
as the regular supervisor would have.
Frank Gilbreth (1868–1924) and Lillian Gilbreth (1878–1972) were a
husband and wife team who translated Taylor’s scientific management
approach and applied it to specific tasks. Taylor often tried to identify means
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to help workers get their jobs done faster. The Gilbreths further sought to
increase the speed of attaining production objectives by eliminating useless
motions. They noted that efficient procedures also led to less fatigue and
chances of error by workers.6 Their research underscores the importance of
designing systems and tasks that support them carefully. As a result, errors
are less apt to occur or may be less frequent and serious after such analysis
than in systems that are not established with empirical methods.
Example: On March 28, 1979, at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, a near meltdown of a nuclear power facility almost occurred.
It resulted in a limited evacuation of the area. As a result of the fear gener-
ated by this emergency, the nuclear industry in the U.S. was stigmatized,
and additional construction of nuclear power facilities ceased. In subsequent
investigations, many factors explained why the nuclear accident at Three
Mile Island occurred. One significant issue was that critical gauges and con-
trols were not within the line of sight of engineers at the control consoles. An
investigation of the Three Mile Island facility by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission determined that an inadequate quality assurance program to
govern construction and monitor quality “resulted in the construction of a
facility of indeterminate quality.”7 Failure to design a facility properly may
explain why losses occur; conversely, good design system may be more
important than marginal differences in human competency in explaining the
achievement of desired effects.
SECURITY MANAGEMENT PRECEDENT SETTERS
The craft of operating security programs effectively is a recent one, when
judged by contemporary standards. The principal professional association
in the field, the American Society for Industrial Security-International, was
founded in 1955. The Security Industry Association began in 1967; the
National Council of Investigation and Security Services was organized in
1975; and the International Security Management Association began in 1976.
Surely, informal private security operations existed prior to the founding of
these groups, and thousands were employed in security positions in the
19th century and the first half of the 20th century. But only in the last half of
the 20th century did security emerge as a defined, usual, respectable, and
visible part of management. In the process, security operations have been
enhanced by the writings and practices of those who have directed success-
ful programs. In particular, four practitioners and researchers are among
those who have contributed notably to the conceptual and operational
framework of the discipline. They are Dennis R. Dalton, Richard D. Pater-
son, J. Kirk Barefoot, and Ronald V. Clarke.
In the last decade of the 20th century, the process of contracting-out
was an option increasingly elected by organizations employing security
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forces. That is, in-house (proprietary) guard or alarm monitoring services
were replaced by professional security contract workers. Dennis R. Dalton
evaluated and streamlined the process by which organizations could make
such a transition. In Security Management: Business Strategies for Success, Dal-
ton presents a strategy for outsourcing by creating a “strategic alliance” with
the service vendor.8 Outsourcing by for-profit businesses and privatization
of services by government have helped shape contemporary security ser-
vices. Dalton’s work helped make the process rational and efficient.
Investigations are an important option for organizations, both for exter-
nal and internal loss control and management purposes. Failure to institute a
fact-finding inquiry may result in unchecked losses or other vulnerabilities.
Richard D. Paterson and J. Kirk Barefoot removed the mystery of undercover
operations by establishing a school that trained students to be effective fact-
finders for internal and external deviance. The process encouraged managers,
in appropriate circumstances, to consider the regular use of undercover opera-
tions as an ethical, reasonable, and efficient means of detecting and deterring
crime victimization and the flouting of recognized performance standards.
Barefoot further detailed the process in Undercover Investigations.9
Although his research career largely has been rooted in studies aimed
at aspects of community crime mitigation and funded by various govern-
mental agencies, Ronald V. Clarke has contributed exceptionally to the
philosophical and research basis of private sector security practices. Clarke,
a professor at the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice, was an
early social science researcher who helped develop the field of situational
crime prevention. Other pioneers in this field include Paul and Patricia
Brantingham, L.E. Cohen, D.B. Cornish, and Marcus Felson. These research-
ers postulate that three separate factors are involved in determining whether
a criminal act will be successful or thwarted. These factors are a motivated
offender, a suitable reward or goal for the offender’s actions, and the
absence of appropriate controls that could check such action by the offender
(see Box 1.2). A fourth component, often mentioned, is the potential creation
of shame or image problems for a perpetrator.
By intervening with any one of these three primary factors—which is
often possible at low or no substantial cost—measurable crime should
decrease. Situational crime prevention does not envision situations in which
an environment will entirely be free of crime. Rather, it seeks to engineer prac-
tical measures that will permit a normal pattern of human and commercial
activity while reducing violent acts and property offenses to a tolerable level.
HOW ORGANIZATIONS ARE STRUCTURED
Fayol stated that a formal structure naturally evolves over time to achieve
efficiency. This view was new when it was first propounded. Yet organiza-
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tions have always used ranks, grades, classes, or other categorizations to
reflect significance and authority. While ranks and titles may change and
considerable variation may exist within characteristics of the organization,
the structures of modern corporations and institutions fit general patterns. A
review of the two major types of non-governmental organizations will illus-
trate where security management may be found.
For-Profit Corporations
Most corporations are established at the behest of private investors who seek a
return on their invested capital; that is, they are for-profit corporations. Such
Box 1.2. Situational Crime Prevention: Key Elements, Possible Controls,
or Mitigating Factors
Key Elements Possible Controls or Mitigating Factors
A motivated offender • Deny access to sensitive areas
• Warn of punishment for illegal behavior
• Prosecute apprehended offenders
A suitable reward or goal • Decrease available assets that might be
stolen from a potential victimization site
• Render vulnerable assets less attractive
to thieves or alter behavior of potential
victims so that they might be less likely
to be victimized.
• Make vulnerable assets impossible for
thieves or other offenders to benefit from.
Absence of appropriate control • Assign security officers (“place mind-
ers”) to protect a location or increase
their numbers.
• Install or upgrade a security system.
• Educate non-security employees and
others to participate willingly in loss pre-
vention strategies.
Note: Situational crime prevention posits that all three elements may
be assessed to determine the crime vulnerability of a location or situation. A
fourth element sometimes mentioned relates to image-risk to the perpetrator
by shame or embarrassment. By changing any one element, the possibilities
of increasing or decreasing violent or property crime change.
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corporations are considered perpetual entities performing the activities
described in their charters. Corporations issue common stock to investors,
who hope to generate a profit (through dividends and growth of value) from
the capital they put at risk.
Individuals or institutions who purchase common stock are termed the
corporation’s shareholders or stakeholders. These shareholders own the cor-
poration, and their degree of ownership (equity) depends on the number of
shares they own relative to the total number of shares authorized to be out-
standing in the organization. Large corporations with thousands of share-
holders are not democratic organizations. They are in no position to hear
from all shareholders individually on corporate matters, and modern share-
holders expect to have no voice in routine operations or planning. However,
shareholders are not without representation. The board of directors legally
represents total ownership—that is, the shareholders of common stock. Fig-
ure 1.1 shows a corporate organizational chart showing related security
functions. In publicly held corporations, in which shares are traded on pub-
lic stock exchanges, investors exercise their factual ownership by casting
votes for directors annually and approving any major changes in the financ-
ing, structure, and governance of the entity. A chairman or chairwoman of
the board heads the board of directors. This person may also hold other
executive duties within the corporation or has held such responsibilities in
the past.
The board may be composed of two classes of directors. One category
is inside directors, who are currently employed by the corporation. This will
include the chief executive officer (CEO) (who may also hold other titles).
The CEO’s role is self-evident: he or she is the person most concerned with
executive responsibilities, being in charge of all planning, growth, and oper-
ations. Usually immediately subordinate to the CEO is the chief operating
officer (COO), who is the main officer concerned with managing day-to-day
operations and who reports to the CEO. Formerly, the title of president was
equivalent to CEO, but that is no longer the case in most large, complex
organizations. The board may also include one or more vice presidents
(sometimes titles of executive or senior vice president are used). These vice
presidents may be responsible for a variety of corporate tasks, including
financing, manufacturing and production, marketing, legal affairs, and
research and development. Other functions can include information (data
operations), human resources, and international operations. Most vice presi-
dents will not be members of the board. They often are referred to in large
corporations as senior staff officers. They constitute the executive cadre in
large for-profit businesses and variously have responsibility for finance,
human resources, research and development, legal affairs, and information
systems.
Other staff officers may be included as board members, depending on
the nature of the corporation. Outside directors also may be included as
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Figure 1.1. Corporate Organizational Chart Showing Related Security
Functions
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board members. Although they are not employees of the corporation, they
do possess skills and experience believed to be valuable in directing the stra-
tegic affairs of the corporation. Sometimes, an outside director represents, or
is personally, a major shareholder, or such a director may own or represent
significant debt obligations of the corporation. Other outside directors may
be executives of other non-competing corporations. They may thus be
enlisted for board membership because of the experience they may offer to
business decision-making. Still other outside directors may be academics,
public figures, or diverse leaders with insight and professional connections
that can aid board decision-making.
Boards meet with the frequency set in the bylaws of the corporation. In
addition to full board meetings, members often serve on committees, which
conduct deliberations on specific issues and make recommendations to the
whole board. Typically, the board committees include executive (daily opera-
tions), public affairs, executive compensation, and audit committees. In large,
publicly held corporations, executive compensation and audit committees
usually are composed exclusively of outside directors. This particular com-
position of the board committees enables fiscal or ethical irregularities at the
senior level to reach independent fact-finders for evaluations.
The audit committee receives prepared financial reports from the inde-
pendent auditor, an external firm of accountants which audits financial
records of the institution and reports on their soundness to the board. While
serving the interests of the shareholders and corporate operations, the audit
report also meets reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. From the security standpoint, should dishonesty or ethical
deviance be occurring by a senior staff officer or officers, a whistle-blower—
defined as an employee who reports illegal activities of his or her employer
or fellow employees to outside authorities—can contact the independent
auditors, who would have a legal duty to evaluate the charge. Often, whis-
tle-blowers have already condemned the illegal activities inside their organi-
zation, but to no avail. Thus they turn to outside authorities as a last resort.
In other cases, the whistle-blower may be motivated to reveal information
for personal or financial reasons.
The highest ranking executive concerned with security may interact
with the board and senior corporate officers in several ways, one of which is
shown in Figure 1.2. In some organizations, security directors present peri-
odic reports to the board on significant protection issues and their implica-
tions for the organization. Additionally, the security director is likely to
supervise executive protection measures, if relevant, and efforts to safe-
guard proprietary information at the board level, as well as elsewhere in the
organization. Finally, security may be involved in specific investigations at
the request of the board or in cooperation with the auditors or other senior
corporate officials.
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Figure 1.2. Possible Reporting Structure for a Security Director in a Large
For-Profit Corporation
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The organizational chart of a large for-profit corporation reflects the
relationship among the corporate staff at headquarters. It may be described
as hierarchical and somewhat like a pyramid, as suggested by Fayol’s earlier
observations. The trend in recent decades has been to shrink the headcount
at headquarters. The senior executive cadre in such organizations sets policy
and objectives and often provides internal consulting.
Daily operations management is less frequently found at headquarters.
Large and diversified corporations may replicate the headquarters hierarchy
with various operating units possessing a similar pyramidal management
structure to the parent corporation. An example of such a hierarchy is shown
in Figure 1.3. These subordinate corporations or companies are called oper-
ating units. The operating units function independently of headquarters to
achieve their goals, though headquarters may retain a planning, monitoring,
and consulting role. Thus, a diversified corporation may have a board, a
CEO, a COO, and other senior staff officers at headquarters, but also numer-
Figure 1.3. How Corporate Staff Relates to Operating Units
Source: T. Moore (December 21, 1987). “Managing: Goodbye, Corporate Staff,” Fortune, p. 65.
Operating Units
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ous operating companies within the structure, all of which may replicate the
hierarchical structure at the staff level. This structure of a small headquarters
senior staff followed by member operating units with varying degrees of
independence from staff operations constitutes the usual situation currently
encountered in large for-profit entities.
Not-for-Profit Corporations
For-profit corporations generally are what the public thinks of when reflect-
ing on the nature of corporate structure. Many organizations do not have as
their goal the necessity of returning dividends and increased value to their
shareholders. These are not-for-profit (NFP) organizations. They include
educational, healthcare, and research institutions, as well as charities and
professional associations. NFPs possess much of the same hierarchical and
reporting structure as for-profit organizations. However, titles may differ;
instead of a president or CEO, the leader might be called a director or
administrator. The board of directors may be equivalent to a board of trust-
ees, governors, or supervisors. No shareholders exist because the board rep-
resents the public at large, which the non-profit corporation is chartered to
serve through its endeavors.
Many NFP groups are large, diversified, well known to the public, and
operate with the same reporting structures and operating practices as for-
profit businesses. While profit is not the motive for NFPs, the accumulation
of losses is not an objective either. In reality, NFPs face most of the same
kinds of management issues common to for-profit organizations. Therefore,
a director of security possesses analogous responsibilities and creates simi-
lar types of programs in NFPs as in for-profit entities.
GOVERNMENT SECURITY OPERATIONS
Government has an obligation to the public to operate effectively. This
includes reducing losses, waste, error, and risks to the lowest practicable
level. Depending on the size and complexity of such units, government may
achieve its goals with a variety of resources. They may include law enforce-
ment personnel delegated to internal protective functions or independent
police or security units. Also, many large government units possess inspec-
tors-general to investigate internal allegations of improper behavior.
LAYERS OF MANAGEMENT
The management structure of large organizations appears on paper like a
pyramid. This reflects the hierarchical structure of the organization. For
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operations to operate efficiently, management often is divided into several
categories: senior management (includes the staff officers most concerned
with strategy, planning, and consolidation of results from subordinate units);
middle management (includes numerous support roles with more restricted
planning and strategizing, while operational tasks are greater); and first-line
management (includes those most concerned with the daily work product of
the organization and who have diminished planning activities).
SECURITY IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY
In a large, diversified organization, the highest officer concerned with pro-
tection of assets from loss may have the title vice president. He or she is usu-
ally categorized as working within middle management. The security vice
president reports directly to a senior officer, who may differ by title accord-
ing to the type of industry involved. For example, in research-oriented busi-
nesses, the security chief often reports to the chief internal counsel; in
manufacturing firms, reporting tends to be with the function concerned with
operations or production; in service businesses, reporting generally occurs
to the director of human resources. These reporting relationships are vari-
able and other reporting structures are common.
While the top corporate security director usually is classified in middle
management, this categorization should not be regarded as inconsequential
or unimportant. Security directors frequently provide reports to the board of
directors and may routinely interact with all senior officers of the corpora-
tion in providing pertinent services.
STRUCTURE OF A COMPLEX SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Security or loss prevention departments can possess considerable variation.
Further, the structure of such departments is likely to change over time. For
example, if security officer services are contracted-out, supervision of the
contract is still required, though the total number of proprietary employees
required will be reduced considerably by the out-contracting process. A typ-
ical security department is apt to oversee propriety personnel, contract staff,
and internal consulting services, as shown in Figure 1.4.
A security department may incorporate considerable breadth and
diversification in its resources and duties. It reflects the guarding, alarm
monitoring, and asset moving and protection found in most organizations,
as shown in Table 1.1. Additionally, it reflects the internal consulting, risk
management, data protection, investigation, and human resources tasks
often performed by security departments. Security operations also audit
programs to determine how loss prevention efforts can be improved.
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Figure 1.4. Work Relationships of a Security Program
Table 1.1. Types of Services Potentially Offered by Large, Complex Secu-
rity Programs
(continues)
Services Frequency
Alarm Monitoring High
Computer Security High
Competitive Intelligence Low
Emergency Planning Moderate/High
Executive Protection Moderate
Facilities Management Moderate
Guarding—Propriety or Contract High
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Related to this function is risk management, which is concerned primarily
with property, casualty, and liability insurance of an organization. In this
case, as risks are reduced, the organization may benefit from lower insur-
ance premiums, fewer restrictions, and benefits in coverage achieved
through improved security operations.
ETHICS AND SECURITY OPERATIONS
Ethics relates to moral actions, conduct, motive, and character. It is profes-
sionally the right or befitting action within its context. While a criminal act
generally is also a breach of moral conduct, ethics includes numerous behav-
iors that fall short of breaching criminal or civil laws. The widely heard cli-
ché is that “ethics start at the top” in any organization. As Ira Somerson, an
industry consultant, noted: “When busy CEOs take time to discuss ethical
issues in their work, the message soon filters down.”10
Seminal research on workplace deviancy was conducted by academics
John P. Clark and Richard C. Hollinger.11 Over 9,500 employees at all levels
were queried in three geographical areas, representing numerous types of
public and private workplaces. Results from the Clark-Hollinger study
show that the level of self-reporting workplace deviance differs widely and
generally is not related to income. Surely not all protection employees are
above reproach ethically. Yet security personnel were assessed in all employ-
ment segments and ranked among the highest in ethical standards. This
finding may be due to the fact that security personnel tend to be selected for
having higher ethical behavior. Another explanation could be that security
Table 1.1. (Continued)
Services Frequency
High Security Courier Low/Moderate
Investigations High
Loss Prevention Consulting Moderate
Polygraph Low
Regulatory Compliance Low/Moderate
Pre-Employment Screening High
Risk Management Low/Moderate
Safety Audits Low/Moderate
Security Training, Awareness High
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practitioners have less opportunity for workplace deviance due to the
nature of their job design.
In many organizations, operational security personnel are regarded as
ethical arbiters, or are normally part of the facility’s ethical resources. At
such organizations, managers are likely to be involved in setting, promot-
ing, and managing ethical programs. They may:
• Draft a corporate ethics policy and disseminate it broadly.
• Emphasize the importance of ethical standards at new employee
orientations.
• Provide new employees with a workplace ethics statement they
may sign.
• Establish mechanisms whereby someone with an ethical concern
may be heard confidentially and non-judgmentally.
• Investigate promptly and thoroughly all allegations of unethical
behavior and refer the results of such efforts to appropriate author-
ities.
The motivation for the growing emphasis on ethics has many bases.
Some executives claim that ethical behavior is morally proper and that is why
they believe in it. Others would agree and discreetly add that voluntary ethical
standards decrease public censure and chances of unwelcome litigation and
legislation. But more than this is at stake. Perhaps the biggest factor behind the
wave of ethical enlightenment is that such behavior is good business. Put dif-
ferently, if only one part of an organization is perceived as being unethical, the
entire organization can be tainted and potentially devastated in the process.
The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) promulgates a
Code of Ethics (see Appendix A). Violators who come to the attention of the
ASIS Ethical Standards Committee are given the opportunity to explain
their perceived misconduct. Expulsion from ASIS is one of the consequences
for those persons who deviate from the code and whose cases are consid-
ered by the Ethical Standards Committee and found in violation of estab-
lished practices.
Other professional and trade organizations concerned with loss preven-
tion also possess codes of ethics and good conduct. Some of these are the
Academy of Security Educators and Trainers, the Business Espionage Con-
trols and Countermeasures Association, the International Association for
Healthcare Security and Safety, the National Burglar and Fire Alarm Associa-
tion, and the National Council of Investigation and Security Services. This list
is not meant to be comprehensive. The point is that security practitioners
generally take ethics as a serious, profound reflection of their responsibilities
to their colleagues, employees, and clients—and to society as a whole. Such
ethical structures usually permit censure, suspension, and expulsion as possi-
ble sanctions for errant members. Normally, the person accused of unethical
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behavior has an opportunity to respond to the charges at a specially con-
vened board to hear charges and responses. The appointed group then col-
lects the facts in the situation, arrives at a conclusion, and may report its
findings to the full group for a final consideration.
SUMMARY
Organizational concerns of corporations only became the object of research
in the late 20th century. Security operation as a discipline is thus less than
two generations old. Successful security operations are critical to the growth
and stability of organizations of any size and complexity. While usually a
part of middle management, security operations are concerned with perfor-
mance throughout the entire organization. The functions of the executive
charged with security operations are diverse and subject to change accord-
ing to the primary operation of the organization. The ethical nature of the
chief executive often influences the behavior of subordinate employees and
others concerned with the operation. Security practitioners generally are
viewed as exponents of an organization’s ethical policy and program and
frequently are involved in establishing and managing such a policy.
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW
1. What is the essence of “the art” of contemporary security practice?
2. When did the era of modern management emerge? When did protec-
tion management appear as a distinct managerial function?
3. Briefly describe the purpose of an executive within contemporary
organizations.
4. The managerial process involves a sequence of interrelated activities.
What are they and why does each have significance?
5. What are the similarities on Henri Fayol’s categorizations of the
workplace and a typical operation today? How are Fayol’s descrip-
tives similar to contemporary organizational structure and activity?
What differences exist between his observations and the present
place of work?
6. What were the contributions of scientific management to the contem-
porary workplace?
7. How does “outsourcing” affect current security practices?
8. Describe the connections between situational crime prevention and
research applications for loss problems or concerns.
9. Explain how the structure of the organization permits recourse to
investigate and respond to allegations of improper behavior, even at
the highest level.
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10. Describe the role of security managers in establishing policies and
maintaining standards in ethical issues within the workplace.
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CORE COMPETENCIES TO 
INITIATE EFFECTIVE 
PROTECTION PROGRAMS 
Private security is more than twice the size of
federal, state, and local law enforcement com-
bined.
—The Hallcrest Report II 
Security activities for an organization are often centered within a depart-
ment concerned with delivering value to the organization through services.
As the previous chapter indicated, much flux occurs in the nature of organi-
zations themselves and within various departments providing such ser-
vices. Still, some generalizations can be made that will be appropriate for
various types of managerial situations. This chapter will examine the means
whereby organizations with dedicated security departments are organized
to serve the entire operation. The chapter further looks at the relationship
between organizations that contract-out for routine security services. We
begin by examining core competencies of security operations. 
CORE COMPETENCIES OF SECURITY OPERATIONS 
Core competencies refer to the fundamental abilities a protective program
needs in order for it to deliver services. These needs will vary according to
the type of organization, its size and geography, recent history, criticality of
resources, vulnerability to losses, and other factors. No single executive is
expected to be competent in all demands required of the position, but the list
below serves as a means of generating thought as to what a protective oper-
ation’s value to the organization is or should be. This list is dynamic and
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reflects the changing nature of the requirements of security programs and of
the expectations of people heading them. 
Initiating and managing security programs. As discussed in the previous
chapter, problems and opportunities require a response by appropriate pro-
grams. The identification of these situations, their analysis after fact-finding,
the organizing of an appropriate program, the appointing of a deputy to
operate the new program, and its supervision and constant improvement
are reasonable expectations of a high-performing operations professional.
Three skills are mentioned first in terms of core competencies: 
1. Initiating new programs. This was discussed in the previous
chapter. 
2. Operating existing programs. The ability to initiate a successful
program is a strategic skill, whereas the operation of existing pro-
grams is less challenging. Nonetheless, this is the basis of most
daily work and includes opportunities for creativity and constant
program improvement, much like what occurs in the initiating of
such activities. Another core skill is the ability to collect informa-
tion that is critical to the operation and assess the success of ongo-
ing programs (see Box 2.1). The manager or director for such
operations is expected to manage the budget for these activities
(see Chapter 8).
Box 2.1. Collecting and Measuring What’s Important 
Once goals are set, data are needed to evaluate how successfully aims are
being reached. Relevant data collection can also point to other issues that
require more attention than was initially apparent. The use of computer pro-
grams helps make the capture of incidents and services easier than the pre-
vious manual form of collecting inputs. Analysis also is improved. This is
partially why security operations have improved over the years. At a mini-
mum, incidents must be collected so that they can be measured for any rele-
vant trend. At the maximum, all service events performed by the security
operation may be collected and measured for the same reason. The follow-
ing is the information collected to assess significant programmatic develop-
ments.
Number of crime incidents, including: 
• Robbery 
• Aggravated assault 
• Other assault 
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3. Handling personnel administration. The recruiting, screening, hir-
ing, training, supervising, promoting, disciplining, terminating, and
conducting of other personnel-related activities are expectations of
high-performance security operations (see Chapters 3 through 7). 
Box 2.1. (Continued)
• Burglary 
• Felony-theft 
• Motor vehicle theft 
• Forgery and counterfeiting 
• Fraud and embezzlement 
• Vandalism 
• Trespassing 
• Other 
Number of non-criminal emergencies, including: 
• Accidents (within the facility) 
• Accidents (automotive) 
• Accidents (other) 
• Computer service response 
• Dangerous behavior 
• Fire and smoke conditions 
• False alarms 
• Loss of utilities 
• Malfunctions of critical equipment 
• Water and flood damage 
• Wind damage 
• Other 
Number of service activities, including: 
• Complaints and miscellaneous 
• Employee records checks 
• Escort service 
• Executive protection 
• Investigations (internal) 
• Investigation (external) 
• Key runs 
• Lock or key service 
• Lost and found 
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Initiating new programs, operating existing ones, and dealing with per-
sonnel issues are expectations of all managers, not just those concerned with
assets protection. However, some tasks are specific to loss prevention staff: 
• Contract services management. Since an increasing portion of
security services are provided by contract personnel, operations
must be able to select, motivate, supervise, and discipline contract
vendors and their personnel so that goals are met (see Chapter 9).
Such investigations may be contracted to investigators or consult-
ants, but the manager in charge of the program is likely to monitor
the assignment to assure that objectives are pursued diligently. 
• Assess security technology. Security practitioners are not
expected to be engineers. However, they are required to be familiar
with current technologies to serve the protective objectives of the
organization. They should further be able to procure such technol-
ogy and services under favorable terms for management (see
Chapter 10). 
• Other expectations. As indicated above, security programs have
considerable variations in their operational goals. Therefore, some
organizations will have such core competency objectives as execu-
tive protection, international affairs, risk management, competitive
intelligence, data security, emergency planning and response, and
other topics. 
Some general personal characteristics are also critical for all high-per-
formance executives: 
• Communications. Security leaders and their programs obtain and
retain support by successfully serving various “customer bases”
(management, employees, visitors). Those responsible for security
programs constantly must enunciate through in-house educational
efforts and other means what security does and why it is relevant,
without being repetitious and boring. 
• Leadership. Security programs often require various groups to
take—or not take—actions against their will. Personal leadership
by persons responsible for the program helps retain the credibility
and support such programs require (see Chapter 11). 
HOW CONTEMPORARY SECURITY SERVICES HAVE 
EVOLVED
Many state governments have used licensed security guard companies and
investigators for decades. But by the late 1960s, no independent research of
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the growing security industry had taken place. That was soon to change. In
1970, contemporary security practices in the U.S. were described and evalu-
ated by the scathing and influential Rand Report. This document represented
the first time the burgeoning security industry received a systematic analy-
sis from a disinterested research group. With a grant from the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA), the Rand Corporation began, in
1970, a 16-month investigation of “private police” in the U.S. The authors,
James S. Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn, were lawyers trained as policy ana-
lysts and employed by Rand in Santa Monica, California, to assess private
security personnel as they affected public policy. 
For starters, the Rand Report impugned correctly the level of employ-
ment standards then common for private security personnel. The authors
observed:
The typical security guard is an aging white male, poorly educated, usually
untrained, and very poorly paid. Depending on where in the country he
works, what type of employer he works for (contract guard agency, in-house
firm, or government), and similar factors, he averages between 40 and 55 years
of age, has had little education beyond the ninth grade, and has had a few
years of experience in private security. . . . He often receives few fringe benefits;
at best, fringe benefits may amount to 10 percent of wages. But since the turn-
over rate is high in contract agencies, many employees never work the 6
months or 1 year required to become eligible for certain of these benefits.1
The Rand Report continued with its litany of harsh observations of pri-
vate security practices: weak pre-employment screening, high turnover in the
industry, and a lack of meaningful licensing standards. That depiction has
not changed much in the opinions of many contemporary critics, but such
views tend to be unanalytical and episodic. Much evidence indicates that
security practices have improved, though the persistence of numerous sub-
standard protection service providers and programs remains a reality. In the
decades following publication of the five-volume Rand Report, considerable
advancement in the industry occurred, though at a measured, slow rate. 
The next significant official scrutiny of private security services also
emanated from LEAA funding. In 1972, LEAA created the National Advisory
Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. This group undertook a
number of detailed, analytical reviews of various issues connected with crimi-
nal justice. One was the Private Security Task Force (PSTF). Following a series
of discussions and inquiries stretching over 18 months, the PSTF issued its
comprehensive report in 19762 (see Appendix B). The PSTF was composed of
a variety of individuals, including law enforcement officials, corporate secu-
rity directors, and an executive of a major security services company. The
report identified almost 80 goals and standards for private security. The list
encompassed such areas as licensing, regulations, consumer services, person-
nel training, crime prevention systems, and conduct and ethics. The Report of
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the Private Security Task Force was not intended as an impetus to achieve fed-
eral legislation to regulate aspects of the security industry; rather, its intention
was to identify significant issues that would stimulate local and state laws and
codes to be passed or strengthened. Also, it would serve as an industry guide
to improvement in procedures. 
These two documents—from Rand and the PSTF—served to inform
legislators, regulators, general management, the security industry, the
media, and the public at large about issues relating to private security. In
some ways, changes have occurred in almost all aspects of security services
delivery; in other aspects, change has been barely discernable. Yet the indus-
try and the performance of security services—both proprietary and con-
tract—have experienced steady growth from a period beginning at least
since the end of World War II to the present. Why? Several reasons exist for
the growth of private security. Senior executives do not accept their subordi-
nates’ recommendations for increased security expenditures—or any other
kinds of financial allocation—without due justification. Such asset alloca-
tions are generally predicated upon defined needs that the organization has
identified and that, therefore, make the existence of security expenditures an
informed imperative, rather than a capricious decision. 
WHAT DRIVES SECURITY OPERATIONS? 
Security operations normally do not exist within an organization for a single
reason. Typically, numerous factors interweave to justify commitments to
fund security operations. These will vary in significance according to a wide
variety of factors relating to the degree of risk appetite, demand for internal
services, and the value of assets to be protected in the workplace. Here are
the leading factors that underpin the reason for being and growth of con-
temporary security programs and that drive their growth and vitality: 
• Cost savings. An operating security program may reduce losses to
an organization that will in turn offset the apparent cost of the
security services. For example, employees may be unwilling to
work certain shifts because they feel unsafe. Their replacement
could be costly. The presence of a security patrol could make the
perilous shift a possibility. 
• Risk mitigation. Security is a fundamental necessity for corporate
endurance and success. Lack of adequate protection could lead to
devastating results. Security programs identify weaknesses and
seek to reduce risk (see Box 2.2).*  
* The goal of security management programs generally is not to reduce risks as low as possible. 
That would be excessively burdensome and costly. Rather, it is to reduce risks to an acceptable 
or practicable level. 
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Box 2.2. A Case of Inadequate Security: The Demise of Pan Am World
Airways
The advertisement proclaimed: “Pan Am Makes the Going Great!” Pan Am
World Airways was the first transatlantic carrier to provide regularly sched-
uled flights. For most of the 20th century, Pan Am possessed its own distinc-
tive cachet. Pilots, flight attendants, ground crew, and passengers were
attracted to the carrier for its élan and quality services, and the airline pros-
pered. In fact, one of the major mid-town skyscrapers constructed in Man-
hattan in 1960s was named for the airline (now the MetLife building). 
In the late 1960s, airlines became aware of their vulnerabilities to
breaches of security. Numerous planes were skyjacked, and pre-board
screening became a routine requirement. The impetus for international air
carriers to improve security had become a priority. Almost all international
air carriers saw their business decline as a result of travelers’ fears of sky-
jacking.
Most airlines developed security programs to provide for their own
needs. For some, attractiveness to contract-out protective services to other
airlines became enticing. One of these was Pan Am, which created, in 1986, a
wholly owned subsidiary, Alert Management Systems, Inc., to provide ser-
vices to Pan Am and other customers. It was financed, in part, by a sur-
charge of $5 per ticket on each transatlantic flight. 
Pan Am’s Alert Management Systems was presumably a high-visibil-
ity service provider and revenue generator for the parent company. Yet the
security “was more for show than genuine security,” according to Steven
Emerson and Brian Duffy, authors of The Fall of Pan Am 103. When Alert
Management Systems began operations at New York’s J.F. Kennedy Airport,
for example, Alert personnel paraded dogs throughout Pan Am’s check-in
counters. However, according to Alert’s first president, Fred Ford, they were
not dogs trained to sniff for bombs; they were merely “well-behaved Ger-
man shepherds.” 
Pan Am retained the services of a security consultancy, Ktalav Promo-
tion and Investment Ltd. (KPI), to critique its performance and to review
operations at Frankfurt and 24 other airports. Isaac Yeffet, a former security
chief for El Al Airlines, then with KPI, wrote to the airline that: “Pan Am is
highly vulnerable to most forms of terrorist attack,” despite the existence of
Alert Management, and that “a bomb would have a good chance of getting
through security” at the Frankfurt Airport. Yeffet concluded: “It appears,
therefore, that Pan Am is almost totally vulnerable to a mid-air explosion
through explosive charges concealed in the cargo.” But Yeffet’s report and
Ford’s request for more resources for Alert Management were ignored by
Pan Am’s senior management. The price of inadequate security would be
xxxx
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• Income generation. A security program is often thought by man-
agers not involved with protection to be a “cost” to the operation,
not a source of “profit.” However, in some circumstances, security
departments perform services that can generate income for the
organization. For example, some organizations provide their own
security services to other businesses or institutions and charge for
them accordingly. Hence, they can become a profit center for the
parent organization (see Box 2.3).  
Box 2.2. (Continued)
high. On December 21, 1989, Pan Am flight 103, a Boeing 747 jet, was blown
apart over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people aboard and an addi-
tional 11 on the ground. 
Pan Am’s decline as a viable business did not begin with Lockerbie,
but instead started in 1973 when the Arab oil embargo pushed up fuel prices
at the same time as a sharp recession began. From then through the 1980s,
Pan Am lost over $2 billion and only survived by selling its Pacific routes to
United Airlines in 1986. But Lockerbie substantially sealed the fate of Pan
Am. By 1994, the airline was bankrupt. A jury held that Pan Am and its Alert
Management Systems, because of the numerous security deficiencies, were
guilty of “willful misconduct” in permitting a security breach that allowed a
bomb to be placed aboard the craft. 
Sources: S. Emerson and B. Duffy, The Fall of Pan Am 103, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1990; 
R. Stuart, “Pan Am Ads Touting Security Plan Stir a Debate,” New York Times, June 10, 1986; 
John Greenwald, “Fallen Emperors of the Air,” Time, January 7, 1991, p. 71; and R. Sullivan, 
“Court Upholds Pan Am 103 Awards,” New York Times, February 1, 1994, p. D2. 
Box 2.3. Making Security a Profit Center 
Profit centers are workplace activities that bring rewards from income
derived by the enterprise from an unrelated entity. 
Profit centers provide security services to non-competitive businesses
for fees. Such activities include guarding, investigations, alarm monitoring,
computer back-up services, and consulting. The process can be profitable for
the service provider. The customer or client derives benefits from resources
with demonstrable performance characteristics and ongoing management
attention. Not all security operations can or should possess profit centers,
but for some, opportunities exist and may be pursued. 
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• Crime. Violent and property crime that could occur within or near
a facility or property can be deterred by the presence of security
personnel, the installation and functioning of an alarm system, and
good security design. This is supported by research derived from
situational crime prevention studies, which confirms that pertinent
measures may reduce losses from crime and other risks. 
• Fear. The presence of trained security personnel and state-of-the-
art systems make employees, vendors, and visitors feel safer at the
workplace. For example, the availability of a parking lot security
patrol may reduce trepidation while it lowers actual risk. In this
sense, security provides a desirable service to those who use the
parking lot. 
• Litigation. The failure to have an adequate security program may
leave the owner and operator of a facility vulnerable to a success-
ful tort action for negligent security in the event that a crime or
related loss occurs. The defense burden is greater if the facility has
a weaker protective program than do comparable operations
within the region. The existence of a security program by itself,
however, does not protect the facility from successful litigation in
the event an actionable offense for negligence takes place. 
• Insurance. Organizations often are required to provide security
services and systems for themselves because their property and
casualty liability insurance coverage— or other specific insurance
policies—mandate certain minimum protective measures. 
• Legal mandates. In some cases, specific litigation directly requires
the presence of security operations. For example, financial institu-
tions face general obligations to maintain a security program sub-
sequent to the Bank Security Act of 1968 and as subsequently
changed.
• Bureaucratic requirements. Numerous governmental agencies
create regulations that mandate the existence of security programs.
Usually, these are the outgrowth of federal laws that contain broad
language and leave the specifics to be developed by a designated
federal agency. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration
requires airport managers and airlines to institute a variety of pro-
tective measures, including pre-board screening of airline passen-
gers and personnel. These regulations were the result of the
passage of a measure to protect the air-traveling public. 
• Accreditation requirements. Institutions that meet the general
standards of their appropriate accreditation body sometimes also
face the specific demands of security measures from such an
accrediting association. For example, the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) promotes
high-quality patient care through a voluntary process of accredita-
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tion, encompassing thousands of healthcare organizations. JCAHO
has no specific security standards at present; however, in practice,
the desirability of an appropriate security program is expressed
through the “Plant, Technology, and Safety Management” section
of the JCAHO 2000 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for Hospi-
tals, which requires a safe environment for institutions desiring to
meet the criteria of JCAHO. 
Clearly, the need for security programs and services in commerce and
institutions is not derived from a single requirement, but rather from a com-
bination of factors. The individual reasons for having a particular level of
security are affected by geography, time, financing, available personnel,
legal precedents pending legislation and litigation, and other consider-
ations. Ultimately, security programs exist due to the conviction that any
vulnerability eventually will lead to unfavorable consequences. This
explains why security services continue to grow. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF A GROWING FIELD 
Security has always been important for the protection of people and prop-
erty. However, the security industry emerged as a modern business activity
within the U.S. in the second half of the 19th century.3 During this period,
investigations, guarding, executive protection, consulting services, alarm
monitoring and response, and armored courier services all had their origins.
By the mid-20th century, corporations themselves had established propri-
etary security programs that initially were concerned with loss prevention
and order maintenance. Managers for these programs in industrial applica-
tions often reported to engineering, maintenance, and general administra-
tive or operational units. 
The era of security as a modern management function did not arrive
until the second half of the 20th century. At the end of the 1950s, a resurgent
economy and the implications of Cold War protectionism vastly increased the
importance of security as an organized business practice. Industry was serv-
ing the needs of military preparedness and expanding commercial inventive-
ness: both required adequate security measures, though of differing sorts.
Such diverse interests in proprietary security were met, in 1955, with the
founding of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS). Full members
were employed usually as loss prevention directors serving for-profit and
institutional organizations. Typically, they would be concerned about physical
security, emergency response planning and coordination, and internal investi-
gations. Members who worked for industrial corporations that provided
products, systems, services, and research for government, especially the mili-
tary, monitored extensive compliance requirements to protect information and
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production know-how from possible compromise. ASIS members in those
years included many retired military officers. Membership also consisted of
retired police officers, special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and other law enforcement organizations, and persons who became responsi-
ble for security without having had any previous formal preparation in the
military or law enforcement. 
Security directors in these organizations often were responsible for
identifying and assigning security classification to information and materi-
als requiring protection in the national interest.4 With the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, the military threat between the superpowers in the East and
West diminished rapidly. The need for protection of intellectual property
and of physical developments related to military requirements declined, but
did not disappear. Meanwhile, other security priorities and duties emerged. 
While the modern origins of professional security are related to mili-
tary and industrial concerns, protection was needed in other organizations
where theft, vandalism, and employee safety were issues. Retailing, distri-
bution, general manufacturing, and many types of service businesses—
especially banking—added security services at the place of work. Most secu-
rity programs in the 1950s and 1960s concentrated on anti-theft and informa-
tion protection measures. But by the late 1970s, numerous security programs
began to absorb other management and administrative duties, including
safety. In the 1990s, data security, emergency planning, and organizational
ethical concerns became significant management issues. 
Today, the security industry is not one entity but a series of commercial
activities that overlap each other. These activities include services such as
guarding, investigations, alarm monitoring, escorting, and consulting; elec-
tronics (including companies that manufacture, distribute, and add value to
systems); and hardware (encompassing non-electronic, high-quality prod-
ucts and materials that serve above-standard protective needs). These ser-
vices and products compose thousands of independent entities. 
Laws That Influenced Growth 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 (29 USC 651 et seq.)
was passed to develop and promulgate occupational safety and health stan-
dards. It required and established a bureaucracy to develop and issue regu-
lations, conduct investigations and inspections to determine the status of
compliance with safety and health standards and regulations, and issue cita-
tions and propose penalties for noncompliance with safety and health stan-
dards and regulations.5 Many security directors also serve as OSHA
compliance officers at their workplaces. 
Other specific laws calling for increased commercial security measures
were passed. Notable among these was the Bank Security Act of 1968.6 This
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law was passed because bank crimes had grown steadily during the decade.
The increased incidence of bank robberies, burglaries, and extortions
prompted Congress to require all federally chartered banking institutions to
undertake specific security measures to reduce the risk of successful crimi-
nal acts. In retrospect, the measure in itself did not reduce the growing pat-
tern of violent and property crimes against financial institutions covered by
the Act: in fact, they kept increasing for years after passage of the law.7 This
Act was significantly modified years later to make requirements more reflec-
tive of changing circumstances. For example, the original law of 1968 pro-
duced regulations for Minimum Security Devices and Procedures
[12CFR21]. These included specific language related to anti-theft technology,
which became less relevant with the introduction of new types of cameras
and recording media. By the 1990s, bankers possessed greater latitude with
regards to designing security systems most appropriate for their needs.
While the Bank Security Act is not directly associated with decreasing bank
crime patterns, common sense argues that such institutions must implement
reasonable security measures to protect employees and the public. Perhaps
without the vigorous measures that were instituted by this law, bank crime
would have increased. This act is one of the few examples of government
passing a measure that created a distinctive security response and in the
process helped the role of security management grow in a particular sphere,
in this case financial industries. 
Another—and demonstrably more successful—example of how a leg-
islative initiative causes the creation of security strategy relates to skyjack-
ing, or the criminal high-jacking of commercial airplanes.8 This type of
crime became an issue in November 24, 1971, when a man who called him-
self Dan B. Cooper commandeered a Northwest Orient flight from Portland,
Oregon, en route to Seattle. The passengers were released in Seattle and a
ransom and parachutes were taken aboard. Cooper ordered the flight to take
off for Reno and to fly at a minimum speed at low altitude. When the plane
landed in Reno, Cooper, some parachutes, and $200,000 in small, used bills
were gone. Within six months, six other attempted skyjackings with para-
chute demands occurred. Most were unsuccessful, but the crime pattern
threatened the air transportation industry. 
Historically, Cooper’s was not the first skyjacking: that occurred in
Peru in the 1930s. Yet from 1930 to 1967, only nine incidents of air piracy
occurred, of which only four were successful. In 1968, 17 skyjacking inci-
dents took place, of which 13 were successful. The next year, the total
jumped to 40 incidents, of which 33 were successful. For the next three
years, as the private and public sectors fought the trend, the number of
attempted skyjackings on U.S.-scheduled aircraft held steady, while the
number of successful incidents dropped from 17 in 1970, to 11 the next year,
and then eight in 1972. With implementation of control measures, skyjacking
attempts dropped for the period 1973–1979 to 31, with only three being suc-
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cessful. The measures succeeded in reducing the risks of air piracy and
restored confidence in travelers. This is a convincing example of how a coor-
dinated security policy can reduce an international problem. 
While loss clearly helped increase the formation of security programs
in banking and aviation, many other industries were developing security
programs without the force of directive legislation. For example, no legisla-
tion requires the retail industry to engage in security measures; however,
substantial measurable losses in retailing have produced a cadre of manag-
ers who evaluate losses and seek to mitigate them. The same holds true for
other aspects of commerce and industry—public, private, and not-for-profit
sectors alike. Non-aviation transporters, distributors, mining and processing
facilities, and a myriad of service organizations have all enhanced their
security policies and systems. 
These factors stimulated the growth of proprietary security programs.
In the process, this trend stimulated the emergence of the contemporary
security industry, which expanded to fill the growing services required by
this commercial impetus. Meanwhile, many proprietary organizations par-
tially or fully shifted security activities to outside services and contractors.
We examine this issue next. 
THE GROWTH OF THE MODERN PROTECTIVE INDUSTRY 
The security industry that grew from the 19th century to the present devel-
oped not as a single category of commercial activity but as a group of inde-
pendent interrelated services and security product manufacturers. Although
little convergence in ownership occurred over the various businesses, the
industry did grow. The U.S. security industry surged at a rate considerably
exceeding that of the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) for the same
period of time. (The GDP is the aggregate measure of economic activity
excluding income from foreign investments.) 
For example, for the years 1987 to 1989, the U.S. security industry grew at
a rate of more than 11 percent annually, from $15.9 billion to $19.8 billion. This
compares with an average annual growth rate of 7.5 percent for the GDP dur-
ing the same period.9 During this period, gross revenues from security ser-
vices—security guarding and related services, central station monitoring, and
armored car services—grew from $11.1 billion to $13.8 billion, an increase of
24.3 percent. Meanwhile, the retail value of electronic security equipment sales
grew from $4.8 billion to almost $6 billion, an increase of 25 percent. Within
these categories of products and services, numerous product lines grew or
emerged to serve the varied interests of proprietary security operations. 
Between 1992 and 1996, growth of the industry continued, but at a
slower rate. Total revenues increased about 8 percent, from $29.1 billion to
$39.3 billion. Meanwhile, the nation’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of
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4.2 percent.10 Therefore, this increase actually represented an improvement
relative to the period 1987 to 1989. Indeed, security revenues as a percentage
of GDP grew from 0.46 percent in 1992 to 0.52 percent in 1996 and are pro-
jected to reach 0.69 percent in 2004, as shown in Table 2.1. 
Historically, most organizations directed security operations through a
proprietary department. This implied that the organization “owned” the
unit that provided its security services. Proprietary security directors and
associates remained central to the planning, organizing, and management of
such services. However, as the previous chapter observed, security depart-
ments have been diminished in terms of proprietary personnel as more
resources have been provided by outside service suppliers. The proprietary
organization became the client, customer, or contractee of the supplier or
contractor. Meanwhile, organizations generally turned to outside suppliers
for security products and systems—hardware, software, and electronics.
Therefore, this relationship has not reflected much change. 
Leading Edge Group, a market research firm, divides the security
industry into two major components: services and electronics. Robust
growth in the services and electronic security equipment segments occurred
in the 1990s and is expected to continue to 2004 and beyond, as shown in
Table 2.2. The reasons for and extent to which these industry segments are
changing reflects changes taking place within the security industry’s clients,
namely, proprietary organizations, which contract or purchase such ser-
vices, products or systems. 
Security Services 
Three out of four dollars expended for purchased protection needs are allo-
cated for personnel-based services. These activities require the support of
equipment and technology, but the bulk of the expenditures are for direct
Table 2.1. Security Service Revenues and Equipment Sales by Product 
Function
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; Leading Edge Reports, Study LE907 
Factor 1992 1996 2000 2004 
GDP (in $ Billions) $6,244 $7,576 $8,869 $10,147
Security Revenues as a Percentage of GDP 0.46% 0.52% 0.60% 0.69%
Total Security Revenues (in $ Millions) $29,109 $39,397 $53,424 $70,271
Security Service Revenues 24,013 31,651 41,410 53,600
Electronics Security Equipment Sales 5,096 7,746 12,014 16,671
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compensation and benefits of personnel and their support. Personnel-based
services may be divided into five categories: 
1. Security guard services. This category absorbs a number of protec-
tion workers with varying responsibilities, including extensive pub-
lic service contact (“officers”); assets protection specialists
(“guards”); receptionists; patrol officers; executive protection per-
sonnel; watchmen; timekeepers; and others. These personnel pro-
vide both the important “visible security” presence required by
many protective objectives and the less apparent, behind-the-scenes
securing of physical assets by deterring, detecting, and reporting
activity related to threats to people or property. 
Table 2.2. Security Service Revenues and Equipment Sales by Type (in $ 
Millions)
Source: Leading Edge Reports, Study LE907 
Services/Equipment Purchased 1996 2000 2004 
Security Services Revenues $31,651 $41,410 $53,600
Central Station Services 13,190 17,610 22,020
Security Guard Services 13,300 17,000 22,700
Consultant Services 661 1,000 1,480
Private Investigation Services 3,500 4,600 6,000
Armored Car Services 1,000 1,200 1,400
Electronic Security Equipment Sales $7,746 $12,014 $16,671
Vehicle Security Systems 1,596 2,187 2,699
Intrusion Detection Equipment 1,840 2,560 3,030
Fire Detection Equipment 1,100 1,415 1,690
CCTV Equipment 818 1,528 2,534
Electronic Article Surveillance 703 1,100 1,690
Metal Detection Equipment 55 84 123
X-ray Inspection Equipment 76 100 111
Bomb Detection Equipment 53 80 121
Secure Telephone Equipment 112 157 205
Access Control Equipment 548 900 1,480
Computer Security Equipment 845 1,903 2,858
Total $39,397 $53,424 $70,271
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2. Central station services. The computing revolution has permitted
organizations to monitor people, places, and events with efficiency
and accuracy. Originally, central stations provided burglar alarm, fire
notification, and messenger-requesting signals. Today, burglar and
fire alarms remain the core of such services, but numerous other
monitoring functions are also available. Expenditures for such ser-
vices have grown steadily in the last 25 years, and are close to the
amount paid for security guard services. 
3. Private investigation services. In the past, investigators were linked
to the resolution of specific losses. That’s still true, but the assign-
ments faced by investigators are broader. Investigators today are
much more likely to conduct evaluations to make sure that corporate
policies are maintained, such as by assuring that licensing fees and
payments are properly documented. Investigators and consultants
are frequently integral in due diligence (that is, the vigilant care
needed in a given situation) prior to acquiring an asset or related to
litigation involving the organization. This category of contracted ser-
vice continues to grow in importance for proprietary security pro-
grams.
4. Armored car services. Ever since Washington Perry Brink started his
transport business with a horse and a wagon in the 19th century, cus-
tomers have turned to outside organizations to physically move
assets. In addition to transporting cash, these services provide activi-
ties such as the servicing of automated teller machines (ATMs) and
the transporting of high-value non-cash assets like jewelry and com-
puter tapes and documents. They also handle aspects of cash man-
agement for financial organizations. 
5. Consultant and other services. When particular problems emerge,
security operations managers often turn to consultants with special
expertise in particular activities. Most major industries and most
types of specific security concerns—for example, data protection and
financial investigations—can retain the services of such persons or
their organizations for a defined period of time to achieve the
desired goals. Due to the shrinking of central staff management in
the last 25 years, managerial resources were reduced and the use of
outside consultants replaced in-house management capabilities.
Meanwhile, other services are equally significant to organizations.
For example, in the event of a loss of computer processing capability,
an organization may turn to facilities that have compatible hardware
that may be commandeered for immediate use. 
6. Electronic security equipment. To provide more control at less cost,
managers turn to electronic security equipment, which can augment,
supplement, and verify the actions of security personnel. Though
smaller than personnel-intensive services, capital outlay for such
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equipment is growing steadily. Here are the ways these funds are
allocated:
• Intrusion detection equipment. These devices and systems
indicate the unauthorized passage of individuals into a pro-
tected area. 
• Vehicle security systems. These products deter and detect the
theft or removal of cars, trucks, vans, and other mobile convey-
ances.
• Computer security equipment. Because of the importance of
data protection, systems to protect information assets are grow-
ing at a substantial rate and play an important role in loss deter-
rence for data systems. 
• Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) equipment. Security opera-
tions increasingly use CCTV to monitor and record activities. 
• Fire detection equipment. Facilities are required to use fire
detection systems by codes, standards, insurance requirements,
or common sense. 
• Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) systems. These systems
are primarily used to control the losses of retail merchandise.
However, EAS systems also may be applied to broader applica-
tions of assets control. 
• Access control equipment. Systems to efficiently allow or deny
entrance make an important contribution to operating a secure
facility. This category is closely related technically to intrusion
detection equipment. 
• Secure telephone equipment. This equipment protects tele-
phone and data transmissions from unauthorized interception. 
• X-ray inspection equipment. X-ray impressions may identify
the presence of weapons or contraband material hidden in pack-
ages or on persons. 
• Metal detection equipment. These systems identify metal con-
tent hidden within packages or on persons. Wide applications
are found at airport pre-board screening and the checking of
people and hand parcels entering at-risk locations. 
• Bomb detection equipment. Still another way of identifying
contraband is the use of technology to identify the chemical sig-
natures of such materials. These may result in an alarm being
sounded or in a security officer setting aside a suspicious object
for further evaluation. 
7. Security hardware. In addition to personnel and electronic devices,
systems, and software, security operations often require the pur-
chase and use of particular products and materials. Hence, any
object or material that is not electronic is categorized as hardware.
This category also is substantial, placed at about $3.775 billion in
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1996, and projected to grow at a rate of 4.8 percent to $4.775 billion
by 2001.11 A door that is required to be intrusion-resistant would be
included in this category; a normal door would not be. Locking
devices including door locks, padlocks, deadbolts, latches, as well as
security storage equipment like safes and vaults and fire extinguish-
ers, and related products are also included in this category. 
HOW SECURITY MANAGERS RANK PRIORITIES 
Security practitioners deploy proprietary and contract services and elec-
tronic security systems in order to achieve a wide range of objectives. Princi-
pally, tasks relating to personnel matters, budgeting, training, and program
planning and administration comprise most of the time available in a man-
ager’s week. However, in addition to routine program management, numer-
ous security-related threats require consideration and action. These change
with the times, geography, and the nature of particular industries. 
The security threats and management issues listed by respondents to a
Fortune 1000 study are various, as shown in Table 2.3. (These issues are dis-
cussed in greater detail in the final chapter of this book.) The following is a
list of these issues: 
• Workplace violence. For most people, the workplace is a safe
place. But occasionally, violence intrudes into an otherwise non-
violent environment. Despite the rarity of the events, the issue can-
not be dismissed by managers; indeed, it is at or near the top of
any list of workplace concerns.12 Diligent managers must take
measures to make employees feel safe on the job, and at the same
time deter disgruntled employees, terminated workers, enraged
customers or clients, and others from untoward action. 
• Crisis management (also called contingency management). Emer-
gencies in organizations can be due to nature-based, people-based,
design-based, and technology-based factors, among others.13 The
crisis or contingency manager seeks to avoid a crisis from occur-
ring by establishing contingency plans. 
• Executive protection. The protection of senior officials from risk
has become a highly evolved skill that draws upon management
planning and analysis.14 Protection choreography, advance secu-
rity preparations, domestic and international travel assessment,
and physical training are all involved in the process. 
• Fraud. The investigation and prevention of fraud (that is, false rep-
resentation or intentional perversion of truth to induce another to
part with something valuable) is an important task in any organi-
zation.15
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• White-collar crime. The term “white-collar crime” was coined by
the sociologist Edwin Sutherland, and signifies unlawful, nonvio-
lent conduct committed by corporations and individuals. It
includes theft, fraud, and other violations of trust, including
embezzlement. Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of
property by one lawfully entrusted with its possession. Frequently,
this crime is committed by someone with a fiduciary responsibility
within the organization, which he or she then abuses. 
Table 2.3. Most Important Security Threats and Management Issues 
Source: Sixth annual survey, “Top Security Threats Facing Corporate America” (1999), Westlake 
Village, CA: Pinkerton. (See also Chapter 11.) 
Rank Security Threat
1. Workplace violence 
2. Crisis management/executive protection 
3. Fraud/white-collar crime 
4. Employee screening concerns 
5. Computer crime (hardware/software theft) 
6. General employee theft 
7. Computer crime (Internet/intranet security) 
8. Drugs in the workplace 
9. Unethical business conduct 
10. Property crime 
11. Sexual harassment/EEOC 
12. Business espionage/theft of trade secrets 
13. Litigation liability (“inadequate security”) 
14. Terrorism 
15. Litigation (negligent hiring) 
16. Insurance/workers’ compensation fraud 
17. Cargo/supply-chain theft 
18. Kidnapping/extortion 
19. Political unrest/regional instability 
20. Product diversion/transshipment 
21. Product tampering/contamination 
22. Organized crime 
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• Employee screening concerns. Security directors frequently are
involved in directing, assessing, and improving ways by which
new employees may be screened (vetted) before an offer of
employment or a significant promotion is made (see Chapter 3). 
• Computer crime. The protection of assets relating to misuse of
information technology (IT) or electronic data processing (EDP)
systems is a large task. Security is involved with the protected data
and its output. To achieve this end, hardware, software, communi-
cations, and the physical environment of the IT/EDP facility must
be considered.16 Similarly, security procedures need to be evalu-
ated for their adequacy. 
• General employee theft. An omnipresent concern for security
practitioners is larceny by employees. Security operations must
seek to decrease the opportunity for such acts and to manage
investigations.
• Drugs in the workplace. Employee drug testing is widely used in
industry. Policies, procedures, consent forms, checklists, and train-
ing materials are needed for such programs.17
• Unethical business conduct. In many circumstances, one of the
tasks for security operations is to play varying roles in drafting,
monitoring, and enforcing an organizational code of ethical con-
duct.
• Sexual harassment/Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). Complaints of harassments by co-workers or others
at the workplace have been recurrent in recent years. Similarly,
alleged violations of the EEOC guarantees have affected security
operations. Both types of allegations require investigation and
response. 
• Business espionage/theft of trade secrets. For many organiza-
tions, the loss of crucial information is of greater importance than
the fraudulent disappearance of products or supplies. These trans-
gressions include espionage or theft of trade secrets, including
developmental procedures and know-how.18
• Litigation: inadequate security and negligent hiring. The reality
or fear of legal action for negligence is one of the driving features
in security management today. Security program operators are
involved in a variety of activities related to these risks, including
instituting procedures and controls to reduce such risks and pre-
paring actions or defenses for legal cases.19
• Terrorism. The bombings of the World Trade Center, the Okla-
homa City federal building, and public and private assets in vari-
ous locales suggest the importance of measures to deter such
attacks.20 While the chances of being a victim of a domestic terror-
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ist attack are remote, a security director must evaluate such risks
nevertheless. In certain international markets where an organiza-
tion may operate, the risks can be higher. 
• Insurance/workers’ compensation fraud. Organizations that pro-
vide workers’ compensation insurance sometimes encounter
abuse, which requires investigation and response. 
• Cargo/supply-chain theft. The stealing of goods that are being
transported or stored is an ongoing concern for product manufac-
turers and distributors.21 Outright theft requires prompt investiga-
tion and response. 
• Kidnapping/extortion. Kidnapping (that is, the forcible abduction
of a person from his or her residence or business) for profit via ran-
som payment is rare in the U.S. Extortion (that is, obtaining prop-
erty by threatening to injure or commit any other criminal offense)
is more common and sometimes involves features of kidnapping.
Security operations must seek to minimize the chances of these
offenses from occurring. 
• Political unrest/regional instability. Many organizations operate in
nations where risks to employees and assets require constant moni-
toring. Optimal security operations must seek to assess the risks in
various nations. They must further stay abreast of any changing
conditions that could lead to threats to employees or expropriations
of assets. In the event of an emergency, security planners must
attempt to remove employers safely from harm’s way. 
• Product diversion. Sometimes, products are sold abroad at a lower
price than what is charged to distributors and retailers in other
markets. The manufacturer loses revenues when these products
intended to be sold into the lower-priced market are surrepti-
tiously sold back into the domestic distribution channels by a third
party. Security operations must seek to prevent such transship-
ment and to investigate any suspected incidents that may be
encountered. 
• Product tampering or sabotage. The integrity of a product is vital
to its maker. Sometimes, however, products are intentionally adul-
terated. In extreme situations, this willful and malicious destruc-
tion of property can lead to injury and death. Additionally, the
organization can have its valuable market position threatened by
the results. 
• Organized crime. Criminal activity that is perpetuated by individ-
uals who are systematized and concerted to common goals is
defined as organized crime. It is not solely a law enforcement
problem, but is also directly of importance to any organizations
affected by it.22
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SPECIFIC CONCERNS FOR DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES 
The security threats and management concerns listed in the preceding sec-
tions reflect responses from managers in numerous types of industries. Nat-
urally, when responses from a particular industry are disaggregated from
the total, the rank and pattern of priorities change. The following sections
present four large industry groups from the sample as well as their respec-
tive top five concerns. 
Manufacturing (30 Percent of Total in Response in the Survey) 
Security directors of Fortune 1000 manufacturing firms cite the top two con-
cerns mentioned above as their primary management concern. The distinc-
tive variance from the overall profile was seen in the high rank accorded to
the security of intellectual property. This reflects the importance of safe-
guarding proprietary technology and processes that create a competitive dif-
ference. 
Top Security Threats: Manufacturing 
1. Workplace violence 
2. Crisis management/executive protection 
3. Employee screening concerns
4. Business espionage/theft of trade secrets 
5. Computer crime (hardware and software theft) 
Business Services (21 Percent of Total) 
Business services in the survey included computer and data service firms,
financial institutions, and insurance companies. This segment placed two
computer-related security concerns among the top five. The theft of PCs and
laptops, for example, can represent a loss of current value and future oppor-
tunity. 
Top Security Threats: Business Services 
1. Computer crime (hardware/software theft) 
2. Fraud/white-collar crime 
3. Employee screening concerns 
4. Crisis management/executive protection 
5. Computer crime (Internet/intranet security) 
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Retail Trade (13 Percent of Total) 
Unlike other major industry groups, retailers and related companies in the
Fortune 1000 group placed employee theft as their paramount concern.
Employee screening concerns also ranked higher with this group than with
other industry groups, which reflects the concerns that security executives in
the retail trade industry have about obtaining and managing ethical
employees.
Top Security Threats: Retail Trade 
1. General employee theft 
2. Employee screening concerns 
3. Fraud/white-collar crime 
4. Workplace violence 
5. Drugs in the workplace 
Utilities (9 Percent of Total) 
Consistent with the broad survey group, the utilities industry placed work-
place violence as its top concern. Also, computer-related security issues rank
high for this group. 
Top Security Threats: Utilities 
1. Workplace violence 
2. Computer crime (hardware/software threats) 
3. Crisis management/executive protection 
4. Computer crime (Internet/intranet security) 
5. Fraud/white-collar crime 
SUMMARY
Security operations must possess competence in a “core” set of skills in
order to run successfully. These skills include program initiation, ongoing
monitoring, and constant endeavors to improve performance. Corporate
security endeavors are still new, having been the focus of independent
research only in recent decades. Yet the reasons for the growth of such ser-
vices involve diverse psychological, legal, social, and financial requisites.
Politics and federal and state laws have helped shape security services. The
changing priorities of security practitioners in large corporations focus on
workplace violence, crisis management, and executive protection, although
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the nature of those concerns differs according to the particular industry of
the corporation. 
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. Why are some operational contingencies considered “core”? What
would be an example of a non-core competency? 
2. Why was the Rand Report so influential on security practices? Is it
pejorative to refer to private security services as “private police”? 
3. What factors are most important in driving the growth of security
services and programs? 
4. How has the ending of the Cold War changed security practices? 
5. Describe federal laws that have helped form security practices. 
6. What are the differential rates of growth of security services, elec-
tronics, and hardware? Why would these grow at different rates? 
7. Corporate security managers place workplace violence at or near the
top of their concerns. Is this likely to change? What factors could
influence different types of industries to report different security pri-
orities?
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STAFFING TO MEET 
PROTECTIVE GOALS 
It is imperative that those exercising supervisory
authority over security guards (whether contract
or proprietary) initiate affirmative actions to
ensure that the guards are physically, mentally,
and morally capable and qualified to perform
their assigned duties. 
—Jennifer F. Vaughan, Avoiding 
Liability in Premises Security 
Staffing relates to the recruiting and pre-employment screening (vetting) of
individuals required for protective activities. This process is critical for all
managers concerned with security operations. Indeed, security directors
and their deputies normally spend considerable time and effort on the topics
discussed in this and the next three chapters. Failure of any organization to
make such screening a priority can lead to regrettable developments (see
Box 3.1). 
The staffing process must balance the requirements of the organization
with the abilities provided by a finite pool of potential employees. The
requirements further change depending on the position needing to be filled.
This chapter discusses staffing matters relating to entry-level, supervisory,
and managerial issues; however, the emphasis will be on entry-level
employment. Hiring personnel for security positions is like hiring persons
for any other position within the organization; however, security positions
are distinctive in some ways and require a level of background screening
that extends beyond the scope suitable for most other employees. This vet-
ting is required due to the high level of trust expected in such positions. The
means of ascertaining the levels of confidence in new hires are discussed
later in this chapter.  
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Box 3.1. The Perils of Poor Pre-Employment Screening 
The failure to vet prospective employees in a comprehensive manner
increases the risks that dangerous and dishonest employees may be hired.
Employers frequently learn that applicants for employment fail to reveal
significant facts of their work or personal history. At BellSouth, for example,
some 15 to 20 percent of new applicants conceal a secret.1 Serious error and
omissions in corporate and professional résumés should be identified by a
diligent review of “facts” provided on the application form. Lack of appro-
priate pre-employment screening has led to the following situations: 
• An international trade director for the City of San Francisco misled
people into believing that he was a lawyer by including on his
résumé that he has attended the Hastings College of the Law and
had passed the California Bar. Neither was true.2
• A former prosecutor, who tried hundreds of cases under two
Brooklyn, New York, district attorneys and the city’s special nar-
cotics prosecutor, pleaded guilty to practicing law without a
license.3
• A professor of criminal justice at the University of Nebraska was
arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska, on burglary charges. A routine
police check of the suspect’s fingerprints showed he was a convict
mistakenly released from prison 11 years earlier and was also a
suspect in the murder of two New York police officers.4
• A medical doctor serving as an intern at University Hospital of the
School of Medicine at the State University at Stony Brook, New
York, failed to disclose on his application that he had spent time in
prison for sprinkling arsenic-laced ant poison on co-workers’
donuts and coffee while working as a paramedic in Illinois. While
at Stony Brook, the doctor treated 147 patients, one of whom
lapsed into a coma shortly after the doctor’s treatment.5
These examples involve non-security professionals. The same dangerous
deception occurs among security personnel. In one example, a security
guard working at the civic auditorium in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was
employed to maintain order during a wrestling match. A bystander claimed
he was observing a disturbance, but the contract security officer concluded
otherwise. The guard handcuffed the observer, removed him to a separate
area, and beat him. At trial, the guard’s earlier conviction for violent crime
was revealed. An appellate level decision found that the security contractor
was negligent. The court ruled, in part, that the security firm did not ade-
quately investigate the background and character of individual guards prior
to hiring them.6
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At all employment levels, with security being no exception, complex con-
cerns relating to the size of the employment pool, geographical considerations,
time of the year, legal constraints, reputation and industry of the potential
employer, and other factors affect the choices an employer is likely to have. 
PERSONNEL PLANNING 
In order to achieve optimal performance, organizations must plan to fulfill
personnel needs for three basic requirements. First, ongoing programs
require personnel to replace those who retire, resign, or leave for cause.
Next, personnel may be needed on a temporary basis to staff a short-term
requirement. And finally, personnel may be needed for new programs. The
processes involved in this planning activity are as follows: 
1. Identify personnel resources. The number of employees required
for current operations as well as any new organizational goals must
be assessed. Further levels of skilled and experienced personnel
needed for any internal growth or contraction or new venture must
be estimated. 
2. Monitor current internal personnel resources. At least some of the
personnel required for a new venture may be found among existing
employees. Therefore, management must have a database of existing
personnel to draw upon when openings arise. 
3. Estimate labor resources available for a particular market. The
characteristics of the workers available (quantity, skills and educa-
tional level, wage rates, and unemployment trends) need to be iden-
tified for each particular market. 
4. Analyze future personnel requirements. The program planner
should be reasonably assured of the capacity of the market to meet
Box 3.1. (Continued)
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needs in the foreseeable future for the variety of staffing demands to
be encountered. 
5. Create personnel strategies. Issues needing to be addressed include
when new employees will be hired and what proportion will be pro-
prietary or contract. 
JOB DESCRIPTIONS 
After the quantity of personnel needed for the project or program has been
determined, job descriptions for these positions are prepared. These are
summaries of the basic tasks required for the position. They serve to estab-
lish minimum desired criteria for persons who will be recruited and vetted
for the available positions. Job descriptions may include title, tasks to be per-
formed, work conditions, persons reported to, and hours and wages. Wages
and benefits are usually determined by the compensation office, which is
often located within the finance department in large organizations. Wages
are set relative to local pay ranges, corporate pay policy, and the urgency
with which the positions must be filled. 
Job descriptions clarify organizational structure and briefly summarize
the key performance standards required for the position. The job description
also is a basis of comparing the eventual performance of an employee with
the original written expectation. Job descriptions vary markedly according
to the position. Job descriptions for an entry-level position emphasize the
minimum skills required (see Box 3.2), while those for supervisory positions
attempt to identify persons who have sufficient experience and personnel
skills to supervise the work of others even if they previously were employed
in a non-protective position. Job descriptions for managerial posts normally
emphasize years of experience and the nature of responsibility held. 
Box 3.2. Example of a Job Description for a Security Officer 
Title: Security Officer 
Grade Level: (employer may set different grades according to skill and pay) 
Hours: (day, evening, night shifts indicated) 
Salary Range: (usually quoted on an hourly basis for this position) 
Major Duties and Responsibilities 
Working with people: 
• Provides necessary assistance to the public in case of injuries or
emergencies 
• Deters unauthorized persons from entering restricted areas by
ensuring that all entering such areas display proper identification 
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Box 3.2. (Continued)
• Provides information and supportive assistance courteously in all
contacts with employees and the public 
• Is trained or trainable in cardiopulmonary resuscitation and emer-
gency first aid 
Working with systems: 
• Operates a computer terminal; capable of entering data and writ-
ing own reports 
• Can use Deister, Detex, or other data-inputting systems 
• Monitors access control, alarm, and CCTV system 
• Can operate a fire alarm system in an emergency 
• Issues temporary identification documents to visitors 
Routine procedures: 
• Patrols assigned areas in accordance with procedures and instruc-
tions located in the post orders 
• Conducts periodic inspections of facilities to identify hazards and
prepare reports 
• Investigates notable incidents observed and reported by him or
her and prepares concise factual written reports 
Qualifications Required 
• Communicates orally in English clearly and courteously 
• Writes reports factually and grammatically correctly 
• Possesses minimum five years’ experience in law enforcement, fire
safety, or with private security where systems experience was
included; or minimum of two years higher education from an
accredited academic program, preferably in security management,
criminal justice, communications, or related fields 
• Meets physical standards necessary to perform assigned duties such as: 
• Responding to emergencies, including assisting a person or
persons to safety 
• Carrying and operating a fire extinguisher 
• Restraining psychologically or physically removing a person
or persons from the premises 
• Driving a vehicle (must have a driver’s license) 
• Standing, walking, or sitting for an extended period of time 
• Possesses no record of felony convictions or convictions for rele-
vant misdemeanors 
• Passes a medical examination including, but not limited to, blood
and urine analysis to detect the presence of any illegal substances. 
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NEGLIGENT HIRING LITIGATION 
The primary reason to implement excellent staffing programs is to attract
and retain a cadre of competent, motivated, and productive employees who
are capable of performing the necessary work. However, another important
factor influencing such programs is the fear of a lawsuit for an untoward
personal action. Less than diligent personnel procedures could allow the
hiring of a rogue employee whose behavior, for example, could hurt another
person or result in loss of assets. This could lead to litigation for negligent
hiring. Prudent operational management can reduce the possibility of such a
plaintiff’s action succeeding. Such an action is usually lodged in civil courts
against the employer-defendant and can be based on constitutional princi-
ples, case law, or federal or state statutes. 
The pressure to take shortcuts in an effort to save money and time—
sometimes because personnel slots need to be filled quickly—can result in
the wrong person being hired and retained until an actionable offense
occurs. But most employment errors take place because the organization has
not created a rigorous human resources vetting program in the first place.
Regardless of the cause, organizations must take a reasonable degree of care
in selecting employees and determining if they are fit for the positions to
which they are assigned.1 If any actionable occurrence results, the specific
charges against the defendant-employer may be negligent hiring and negli-
gent retention, which are separate causes of action based on employer negli-
gence.2 Negligent hiring occurs when the employer knew or should have
known of the employee’s unfitness prior to offering that individual a posi-
tion within the organization. Negligent retention takes place when the
employer becomes aware of the employee’s unfitness for duty and does not
terminate the employee promptly. 
In addition, an employer is responsible for certain acts of the employee
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This is a concept of vicarious liabil-
ity in which the employer assumes responsibility in certain cases for wrong-
ful acts of the employee acting on behalf of the employer. However, if the
employee acts outside of the course and scope of his or her employment—
even when on the job and being compensated at the time—such an incident
may not necessarily result in a judicial verdict against the employer. Cer-
tainly, if the employer could have determined something about the
employee from a routine background investigation that would have pre-
vented hiring the person, but did not conduct such an investigation, the
employer may be held liable for negligence in hiring. 
Other reasons for vetting employees are to assure that certain frequently
occurring hiring-related problems do not occur.3 Some examples of these are: 
• Hiring people who have too much in common with their inter-
viewers
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• Hiring friends or repaying favors 
• Settling for mediocre candidates because of the pressure to fill
positions
• Hiring someone for political reasons or for the feeling that one can-
not afford the best candidate 
• Not probing for limitations, lies, or relevant details in the pros-
pect’s work or education history 
• Talking instead of listening while conducting pre-employment
interviews
• Overselling the position 
For whatever reasons, the consequences of failing to vet employees
properly prior to making an offer of employment can lead to substantial
losses by the employer in a trial (see Box 3.3). The legal principles pertaining
to negligent hiring are not fixed and are thus subject to change, from court
decisions to appeals, to changing conditions and new laws. Generally, the
main requirements of a plaintiff to establish civil liability in which an allega-
tion of injury or damage occurred are: 
1. The existence of a legal duty by the plaintiff to protect the defendant, 
2. A breach (failure) of that duty, and 
3. Damage, harm, or injury as the proximate cause of that breach. 
Box 3.3. Negligent Hiring: Verifying Indications of Integrity 
The burden of appropriate vetting is incumbent upon both proprietary
employers and employers of contract workers. In such cases, an employer is
obliged to conduct a reasonable investigation into the employee’s work
experience, background, character, and qualifications. The standard of care
does not vary though the greater the risk of harm, the greater the degree of
care necessary to constitute ordinary care.  
This is demonstrated in the case Welsh Manufacturing, Division of Tex-
tron, Inc. v. Pinkerton’s, Inc. [474 A.2d 436 (1984)]. Welsh Manufacturing sued
Pinkerton’s for losses sustained due to three major thefts connected to a
Pinkerton’s security guard. Welsh claimed that Pinkerton’s was negligent in
the hiring, training, supervising, and assigning of a guard who was later
found to have been a co-conspirator in such losses, and that the negligence
was proximate cause to the losses. A Rhode Island civil court returned the
verdict in favor of Welsh. Pinkerton’s appealed. The appeals court reviewed
Pinkerton’s contention that insufficient evidence existed relative to the theo-
ries of liability raised in the lower court. The security firm requested that the
lower court’s decision should be set aside. 
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Box 3.3. (Continued)
The Background 
For 30 years, Pinkerton’s had a contract to provide security services for
Welsh, which manufactured gold sunglasses frames for the U.S. govern-
ment. The Welsh manufacturing complex contained sizeable quantities of
gold required for these manufacturing purposes. Pinkerton personnel were
aware of the gold stored on the premises. Pinkerton’s assigned a 21-year-old
part-time employee to patrol the Welsh premises during the night shift. The
guard had worked for Pinkerton’s less than six months at the time of the
assignment. Over the next 45 days, during the night shifts, three thefts
occurred at Welsh’s facilities, resulting in a loss in excess of $200,000. An
investigation identified the new guard as the culpable thief in two of the lar-
cenies. He had resigned by the time the third crime occurred but testified
later that he provided vital information to parties who robbed the facility of
another $180,000. In that third crime, the former Pinkerton guard put a gun
to the head of a replacement guard. The erstwhile guard further testified
that he secured the position with Pinkerton’s in order to steal from Welch’s,
to which he expected to be assigned. 
The Deficient Pre-Employment Process 
Pinkerton’s application for employment requested the names of former
employers and of three character references. Pinkerton’s did not contact the
character references. The company did forward reference forms to the appli-
cant’s high school principal and to a hospital where the applicant had
worked for about one month. The forms did not address questions relating
to the applicant’s honesty and trustworthiness. The hospital provided an
employment-termination form in which a supervisor checked a box indicat-
ing the worker was deemed “good” for “honesty.” The supervisor also
noted that the worker had failed to report for work on two occasions. Pink-
erton’s also telephoned someone who had been the applicant’s superior
officer in the navy for about two months, who said that he would recom-
mend the applicant for a job with Pinkerton’s.
Despite these measures, the appellate court ruled that “Pinkerton’s
cursory investigation prior to [the applicant’s] employment provided it with
little current intelligence on him and could well support an inference of neg-
ligence in hiring for such a sensitive assignment as the guarding of gold.”
The court further noted that the applicant had no prior working experience
similar to Pinkerton’s business. His prior assignment before being assigned
to Welsh did “not evidence ascending levels of sensitivity.” The appeals
court dismissed Pinkerton’s appeal and affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.
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Box 3.3. (Continued)
The Lesson 
At the time of this incident, which happened in 1973, vetting standards were
lower than the levels reached in later years. Indeed, Pinkerton’s procedures
did not appear to represent a deviation from the norm of the time. What the
case establishes, however, is that an ordinary duty of care requires a reason-
able investigation of a security applicant’s background, including his or her
character. In this case, Pinkerton’s did not have a single affirmative state-
ment of the candidate’s probity from a supervisor or other independent per-
son. If such statements were obtained, an employee nonetheless might steal
on the job. But the employer in such a circumstance would have demon-
strated good faith in meeting this appellate court’s standard. 
Source: D.A. Maxwell (1993). Private Security Law: Case Studies. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Hei-
nemann.
In various cases, appellate courts have established criteria for negli-
gent hiring and training. They further identify issues in the failure or omis-
sion to take reasonable measures to reduce these risks. Frequently in
plaintiffs’ actions, the loss prevention director and other individual employ-
ees involved in the case may be charged personally as defendants, in addi-
tion to the employer. Even if the loss prevention director is defended by
attorneys for the employer, such an individual may need to consult indepen-
dent counsel to protect his or her own interests. Thus, a lawsuit for negligent
hiring can require corporate and individual response, involving financial
costs and unwanted publicity and misuse of time, which possibly could
have been mitigated by the exercise of reasonable vetting measures. The
remainder of this chapter will concern such measures. 
THE VETTING PROCESS 
Hiring the right people can be costly, slow, and frustrating. But optimally
performing security operations personnel are not deterred from their goals
even during times when unemployment is low, compensation costs are ris-
ing, and the pool of potentially desirable candidates appears to be weak. The
astute manager will persevere to obtain the best employees as possible
under the circumstances. 
The entire vetting process is costly. For entry-level and supervisory
employees, vetting involves expenditures to recruit candidates, perhaps to
pay personnel agencies, costs of staff time to review applications and con-
duct interviews, and outlays for background investigations. Only then can
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the additional cost of training be contemplated. For managerial positions,
costs may involve management recruiters and the expenses incurred to
interview and eventually relocate the successful applicant. 
The personnel process can be partially analyzed according to produc-
tivity costs; that is, what means of attracting candidates produces the best
long-term results. This can vary widely in organizations. One means of
attracting candidates for employment can be exhausted or become less effi-
cient with time, much as a vein of gold becomes fully consumed by miners
who must then move their search elsewhere. The vetting process in security-
oriented employment contains a number of distinct phases, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.1. The first step is to obtain as large a pool of prospects as possible at a
reasonable cost. This process often involves recruiting. 
Recruiting
For entry-level personnel positions, most managers prefer that many can-
didates be considered before a final selection is made. In cases where spe-
cific and demanding criteria are established as a requirement for
employment, the number of qualified candidates will be less. Recruiting
expenses hopefully should produce a commensurate return with their out-
lays. A manager is likely to experiment with different means of attracting
applicants and determining which methods produced the most desirable
results. For example, Table 3.1 shows a simple security recruitment pro-
ductivity worksheet whereby different recruiting methods can be analyzed
for their cost effectiveness. The table identifies cost per completed applica-
tion, but the final criterion of successful recruiting is the number of suc-
cessful applicants who are screened and offered a position that is accepted.
In addition, it is important to take into account whether the worker makes
a positive contribution over an extended period of time. The recruitment
method that produces the most acceptable applications may be different
from the one that produces the most acceptable employees on a long-term
basis. Analysis can help identify the most effective recruitment medium
for an employer. 
Security program managers must attract applicants so that they can
have a large enough pool to select the best candidates for the position. The
comparative study divides the dollar cost of acceptable applications by the
number of applications received. This yields a cost per application, which
can lead to a ranking of the most productive means of recruiting. While this
sample report is concerned with measuring completed applications, other
analyses could identify actual hires, or those employees who remain on the
job for 90 days or more. Such results may differ from those based only on
applications completed. 
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Figure 3.1. Stages of the Security-Oriented Vetting Process 
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Employers of security personnel use a number of strategies to attract
applicants. The following are means used for entry-level and supervisory
personnel:
• Classified advertisements 
• Display advertisements 
• Radio or television advertisements 
• Internet employment sites 
• Personnel agencies 
• State employment services 
• Incentives to current employees 
• Job fairs 
• College placement services 
• Military or Veterans Administration employment services 
• Association job placement services 
• Health club or community centers member recruitment 
If some types of recruitment sources begin to pale in effectiveness, high
performance managers turn to other means of obtaining needed applicants.
Flexibility on management’s part may achieve the desired goal. For exam-
ple, offering part-time or flexible schedules and unusual incentives may
Table 3.1. Security Recruitment Productivity Worksheet Monthly Review 
Recruitment Method Completed
Applications
Recruitment
Cost
Cost per 
Application
Classified Advertisements 
Daily Newspaper A — $— $—
Daily Newspaper B — $— $—
Sunday Newspaper — $— $—
Display Advertising — $— $—
E-mail Responses — $— $—
Web Site Inquiries — $— $—
Incentives to Current Employees — $— $—
Job Fair Attendance — $— $—
Personnel Agencies — $— $—
Radio Spots — $— $—
TV Spots — $— $—
Other — $— $—
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draw applicants who might otherwise not consider applying for full-time
work. Similarly, making prospects feel welcome, valuable, and engrossed in
interesting and relevant work—like security—may produce qualified appli-
cants who might otherwise pass on the opportunity to work for the organi-
zation. Employers may find at times that they must aggressively and
imaginatively lure individuals to apply for the positions they have avail-
able.5
In analyzing the effectiveness of different recruitment sources, a man-
ager may later determine that one type of source is better than another. The
results may differ according to the type of security assignments involved
and the culture of the employer. For example, a study of newly hired mar-
keting representatives found that employees recruited through college
recruitment efforts had better initial levels of performance than did those
recruited from newspaper advertisements.6 The analytical security execu-
tive is likely to identify which recruiting sources are most productive for the
short- and long-term by monitoring performance of different recruiting
sources over time. 
The potential employer’s Web site, which should contain available job
descriptions and an opportunity to apply over the Internet, will appeal to
some applicants and is growing as a recruitment tool. Managers are particu-
larly apt to use the Internet when looking for employment opportunities.
Applicants for managerial and executive positions may also be recruited by
outside personnel recruiters, or headhunters. These share some of the bur-
dens of vetting candidates they propose to the prospective employer. Man-
agement and executive recruiters usually charge the employer a percentage
of the successful applicant’s beginning annual compensation; in other cases,
a flat fee is charged, regardless of success. 
Pre-screening
Anyone who physically presents himself or herself to a personnel office and
requests an application for work should be provided one readily, even if no
positions are currently available or will be in the foreseeable future. To do
otherwise could risk the perception of discrimination and subject the organi-
zation to a civil action for employment discrimination. If no positions are
currently available or likely to be in the foreseeable future, a posted notice or
a receptionist may inform potential applicants of this situation. At their
option, job-seekers may then complete an application that can be filed for
possible future consideration when positions become available. 
If positions are available for those with particular skills or require-
ments, these attributes can be indicated on signage apparent to all visitors at
the personnel reception office. Upon the receipt of a completed application
from such a candidate, a clerk or manager may conduct a brief interview to
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provisionally ascertain the facts of the application and to inform the appli-
cant of the subsequent steps in the employment process. The brief informal
interview also helps establish the communications skills of the applicant. 
The Application 
The application is management’s opportunity to obtain information needed
to determine whether the applicant should be considered for further back-
ground screening and a possible offer of employment. For most of the past
century, applications were completed on paper forms. However, organiza-
tions increasingly have the applicant enter the information directly into a
computer terminal within a personnel office or send it to the company’s e-
mail address. The quantity of information required from the applicant on
the employment form differs widely based on the employer. The degree of
detail and the thoroughness of the evaluation process reflect the employ-
ment philosophy of the employer (see Box 3.4). 
Box 3.4. The Employment Application: How Much Is Enough? 
Some employers of security personnel use simple application forms that
require directory-type information and little more. Guardsmark, a nation-
wide security service firm based in Memphis, Tennessee, presents applicants
with a 24-page booklet that requests a detailed educational, work, and social
history. The copyrighted application also includes information on the com-
pany’s philosophy and ethics policy. Applicants are informed that they must
successfully pass a polygraph examination for which a release is included in
the application. A consent to drug and alcohol screening tests and release is
also included.
Vetting methods from the application process to the point of finally
offering a position of employment involve aspects of privacy as well as
questions of fairness and reliability. A balance between the rights of the
applicant and the needs of the employer must be maintained.7 This is partic-
ularly true for employers of protection personnel. For security-related posi-
tions, more information generally is requested of applicants than in other
types of employment. Regardless of the length of the application, some min-
imum information is required. Directory-type data—current address, phone,
and Social Security number—are required, as well as work history. The spe-
cific questions asked of new prospective employees on applications have
Staffing to Meet Protective Goals 71
been shaped in recent years by various federal laws. The main federal laws
affecting pre-employment standards are: 
• The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (The Wage and Hours Law) 
• Title 7, Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972 
• The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 
• The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
• The Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 
• The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
• Executive Orders 11246, 11375, and revised orders 4 and 14 (Affir-
mative Action) 
• Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 (Civil). This section guar-
antees citizens of the U.S. or other persons within its jurisdiction
from the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and its laws. 
• Title 18, United States Code, Section 242 (Criminal). This section
protects citizens and others from discrimination by reason of color
or race and allows for criminal penalties against offenders. 
• The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1971 
• The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
• The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 
• The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. This act prohibits
employers with 15 or more workers from discriminating against
qualified persons based on their disabilities. It is important to note
that knowing what constitutes a disability is not always clear (see
Box 3.5). 
Box 3.5. Defining What Is a Disability 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 defines a disabled person as
someone who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, has a history of physical or mental impair-
ment, or is regarded as having a physical or mental impairment. The nature
of specific disabilities is in a constant flux related to court decisions that
modify what employers may or may not exclude in considering the appli-
cant. Sometimes the concerns about excluded positions has led to searching
questions for security and Human Resources managers. For example, does
wearing glasses constitute a disability? May security employers be forced to
hire convicted felons because they are in a protected class?  
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Box 3.5. (Continued)
The ADA modifies the hiring process, but guidelines are compatible,
nonetheless, with the desire of achieving a competent and effective work-
force. The employer must be aware, however, of the ADA’s context. Appli-
cants who are “qualified” and able to perform “essential functions” of a
position with or without “reasonable accommodation” may be in a pro-
tected status to receive employment consideration. The employer may insist
on the following guidelines: 
1. The disabled individual must satisfy the prerequisite of the estab-
lished position. Certain levels of experience and education are typi-
cally permitted prerequisites. 
2. The individual must be able to perform essential job functions with
or without reasonable accommodation. A key factor is whether a
particular job function is essential. For example, a position requiring
a security officer to communicate with the public verbally could
exclude a candidate who is mute. However, if verbal communication
was not an essential job function, the employer might make “reason-
able accommodation” by permitting a mute employee to communi-
cate by signs or symbols or by using a technological device to
respond. 
3. In terms of defining “reasonable accommodation,” employers only
have to provide accommodation if it does not present the organiza-
tion with “undue hardship.” This is further defined as “requiring
significant difficulty or expense.” The employer is held to ADA stan-
dards that are related to size of the corporation, number of employ-
ees, and the cost of the accommodation necessary to render the
disabled person capable of performing the required work to estab-
lished standards. 
Source: L. Greenhouse, “Justices Wrestling with the Definition of Disability: Is It Glasses? False 
Teeth?” New York Times, April 28, 1999, p. A26. 
Existing measures may be further strengthened by subsequent modifi-
cations in rules and regulations. Also, state measures may expand upon fed-
eral coverage. As a result of these proscriptives, application forms are
limited in what they may or may not ask. Such limitations may change at
any time based on new rulings in case law and passage of federal and state
legislation.
The employer has a legal obligation to verify essential information in
the application, particularly for security-related positions. This is a vital ser-
vice because applicants may provide incorrect or misleading information in
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their applications and resumes. Verification of references and other relevant
information should be completed substantially or fully before a formal inter-
view is scheduled. 
References
Most applications request references of applicants. Generally, these may be
of two types: employment-related or personal. Of these two, employment-
related are more significant in that they relate to workplace attitude and pro-
ficiency. Personal references tend to be biased and are usually not job-ori-
ented; therefore, most employers place emphasis on job-related sources for
information about the applicant. However, government and private sector
positions requiring a high level of integrity in their hires may request char-
acter references in addition to those linked to past or present employment.
Self-serving personal references from applicants’ mothers and best friends
are not convincing. Employment verifications and confidential references
from applicants’ direct supervisors carry much weight. 
References may be vetted by clerks telephonically, by written requests,
or by a combination of both. Some organizations turn to investigators or
contract services to aid them in their reference checking. As noted earlier
(Box 3.3), the failure to obtain a single affirmative statement of probity con-
cerning a candidate can lead to a charge of negligence in hiring. This would
occur in the event that an employee had a relevant personal history experi-
ence, capable of negating consideration for employment, that was not
revealed on the application but that a reasonable effort on the employer’s
part would have discovered.  
Employment Verification and Continuity 
References and employment evaluations from an applicant’s previous direct
supervisors are valuable to employers in making a decision on whether to
hire that person or not. Some employers are reluctant to permit their super-
visors to share candid insight on a departed worker’s performance and per-
sonal behavior. They fear possible civil suits for slander or liability from
workers who may be denied an employment offer based on such negative
statements. However, supervisors who speak truthfully and without malice
about a former worker, even while revealing negative aspects about the
worker’s employment history, rarely are targets of litigation that is sus-
tained by the court. 
Astute security-conscious employers look carefully for any gaps in
employment. These are not necessarily red flags of trouble. Dates of employ-
ment gaps may reflect time needed to find new employment after one job
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has ended, or it can reflect time off for education, training, relaxation, or
healthcare. Such a gap could also reflect jail or prison time or other involve-
ment with the criminal justice system. Careful evaluation should determine
why employment gaps have occurred. 
In addition to personal and employment references, verification of
other information in the application should be undertaken. Such inquiries
generally require the approval and sometimes cooperation of the applicant.
Managers should always be aware that information derived from commer-
cial services requires careful evaluation. A decision not to hire someone on
the basis of a single finding cannot be justified. Commercial services greatly
expedite the cost of conducting a comprehensive, relevant, and accurate col-
lection of the applicant’s records. However, an employer is able to accom-
plish the same objectives in collecting information by in-house investigators
using available credentials checking manuals, directories, and Internet data-
bases.8 This type of information includes: 
• Social Security Number (SSN) verification. Congress never
intended SSNs to become national identifiers, but they are. Once
issued, an SSN is permanent and is only changed under extraordi-
nary circumstances. The SSN is the best indicator that the appli-
cant is who he or she says he or she is. Guides to understanding
the SSN explain the information revealed in the distinctive num-
bering sequence.9 SSN verification can indicate the state and
approximate year of issuance. 
The importance of SSN as an identifier is beyond question.
Therefore, all employers—and individuals—have an obligation to
take reasonable efforts to protect the privacy of such numbers. The
SSN is vital for both credit checks and criminal records searches. It
is important to note, however, that an applicant may be victimized
by another person who is currently using or has used that person’s
SSN for unauthorized purposes. This is called identity theft. This
crime could occur without the victim-applicant’s knowledge.
Hence, problematic information revealed through an SSN check
should not be the sole basis, without further confirmation, of elim-
inating a candidate for employment consideration. 
• Credit history checks. Credit reports are important as part of a
conscientious pre-employment verification. In many—probably
most—cases, the employer is not seeking to obtain the applicant’s
actual or potential debt, which is partially revealed from such
reports, but rather wishes to obtain factual directory-type informa-
tion from an independent source. The major credit bureaus deliver
reports rapidly and, due to the automated nature of the business,
costs for such reports are low. Prospective employees must specifi-
cally authorize the employer to undertake a credit search. A state-
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ment of the applicant’s rights must be provided and the applicant
must authorize the search by signing an appropriate form. Three
major credit bureaus are supported by hundreds of independent
local and regional credit collection businesses. Both credit bureaus
and their customers should be familiar with terms of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) as amended. The full text of the
FCRA and notices of rights are available on www.ftc.gov/bcp/
conline/edcams/fcra/index.html.
• Military history. Employers generally are not allowed to ask about
the nature of discharge of applicants with military service history.
However, asking whether the applicant is registered for Selective
Service or was a member of a branch of the armed forces is accept-
able. The applicant may obtain a standard form (DD214) detailing
his or her personal military service history. It provides information
on training specialties, ranks achieved, dates of service, and type
of discharge. Locations and dates of foreign service, awards, and
distinctions received are cited. Disciplinary information may be
revealed. However, offenders have the opportunity to appeal to a
military court, subsequent to the time any punishment has been
discharged, and request that the court seal the records of any crim-
inal or other charges. In this situation, the potential private sector
employer would not be aware of such factors in the applicant’s
military background. 
Employers may help their applicants obtain a DD214 by provid-
ing them with form SF 180, Request for Military Records Form. This
may be downloaded from www.nara.gov/regional/mprsf180.html. 
• Motor Vehicle Reports (MVR). Even if the applicant is not
expected to drive a vehicle in the course of his or her intended
employment, an MVR check may be wise. The record provides
directory-type information and may also reveal other facts about
the candidate that could be important in arriving at an employ-
ment decision. For example, the MVR may reflect an address dif-
ferent from the one that appears on the application; the employer
might wish to determine the reason for this difference. Further, if
the applicant must or could potentially drive in the process of
employment, the logic of an MVR search at the onset of employ-
ment consideration is apparent. MVRs contain directory-type
information but also data on height, weight, eye and hair color,
date of birth, when the license was issued, violations, often recent
convictions, accidents, and other facts. Employers may use the ser-
vices of a professional records verification service (see below) or
contact state motor vehicle agencies directly to obtain such infor-
mation.
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• Civil records searches. When filling a management position, an
employer may wish to evaluate the civil records of the applicant.
Such searches can identify possibly concealed information about
the candidate, including other names used, addresses, former
employers, and the existence of judgments, liens, bankruptcies,
and pending litigation. Although, many types of liens and Uni-
form Commercial Code filings are available free of charge, a com-
mercial records checking service may expedite the process. In
addition, the expertise and time required to retrieve them explains
why many larger employers farm out this task. In some states and
cities, telephone queries are answered, while such information is
increasingly available over the Internet. For a list of state and local
sites with free Internet access, visit www.brbpub.com. 
• Criminal history. Employers in protective services are eager to
determine, and rightly so, whether prospective employees have a
criminal history that would render them unsuitable for a position
of trust. In the past, employers often believed that any arrest or
conviction for a criminal offense should automatically lead to a
rejection of the candidate. However, today many factors have
changed employers’ ways of thinking about this issue, reflecting
the position that certain types of arrests or convictions should not
necessarily block a person from obtaining employment for a secu-
rity position. The key factors are the relevancy of the candidate’s
offense to the nature of the security work anticipated and the par-
ticulars of the offense. Relevant details include the age of the
offender at the time of the crime, how long ago it occurred, its
severity, and the presence or absence of subsequent illegal behav-
ior since the offense originally took place. 
Criminal records are public documents. However, since
states keep their records in different locations and have their own
procedures for releasing them, access can be difficult for someone
unfamiliar with the process. Most criminal records are retained at
the county as well as the state levels. Over 5,000 locations exist
within the U.S. where such criminal records may be found.
Depending on the locality, such records may be obtained by mail,
fax, commercial service, the Internet, or in person. Fees for provid-
ing copies of the records and supporting documents often are
charged. Usually, search information requires the person’s full
name, date of birth, years to be searched, and SSN.  
Potential employers are advised to consider relevant felony
and misdemeanor records only in evaluating the candidate’s total
credentials for employment. That is, currently many counties also
provide arrest records that did not lead to conviction. For the sake
of employment consideration, such information must not be con-
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sidered. However, sometimes in the process of conducting a back-
ground investigation, an employer discovers an open arrest
warrant for the applicant, often in a distant jurisdiction. In such
circumstances, the employer should contact law enforcement
immediately. 
The obtaining of criminal history records is highly desirable
for comprehensive background investigations of a new candidate.
A potential employee may sign a criminal background check
release form, including SSN, date of birth, any aliases used, and a
driver’s license number to expedite the search. This form should
be witnessed and notarized. Alternatively, an employer may ask
an applicant to obtain a Certificate of Good Conduct from the
police department of the communities in which the applicant has
lived. This should not be considered a definitive record since the
applicant may have committed a crime and been convicted and
punished in a different jurisdiction from the one in which the
applicant is currently residing and from which it is supplying
good conduct documentation. 
Employers of security personnel can satisfy their needs for
criminal records in communities in which state security guard reg-
istration exists and in which the state vets all such applications
through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The NCIC col-
lects and organizes records provided to it by state criminal justice
agencies. Thus, an employer may have a high level of confidence
that the applicant has not been convicted of a crime, making him
or her unfit for security employment, as defined by the offenses
cited as relevant in the states which require NCIC screening for
security personnel. At present, only a few states require such a vet-
ting measure. (For further discussion, see Chapter 10.) 
Is it possible for the applicant to possess a security conviction
and yet not have it revealed by comprehensive police record
checks? Yes. One way is by an error in the record-keeping process,
such as the failure of authorities to receive such information from
the state or local level. Another way is for the applicant to appeal
to a court for a certificate of relief to be granted after discharge
from incarceration or termination of parole. This certificate seals
the offender’s record from public scrutiny. An exception is for cer-
tain government jobs in which the applicant must agree to have
records of the offense unsealed temporarily for scrutiny by govern-
ment employment background investigators. 
In some employment situations, even a “clean” police record
does not necessarily mean that the applicant does not have a past
felony conviction. However, a diligent review of the applicant’s
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work history dates should reveal any unexplained time gap that
could reflect jail time or other reasons to give the employer pause. 
• Educational records. Over 4,000 post-secondary academic institu-
tions and programs exist in the U.S. About four out of five such
institutions will verify degrees received and years of attendance of
past students and graduates. Educational institutions will confirm
such requests by phone, mail, and fax, usually without charge. The
employer can provide a Request for Educational Verification
signed by the applicant for those institutions that do not readily
provide such information. 
If the employer desires a transcript of academic records, a
release generally is needed, including the name, year graduated,
campus attended, and SSN. At a few institutions, e-mail requests
by students for transcripts are accepted. The student’s signature is
required in order to release a transcript to a third party. The stu-
dent may request that the transcript be mailed directly to the pro-
spective employer, in which case the envelope should be retained
and be considered part of the document. Institutions usually
charge fees for transcripts. 
• Other records. Prospective employers may scrutinize other infor-
mation provided by the applicant. Some examples are vital statis-
tics, workers’ compensation records, and licenses. Verification of
such data may help raise the confidence level the employer has in
the applicant. Such information also sheds light on the applicant
that might otherwise not come to the attention of the employer.
Professional licenses and certificates may reveal such information
as the date of issuance, current status, expiration date, and field of
certification. A license and a certification are indications, but not a
guarantee, of competence. 
Disciplinary information from candidates usually is not
available from the granting authorities. In many cases, a person
disciplined by an organization responds by resigning from it.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to document credentials offered by a
potential worker prior to offering him or her employment. Candi-
dates might be asked to produce original diplomas or certificates
as proof of purported achievements. 
The Polygraph 
Efforts to determine the honesty of a person go back a long time. Many of
the techniques developed to identify honesty were crudely related to obser-
vations that psychological stress modifies behavior and physiology. The
early Chinese gave suspected liars rice powder and asked them to spit it out.
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If the powder was dry, then the person was believed to be dishonest. This
was based on the premise that lying affected emotion, which, in turn, had a
measurable physiological effect—in this case, deception was believed to
lower saliva production.10 In other cases, truth seekers used methods to
detect lies that were hardly reliable or scientific. These included the Ordeal
of the Red-Hot Stones and the Ordeal of the Red-Hot Iron.11 If the suspect
survived the walk on the coals or the touch of the iron, he or she was
deemed to be innocent of the charges. 
Determining what constitutes a lie and what constitutes the truth is not
always clear. Deception is a normal part of life. Not surprisingly, it fre-
quently occurs when a person wishes to obtain employment or some other
benefit and suppresses information that could damage that opportunity. But
in employment circumstances, the nature of the information required tends
to be specific. A prospective employer might desire unequivocal responses
to certain questions, such as “Are all the facts in your application for
employment true?” or “Have you ever stolen any item from a previous
employer valued at more than $25?” The answers to such questions, if rea-
sonably obtainable by some objective measurement, can be valuable in an
employment decision. This was an expectation of the polygraph examina-
tion in the U.S. until the late 1980s. 
Polygraph examinations originated in the 19th century, when an Ital-
ian criminologist named Cesare Lombroso invented a blood pressure
recording device that recorded pulse and blood pressure changes as subjects
were being questioned. William Multon Marston, a U.S. lawyer who also
studied psychology, publicized the possibilities of using Lombroso’s device
to aid in distinguishing truth-telling from deception.12 The first practical use
of a polygraph was undertaken by August Vollmer, police chief in Berkeley,
California. Vollmer assigned John A. Larson and later Leonarde Keeler to
develop the modern device. The instrument collects human physiological
responses to various yes or no questions. The device measures and records
minute blood pressure changes as questions are posed, and graphically dis-
plays changes in breathing, pulse, and electrodermal response. 
During a polygraph examination, subjects usually are put at ease and
are informed on how the examination will be conducted. Sensors are
attached physically to the interviewees and they are asked a series of rele-
vant questions about substantive matters, which are contrasted with irrele-
vant ones. The polygraph examiner identifies a baseline from physiological
responses to irrelevant questions and uses the points of comparison of rele-
vant questions to irrelevant ones to identify possible deception. This is
called the relevant/irrelevant technique. 
Over most of the 20th century, many law enforcement units, govern-
ment, and private industry in the U.S. used the polygraph as a means of
determining deception in pre-employment vetting, criminal investigation,
and for other purposes. But given the relativity of truth itself, is the poly-
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graph reliable for such use? In 1984, a Department of Defense research
report summarized 42 studies concerning the polygraph under varying cir-
cumstances. The report observed that the polygraph could create two kinds
of errors. False negative errors are erroneous decisions that an individual is
not deceptive when he or she is actually deceptive. False positive errors are
erroneous decisions that a person is being deceptive when he or she is being
actually truthful. These are the most frequent types of error. Nonetheless,
the report concluded: “Used with prudence, and a full knowledge of its lim-
itations, the polygraph will continue to play a role in our criminal justice
system and counterintelligence operations.”13
A year later, the Office of Technological Assessment (OTA), the
research arm of the U.S. Congress, conducted its own review and assess-
ment of the scientific evidence on the validity of polygraph testing at the
request of the House Committee on Government Operations.14 OTA’s find-
ings further underscored the broad utility of polygraph examination in
numerous applications, but concluded that unanswered questions remain
about the validity of polygraph use in some circumstances, such as pre-
employment screening. 
By the mid-1980s, according to an estimate based on a survey con-
ducted by the American Psychological Association (APA), as many as 5 mil-
lion polygraph examinations were administered in the private and public
sectors, mostly concerning private sector employment.15 Most observers in
the field believed that this estimate was far too high. A Congressional report
put the number of polygraph examinations at “over a million” a year—
300,000 of them for employment purposes alone in the private sector.16
About 20,000 federal exams were administered each year. But Congress, fac-
ing pressure from unions, passed the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
(EPPA) of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.). This act sought to discourage the
widespread use of polygraph testing in non-criminal investigations and it
succeeded in that regard. The EPPA prohibited most private employers from
using polygraph examinations either for pre-employment screening or dur-
ing the course of employment to detect any unreported workplace theft.
With the passage of this law, use of the polygraph decreased substantially in
the private sector. However, federal, state, and local government retained
the right to use the polygraph as part of their employment decisions, and
some governmental units continue to do so. 
Nonetheless, the polygraph was not totally excluded for use in pre-
employment circumstances. The act permits polygraph tests to be adminis-
tered in the private sector, subject to restrictions, to certain prospective
employees of security service firms. These include security guards and
armored car and alarm monitoring and response employees. Specifically, Sec-
tion 2006 of the EPPA does not provide blanket exemption on the use of the
polygraph for uniformed and plainclothes security personnel unless the per-
sonnel are being engaged in facilities, materials, and operations concerned
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with production, transmission, or distribution of electric or nuclear power;
public water supply facilities; shipments or storage of radioactive or other
toxic waste materials; and public transportation of currency, negotiable secu-
rities, precious commodities or instruments, or proprietary information. 
The EPPA does not elaborate on what constitutes “precious commodi-
ties or instruments,” or “proprietary information.” One national security
guard company claims that all of its new security personnel directly or even-
tually will be involved in such activities, which necessitates polygraph vet-
ting of all prospective security personnel. However, most other security
service providers, large and small, routinely have not required polygraph
screening since the passage of EPPA. Like other factors in employment deci-
sions, polygraph examinations have limitations (see Box 3.6). Other mea-
sures have grown in use and are discussed in the next section. 
Box 3.6. Beating the Polygraph: The Aldrich Ames Case 
Use of the polygraph by the military, law enforcement agencies, and national
security staffs has provided such success that government received exemption
from the polygraph limitations cited in the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act (EPPA) of 1988. However, nobody claims that results from a polygraph
examination are infallible. Spies have been trained to overcome the skills of an
experienced polygraph examiner by using tranquilizers, biofeedback tech-
niques, or pressing toes down at critical points during questioning. 
The most serious breach of security in the U.S. intelligence system
occurred despite the fact that the convicted traitor, Aldrich Ames, was given
routine polygraph tests by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) over an 11-
year period. Yet Ames was able to identify to the KGB at least 11 clandestine
CIA agents, four of whom were executed, plus other information. 
How was Ames able to overcome a system that appeared to have
worked well in the past? Ames, a veteran CIA case officer, seemed to do
nothing more devious than act friendly with his polygraph examiner. Ames
first started working with the KGB in 1985 for cash payments that eventu-
ally totaled $2.5 million. The year after he began spying, Ames was recorded
as deceptive on a polygraph question related to his personal finances. In
1991, deception also was reflected on a question as to whether he had ever
worked for the Soviet Union. In both circumstances, Ames was given four
days to rest and then retake the polygraph examination, which he then
passed. The deception on Ames’s 1991 relevant question as to possible spy-
ing was not forwarded to the FBI until two years later. Hence, it might be
said that Ames did not “beat the polygraph,” but that he “beat the system”
of evaluating such readings. 
Source: D. Waller, “How Ames Fooled the CIA,” Newsweek, May 9, 1994, p. 24. 
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Pre-Employment Testing 
Applicants for employment may be screened by a variety of standardized
objective instruments designed to measure personality, aptitudes, interests,
and achievements of potential employees. Test anxiety should be minimized
and coaching on how to achieve the desired results should be considered
unethical. Different types of test instruments are available to employers,
which will be discussed in the following sections. 
Psychological Stability. For some positions, prospective employers will
wish to be assured that all reasonable efforts have been made to identify and
assess relevant psychopathology in the applicant. Such testing is complex
and invariably involves collaboration with a psychologist trained in testing
methods. The potential employer normally is not interested in classification,
etiology (causation), methods of diagnoses, and other facets of abnormal
psychology, as interesting as they may be. The employer’s goal is to autho-
rize relevant tests that can identify abnormal traits that could lead to dan-
gerous or otherwise unacceptable work performance from such an
employee. For example, an employer is likely to be concerned with candi-
dates for employment who evidence mental disorders that would make
them risks in stressful circumstances where they would be required to carry
weapons.
A psychologist educated in personnel selection and training has many
psychological instruments from which to choose as part of a behaviorally
oriented screening process. These include the Minnesota Multiphasic Per-
sonality Inventory and the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire. 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is a self-
report test of 565 true-false questions. The MMPI was developed in the 1940s
to assess psychological adjustment problems in mental health settings. It
was developed empirically by finding items that separated two groups of
individuals: one with known psychiatric problems such as anxiety, depres-
sion, and psychosis, and the other, “normals.”17 Uses of the MMPI include
pre-employment screening, evaluation for promotion, performance assess-
ment, disability evaluation, and return-to-work evaluation. It is also used to
determine whether personality factors are related to job success. 
An individual taking the MMPI answers true-false questions, which
are assigned T-score values on different scales (for example, scale I = hypo-
chondriasis, scale II = depression, and so on). Profiles are then drawn for
comparisons to normals; these profiles can be created for highly specific
employment circumstances. In 1982, the MMPI was revised, that resulted in
the publishing of the MMPI-2 in 1989. The new version includes an updated
normative sample for seven regions of the U.S., and is balanced for demo-
graphic characteristics. 
Staffing to Meet Protective Goals 83
The value of the MMPI-2 as a screening instrument has been widely
recognized. The psychologists J.N. Butcher and S.A. Coelho describe the
scales that are valuable in evaluating candidates for law enforcement and
protection employment: 
Thus, it appears that common personality problems to be wary of in selection
of police and security personnel include applicants who are impulsive, superfi-
cial, overactive, manipulative, easily frustrated, and immature. These person-
ality traits are likely to show up in pre-employment screening as elevation on
scales 9 (mania), 4 (psychopathic deviate), 3 (hysteria), or 1 (hypochondria-
sis).18
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, MMPI-2 is considered to be
a medical test and, therefore, should be administered only after a condi-
tional job offer has been given to the applicant. MMPI-2 test results should
not be placed in an employee’s personnel file due to ethical requirements
mandating confidentiality of psychological and medical information. They
should be filed separately and securely. MMPI-2 results should not be used
solely as a basis to deny individuals employment consideration. Proper
interpretation—conducted by a trained psychologist—requires a review of
an individual’s life history and assessment of current functioning.19
Another psychological personality test used extensively for security
employment in the U.S. is the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire
(16PF), currently in its fifth edition. The 16PF has been the subject of more
than 4,000 published research articles. Like the MMPI-2, the 16PF requires
professional users to have had graduate training in psychological test inter-
pretation. Also like the MMPI-2, the 16PF is considered part of a “screen
out” assessment strategy for psychopathological potentials. The state of Cal-
ifornia currently requires it in the selection of all state police officers. The
16PF, which is composed of 185 items, is faster to take than the MMPI-2.
Testing can be self-administered through a reusable booklet or via computer
administration.
But such psychological tests are only part of a screening process. J.M.
Fabricatore, a psychologist who critiques such psychological instruments,
emphasizes the importance of considering testing results as only one factor
in an employment decision: 
Every security administrator/selection executive/chief of police would dearly
love to have a 10-min. unfakable psychological test that costs $3, can be scored
in 30 seconds, be interpreted by a non-professional, is ADA/EEOC invulnera-
ble, and has a predictive validity of 0.99. The difficult and complex truth is that
selecting applicants for security/law enforcement assignment is always a
human judgment.20
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The Clear Purpose Test. In addition to personality psychological tests,
another type of testing is even more widely used in pre-employment screen-
ing for security personnel. Many security employers—large and small—
screen all prospective employees with a test instrument that identifies spe-
cific personality and behaviorally oriented traits, particularly oriented
toward honesty. Unlike the MMPI-2, the 16PF, or others of the genre, these
“clear purpose” tests may be administered before an offer of employment is
contemplated. A version may be given to the applicant when he or she
enters the employment office for the first time. 
The term “clear purpose” refers to testing goals that focus on specific
qualities such as integrity, propensity of drug or alcohol use, and likelihood
of being terminated from employment for cause. A clear purpose test may
signal the presence of an undesirable workplace trait. For most of their his-
tory, these tests have been called paper-and-pencil instruments, and are
often self-administered with a pencil and booklet. But increasingly, the test-
taking process involves interface with a computer, which then scores results,
providing them instantly to clients. Other test-scoring variations exist,
including mailing, faxing, or e-mailing answer sheets to the test publishers
for scoring and results. 
Because of the importance of employee honesty, employers have been
eager to embrace objective pre-employment testing as part of the evaluative
process. Tests that focus on integrity traits have grown in importance for
entry-level employees in certain industries. These pre-employment screen-
ing instruments have achieved substantial support among security-con-
scious employers for a number of reasons, as shown in Table 3.2. Test
publishers have issued two types of measurements, either one of which—or
both—may be included in the same test. The first type is referred to as an
overt integrity test and measures theft attitudes. This type of test includes
questions about frequency and extent of theft and counterproductive activ-
ity in general; one’s punitiveness and rumination about theft; the perceived
ease of theft; and an assessment of one’s personal integrity.21 The second
type of test asks applicants to self-report their frequency and amount of theft
and other illegal or counterproductive activity. 
Other Tests. Another type of test, labeled as “disguised-purpose” or
“covert,” is linked to normal-range personality devices. These are broader in
scope and are not explicitly aimed at theft. The items do identify other desir-
able features in employment such as dependability, consciousness, social
conformity, thrill-seeking, trouble with authority, and hostility.22
Still another pre-interview questionnaire is created from a pool of true-
false items. The instrument identifies a set of questions that, it is believed,
are related to specific aspects of reliable and productive work behavior and
can differentiate against a population with contrary responses.23 These crite-
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Table 3.2. Pre-employment Integrity Screening Methods Compared 
Source: Adapted from J.W. Jones and W. Terris, “Selection Alternatives to Pre-employment 
Polygraph,” Recruitment Today, May/June 1989, pp. 24–31. 
Screening
Methods
Convenience
Issues
Main
Problems
Main
Advantages
Integrity
Tests (also 
called “clear 
purpose”
tests)
Can easily be 
made part of the 
usual screening 
procedure.
Company representa-
tive(s) must be trained to 
appropriately use test 
scores. 
Not all integrity tests are 
thoroughly validated. 
Should not be confused 
with clinical personality 
testing.
Validity evidence 
exists.
Generally non-offen-
sive.
No adverse impact 
(meets EEOC guide-
lines).
May discourage dis-
honest applicants from 
applying.
Personnel
Interviews
Usually part of hir-
ing procedure and 
are often time-
consuming.
No evidence of validity 
with theft criteria. 
Difficult to determine 
applicant’s truthfulness in 
discussing theft and coun-
terproductive activity. 
Can lead to charges of bias 
or discrimination. 
Inexpensive (already 
part of hiring proce-
dures). 
Structured interviews 
show more promise 
than traditional inter-
views.
Reference 
Checks
Are often time-
consuming.
Little evidence of validity. 
Most misconduct is unde-
tected.
Previous employer reluc-
tant to give negative infor-
mation.
May increase truthful-
ness of applicants. 
Verifies information 
provided on applica-
tion forms and 
resumes. 
Criminal
Background 
Checks
Commonly avail-
able, yet lengthy 
turnaround 
required. 
Not all criminals are on 
record. 
Likely to exhibit adverse 
impact.
Information obtained 
must be job-relevant. 
Many states are introduc-
ing restrictive legislation.
Complete, reliable, ver-
ifiable data can be 
obtained (although the 
process may be bur-
densome).
Credit 
Checks
Quick but some-
what costly.
Relevance to theft not 
clear. 
May not meet EEOC 
guidelines.
Obtains information 
relevant to financial 
need and fiscal respon-
sibility. 
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rion-keyed true-false questions plot the test takers’ responses for seven
scales, including trustworthiness and safe job performance. 
Other areas to consider with regards to pre-employment personality
tests include the following: 
Testing the Tests. Employers can select from numerous test publishers.
These publishers should meet certain criteria so that their tests follow legal
and privacy considerations, including: 
• Reliability. Tests should produce the same results from individu-
als who are retested. Publishers demonstrate this quality by retest-
ing and determining coefficients of agreement between the
original test and the retest. 
• Validity. Does the test deliver what it is supposed to? Test publish-
ers use a variety of research strategies to establish validity. These
include correlation with polygraph test results; correlation with
anonymous admissions; the use of a time series to examine aggre-
gate rates of inventory shortage before and after the introduction
of a test program; and the comparison of test performance by
groups hypothesized to differ in integrity (for example, felons
compared to test takers without criminal records).24
• Legality. The testing instrument must follow federal and state stat-
utes relating to pre-employment screening. If an applicant is
denied employment in part because of scores from a pre-employ-
ment test and institutes a legal action against the would-be
employer, the test publisher must be prepared to demonstrate how
its test conforms with such laws. 
• Utility. Assuming that a test meets the criteria of validity, reliabil-
ity, and legality, its utility to the workplace must also be estab-
lished. Major reviews of integrity tests were undertaken by the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 199025 and by a panel
from the APA26 in 1991. The OTA report was critical about integ-
rity testing, but neither called for legislative remedies nor sug-
gested alternatives. The APA report supported the validity of such
testing, but generally criticized test publishers for their failure to
cooperate with independent researchers. 
The OTA report found no studies conducted by independent
researchers in which detected theft was used as the criterion. How-
ever, a few years after the OTA report was released, H. John Ber-
nardin and Donna K. Cooke, at Florida Atlantic University, studied
a group of 111 employees hired by a major retail convenience store
chain over a three-year period.27 The researchers found that a test
designed to detect deviant/non-deviant characteristics success-
fully predicted theft for a group of convenience store employees.
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No significant differences on the test emerged as a function of race,
gender, or age. Other studies have identified the value of such tests
in reducing counterproductive behavior in the workplace.28
Job-Related Skills Testing 
Employers know from experience that prospective workers differ in terms
of personal abilities and behavioral characteristics. Apart from integrity and
counterproductive behavior, prospective employers can identify specific
minimum levels of skills required for the workplace. For example, security
employees who must write concise, coherent reports can be tested on their
writing abilities. Those who interact with the public can be evaluated on
their interpersonal problem-solving traits. Employers may learn from expe-
rience that certain personal characteristics are the marks of high-performing
employees in their industry and can obtain standard tests to use as a means
of identifying the presence of these desired characteristics. A vocationally
oriented psychologist can aid employers in selecting such tests. 
Reviewing the File 
In an ideal situation, at this point in the vetting process, a candidate for
employment might have had a brief interview, completed the application,
and have taken a clear purpose pre-employment screening test. Meanwhile,
personnel have used the time to verify information contained in the applica-
tion. This method has saved costly assets of the organization—namely, inter-
view time—from being deployed wastefully in interviewing candidates
who do not meet the requirements. An applicant may be scheduled for an
interview as the applicant’s employment folder is being completed. 
The Employment Interview 
Due to the time required, this is the most costly aspect of pre-employment
screening. Nonetheless, one or more interviews are desirable to evaluate
prospects for security employment before making a final decision. Many
reasons exist for why this widely used selection procedure is employed.
First, written and verbal references are valuable in providing insight into the
applicant’s fitness for the particular position, but can be incomplete. A per-
sonal interview can help to fill out missing information from references.
Next, the information collected prior to the interview often contains details
that are divergent with details provided by the applicant on the application
form. The interview provides an opportunity for these uncertainties to be
explained. Finally, the interview process may help the employer to deter-
mine the ability of the applicant to explain why she or he is interested in the
position and why he or she would or would not perform the job well. 
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The interview has many flaws, however. The applicant may be
coached to answer questions in a certain way in order to please the inter-
viewer, but that fail to reveal the true motivations behind seeking the posi-
tion. Also, some interviewers have biases that prevent them from objectively
identifying the best candidates for the available position. Indeed, computer-
based interviews might accomplish the same goals as face-to-face integrity
interviews, with greater objectivity and speed as well as less cost.29 Still,
most employers prefer that job prospects be interviewed because the inter-
view is an efficient means of resolving incomplete or confusing data about
the application. In addition, the face-to-face interview presents an opportu-
nity to examine a candidate’s non-verbal communication skills. Also, some
candidates might not accept a position in an organization in which they
were not interviewed personally. Finally, in positions of critical importance,
the opportunity to raise probing questions and ascertain how the applicant
deals with critical issues is afforded by the interview process. Just as the
application form—paper or electronic version—must avoid discriminatory-
type questions, the face-to-face interview must do the same (see Box 3.7). 
Box 3.7. Fair and Unfair Pre-employment Interview Questions
State and federal employment regulations guide what may or may not be
asked on applications and during interviews. The employer’s labor lawyer
or local human rights officials can direct employers to local variations in
prohibited questioning. Questions related to race, religion, and ethnic or
national origin are prohibited. The following are other general topics of
what is fair or unfair to ask: 
Unfair Inquiries Fair Inquiries 
Age of applicant If the applicant will be older than a certain age, say 
21, at the time the job will begin 
Citizenship The applicant must be able to complete an I-9 form 
to prove his or her right-to-work in the U.S. 
Arrests Felony and relevant misdemeanor convictions 
Marital status or 
dependent children
If the applicant has any reason why he or she might 
not be able to work certain hours if the job ordinarily 
would require it 
Military discharge Request a DD214 as part of the screening process 
Medical history Require medical tests before a final offer of employ-
ment is extended 
Submit a photograph May be taken once a job offer has been made 
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Interviews might be in the form of a single individual session, several
sessions over an extended period of time, a panel involving two or more
interviewers with the interviewee at the same time, or a combination of
these. The trend at the entry level is to conduct one or two brief interviews
so that a variety of candidates can be compared. At the management and
executive level, the trend is toward multiple contacts over an extended
period of time with different persons involved, all of whom eventually pool
their observations before a decision is made. 
The interview may last from a few minutes to over an hour. The inter-
view process can be construed to be a test. Therefore, interviewers should
assure that the questions raised relate to requirements of the job. Typically,
interview types are divided into several categories: 
• Structured. The questions follow a progression and often are pre-
pared in advance. The interviewer may ask every prepared ques-
tion to every candidate.30 This is the most frequently used
interview style, though aspects of other types may be included.
Interviewers take this opportunity to ascertain technical and inter-
personal skills. Interviewers are likely to ask a series of open-
ended questions that require the applicant to respond at length,
rather than with a yes or no answer. An example of an open-ended
question is: “Tell me about a problem you encountered in your
previous position and how you overcame it.” 
• Unstructured. This type of interview is more free in form and
often seems random, with features of an informal conversation.
Information is likely to be copiously provided by the candidate,
but it may not be adequately job related. 
• Depth. This style is used for careful evaluation of the candidate’s
fitness for a particular critical position. It may carefully review
contents of the application form and raise hypothetical situations
calling for on-the-spot problem solving by the applicant. 
• Panel. To the applicant, interviews by two or more people at the
same time may seem more stressful, but this is not necessarily so.
Panel interviews permit several interested persons within manage-
ment to make a collective decision and to permit the same verbal
responses and non-verbal cues to be evaluated by more than one
person.
• Stress. This type of interview is similar to the structured type
except that it introduces difficult and sometimes challenging ques-
tions to the applicant to ascertain how he or she might react. In
some cases, this interviewing format poses questions for which no
plausible answer is available or for which the applicant is highly
unlikely to possess the information required in order to properly
answer the questions. 
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Assessing the Candidates 
With the completion of the pre-employment screening process, management
must now decide which candidates should be offered positions. All the
information that has been collected will be assessed. This may be conducted
by the employer or by an independent reviewer who has not personally met
the candidate. 
To determine whether the employer is discriminating against a pro-
tected class in its testing or screening process, data should be retained on
who passes the process and who fails. If the pass ratio of the percentage in
the protected group is less than four-fifths of the majority group, the
employer may be creating an adverse impact, according to the law.31
Example:
Percent passing from the protected group: 50 percent 
Percent passing from the majority group: 75 percent 
Ratio = .50/.75 = .667 or 67 percent 
Four-fifths = .8 or 80 percent 
Therefore, this test does not meet requirements of the “four-fifths rule” and
is not in compliance with EEOC guidelines. The employer would be advised
to re-evaluate the screening process, determine why some groups are being
excluded, and revise the process in accordance with the findings. 
Pre-Employment Drug Screening 
Many workplaces have a drug-testing policy. It usually requires such testing
after a conditional offer of employment has been made. All applicants
should be informed in writing of the organization’s substance abuse policy
and drug screening procedures. In cases in which the potential employer
conducts work on behalf of the federal or state government, such a policy is
a legal requirement. For example, in Title V of the Omnibus Drug Initiative
Act of 1988, including a provision with the short title of the Drug-Free Work-
place Act of 1988 (PL 100-609), all businesses contracting with the federal
government and all grantees receiving federal financial assistance must cer-
tify that they have in place policies directed toward the creation and mainte-
nance of a drug-free workplace.32 The act does not require pre-employment
drug screening. However, many organizations establish this procedure as a
policy. 
Prospective employees should be requested to sign an informed con-
sent form to permit substance abuse testing. This notice may state that a con-
firmed positive result may produce a rejection of an employment offer. The
form may also state that the failure to consent to the test will result in the
application process being incomplete, hence, not leading to a final offer of
employment.
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Screening test samples are usually analyzed at clinical centers. The
usual technique is an Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT),
which analyzes the urine sample of the prospective employee. This mea-
sures the presence of a drug or drug metabolite by comparing a test sample
of urine with a reference solution. The test requires about 90 seconds to pro-
duce a reading. A positive reading for the detection of substances tested
requires an additional confirmatory test before results are shared with the
applicant or a decision about employment should be made by management.
A second test, with greater specificity than the initial procedure, is con-
ducted. An example of this is gas chromatography/massspectroscopy (GC/
MS). Preferably, the test is conducted on the initial urine sample. Organiza-
tions should engage the services of clinical laboratories meeting high profes-
sional standards to minimize false positives and to assure test accuracy
while minimizing cost of the tests. 
The employer may decide that a medical examination for general
health determination might also be required after a conditional offer of
employment. This may occur when the applicant has had physical disabili-
ties in the past and the employer requires a medical opinion on the potential
for recurrence of the problem. 
The Final Offer of Employment 
Following the collection of all relevant information on the applicant, includ-
ing drug and medical documentation, a final offer of employment is
extended. The next step in the employment process is orientation and train-
ing, subjects of great concern to successful security operations management. 
SUMMARY
The secret of success in many organizations is to hire and retain the right
people. Reliable pre-employment screening is at the core of successful oper-
ations management. This is particularly the case for protection programs.
Security personnel are selected in much the same way as other workers in an
organization; however, higher standards for determining applicants’ previ-
ous legal, moral, and ethical behavior guide employment decisions. 
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. Why is it incumbent upon employers of security personnel to vet
prospective employees more thoroughly than in non-security posi-
tions?
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2. In a civil action, how can a claim of negligent hiring have a better
chance of succeeding? 
3. What is the risk to security operations managers if they are person-
ally cited in a civil action involving a claim of negligent security? 
4. What are the inherent risks of personal references? What are the
desirable reasons for retaining such procedures despite the limita-
tions?
5. How have technology and the Internet changed pre-employment
screening? 
6. Several federal acts protect the privacy of individuals. If an employer
in the process of screening an application discovers an open arrest
record for an applicant, what is the recommended course of action? 
7. Does the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) make an excep-
tion for certain employers? If so, who are they? 
8. Explain the difference between reliability and validity in pre-
employment tests. 
9. Under what circumstances might a test for psychological stability be
highly desirable in employing security personnel? 
10. Explain how the “four-fifths rule” serves as a means of identifying
employment bias. 
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4
TRAINING AND 
DEVELOPMENT FOR 
HIGH PERFORMANCE 
Training is everything. The peach was once a bit-
ter almond; cauliflower is nothing but cabbage
with a college education. 
—Mark Twain, Pudd’nhead Wilson
The training of employees and the development of their skills and careers is
a critical and time-consuming activity within security operations. Successful
training is directly linked to high performance on the job. High standards
are more likely to be achieved with a relevant, engaging period of learning.
Successful training ensures that the employees meet the short-term needs of
the employer, while further development enhances the skills and career
paths of workers. It also provides the organization with employees who
understand the corporate culture and who are prepared to meet the future
needs of the workplace. Numerous approaches regarding training and
development have been used in the history of management. Before consid-
ering them, the organization needs to establish the training and develop-
ment resources required and how to teach new employees their tasks. 
Security as a vocation is constantly changing. Skills need to be kept up
to date, and relevant knowledge must be shared with workers. Yet at the
operational level, security is not akin to a skilled craft in which a period of
apprenticeship is expected. Usually, security knowledge and procedures
needed, say, before an initial patrol or system monitoring assignment, can be
taught much more quickly than in an apprenticeship. But security practitio-
ners at all levels must constantly learn more about their endeavors. Training
and education thus not only help work become more satisfying for individu-
als, but also produce direct benefits to the employer as well. 
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WHY TRAIN ANYHOW? 
Training provides employees with the skills and information needed to do
the job well. However, additional factors mandate the importance of secu-
rity training. These are more relevant than in many other vocations. The fol-
lowing are the main reasons why training is important in high-performance
security programs: 
1. The law requires security training in many states. Pre-assignment or
initial training is required in a number of states, and the trend for
such state-mandated learning is continuing. According to data col-
lected by Guardsmark, Inc., in 1986, 12 states required pre-assign-
ment training for unarmed security officers. By 2000, that number
had grown to 18 (see Box 4.1). Requirements for armed security offic-
ers grew from 22 states in 1986 to 33 states in 2000. 
2. Many states also require refresher training. The states that mandate
refresher training for unarmed security officers have grown from
two in 1986, to six in 2000. Meanwhile, refresher training for armed
officers was mandated in 24 states in 2000. 
3. Many security positions require more training than the legal mini-
mum or a few hours prior to the initial assignment. Security officers
who deal extensively with the public, who are armed, who are
expected to respond appropriately in emergencies, and who interact
with complex technology are examples of those who require more
training than the minimum. The length of such training and educa-
tion will be according to the actual need. For example, in schools
where Peace Officer Standards of Training (POST) exist, school secu-
Box 4.1. Security Officers’ State Training Requirements (Based on the 50
States Plus the District of Columbia) 
Source: Guardsmark, Inc., December 1986 and June 30, 2000. 
Number/percentage
Requirements 1986 2000
Initial/Pre-assignment 12/23% 18/35%
Unarmed Refresher 2/4% 6/12%
Armed Pre-assignment 22/43% 33/65%
Armed Refresher ? 24/47%
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rity officers usually are required to complete a minimum of 40 hours
pre-assignment training.1 In other cases, training of security officers
can last weeks. For example, three weeks of pre-assignment training,
in addition to state-mandated training, are required by New York
City’s Health and Human Resources Administration before security
personnel are assigned to homeless shelters. And in Sweden, secu-
rity officers for a private security services company are trained
almost six months before being assigned to certain government-con-
tracted assignments. 
4. Training and retraining produce important measurable benefits.
Training reduces risk and loss. Research by Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Company indicates that a mere 2 percent of industrial accidents
occur because employees didn’t know how to perform the task
safely or properly.2 Only 6 percent of accidents are due to equipment
failure. The vast majority of industrial accidents—92 percent—hap-
pen because workers failed to perform their tasks properly. Perfor-
mance deficit may be diminished by training and refresher
retraining. 
5. Lack of adequate training may be the basis of a successful tort action.
The failure to provide adequate training for security personnel can
lead to a successful plaintiff’s action for negligent security that could
be upheld at an appellate level. David A. Maxwell, a lawyer and
educator specializing in protective matters, writes: “Employees
should be subjected to training prior to assignment. . . When the role
at hand involves a potential for harm or injury, the standard for
training rises to the risks.”3 Courts have held that when employees
are not trained on how or how not to use weapons and an injury
results, the employer may be negligent. 
6. Requiring security officers to be trained is a reasonable public policy. In
the 1950s and 1960s, the average police officer possessed a high school
education and was trained in a police academy for a few weeks. Today,
police officers in cities and industrialized states often must possess a
minimum number of college credits or an awarded academic degree in
order to be considered for law enforcement. Meanwhile, academy
training averages five to six months for urban police forces. 
7. Workers value employers who provide good training. Many workers
are attracted to employers who provide training programs and edu-
cational benefits. This self-selection enhances the quality of the pool
of prospective employees. Once hired and trained, employees are
likely to remain longer with such employers, returning to the work-
place the benefits of the training and education they have achieved. 
The analogy between public police and private security services is
awkward and debatable on many points. Yet it is apparent that many simi-
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larities also exist between the two. Private security personnel “protect and
serve” in much the same way as police officers on patrol do, albeit on pri-
vate property and for private interests. Therefore, it is reasonable as a public
policy that security officers be trained to a level at which they can do their
jobs well, while understanding the legal rights and limitations of their roles.  
THE TRAINING MANAGER OR OFFICER 
High-performance security training programs are headed by training man-
agers or supervisors. Their responsibilities include consulting on training
policy and content with senior managers and others involved in establishing
training goals. They further seek to ensure that such objectives are achieved.
The training manager or supervisor organizes internal training courses and
may teach some or all of them. Typically, such a person is closely involved in
the instruction of new employees and newly promoted supervisors. The
chief trainer is expected to remain informed of the latest materials and tech-
nologies to enhance learning of all who come under his or her tutelage. This
person also is involved in the evaluation of training programs, though anal-
ysis of training results may occur elsewhere in the organization. 
The training department itself may be a single person who juggles
other responsibilities. In smaller programs, the security manager serves as
the chief trainer, but also has other responsibilities. Large departments may
have several staff members, mount a variety of programs, and produce their
own curricula and training aids. Trainers may be obliged to use whatever
space can be assembled or they may use a specially designed and dedicated
learning facility, perhaps with distance learning capabilities. 
PLANNING TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Security-oriented programs require different types of training for different
purposes. In most organizations, entry-level training receives the greatest
attention. These programs cannot become static. Key aspects in training pro-
grams require review and renewal so that programmatic information
remains fresh and pertinent. 
Changes in the workplace and society make good training and devel-
opment important. Many executives think of training as a cost burden.
However, the training process should provide precise, desired results for
management, with measurable changes in workplace performance. Training
methods welcome experimentation in order to improve results and reduce
costs. For example, technology-based learning can decrease the cost and
enhance learning effectiveness for new workers.4 Students remain with the
program until all critical elements can be tested and passed. 
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While a large number of vocations require some pre-assignment train-
ing, that obligation is particularly clear-cut for security positions. The Report
of the Task Force on Private Security refers to training as “a vital determinant of
job performance” and proposes standards that would be monitored by state
boards.5 Several states have mandated specific requirements for training for
security personnel: proprietary and contract workers by law must meet a
prescribed curriculum possibly involving pre-assignment training, post-
assignment training, and periodic retraining. Security programs are obliged
to keep details of individual training achievements for use in potential civil
litigation for alleged inadequate training.6
In today’s Information Age, the need for training and personal devel-
opment is never-ending. Consequently, effective operations must be on the
alert for any new specialized training that is required, including short ses-
sions on new laws, technologies, and strategies. 
Training is thus defined as a process of learning specific skills and
knowledge required by the employee to carry out an existing job or to com-
plete a new one. It is vocationally oriented. The process is mostly aimed at
operational-level workers, both proprietary and contract. Training merges
with a separate learning category, development, which seeks to advance the
informational, critical, and analytical skills of persons responsible for mana-
gerial and executive responsibilities. Development will be discussed later in
this chapter. For now, we will look at the initial contact of a new employee
with the formal organization. 
THE ORIENTATION 
Orientation introduces new employees to the history, ethos, objectives, and
available resources of the organization. In large organizations, orientation
and training programs may be in the hands of dedicated personnel. How-
ever, operational-minded managers generally are involved closely with the
training process. They are likely to appear at orientation sessions to make
new employees feel welcome and to emphasize the personal concerns of the
director. 
An orientation provides a variety of information types to new employ-
ees. The orientation process usually serves as a welcome to new employees
from representatives of management and contains the following elements: 
• The history and ethical basis of the organization 
• What management expects from all employees 
• What employees can expect from management 
• What the organization does; its trends 
• Characteristics of the department where the employee will be
assigned
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• The reporting structure (an organizational chart may be provided) 
• The purpose of security in the organization and the value manage-
ment places on it 
• Security and safety policies at the workplace 
The orientation covers certain fundamentals so that all new employees
will become familiar with the same organizational requirements and expec-
tations as those who have gone before them. Orientation also covers practi-
cal information, such as keys to be assigned; hours to be worked; payroll
procedures; the restroom locations and use policy; the alcohol and drugs
policy; the firearms policy; the personal telephone use policy; and the policy
regarding personal visitors. Some employers request that new employees
sign a statement that they have heard and understood policies introduced
during the orientation process. 
At such an orientation, new workers complete forms required for tax
and statutory benefits purposes. The company handbook is distributed and
may be reviewed in depth with the new employees by the orientation leader.
At the conclusion of the orientation phase, new workers typically feel
upbeat about having achieved an offer of employment from the organiza-
tion and they are now eager to learn specifically how they are expected to
perform their work.
Training Content 
Prior to beginning the training process, the operating manager will expend
considerable energy to identify what information should be transmitted to
new employees. No two employers are likely to be identical in their training
objectives, protocols, and needs. Content of the training program will
emerge from the ethos and needs of particular employers. Still, some sub-
jects related to security services are likely to be found in most programs. 
The content of the training material should be related to the job
description created for the position being filled. The frequency and impor-
tance of various tasks undertaken by the workers should be related to the
amount of training time allocated. For example, fires at the workplace are
not frequent occurrences, but they are emergencies when they do occur.
Therefore, adequate time should be provided for the worker to learn about
fire suppression equipment and use. 
The following are specific training factors for certain types of security
personnel:
Pre-assignment Training. Security personnel require training, subsequent
to orientation, before being assigned to a position in an operating program.
The number of hours devoted to this phase of training is variable. For exam-
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ple, the State of New York currently requires 8 hours of pre-assignment
training followed by 16 hours of basic training within the first 90 days of
employment.7 The Task Force on Private Security in 1976 recommended a
minimum of eight hours formal pre-assignment training with a minimum of
32 hours of basic training within three months of assignment. In the Task
Force’s standards, a maximum of 16 hours could be supervised on-the-job
training. Many employers, however, combine pre-assignment training with
basic training before the employee is assigned a position. The number of
hours that organizations actually train security employees differs widely.
Most train for the minimum number of hours required by law; however,
some programs have determined that extensive additional training is neces-
sary due to the nature of the demands of such protective employees. 
The trend in the U.S. and in other industrial nations is to increase the
level of initial training required before personnel are assigned to posts of
responsibility. This is because of the growing legal burden to train security
personnel so that they are aware of their legal obligations in dealing with the
public. Failure to understand such principles could lead to a charge of inad-
equate security in a tort action. Employers may also increase the amount of
training because security employees often must interact with complex sys-
tems or because further job-specific training is necessary.  
Workers generally require training even if they come to the job with
experience in police departments, the military, private security companies,
or in proprietary security departments that have provided training of their
own. This is because the employer will wish to be assured that permanent
employees share the common curriculum of all employed in such positions.
An exception to this policy is usually made for temporary security workers
who work under close supervision and for active police officers who are
working temporarily, that is, moonlighting, in security positions. 
The eight-hour pre-assignment training course, proposed by the Task
Force for entry-level security personnel, is divided into four segments: ori-
entation; legal powers and limitations; handling emergencies; and general
duties, as shown in Table 4.1. The course is to be used in classroom instruc-
tion, possibly in conjunction with audio-visual aids, and is concluded with a
test to assure that the content has been understood and mastered. 
Basic Training. As previously mentioned, many employers combine orien-
tation with pre-assignment training and basic training. However, some
employers prefer to provide basic training in modules over time for new
security workers. The Task Force on Private Security recommends a mini-
mum of 32 hours of basic training in addition to the pre-assignment phase,
as shown in Table 4.2. This training should be completed over a three-month
period and may include a maximum of 16 hours on-the-job training.
The growth of training required for security personnel is similar in
some ways to the increased training for public law enforcement officers. In
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Table 4.1. Private Security Eight-Hour Pre-assignment Training Course 
Source: Based on a model originally prepared by the Private Security Advisory Council, 
included in their Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Statute. 
Section I: Orientation 
Two hours are spent on the following topics: 
• What is security? 
• Public relations 
• Deportment 
• Appearance 
• Maintenance and safeguarding of uniforms and/or equipment 
• Note-taking/Reporting 
• Role of public law enforcement 
Section II: Legal Powers and Limitations 
Two hours are spent on the following topics: 
• Prevention versus apprehension 
• Use of force 
• Search and seizure 
• Arrest powers 
Section III: Handling Emergencies 
Two hours are spent on the following topics: 
• Crimes in progress 
• Procedures for bomb threats 
• Procedures during fires, explosions, or other emergencies 
• Responding to alarms 
Section IV: General Duties 
Two hours are spent on the following topics: 
• Fire prevention and control 
• Inspections 
• Interviewing techniques 
• Patrol procedures 
• Safeguarding valuable property 
• Safety 
• Surveillance 
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Table 4.2. Private Security 32-Hour Basic Training Course 
(continues)
NOTE: A minimum of four and a maximum of 16 classroom hours should be 
allocated in each of the following sections, and a maximum of 16 hours of 
supervised on-the-job training should be permissible. 
Section I: Prevention/Protection 
• Patrolling 
• Checking for hazards 
• Personnel control 
• Identification systems 
• Access control 
• Fire control systems 
• Types of alarms 
• Law enforcement/private security relationships 
Section II: Enforcement 
• Surveillance 
• Techniques for searching 
• Crime scene searching 
• Handling juveniles 
• Handling mentally disturbed persons 
• Parking and traffic 
• Enforcing employee work rules/regulations 
• Observations/description 
• Preservation of evidence 
• Criminal/civil law 
• Interviewing techniques 
Section III: General Emergency Services 
• First aid 
• Defensive tactics 
• Fire fighting 
• Communications 
• Crowd control 
• Crimes in progress 
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1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals recommended 400 hours training for sworn police officers. Since then,
most urban police departments require police cadets to successfully pass
requirements in a program that is about six months in length. Smaller
departments also require academy training, but the time allocated is closer
to the 400 hours proposed in 1973. In policing and security, instruction on
legal issues, public relations, and new technology add to the quantity of
time required in order to be fully effective in these jobs. 
Firearms Training. The vast majority of private security personnel are not
armed in the course of their employment; however, some are. Security offic-
ers who are expected to carry firearms in the course of their employment
invariably face additional burdens on training. The Task Force on Private
Security recommends that security personnel be required to complete suc-
cessfully a 24-hour firearms course that includes legal and policy require-
ments, or submit evidence of competency and proficiency, prior to
assignment to a job that requires a firearm. The course of training is divided
into classroom and range components, as shown in Table 4.3. 
Weapons proficiency requirements should be met on an annual basis if
the employee continues to require the weapon as part of his or her duties.
State and local requirements for the possession and use of firearms provide
specific regulations about firearms retraining and range experience for that
Table 4.2. (Continued)
Source: Private Security: Report of the Task Force on Private Security (1976). Washington, DC: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, p. 103. 
Section IV: Special Problems 
• Escort services 
• Vandalism 
• Arson 
• Burglary 
• Robbery 
• Theft 
• Drugs/Alcohol 
• Shoplifting 
• Sabotage 
• Espionage 
• Terrorism 
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particular jurisdiction. Instructors are recommended to be qualified through
the National Rifle Association or other comparable qualifications program. 
The armored car industry, which requires most service employees to
carry firearms, has created its own set of standards. The Training Committee
of the National Armored Car Association has proposed an outline of basic
firearms training for its employees, as shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.3. Proposed Standards for Security Guard Firearms Training  
Classroom-Based Training 
Topic I: Legal and police restraints (3 hours) 
• Rights of private security personnel to carry weapons and the power
of arrest 
• Statutory references 
• Policy restraints 
Topic II: Firearms safety and care and cleaning of the revolver (2 hours) 
• Nomenclature and operation of the weapon 
• Performance of cartridge 
• Safety practices on duty and at home 
• Range rules 
• Care and cleaning of the weapon 
Topic III: Successful completion of written examination (1 hour) 
• At least 20 minutes on the above topics with a minimum passing
score of 70% 
• Should be designed so that persons with other or prior experience
can demonstrate competence in the subject areas. 
Range-Based Training 
Topic I: Principles of marksmanship (2 hours) 
Topic II: Single-action course (8 hours) 
• A silhouette target with a distance of 25 yards is used with 30 rounds
fired under different circumstances for qualification of which the
minimum passing score is 18 hits (60%) 
Topic III: Double-action course (8 hours) 
• The distance and target are the same, but trainees operate from a
crouching position under different circumstances and must score 43
hits out of 72 attempts (60%) 
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Investigative Training. Investigators vary widely according to their assign-
ment type. Usually, a combination of classroom, home study, and on-the-job
training is provided. For example, the May Corporation, a major retailing
chain, has produced a 60-day training program for undercover operatives.
Much of this time is spent observing the performance of highly proficient
security investigators. This field experience is supported with study of a
proprietary manual. After considerable observation and discussion, the
store detective is ready to operate, with the instructor acting as a coach. 
Ongoing Training. This refers to flexible, continuous, individualized pro-
grams to ensure that private security personnel are kept informed of perti-
nent developments in the field. This information is provided during roll-call
training, by visits from supervisors to security personnel on posts, with
mailed or distributed training bulletins, and by other means. This may be
provided through bulletins, telephone messages, e-mail, and other means
that can inform security personnel of important subjects that are not related
to the day-to-day routine. Such means serve to emphasize best practices.
Easily forgotten procedures can be reviewed and emphasized with testing. 
TRAINING TECHNIQUES 
Training may be achieved by using a number of techniques that are adapt-
able to specific needs. Most of these approaches are suitable for entry-level
operational personnel, but they can be successfully used at other employ-
ment levels as well. 
Table 4.4. Firearms Training for Armored Car Personnel 
Source: Training Committee of the National Armored Car Association. 
• Company and industry policy on use of weapons 
• Legal limitations 
• Firearms safety 
• Care in firearms cleaning 
• Basic revolver training 
• Combat firing 
• Use of gunports 
• Use of shotgun 
• Qualification and certification 
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Classroom
Training individuals classroom-style has many advantages. One instructor
can provide training to many learners at the same time. In addition, numer-
ous learning aids (lectures, discussions, films, videotapes, computer aided
demonstrations, role playing, and others) can be used during the same train-
ing process. For these reasons, classroom training is efficient, uniform, and
economical. Furthermore, this method promotes bonding among new
employees who come to know each other as fellow learners in a supportive
setting. Classroom instruction is valuable for all tiers of learning. 
At the management level of training, the case history method is some-
times used. This introduces a hypothetical or an actual unresolved organiza-
tional problem, with the management options then considered. Often,
groups of managers work in teams to compete with each other in identifying
optimal solutions. 
Case histories have been an integral part of training and education for
over a century. Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the case history
method to students at Harvard Law School in the 1880s. This method
replaced the previous technique of law school professors slowly reading
their notes to students, who would copy them and later commit their points
to memory. The case history method extended from law schools to other
educational venues, including graduate education in business and manage-
ment.8 Participants in case history learning experiences absorb considerable
information about a situation and are asked to analyze the material and
present their own recommendations to help the organization resolve its
identified problem. This helps participants enhance their understanding of
specific circumstances while at the same time hone their decision-making
skills. In less challenging circumstances, hypothetical case histories are used
to replace extended real-life examples for edification and discussion. Lead-
ers often pose questions for students such as “How could the developments
in this situation have been avoided?” or “What other circumstances does
this circumstance remind you of?” or “What are the hidden losses in this
case scenario?” 
The disadvantage of the classroom method is that it may be too pas-
sive. Learners are present physically and may appear to participate in the
learning process, but actually may tune out or not comprehend the neces-
sary information. Further, classroom instructors vary considerably accord-
ing to their effectiveness. While most are enthusiastic about helping
students learn, some cover material inadequately, serving as harmful role
models for new employees. Additionally, classroom training is not hands-on
training. Lecturers may discuss procedures and share illustrative or per-
sonal experiences to make points clearer; however, if the learner needs to
interact with technology or others, he or she may need direct exposure to
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these circumstances, guided by the instructive presence of an experienced
worker. This process is described next.  
On-the-Job (OTJ) Training 
This type of training occurs while employees perform actual job-related
activities. They are neither in a classroom nor in another type of learning
facility, though these may be incorporated in the process. The learner is in an
actual work location guided by an experienced, competent, and reliable
worker who serves as a supportive instructor. For example, novice store
detectives learn the craft of making successful apprehensions by observing
and shadowing experienced detectives. The detective trainees do not make
apprehensions, but observe them, participate in interrogations, and may
witness the signing of apprehension reports. In time, the instructor will
determine whether the learner is prepared to conduct his or her own appre-
hension, and at this point the new employee will be encouraged to do so
under supervision. If the apprehension is conducted generally as desired, it
will signify that the OTJ training process has achieved its objectives and that
the store detective will begin to work under less direct supervision. 
Managers are generally positive about OTJ training because the learn-
ing process is direct and relevant. Instructors may describe the desired per-
formance and then watch someone learning the new skills. Errors can be
identified and corrected immediately and on the spot. Desired behavior can
be supported by immediate praise, re-enforcing the desired actions. The dis-
advantage of OTJ training is that it is costly. While the instructor and learner
are conducting useful work during the training process, the quantity of
work achieved is no more than what a single experienced worker alone
would perform, and often less. Furthermore, OTJ training depends on the
availability of motivated instructors who will nurture the learning of others.
Not all of even the most highly qualified workers are able to meet these
requirements. 
Computer-Aided Instruction 
Computer-based learning has had a substantial influence on the training
process in recent years. Unquestionably, this dynamic process is continuing
and will aid learning endeavors by increasing interactivity. Program enrich-
ment and dramatic special effects make the material memorable. 
The subject material is logically created, presented in programmed for-
mat, often enlivened with animation and audio materials, and designed to
elicit responses to assure comprehension of the material. When the learner
answers a question correctly, the program acknowledges it—often with per-
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sonal references that may be part of the programming: “Good work,
Joseph!” “That’s your fifth correct answer, Tina!” If the learner presents an
incorrect answer to a question, the program will suggest “try again” and
await the correct answer to provide the expected praise. In some cases, the
learner will be referred back to earlier materials in the sequence where the
critical information was initially presented. By this looping back process, the
learner will review and presumably understand the desired instructional
material before being able to proceed further with the lesson. Unlike con-
ventional learning, where some students will have full comprehension and
others “passable” but incomplete learning, computer-aided instruction
allows full achievement by all participants. Further, the training manager
will have details on what questions in the testing sequence a particular stu-
dent initially had trouble with. These wrong answers may suggest the need
for additional training by the learner. However, they may also indicate that
the teaching material was not sufficiently clear or compelling for learners to
understand more quickly what was to be comprehended. 
The disadvantages of computer-aided instruction relate to complexity
and cost. The learning process is related to specific facts, policies, and proce-
dures. The time and effort required to create the learning segment of this
type of instruction is extensive, though computer techniques have reduced
the costs in the past and promise increasing future efficiencies. Still, the pro-
gramming activity often has a designed rigidity that makes the student less
able to deal with unexpected occurrences, so frequently part of security
experience. That’s why computer-aided learning is rarely the sole way train-
ers have employees learn new material. And although computer learning
gives all participants a full understanding of the key points in the subject
material, retention of such information will differ among learners. 
Computer-aided instruction may supplement other modes of training.
Such instruction may be delivered at workstations as part of instructor-led
courses, at commercial learning centers, within a corporate or security depart-
ment training center, or wherever the learner has access to a computer with a
modem. Some programs may be self-paced and delivered via laptops. Pro-
grams are available for different levels of complexity—from entry-level basic
patrol instruction to advanced systems and data security (see Box 4.2). 
Box 4.2. Outline of an Advanced Security Programming Course: Imple-
menting Windows NT Security 
The following program provides an example of a course to be learned over
five days. Hands-on exercises provide the learner with practical experience.
These include observing a brute force attack on NTFS files, using tools to
gain unauthorized administrator privileges, and controlling access to files
using privileges and permissions. 
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Box 4.2. (Continued)
Introduction to Windows NT Security 
• An Overview of Security Objectives 
• Developing a Windows NT Security Policy 
• Trusted Computing Base (TCB) 
Encryption and Authentication 
• Encryption Techniques 
• Authentication Methods 
Windows NT C2 Certification 
• Microsoft’s Security Commitment 
• Practical Implications of C2 Security 
Administering Windows NT Security 
• The NT Security Sub-system 
• NT Security in Action 
• Planning Domains 
• Managing Accounts and Groups 
• Password Vulnerabilities 
Object Security 
• Overview of Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
• The Registry 
• The NT File System (NTFS) 
Auditing Windows NT 
• Mechanics of Auditing 
• Common Auditing Scenarios 
Network Security 
• Protecting Shared Resources 
• Identifying and Preventing Attacks 
• Securing Networked NT 
The Evolution of NT Security 
Source: Learning Tree International 
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Audio-Visual (AV) Materials 
Security management facilities may possess rich resources of films and tapes
for training and educational purposes. AV resources can enliven classroom
learning and may also be incorporated into computer-aided instruction. AV
resources are valued because they can draw upon dramatic situations, actual
images from past crimes or incidents, and the use of corporate officials or
professional actors to convey desired messages. AV materials use voice,
action, and special effects just like any Hollywood production. 
AV materials have an initial high cost for acquisition, but they can be
used and reused for future training iterations. Some AV programs for security
use include a manual for instructors and student handouts. AV material can
be exciting and informative when well produced, although a few productions
fail to achieve their desired goals and are boring, while other films can quickly
become dated and obsolete. The trainer will preview such materials and select
those that best meet the needs of the workplace. Often site-specific AV materi-
als can be developed on videotape or digital format at moderate cost. 
Demonstrations
Often following the acquisition of new products, systems, and software,
employees must be trained in their use. Such training may be provided with
demonstrations of the actual materials acquired and intended to be used in
the workplace. (Occasionally, such products may be “demo-ed” prior to
their purchase to obtain critical feedback from workers.) Demonstrations
may be incorporated into OTJ training and classroom training as well. For
new products and services that are acquired, initial demonstrations may be
given by vendors, although some vendors have computer-based instruc-
tions to aid in the process. Demonstrations are important because they rep-
resent the most efficient means by which new corporate investments in
hardware or software can be disseminated to persons most likely to use
them on a daily basis.
T Groups (Sensitivity Training) 
These highly participatory learning methods are intended to improve train-
ees’ skills in working with other people. This is achieved by increasing their
ability to understand how others react to behaviors encountered in the
workplace. T (for training) groups are small sessions that may take place
without a leader for much of the time. The group will be given a task, and
members will create working relationships with each other to achieve the
goal. T group members eventually may see the subtleties of their verbal and
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non-verbal communications with each other. A manager may use such a
technique to explore feelings of sexism, racism, and other issues that might
hamper workers from interacting productively and harmoniously with each
other. For example, if concern for harassment in the workplace exists, T
groups can evaluate the nature of how people feel differently about remarks
and behaviors that might seem like normal communication or joking to
some, but which are offensive to others. Such a process generally leads to
greater sensitivity on the part of those who might be the cause of, bystand-
ers to, or recipients of such behavior. 
Role Playing 
A leader or coach may describe a particular situation to a group and then
ask members of the group to improvise the scenario. For example, the
trainer may wish to instruct a new group of retail security personnel on how
to apprehend a shoplifter. One volunteer would play the shoplifter’s role
and others would act as security agents intent on apprehending the
offender. The remaining learners would observe and critique the process.
The unrehearsed acting by the participants provides an opportunity for the
leader or coach to stop the action at different points and ask trainees what
they think is right or wrong about action as it is occurring. The use of
unstructured drama in role-playing can substantially aid trainees in under-
standing procedural and behavioral lessons that need to be learned. For
example, a security manager who is responsible for healthcare or social ser-
vice facilities may determine that T groups are valuable in helping trainees
understand the nature of their patients’ or clients’ emotional status, which
could be fragile or dysfunctional. Role playing scenarios are mini-dramas
that are usually enjoyable for instructors and participants alike, leading to a
generally stimulating learning experience. 
Other Techniques 
Numerous other types of training also exist, but are less frequently found in
security training programs. These include apprenticeship or extensive OTJ
training; behavior modeling methods that provide immediate feedback; and
skill analysis, in which relevant workplace behavior is assessed for weaknesses. 
FIREARMS TRAINING 
The need for firearms training is generally codified by state and local regula-
tions. In 1999, 32 states and the District of Columbia required initial training
for armed security personnel. Of these, 24 also required refresher training.
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Generally, specific training by a certified firearms instructor is required prior
to registration. In some cases, states that do not require initial training have
requirements on a county or city level. 
Managers of security programs and operators of security service busi-
nesses have depended less on armed employees than in earlier years. The
Rand Report, released in 1970, stated that 49 percent of private security per-
sonnel carried firearms. By the year 2000, that percentage was well under 10
percent. Further, at the time of the Rand research, only 19 percent of private
security personnel carrying firearms had job-related training on use of the
firearms they carried. 
The decline in the arming of private security personnel is mostly
related to the increased liability from accidental or unintentional injury from
the possession of firearms. Most security directors have determined that
they can design security programs that meet their objectives without arming
security personnel. Nonetheless, numerous examples exist where security
officers probably should be armed. In such cases, responsibility for assuring
that armed security personnel are initially trained and maintain their annual
training requirements is a responsibility of both the individual security
officer and his or her direct employer. Software programs can keep track of
completed training and provide reminders when annual refresher firearms
training should be scheduled. 
The Report of the Task Force on Private Security proposed a standard of a
24-hour firearms course—or its equivalent—prior to assignment to a posi-
tion requiring a firearm. The proposed standard further required re-qualifi-
cation annually as long as the security officer continued duties requiring use
of a firearm. In New York state for example, security guards carrying fire-
arms require an additional 47-hours of initial training and eight hours of
annual training in addition to the basic training required by the Security
Guard Act of 1992, as amended. 
ONGOING TRAINING 
Most high-performing security programs require formal training on an
annual basis for all security personnel. This training maintains the basic
skills, knowledge, and judgment employees need to perform their assigned
duties. Such training helps keep performance levels high as the re-learning
counteracts the tendency of skills—once learned but not used—to decline in
their reliability. It additionally is presented to keep employees informed on
issues such as changes in corporate directions, legal aspects, criminal and
loss-related patterns and trends, and technological advancements. 
Ongoing training can be presented using the techniques described earlier
in this chapter. For routine emphasis, personnel may also receive brief training
before the start of a shift. This is widely incorporated into law enforcement pro-
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grams. The same technique can be logically applied to circumstances in which
a large number of security officers congregate before leaving for their posts.
Lectures, handouts, and brief audiovisual presentations, for example, can
emphasize the importance of a point in the training agenda. For security offic-
ers who are few in numbers or who work at dispersed locations, training can
be provided by phone-in messages, through contact with supervisors, and
from printed material left for or mailed to such employees. 
Ongoing training is flexible and draws upon the resources most perti-
nent to the application of the workplace. This type of training is needed for
several important reasons. First, existing skills become obsolete and need
refocusing. Further, employees need to learn more so that they can absorb
other tasks within the organization during times of need. This is referred to
as cross-training. In addition, retaining is often needed. 
SECURITY TRAINING FOR NON-SECURITY PERSONNEL 
In many situations, the number of security personnel budgeted will not be
adequate to achieve the level of staff coverage desired by the director of secu-
rity. Even if this is not the case, the strategy in many organizations is to
involve all employees in the protective process. Therefore, the security man-
ager or the security training manager will enlighten non-protective workers in
the rationale and methods of workplace security and safety issues (see Box
4.3). In large proprietary organizations, security managers routinely speak
about relevant protective issues at orientations for new classes of trainees.  
TRAINING FOR TRAINERS AND SUPERVISORS 
In recent decades, attention has been devoted to training the trainers as well
as aiding supervisors and managers to be more effective in their positions.
Such efforts improve the quality and performance of the services provided.
Specific training-for-trainers courses are available at trade and educational
institutions throughout North America. While not specifically related to
training for protective purposes, the brief courses expose trainers to princi-
ples that can be applicable to loss prevention needs. One benefit of the pro-
gram is that trainers have the opportunity to be exposed to new techniques
and strategies by attending such training sessions and conferences. 
DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION FOR MANAGERS AND 
EXECUTIVES
Managers and executives also must grow in their positions. Because of the
knowledge-based content of managers’ work, the term “development” is
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used for the ongoing cognitive and skills growth of managers and execu-
tives. Development is fostered by education, which can be provided in a
variety of settings. Attendance and participation at programs provided by
specific security-related and general management organizations can serve
personal developmental needs. Examples of specific programs include those
offered at symposia, conferences, and exhibits of the American Society for
Industrial Security, the International Security Conferences, and meetings
held by other industry-specific groups that support security training and
education. General management organizations that offer courses include the
American Management Association, the Conference Board, and numerous
academic institutions found throughout North America and abroad with
programs and courses in management and organization. Additionally, grad-
uate and undergraduate institutions provide continuing education courses
in security management and business administration, criminal justice, and
industrial/occupational psychology. 
Distance learning is a recently developed teaching setup in which the
student is not present in a classroom with the instructor, but learns via a
closed-cable television link. The term also refers to self-paced learning that
may be monitored by an educational institution. Distance learning helps
students come in contact with instructors and resources not available in the
learner’s immediate area. It further permits self-motivated individuals to
study where they are and when they can. However, most academicians
Box 4.3. Training Non-Security Personnel 
Ongoing security training need not be just for protection personnel. Many
security directors train non-security workers on security aspects of their job
assignments, in effect making them part of the security process. At Manhat-
tan East Suites Hotel (MESH), a chain of 10 suite hotel properties in the New
York City area, the director of security trains all employees who have public
contact in security and safety principles. “It’s a challenge to schedule the
training times since the segments must be done when the employees’ regu-
lar jobs will not be interfered,” notes William J. McShane, director of loss
prevention of MESH.  
McShane divides the training into seven modules, each 10 to 15 min-
utes in length. The sequence of the modules to be learned is not considered
vital. When employees complete all the segments in the security and safety
training program for MESH, they receive a certificate of completion. The
training program stresses aspects of guest safety, protection of personal
property, emergency procedures, and legal liability. 
Source: Security Letter, November 1, 1995, Part I, p. 4. 
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believe at present that, while distance learning has much value, its value has
not met the test of time like conventional group learning.
Many employers encourage self-paced development and education by
providing partial or full tuition reimbursement for employees who attend
institutions of higher learning on a part-time basis. This encourages employ-
ees to pursue degree programs that will enrich their careers. Workers may
also learn by taking management-sponsored correspondence courses on
subjects of relevance to the workplace (see Box 4.4). 
Certification is a process whereby an individual is awarded a designa-
tion after having demonstrated competence through education, pertinent
experience, and independent verification, usually through testing. Among
security practitioners, two certifications have stood the test of time. The Cer-
tified Protection Professional (CPP) designation is awarded by the Profes-
sional Certification Board of the American Society for Industrial Security.
The CPP program began in 1979, and over 3,000 individuals around the
world meet CPP requirements. Re-certification requires proof of continuing
education and growth and must be verified every three years. The other
main certification in the protection field is the Certified Fraud Examiner
(CFE) indication issued by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.
The CFE program started in 1988, and numbers over 2,000 practitioners,
often with auditing and investigative responsibilities. Re-certification for the
CFE also is required on a triennial basis. 
Employers generally view apt certification of managers positively,
since the process provides an independent indication of relevant capability.
Senior managers often encourage managers to obtain professional certifica-
tion, and to keep it once earned.
Box 4.4. Correspondence Courses 
Security training normally occurs during conferences, symposia, meetings,
and courses. But learning can also occur on an ongoing basis through les-
sons delivered by mail or by the Web. 
One of the time-tested ways to learn is through correspondence
courses. In such courses, learners can proceed at their own pace and may
select courses that are of greatest interest or importance to them. Allied
Security, a national security services firm based in King of Prussia, Pennsyl-
vania, offers a home-study course for all employees. The 11-volume self-
study program includes topics such as report writing, appearance and pro-
fessionalism, and conflict management. Completion of each volume is veri-
fied by tests, which are graded at the training facility. Tangible incentives are
awarded to learners who achieve a certain level of points on the quizzes. 
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MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 
Security training is too important not to be validated and evaluated. Yet all
forms of training cannot be completely and objectively or quantitatively
assessed. This is a difficult issue for quantitatively oriented managers: it is
not possible to prove that by providing a certain number of hours of instruc-
tion on a particular topic that a measurable effect in workplace performance
can be determined. Nor is it always possible to see that this effort will have a
definable economic impact. Still, certain fundamental questions can be
raised, as suggested by Leslie Rae9:
Has the training satisfied its objective? 
Has the training satisfied the needs of the clients or workplace? 
Are people operating differently at the end of, and as a result of, the training? 
Did the training contribute directly to this behavior? 
Is the learning achieved being used in the real work situation? 
Has the learning contributed to the production of a more effective and efficient
worker?
Has the training contributed to a more effective and efficient (hence, more cost-
effective) organization? 
The first three questions relate to the nature of training itself, while the
last four are concerned with the effect of training on the work. According to
Rae, questions arise in validation and evaluation that are subject to assess-
ment. These include: 
• Content of training. Is it relevant? Is it up to date? 
• Method of training. Were the methods used the most appropriate
ones for the subject? Were the methods used most appropriate for
the learning styles of the participants? 
• Amount of learning. What was the material of the course? Was it
new to the learner or merely a rehash of information previously
learned? Was it useful, although not new to the learner, as confir-
matory or revision material? 
• Trainer skills. Did the trainer have the necessary skills to present
the material in a way that encouraged learning? Did the trainer
have a positive attitude about learning? 
• Length and pace of the training. Was the learning of the essential
material of appropriate length and pace? Were some aspects too
extensively covered? Were others provided insufficient time to
adequately learn? 
• Objectives. Did the training achieve its desired objectives? Did the
learner have the opportunity to try to satisfy personal objectives? 
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• Omissions. Were any essential points omitted from the learning pro-
cess? Was material included that was not essential to the learning? 
• Learning transfer. How much of the learning is likely to be put
into action on return to work? If it is to be a limited amount or
none at all, why is this so? What factors will deter or assist in the
transfer of learning? 
• Accommodations. If the training facility is within the control of
the trainer, was it relevant to the type of training provided? Was
the learning in a facility suitable to the occasion? Were adequate
refreshments and comforts available? 
• Relevance. Was the course/seminar/conference/workshop the most
appropriate means of presenting the learning activity undertaken? 
After a period of time, learners may be questioned about their reflec-
tions on the material they had learned. Such issues as these may be assessed: 
• Application of learning. What aspects of your work now include
elements that are a direct result of the learning event? What new
aspects of work have you introduced as a result of your learning?
What aspects of your previous work have you replaced or modi-
fied as a result of your learning? 
• Efficiency. How much more efficient or effective are you as a result
of the training? Why or why not? 
• Retrospective analysis. With the passage of time and attempts to
apply learning, are there any changes you would wish to make to
your outcome answers? 
• Ongoing evaluation. The assessment of learning can be conducted
by providing questionnaires to learners asking them to rate their
experiences. For example, learners can be asked to evaluate the rel-
evance of their training on a scale. One scale frequently used is the
Likert Scale, which has seven levels, where 1 represents the lowest
score, 4 represents neutral or the midpoint, and 7 represents the
highest score. Gradations between the extremes and the midpoints
allow variations of feelings to be identified. Such questionnaires
can be scored quickly by management, though interpretation will
take longer. Many managers prefer to evaluate training shortly
after it is completed by a group and then again at some point in the
future when the lasting effects of the training may be assessed. 
Questionnaires may also include open-ended questions
about the content and process of the learning experience. Exam-
ples of such questions include: “What did you most like about the
training you received?” “What did you least like?” “Do you
believe others in your position should receive this training pro-
gram in the future?” 
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In addition to questionnaires, managers may wish to establish control
groups in which the performance of those who undergo training is con-
trasted with the performance of those in a control group. Clearly, control
group research is not desirable for situations in which it is necessary to train
all workers about critical skills or knowledge. 
Another way to evaluate training is through direct observation, in
which training evaluators or supervisors report on the performance of
workers following the completion of training. (Presumably, these evaluators
would have had experience observing these employees prior to the training
process and are thus in a position to note performance differences.) Training
or Human Resources personnel may also conduct in-depth interviews with
trained workers to assess what they achieved during the learning process.
Questions tend to be specific, asking workers what is different about the
workplace processes since the training concluded. Additionally, trained
individuals may wish to keep journal accounts of the ways in which their
training has affected their behavior and performance. 
Training assessors collect such questionnaires, research data, interview
notes, and journal accounts in an attempt to evaluate the effects of training
and determine the value such training has to the employer. The training
evaluator also is likely to speak informally over time to those who have been
trained and to those who supervise or manage those who have been trained
and obtain useful subjective information on how the training has been bene-
ficial or has failed to meet its objectives.
SUMMARY
With the complexity and diversity of security management tasks today, ade-
quate initial training for workers is expected. This may be supplemented by
ongoing in-service training for operational workers. Managers and executives
also require development through education at conferences, seminars, and
academic courses. Such training sometimes seems costly to managers who do
not understand its benefits. Training should be planned to achieve or exceed
the objectives of the employer. A variety of training methods can be consid-
ered to meet the requirements of cost-effective learning. Workplace training
requires validation and review as well as long-term evaluation and follow-up.  
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. What are the salient arguments for training new security personnel? 
2. How has the Information Age affected content and delivery of train-
ing programs? 
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3. What appears to be the main emphasis to the eight-hour pre-assign-
ment training course proposed by the Task Force on Private Secu-
rity? What is the reasoning behind pre-assignment training? 
4. Define ongoing training and compare it with in-service training. 
5. What are the strengths of the case history method for training? What
are its weaknesses? 
6. Under what circumstances would management provide T group in-
service training?
7. What are the inherent limitations in measuring the effectiveness of
training? What reasonable measures might a manager take to collect
data to help assess a recently completed training program? 
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5
SUPPORTING AND 
MOTIVATING
SUPERVISORS AND STAFF 
There are few jobs more difficult but at the same
time more interesting than that of supervising
people.
—William R. Van Dersal 
Executives and managers work through other people. No matter how tal-
ented senior and middle management may be, results are achieved through
the combined efforts of the larger organization working together. A key
component to operational success of the organization is its supervisors.
Supervisors are also called first-line managers—the lowest level of the man-
agerial hierarchy, but management nonetheless. Supervisors differ from
middle and senior managers in having larger directing and controlling
responsibilities and less to do with planning, organizing, and staffing.  
The titles of those subordinate to supervisors differ according to the
nature of the employer. Operational-level security staffers may receive titles
specific to their position, such as security guard or officer; agent; investiga-
tor; store detective; alarm console operator; firefighter; or documents classi-
fier. A few organizations use vaguer titles, such as associate or team-
member. Generically, these individuals may be termed “staff” (not to be con-
fused with headquarters senior staff) or just “workers.” Senior management
often seeks to find a dignified and enhancing term to refer to workers. For
this chapter, first-level managers will be referred to as supervisors and the
individuals they oversee will be referred to as staff. 
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SUPPORTING SUPERVISORS AND STAFF 
For the work to be achieved and the desired results attained, management
must not only provide ample workers capable of achieving or surpassing
goals, they must also provide different types of support so that these staff
members can thrive. The best planning and team of co-workers will come to
naught if those persons do not have what they need. In a sense, the failure of
the staff in such circumstances is a failure of management. The requirement
of routine supplies, vehicles, and forms is clear enough. Less obvious are the
procedural support commitments that are found in higher performing orga-
nizations. The first section of this chapter, therefore, considers these specific
needs for this cadre of workers. Nobody, for example, would blame an auto-
worker on an assembly line for not doing his or her fair share if that person
didn’t possess critical parts or tools needed to do the job. The same analogy
holds with security employees, though in most cases what these individuals
require are not nuts, bolts, and side panels, but mostly intangibles that are
central to getting the job done. Providing the staff with various support
items and resources is not merely a desirable action for first-line and middle
management, it is a duty. 
To achieve desired results, management plans conscientiously so that
resources are ready before they are likely to be needed by supervisors or
staff. But before that occurs, it is necessary to find the right person for the
right slot. That is the role of placement. 
Placement
Fitting people and their jobs together is the first step in successfully bringing
newly trained workers into the job stream. Management has determined
that openings are available for particular shifts, days, and levels of experi-
ence. The Human Resources and training officer plan the assignment so that
newly trained workers can be placed in positions to work without delay.
Prior to the assignments, the supervisor is consulted on facts involving new
staff workers assigned to his or her unit. At this point, the supervisor may
review the training files and pertinent information about the new worker.
He or she may conduct a brief interview to ascertain that the nature of the
job and the characteristics of the worker are compatible. This is no time for
uncertainty. For example, if the new employee begins by working the night
shift, is he or she truly prepared to accept that assignment for a minimum
period of time? This is when the supervisor determines whether any reasons
exist as to why the placement would not be successful. In addition to sched-
uling issues, the supervisor will review the particular nature of the position
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to assure that the fit for the worker to the position is appropriate. This
includes an analysis of: 
• The specific nature of the tasks to be performed 
• The knowledge required for the site and the particular duties 
• The equipment or supplies the security worker will require 
• Any particular physical requirements, such as lengthy standing or
walking, or the possibility of having to endure substantial temper-
ature changes during a tour 
• Any unusual requirements relative to the site and the position 
Supervisors are likely to take for granted the physical circumstances of
the job and the particularities of the personalities involved. This attitude could
be counterproductive to staffers’ success. Therefore, the supervisor needs to
consider carefully any means by which the new worker might not succeed in
this placement and ascertain how further information or additional support
might help mitigate any possible assignment difficulties early on. 
Providing new employees with a personal welcome is practiced at
some workplaces. At Southwest Airlines, the new-hire orientation program
includes signage: “New Hire Celebration: You, Southwest, and Success.”
Thus, Southwest Airlines provides an opportunity for new workers to be
welcomed by their peers in a relaxed, friendly atmosphere, focused on suc-
cess.1
Within the context of supervision, several principles guide the relation-
ship between supervisor and the supervised. The principles need to be
learned when a staffer is promoted to supervisor or when an outside person
is hired into a primary or secondary management position: 
1. Staffers must understand exactly what is expected of them. Much of
the information shared between the supervisor and the new worker will
have been covered during training. However, the supervisor provides her or
his own second orientation as a specific introduction to the job.2 This process
is highly meaningful as the staffer is now about to start working and knows
that pleasing his or her supervisor will now become a priority. 
During this second orientation, the supervisor likely reviews topics of
utmost importance at the time the worker begins the assignment. A number
of issues are routinely covered at such times: 
• A few words about ethics and fair working conditions. Security
people work with the trust of others. The trade and professional
organizations have codes of ethics, binding the members who
belong to such groups. But ethical issues do not stop there. At the job
site, the nature of the ethical commitment of the organization itself
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and of its entire staff should be shared with the new worker. The
supervisor may communicate informally a message: “You’re fortu-
nate to join the leading manufacture of smart widgets in the indus-
try. Since the day we were founded, all of us here have been
committed to serving our customers with the best products and ser-
vices. Our commitment to fair, honest, and honorable dealings
equally involves vendors and employees. Security is important in
our success and growth.” The new staffer may be referred to the
organization’s ethical statement and information on the workplace
ethics and ethos. This statement may be printed in the employee
handbook or be posted at different locations in the workplace. By
taking a moment to call the worker’s attention to these statements,
their importance is bound to be enhanced in the staffer’s estimation.  
The supervisor may point to the statement of principles
involving the dignity and fair play for all employees. If an
employee has a complaint and it cannot or is not handled ade-
quately by the supervisor, the new staffer should learn that higher
management will be available to hear the dispute or issue. If the
general manager has an open-door policy, this fact should be men-
tioned as well. These comments are relevant for proprietary orga-
nizations. When employees for the outside contractors have
unresolved workplace complaints, mechanisms for dealing with
them should be structured and communicated to those involved. 
• What the organization does. After a period of orientation and
training, it might be assumed that the new worker has a clear idea
of what the organization actually does. This is not usually a safe
assumption. The supervisor should therefore discuss with the new
employee the nature of the organization: what it does; what the
strategy appears to be; what the organization is particularly proud
of; and what current challenges and difficulties the organization
faces. Having established the ethical nature of the workplace, the
supervisor should make it clear what the organization stands for
and what impediments are in the way of the goal from being
achieved.
The new staffer may think that he or she knows what the
organization’s reason for being is, and probably does to some
extent. But relating what takes place at the job site and putting it
into a larger framework of the organization’s total goals and strat-
egy is useful and valuable in the early interactions between the
supervisor and new staff members.  
• What the job involves. The training received by the new worker is
valuable, providing general, legal, operational, and emergency
information to the new security worker. But on the job site itself,
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the nature of the tasks to be performed by the worker need to be
reviewed. This is the time for the supervisor to make sure instruc-
tions are understood. This is also a time to make clear the extent to
which the supervisor will be available for assistance, the ability to
contact other co-workers on the job sites for any assistance, and
steps to take in an emergency situation. 
Initially, the new worker is likely to assist the efforts of an
experienced person who acts as an on-the-job trainer and facilita-
tor for the new staffer. The supervisor usually introduces the two
parties to each other and observes the nature of the interaction. If
the on-the-job trainer has not trained a new worker before, the
supervisor will stay in touch with both on a more frequent basis
than would otherwise be the case. Before leaving the new worker
with the experienced security staffer, the supervisor may again
review important aspects of the job. The supervisor also will
emphasize possible pitfalls and ask whether the new worker
understands what has been said and whether he or she has any
other questions. 
• Where to get what’s needed for the job. The new staffer will need
access to a supervisor and co-workers in order to obtain general
information. Specialized information and supplies and services
may be needed for the position as well. The worker is on post and
may need instant help, replacement parts for equipment that fails,
or routine supplies that are unexpectedly exhausted. 
• How the quality of work is to be measured. Workers in produc-
tion and service positions are interested in learning what the qual-
ity of work is to be expected. This is particularly the case when
trainers have stressed how the organization places emphasis on
superior results. Security officers may have the quality of their
work assessed primarily by direct observation and frequent inter-
action with supervisors. However, other methods are also avail-
able, including measurements and electronic recordings of data
collected by the officer; observations and informal and formal
reports by other workers; observations and reports by senior man-
agers interacting with security personnel; and questionnaires and
comments from the public. 
Alarm monitoring operators may have quality of their work
measured by the speed, manner, and accuracy with which an
alarm condition is responded to. Central monitoring operations
often have quality control standards that will be subject to supervi-
sory or management review. 
Investigators usually are evaluated on the accuracy, com-
pleteness, and insightful evaluation of the investigative reports
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they complete. Such reports may be strong enough to use success-
fully in legal actions. 
Armored car personnel may be measured by the care by
which they note the deliveries and pickups from the various loca-
tions on their routes. Attention to security procedures will be
another factor in determining quality of job performance. For
example, does the guard vary routine as much as possible? Are
firearms maintained in a safe and responsible manner? Does some-
one remain locked within the armored vehicle at all times, if com-
pany policy requires this measure? 
Security technicians are judged by their ability to complete a
task fully, without the need for subsequent service calls. For exam-
ple, a particular alarm system installer might take a few minutes
longer than a peer to install a system. But that technician may com-
plete the job with higher quality and instruct users on applications
well so that further service calls will be less frequent. 
The staffer may be informed that quality is a constant issue to
be discussed with the supervisor. However, near the end of the
probationary period and during formal reviews, the results of such
findings will be discussed specifically. 
• How the quantity of work is to be measured. Quality matters;
however, quantity does as well. In security work, the nature of
tasks performed by security personnel is increasingly measurable
by security systems that track completed tasks. Quantity of tasks
completed by personnel is an important and usual basis of evalu-
ating workplace performance. 
Security officers may be measured by the frequency of secu-
rity rounds to posts they must cover. Also, the number of specific
recorded services may be a basis of evaluation. For example, secu-
rity officers who conduct escorts, key runs, or vehicle checks may
be recorded by data entry systems. Over time, these will serve as a
basis for comparison between security guards working during
similar time shifts. Such reports may also be aggregated to docu-
ment total services performed by the security unit over a period of
time.
Alarm monitors may be evaluated by the number of cus-
tomer interactions during a work period. To be sure, a slow num-
ber of alarm conditions may not reflect badly on a monitoring
operative if that is the reality. In such cases, however, management
will wish to evaluate the circumstance to determine whether an
alternative way of managing alarms could be arranged to achieve
optimal use of personnel, if an alarm monitor is not busy enough.
In handling telephone communications with system customers,
management may set a desired goal of maximum average cus-
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tomer contact time, for example, two minutes. Signals to the opera-
tor and supervisor can indicate when that point has been reached. 
Armored car personnel may be monitored by the number of
runs conducted by the group in the course of a shift. Security tech-
nicians may be judged by the number of installations and service
calls completed during a period of work. Depending on the nature
of the tasks, the assessment may be on a daily, weekly, or monthly
basis. Adjustments can be made for time off or other circumstances
that otherwise would make comparison meaningless. 
In many cases, the quantity of work completed by security
service workers is not comparable to that of other employees
where measurable units of production or sales can be counted.
That does not imply, however, that supervisors and their managers
are not concerned about measuring the quality and quantity of
individual personal efforts. Supervisors and their managers con-
stantly search for fair, logical means by which work can be mea-
sured and assessed. 
• Relevant resources. The supervisor will make the new staffer feel
more prepared to deal with the tasks at hand by providing
resources directly related to the organization and to tasks at the
specific job site. Here are some important examples: 
• Procedure manual and post orders. In many security posi-
tions, a manual will outline the workplace tasks and expecta-
tions. Additionally, specific post orders describe what is
required of the worker for the specific workstation. The super-
visor will review these site-specific requirements, making sure
the material has been thoroughly covered. 
• Job description. The new worker has been selected because he
or she is capable of performing the required task and has been
trained to do so. The job performance should remain accessible
for the worker. However, it should be made clear that job
descriptions are not immutable documents, but rather change
with the times as the nature of the job is modified to fit differ-
ent circumstances. 
• Rules and regulations. Requirements of the workplace need
to be reviewed early in the relationship between the new
staffer and the supervisor, even if the training provided covers
many or all of these points. If the facility does not permit
smoking, that should be mentioned. The policy for personal
use of telephones, facsimile machines, and Internet resources
should be discussed. Visitors are usually not permitted on the
job except for exceptional circumstances. Many operational
security staff are expected to arrive a few minutes before the
beginning of their shift or scheduled responsibilities. They
130 Security and Operations Management
may also remain for a few minutes after their work is over.
However, presence at the workplace when one is not sched-
uled to be at the job is not permitted in many security opera-
tions. If the workplace requires security personnel to possess
and carry firearms or weapons of any types, specific regula-
tions will pertain to them. Otherwise, employees who bring
weapons to the job without authorization are subject to sanc-
tions, including dismissal. 
• Property. The worker needs to know what property she or he
will be assigned and how that property should be cared for.
Property may include keys, two-way radios, cellular phones,
laptop computers, data collection devices, manuals, vehicles,
uniforms, weapons, and other items. The employee’s role in
protecting electronic assets, including programs, hardware,
and output, should be made clear. Password protection issues
should be covered. 
• Hazardous materials. The worker needs to know what his or
her rights are concerning any chemicals or material safety
issues that could affect them on the job. Specific training on the
observations of and response to any hazards must be provided
before staffers are responsible for such materials. 
• Organization chart. This helps the worker understand the per-
sonnel structure and reporting relationships at the place of
employment.
• History and CEO’s welcome. A leaflet, booklet, or video of the
organization’s history may help make the workplace more
alive and relevant to the new staffer. It may also make the new
staffer feel more connected with the breadth of operations of
the employer. Sometimes, in large organizations, a video from
the CEO welcoming new workers is presented. 
• Career tracks. Most new employees have cloudy visions about
how they can grow in the job and where their initial positions
can lead them. The supervisor or manager should make clear
what the realistic career growth opportunities are and how
individuals will have an opportunity to take advantage of
them when opportunities arise. 
• Compensation. Human Resources will have established the
pay level for the new employee. Therefore, this topic is not one
the supervisor usually needs to dwell upon. However, fre-
quency of pay reviews and their significance over the first two
or three years of employment may be discussed with the
employee. This discussion should not indicate that pay
increases will be automatic, unless this matter is a workplace
policy. How compensation is delivered physically or electroni-
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cally to workers should also be explained. The location of the
compensation office or its telephone number should appear in
the literature provided to the new staffer. 
• Benefits. Technical questions on benefits are best referred to
the human resources department. However, supervisors may
provide some general advice, if asked, on the different types of
benefits when a choice is required. Supervisors should never
put themselves in a position of forcefully arguing for one type
of benefit option over another, but rather answer questions so
that new staffers are fully apprized of the opportunities man-
agement has made available. A new worker may be grateful
years later if a supervisor encourages her or him to participate
in the employer’s 401(k) self-contributory retirement or other
similar program. 
• Creature comforts. New workers need to know where the
restrooms are on each floor, and where the cafeteria or canteen
is located and the policies related to its use. 
2. Staffers need general guidance to do their jobs properly. Despite supe-
rior efforts of employment selection, training, and orientation, circum-
stances may occur within the scope of employment in which the worker will
need further assistance. This is the task of the supervisor.3 Several types of
such guidance may be needed: 
• Routine job support. The supervisor’s presence supports and
guides security personnel in dealing with circumstances where the
vision of a more experienced person could be of benefit. Fre-
quently, these situations involve public contacts by security per-
sonnel in which the supervisor later may critique the performance
of the worker. Often, the supervisor may be present to take respon-
sibility for managing the situation on the spot. Supervisors also
provide guidance to the worker on organizing tasks, writing
reports, and dealing with unexpected events. 
• Public relations skills. Much of the activity of security workers
concerns the public. Therefore, the enhancement of interpersonal
skills is a concern of the supervisor and middle managers. The suc-
cessful supervisor provides support to enable the staffer to under-
stand his or her emotional predisposition in dealing with the
public.
• Information support. The job environment changes constantly.
Risks change. Procedures are altered. Personnel come and go.
Workers expect to be informed by supervisors of the routine but
significant news and information pertinent to the job. During con-
tacts with staffers, supervisors are expected to share factual infor-
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mation that can help the worker understand the current
circumstances at the job site.  
• Specialty information. When a new procedure, tool, device, data-
base, or system is introduced to the workplace, the staff person
may require assistance beyond training. At such times the worker
turns to the supervisor for specialized assistance in mastering the
new resource. In this sense, the supervisor continues the training
by providing field support for workers. 
3. Staffers deserve to be recognized for good work. Kenneth Blanchard
and Spencer Johnson have provided a simple but compelling method of
emphasizing the positive. Supervisors and managers are expected to recog-
nize good performance they observe among staffers to help their behavior
become better still.4 Supervisors know that prompt recognition of good
work reinforces it, increasingly the likelihood that the desired behavior will
become learned and be expressed as a natural behavior. Supervisors are the
logical authority figures to observe and comment upon superior and com-
mendable behavior that they observe. Normally, the supervisor will provide
the direct positive feedback to sustain desirable performance. However, on
some occasions, the supervisor may arrange for her or his manager to
deliver the praise. 
Supervisors have a number of means available of delivering the posi-
tive feedback that most workers crave. For example: 
• Verbal feedback. The simplest and most direct means of recogniz-
ing good work is by a verbal message. The message should be
direct and comprehensible. The Blanchard-Johnson thesis suggests
that people should know up front that the supervisor is going to
let them know how they are doing. People are praised immedi-
ately on good work (see Box 5.1). The praise is specific. The man-
ager says how good he or she feels about what the worker did and
how these actions help the organization. The manager stops for a
moment of silence to let the person being praised “feel” how good
the manager or supervisor feels. Further encouragement is offered.
Finally, the manager shakes hands or touches people in a way to
make it clear that the manager supports the staffer’s endeavors in
the organization. For example, the manager might say: “That last
visitor was irate when he arrived. You listened sympathetically to
what was bothering him. Then you provided a helpful suggestion.
In the end, he left in a better frame of mind. That’s an ideal way to
handle such circumstances.” Speaking directly, specifically, and
objectively to workers about their exemplary behavior stimulates
the acknowledged behavior to be remembered, and possibly fur-
ther improved upon. 
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Box 5.1. The One Minute Manager on Praising Good Work 
Two wise authors, Kenneth Blanchard and Spencer Johnson, have provided
valuable guidance on how people who manage others may achieve goals
productively and humanely. In The One Minute Manager, the authors
describe a mythical extraordinary manager who achieves success with such
brilliance that he leads a stress-free high-achievement orchestration of his
subordinates’ performances. Much of the book describes the simple pre-
mises that lead to this achievement. The mythical marvelous manager
believes in catching an employee “doing something right,” reinforcing this
desirable behavior: 
1. Tell people up front that you are going to let them know how they
are doing. 
2. Praise people immediately. 
3. Tell people what they did right; be specific. 
4. Tell people how good you feel about what they did right, and how it
helps the organization and the people who work there. 
5. Stop for a moment of silence to let them “feel” how good you feel. 
6. Encourage them to do more of the same. 
7. Shake hands or touch people in a way that makes it clear that you
support their success in the organization. 
Source: K. Blanchard and S. Johnson (1983). The One Minute Manager. New York, NY: Berkley 
Books, p. 44. 
• Formal written praise. A letter or memorandum that summarizes
superior behavior can also reinforce desired behavior. The differ-
ence is that such communication represents a higher level of
thought and effort: the tribute requires discernment and concern.
The written praise also can become a permanent part of the
worker’s record. 
Some supervisors pause about bestowing workers with writ-
ten praise because they fear that the laudatory remarks could
return to haunt the writer. For example, an employee whose work
was once praiseworthy might use letters in defense when that
employee is disciplined for cause. However, managers who are
consistent can use written communications to complement work-
ers as well as to correct behavior (see Chapter 7). The practice of
formalizing approval of superior behavior in written form often
produces a sense of pride and a commitment to further good
efforts that extend beyond verbal honorable mention. 
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Formal written approbation is also appropriate when a direc-
tor or manager at headquarters wishes to applaud superior behav-
ior of those working at distant sites. The process of formal
approval from headquarters has a powerful impact on individual
performance, sustaining it in ways words alone could not achieve
(see Box 5.2). Writing costs little and means much. 
• Provide certificates. A supervisor might provide a certificate of
good service, signed by the supervisor and manager and pre-
sented thankfully to workers, as a tangible example of recognition. 
• Promotion. The supervisor may use good work as a basis of pro-
moting the worker to a higher classification. 
• Better scheduling or conditions. To reward the deserving, the
supervisor may be able to find preferred hours, days off, locations,
or conditions for the workers. 
Box 5.2. A Letter from J. Edgar Hoover 
For 47 years, John Edgar Hoover (1895–1972) not only led the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, he was the FBI itself personified. Hoover was in his
post too long and used his power to achieve control by attempting to
destroy or silence those with whom he did not agree. In the years following
his death, his reputation has been sullied by many writers. 
Nonetheless, Hoover should be regarded as a brilliant manager whose
efforts turned a poorly supervised group of politically appointed investiga-
tors into a highly efficient and ethically salutary organization. Hundreds of
security directors in public and private organizations were trained during
the Hoover years and were influenced from the controlling reaches of
Hoover’s Pennsylvania Avenue office suite. 
Hoover trained special agents in charge of FBI field offices to observe
and report to the central office details of superior field performance by indi-
vidual special agents. Days after a significant event, special agents would
find in their mail a letter personally addressed from FBI headquarters. With
trepidation they would open it. Inside would be a brief recitation of the spe-
cial agent’s recent actions and would end with the observation that this
behavior was in the “highest traditions of the Bureau,” signed in ink by the
director himself. Some special agents had received a number of such cita-
tions by the time their careers ended. The letters from Hoover were power-
ful motivators and served as lasting treasured mementos to the special
agents who received them. (The opposite was also true. Hoover would criti-
cize disappointing behavior of special agents with the same precise lan-
guage used to praise.) 
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• Award merchandise. Supervisors may award gifts of merchandise
to personnel under some programs. Professional Security Bureau
(PSB), a security services firm based in Nutley, New Jersey, pro-
vides booklets of coupons worth points toward merchandise for
meritorious security to their personnel. The booklets are given by
PSB to their clients as well as PSB supervisors and managers. Secu-
rity officers use the coupons to redeem merchandise: sports cloth-
ing, travel bags, pens, clocks, pocket calculators, and numerous
other items. The on-site PSB supervisor and client both can reward
the security officer tangibly for superior performance. 
• Provide a night out. In Great Britain, many service businesses,
including security firms, provide recognition for superior perfor-
mance by awarding the worker with an evening’s entertainment
and dinner for two on the town. These are popularly called “ben-
nies.” Scaled-down bennies may be concert or theater tickets with-
out food. 
• Cash or bonus. Almost all workers like to be told they have done a
good job with cash. 
This list is not complete, and is limited only by imagination. Some
supervisors will find other unusual ways of recognizing their employees,
which we will discuss late in this chapter. The tangible and intangible recog-
nition that a supervisor might provide all carry with them degrees of desire
and significance. Surely, excessive use of any reward system can cause it to
become unproductive, leading eventually to its collapse. The astute supervi-
sor focuses upon desired behavior to support it with a reward that is appro-
priate to the circumstance. Such tangible or intangible rewards should not
disturb the web of workplace personal relationships by unfairly rewarding
some persons and ignoring others. 
Ideally, such awards and benefits are deserved and are seen by other
workers who are not recipients, nonetheless, as a cause of general congratu-
lations to the persons being recognized. Good work is recognized publicly
so that the recognition and rewards can have a quantum effect on the imme-
diate recipients and all other workers in the unit. Other programs like
Employee of the Month and Office of the Month can reward superior
achievements.
4. Staffers deserve constructive criticism for poor performance. Desired
behavior is achieved more effectively by emphasizing positive traits rather
than trying to suppress negative ones. Still, poor performance occurs in the
workplace. At such times, the supervisor must provide constructive criti-
cism so that such behavior can change. In most cases, the worker is aware of
the substandard performance and awaits reaction from the supervisor. If
such a reprove is not forthcoming, the worker may lose respect for the
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supervisor and also feel permitted to engage in a continuance of such activi-
ties.
Unlike the public reward for good behavior, poor performance
deserves prompt, constructive, private reproach. Again, the Blanchard-
Johnson thesis has a strategy for responding to undesired workplace perfor-
mance (see Box 5.3). The following steps ensue: 
i. The supervisor summarizes specific unsatisfactory behavior and
asks if the facts are essentially correct. If the worker starts to explain
or otherwise not answer the question immediately, the supervisor
Box 5.3. The One Minute Manager on Correcting Poor Work 
According to the Blanchard-Johnson thesis, successful managers leave sub-
ordinates alone to do their work undisturbed. However, sometimes work is
not satisfactory and a reprimand is necessary. The following presents the
essence of the Blanchard-Johnson human relations strategy: 
1. Tell people beforehand that you are going to let them know how they
are doing and in no uncertain terms. 
The first half of the reprimand:  
2. Reprimand people immediately. 
3. Tell people what they did wrong; be specific. 
4. Tell people how you feel about what they did wrong, and in no
uncertain terms. 
5. Stop for a few seconds of uncomfortable silence to let them feel how
you feel. 
The second half of the reprimand: 
6. Shake hands, or touch them in a way that lets them know you are
honestly on their side. 
7. Remind them how much you value them. 
8. Reaffirm that you think well of them but not of their performance in
this situation. 
9. Realize that when the reprimand is over, it’s over. 
Source: K. Blanchard and S. Johnson (1983). The One Minute Manager. New York, NY: Berkley 
Books, p. 59. 
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cuts off the digression until the worker agrees that the facts are
essentially right. 
ii. Next, the supervisor briefly states that the behavior was unsatisfac-
tory. The supervisor avoids criticizing the worker personally, but
rather makes it clear that the particular acts were unacceptable. The
supervisor attempts to avoid circumstances in which the worker
vaguely blames others for the situation. The burden for the correct
behavior is on the worker alone in most cases. (In some situations,
additional training may be needed to correct the cause of the sub-
standard performance; other measures may also be indicated.) 
iii. The worker acknowledges the poor performance that has been
described.
iv. The supervisor asserts that she or he has confidence in the worker’s
abilities, and a reference might be made briefly to positive aspects of
the worker’s performance. The supervisor indicates that the interac-
tion has come to an end by lightly touching the worker on the shoul-
der or elbow. The worker returns to his or her duties. The process is
over. 
5. Staffers should have opportunities to show that they can accept
greater responsibilities. Many high-performance workers are not happy
with their status quo. They want to improve themselves. Astute supervisors
realize that the needs of such self-improvement can be channeled produc-
tively when the employee feels that he or she has the supervisor’s support in
advancing in the workplace. 
Promotion might be an eventual option for the worker seeking greater
responsibilities. In the meantime, the worker may be given opportunities to
demonstrate a competency in new circumstances. The worker may be
assigned a special project, perhaps one that the supervisor does not have
time for. Yet such an assignment requires burdens on the supervisor: the
original worker may require some time realignment from his or her previ-
ous schedule; work normally done by the worker may be performed at less
than its usual level; and other workers may sense that the special assign-
ment reflects undue favoritism and create new problems for the supervisor
in the process. However, such assignments produce insights also, making
the extra burdens on the supervisor worthwhile. The worker who is willing
to accept increased or more challenging responsibilities deserves the chance. 
In many organizations, supervisors find ways of distributing special
assignments and responsibilities among many staffers, indeed, among
everyone who seeks additional opportunity. In all cases when such workers
have demonstrated their abilities, such achievements should be recorded in
their personnel file. 
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SAFETY AT WORK: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPERVISORS 
The American workplace is generally safe, or safer than it was in past gener-
ations. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, security guards
were the knights of ownership, protecting private property from striking
workers. In this type of assignment alone, scores of security workers were
seriously injured in attempts to fulfill their duties. Similarly, numerous
thieves, vandals, and strikers were killed or injured by zealous private secu-
rity personnel. 
Even now, security staffers have a higher risk than most employees of
serious injury and death.5 Many security personnel have been victims of
personal assaults at one or more points in their careers. In a few cases, inju-
ries have reached the level of felonious assault. About 20 to 40 security
guards lose their lives each year in the course of their employment. 
Not all security positions are equally dangerous. The night watchman in
a warehouse or museum needs to fear the risk of an accident more than the
possibility of felonious physical injury. The investigator who works primarily
with the telephone and computer and the central alarm station monitor opera-
tor are at greater risk of falling than from being attacked. Nonetheless, accord-
ing to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
security personnel rank fourth in terms of rates of workplace homicides when
adjusted for number of workers, as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Workplace Homicides to Employees in High-Risk Industries in 
the U.S. (1980–89 and 1990–92) 
Note: Rates are per 100,000 workers per year. 
*Data for New York City and Connecticut were not available for 1992. 
Source: “Violence in the Workplace” (June 1996). Cincinnati, OH: National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, Current Intelligence Bulletin 57. 
1980–89 1990–92*
Industry Number Rate Number Rate 
Taxicab services 287 26.9 138 41.4
Liquor stores 115 8.0 30 7.5
Gas stations 304 5.6 68 4.8
Security services 152 5.0 86 7.0
Justice/public order 640 3.4 137 2.2
Grocery stores 806 3.2 330 3.8
Jewelry stores 56 3.2 26 4.7
Hotels/motels 153 1.5 33 0.8
Eating/drinking places 734 1.5 262 1.5
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Physical assaults to security personnel are much more numerous than
fatalities. Here again, security personnel are disproportionately victimized
relative to most other vocations. According to a study based on the National
Crime Victimization Survey (1992–96), security personnel ranked fourth in
occupational victimization for nonfatal violent incidents, adjusted for the
number of workers, as shown in Table 5.2. 
Workplace violence is a matter of concern for security supervisors and
managers in many industries. Those at greatest risk work in armored car
courier services; banking; food service; healthcare (especially emergency
rooms); retailing (when making apprehensions); and at places of public
assembly, such as theaters and concerts. Any location that has on its pre-
mises substantial cash and other liquid assets—check cashing businesses,
cashiers, and jewelry businesses—creates risks for security and non-security
employees alike. 
Security of workers is a management responsibility, extending from
planning through training and supervision. This principle does not absolve,
certainly, an individual security worker who abandons common sense and
flaunts rules and regulations to take a risk that results in harm. Nonetheless,
the supervisor bears inordinate responsibility in dissuading workers from
actions that result in unacceptable risk-taking behavior. Further, the supervi-
sor has direct responsibility in deciding whether a particular situation is too
Table 5.2. Occupations of Victims from Non-fatal Workplace Violence 
(1992–96)
Rate is per 1,000 workers. Calculated from National Crime Victimization Surveys for 1992–96. 
Source: G. Warchol (July 1998) “Workplace Violence, 1992–96,” Washington, DC: Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics, Report No. 168634. 
Occupation Average Number Rate
Police 234,200 306.0
Corrections 58,300 217.8
Taxi drivers 16,100 183.8
Security 71,100 117.3 
Bar workers 26,400 91.3
Mental health 50,300 79.5
Gas station attendants 15,500 79.1
Convenience/liquor stores 61,600 68.4
Junior high teachers 47,300 57.4
Bus drivers 70,200 45.0
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dangerous for trained security personnel. In such cases, the supervisor
should opt instead to keep security personnel away from the danger until
the risk can be reduced to an acceptable level. 
Similarly, when security staffers are in an environment in which work-
place safety is poor, the supervisor holds direct responsibility on behalf of
management in deciding the extent to which risk may be reasonably
assumed. Chemical plants, healthcare facilities, and nuclear process indus-
tries are a few of the workplaces in which hazardous materials exist. Such
facilities can be well managed and pose little risk for security personnel, yet
wherever hazardous materials or conditions exist, supervisors have an obli-
gation to assure that their people are not exposed to undue risks. In addition
to hazardous chemicals, such factors as lighting, workplace design, safety
devices, structural features, and even ventilation, when harmful, can present
an unacceptable risk for employees.6
All employees have a right to know about the hazardous materials
located within their workplaces. They have the right to obtain safety data
sheets, which should be provided within five days of any request by an
employee. While security personnel normally will not personally handle
hazardous materials at such facilities, should the possibility exist, they need
to be properly trained in emergency response procedures relative to such
substances.
WHY BE A SUPERVISOR, ANYWAY? 
The previous section indicated that “security supervisors are the direct link
between the management of a security organization and the security officers
who carry out the duties associated with the security function.”7 The secu-
rity supervisor has to be willing to accept responsibilities, and must have
demonstrated competence in technical, human, and conceptual skills. Often,
the inducements to become a supervisor do not appear to be great, and
many competent and valuable security staffers decide not to accept the pro-
motion to supervisor when offered one. Yet some compelling reasons exist
for why operations-level workers may accept the challenge of a promotion: 
• Achievement is reflected in the new position, buttressing one’s
self-image
• Authority and control come with the position 
• Creativity is encouraged: the supervisor is a resourceful problem-
solver
• Opportunity to higher positions such as middle management may
be made possible 
• Pay and other benefits usually, but not invariably, are better 
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DUTIES OF EMPLOYEES TO SUPERVISORS AND THE 
WORKPLACE 
Up to this point in the chapter, obligations of the supervisor to his or her
staff have been discussed. However, security employees themselves have
obligations to their supervisors, management, and, by extension, to the man-
agement of the employing organization. This extends to contract employees
and consultants who provide services. Such duties are not unreasonable
burdens, but rather reflect the nature of the particular employment and its
requirements. These are bound to change according to the workplace and its
characteristics. Many of them will be described in the employee manual. As
an example, the following are 12 rules and regulations established by a
major casino for its employees, including security personnel. Note that rules
9 and 10 are specific to a gaming environment. The list may stimulate the
reader to consider the context for other occupational settings: 
1. Employees will conduct themselves in a manner promoting good
public relations and goodwill. 
2. Use of profanity, rude behavior, and lack of consideration for cus-
tomers or other staff may be considered grounds for disciplinary
action or termination of employment. 
3. The use of force by company employees is forbidden, except as a last
resort to protect the life of a customer, fellow employee, or oneself. In
such a situation, only the minimum force necessary is acceptable.
Protection of property IS NOT considered grounds for use of force.
Persons violating this policy may be prosecuted criminally or civilly
or both. 
4. The use or possession of alcohol, narcotic drugs, or any type of
weapon while on company property is strictly forbidden. 
5. Family members will not be hired as co-workers. 
6. Sexual harassment—or any act that may be considered as sexual
harassment—is strictly forbidden. Any reports of such conduct will
be fully investigated. 
7. No one other than authorized employees or official visitors are to be
given access to any office or storage areas at any time. 
8. Cash collection policies and requirements for recording transactions
must be followed exactly as written procedures indicate. Failure to
do either may result in termination of employment. 
9. Employees will not play games, be a partner in games with custom-
ers, or finish a game for a customer or one which a customer has
abandoned.
10. All refunds or settlements of customer disputes will be conducted as
prescribed and recorded on the proper form. 
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11. Employees will not store or hold packages or valuables for custom-
ers.
12. Employees will not discuss company business, policies, or practices
with any person not authorized access to such information. 
This example of one organization’s general rules and regulations
reflects concerns about general civility, the drug-free work environment pol-
icy, sexual harassment, and policies and procedures that, if not followed, can
promote internal and external crime. In this case, employees were asked to
sign a statement that they had read and understood these rules and regula-
tions. Further, employment terms stated in the employee manual are also to
be considered conditions of employment and violation could lead to termi-
nation. The new employee signs and dates such a statement. The signature
is witnessed by a supervisor or Human Resources manager. 
Rules and regulations of other security departments commonly stress
punctuality, care of uniform, personal hygiene (showering before reporting
to duty), and respect of the employer’s property. 
MOTIVATING SUPERVISORS AND STAFF 
Supervisors and managers at all levels are responsible for achieving and
maintaining high levels of workplace productivity. As part of this objective,
management is expected to maximize use of time. Personal time manage-
ment techniques can be useful for management at any level. But apart from
using one’s time well, a separate conceptual category—motivation—is
addressed to help supervisors and managers understand this topic. 
TIME MANAGEMENT FOR SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS 
The first chapter of this book discussed the seminal contributions of Freder-
ick W. Taylor in establishing the time study method for improving work-
place productivity. This concept is applicable in process work in which
employees are responsible for measurable throughput. But the tasks of first-
and second-level management require time for planning, organization,
direction, and problem solving. The need for time devoted to planning is
hard for many managers to find. Although nobody has more than 168 hours
per week, some individuals are able to accomplish more than others. Certain
time management techniques can help people accomplish more. 
Business school professor Henry Mintzberg wrote: “Free time is made,
not found, in the manager’s job; it is forced into the schedule. Hoping to
leave some time open for contemplation or general planning is tantamount
to hoping that the pressures of the job will go away.”8 Many books have
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been written on time management, and numerous others are doubtlessly
awaiting their day. They have influenced millions. Nonetheless, time man-
agement is a topic not readily adaptable for quantitative research; therefore,
it is not always clear which methods work best. Close observation of suc-
cessful managers identifies attributes that lead to achievement and greater
productivity. Superior time management is part of that achievement path.
The following are some widely used techniques to increase managerial pro-
ductivity. 
The ABC Technique 
Not all tasks are equally important. A manager can face a seemingly endless
series of demands on his or her time. Yet concentrating on what’s most
important, making these tasks the priority, and working on them until they
are completed will enable the most important work to be completed before
less important items. 
The ABC technique directs users to divide all work-related matters to
be handled into three categories: A, vitally important; B, of nominal impor-
tance; and C, unimportant relative to A and B. The manager learns to iden-
tify what is A, B, or C quickly upon being presented with a task or
opportunity. Greatest effort is devoted to A; B is next; and what time is left
goes to C. 
The Pareto Principle 
Popularly called the 80/20 rule or Pareto’s Law, this is another control
scheme like the one above that identifies workplace tasks in order of their
importance. The principle is named for Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian econo-
mist.9 In 1908, Pareto proposed that the distribution of wealth and income in
a population was mathematically predictable. In time, the principle
expanded to fit other circumstances. 
While the ABC analysis denotes three categories of analysis, the Pareto
technique focuses on the inverse relationship between the percentage of
items in each of a set of subclasses and the importance of such subclasses.
The principle is best illustrated by thinking about customers or clients in an
organization. Not all are equal. Through the use of conventional analysis,
some customers or clients will be particularly important. The Pareto princi-
ple posits that 80 percent of an organization’s sales are due to only 20 per-
cent of the customers, and vice versa. 
The 80/20 ratio is not meant to be taken literally; but the point holds
across numerous applications that a small number of issues or customers—
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external or internal—are more important than others to the operation. The
principle has limitations and dangers. It encourages proponents to focus on
the important 20 percent in the organization. That certainly seems wise, but
at some point various components of the important 20 percent may disap-
pear for reasons over which the service supplier has no control. And compo-
nents of the less profitable or urgent 80 percent might become more
important. Supervisors and managers must consider that all customers, cli-
ents, and tasks are important, but that the important differential over time
can be helpful in prioritizing what to do first, if competing demands for ser-
vice are received at about the same time. 
Time Analysis Management 
Why is it that some people are more effective when they appear to work no
harder or longer than others in the same position? Perhaps they have
learned and practice the previous principles. To determine whether exces-
sive emphasis is placed on matters that are not true priorities in a manager’s
agenda, time analysis may help.10
One key to time analysis is to obtain an accurate record of how one’s
time is used. Time diaries may be kept for that purpose. A manager who
keeps track of a typical week and then analyzes how his or her time is used
may discover that too much time is devoted to tasks of minor importance.
This leaves important obligations on which the manager is judged with less
time than desirable to complete or to develop fully. In the process of keeping
a time diary, the diarist quantifies time used for various activities and deter-
mines whether this pattern is satisfactory and justifiable. Often, the diarist is
surprised to learn that counterproductive habits have crowded out valuable
hours that should be allocated to priority work. This could bring the aware-
ness that changes time-use priorities. 
Delegate Everything Delegable 
Supervisors and other managers have subordinates to whom work may be
delegated. Directing and controlling activities generally are not amenable to
being delegated.11 However, numerous other activities that a manager
might ordinarily take on can be delegated. Routine memos and drafts of let-
ters; reminder calls; organization of forthcoming meetings; normal requests
for supplies; and related matters may be delegated to subordinates. This
provides the supervisor and manager with more time for planning and for
routine communication with workers, customers, and others. 
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Using Technology for Greater Efficiency 
The highly productive manager constantly searches for ways to use time
more effectively. Technology dramatically helps meet that objective. Per-
sonal computers loaded with time-saving software, laptops, palm comput-
ers, cellular phones, beepers, facsimile machines, and portable dictating
systems have greatly enhanced the means by which managers have become
more effective in achieving their goals. A device or system that saves a man-
ager as little as an hour or two a week is highly valuable over an extended
period and is well worth the capital investment required.  
Clean Desk or Messy?
The vision of the manager with the desk completely empty of papers—
except for the matter being worked on at that moment—seems powerfully
etched in the minds of many CEO watchers. Such clean-desk managers are
considered on top of things, cool, and fully focused on the decision immedi-
ately facing them. But are these persons really more efficient or effective? No
strong evidence supporting the clean desk or messy viewpoint exists,
though many high management achievers seem to have little paper on their
desks. Others achieve much—with piles upon piles of papers, records,
books, and communications messages scattered everywhere. 
Motivation Matters 
Managers seek to elicit peak performance from subordinates. According to
entrepreneur and writer Andrew S. Grove, high output from subordinates
can be achieved in two ways: from training and motivation.12 Both can
improve performance, yet training an individual with a low degree of moti-
vation will produce far fewer benefits than training those who possess a
high degree of motivation will. Figure 5.1 graphs the connection between
motivation and training. Motivation research identifies the attitudes, habits,
and motives that trigger desired behavior. A few theories have served to
underpin the thinking of contemporary management and have even
affected workplace performance. 
Theory X and Theory Y 
This famous management construct proposed by Douglas McGregor
encompasses the complex and dynamic relationship between personality
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and motivation.13 A Theory X manager reflects authoritarian leadership
favoring centralized decision-making. Theory X is often thought of as the
view of old-line management. Workers are to be supervised closely. Theory
X managers tend to hold the following views: 
1. Most people do not like to work and will avoid it whenever possible. 
2. The average person prefers to avoid responsibility and would rather
be told what to do than have to make a decision. 
3. The most effective managers use punishment, or the threat thereof,
to achieve their goals. 
Figure 5.1. Linking Performance to Degrees of Motivation and Training 
Managers have two ways to improve performance: training—or retrain-
ing—and motivation. Point A indicates the beginning of training, which
serves to increase performance. Persons with high motivation increase
capacity even further, eventually reaching point B instead of point C. 
Source: Andrew S. Grove (1985). High Output Management, New York: Vintage Books. 
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Theory Y, on the other hand, is sometimes considered to be “the
unions’ view” of the ideal employer-worker relationship. The Theory Y
view holds that: 
1. Work is natural for most people and they do not avoid it. 
2. If individuals are committed to the organization’s objectives, they
will obtain satisfaction from helping to achieve those goals. Such
exertion will be self-motivated. 
3. Human potential is greater than what most managers realize. Most
workers are capable of creative problem solving, but their employers
are not conditioned to take advantage of this potential. 
If placed on a continuum with X at one end and Y at the other, the X
end would be harsh, punitive, and pessimistic. The Y end would be
humanistic, optimistic, and laissez-faire. In reality, no actual management
exists at either extreme. McGregor believed that most organizations pos-
sessed a culture that placed them on a changing but narrow band of the
continuum. McGregor’s construct is useful for those who supervise behav-
ior at all levels as it encourages supervisors to consider where they would
place themselves—or be placed—on such a continuum. It also says some-
thing about the nature of workplace productivity and satisfaction. The
popularity of McGregor’s research has produced the another concept, The-
ory Z. 
Theory Z 
Theory Z draws from observations of Japanese organizational manage-
ment. The term was coined by William G. Ouchi, who identified practices
that were unique expressions of Japanese culture and were difficult, if not
impossible, to transfer to Western management practice.14 Ouchi posits
that most Western-style firms embody McGregor’s principles in what
Ouchi calls “Theory Z.” Ouchi uses Theory Z to refer to those American
firms that copied or independently developed Japanese-style management
concepts.
Theory Z allows the manager to move between the poles of Theory X
and Theory Y depending on the circumstances. Theory Z focuses on stabiliz-
ing employment, greater employee workplace participation, and a slower
system for evaluation and promotion. This scheme has been less admired by
American organizational theorists since the Japanese economy faltered in
the last decade of the 20th century. It is likely, however, that Western manag-
ers will continue to look to Asia and elsewhere for ideas that might translate
into greater productivity while improving worker satisfaction. 
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THE COMPLEXITY OF MOTIVATION 
What propels some workers to greater achievement fails with others. And
what propels workers at one time may not be successful in the future. No
single motivator is likely to work on its own. This is because motivation is
complex and has many factors. Further, motivation is not satisfaction. Peo-
ple are motivated—that is, forced to perform—in order to achieve satisfac-
tion—that is, the pleasure of achieving a goal. 
The Hawthorne Investigations 
One of the earliest controlled research studies of production variables began
at the Hawthorne, Illinois, telephone relay assembly plant of the Western
Electric Company, a major telephone production facility of American Tele-
phone and Telegraph (AT&T). In the 1920s, Elton T. Mayo, a professor at
Harvard Business School, began research investigations into various envi-
ronmental and situational factors that could alter production there. 
In the early 1920s, Western Electric began a series of short experiments
to ascertain the relationship between different intensities of workplace illu-
mination and any changes in the resulting productive output. The studies
were inconclusive and the researchers thought that relevant psychological
variables were not adequately controlled. Advice was sought from Mayo,
who began his research in 1927 and whose efforts continued through 1932.
Mayo conceived the research in classic fashion: an experimental group of
phone relay assembly testers worked adjacent to the general manufacturing
area in a specially constructed environment that could be controlled for
experimental purposes.15 The general manufacturing area would serve as
the control group. The relay testers and other assembly workers—all
women—were unaware of the objects of the experiments. 
Over five years, experimenters sought to discover variables that could
affect production, both positively and negatively. Initially, experimenters
were amazed that productivity was enhanced even under adverse circum-
stances. Why? At length, the researchers found that workers in the relay
assembly test room had developed positive personal relationships with each
other. The socialization among the workers who had bonded with each
other encouraged greater productivity compared with other workers. Fur-
ther, it was realized that the workers were operating in a social environment
devoid of the supervisory controls operating elsewhere in the plant. 
In all, about 20,000 employees were interviewed confidentially by
members of the research team. The researchers concluded that attitudes
within a social group affect productivity. The previous assumption was that
the worker was an individual to be studied; post-Hawthorne conclusions
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were that the group needed attention. The human relations aspect of man-
agement research began.16
In recent years, however, other observers have noted that fear and
uncertainty in the workplace may have had something to do with the suc-
cessful efforts by the Western Electric workers to increase production
despite disincentives. After all, by 1929, economic depression had arrived;
jobs were not secure. The workers apparently had no idea why they had
been selected for the project and what the various experimental circum-
stances imposed upon their working conditions meant for their personal
futures. They were the subject of frequent visits by researchers and distin-
guished visitors who came to the Hawthorne plant to see what was going
on. This made their workplace position seem special—they were being paid
attention to—yet circumstances were ambiguous and unsettling at the same
time.17 A once firm conclusion of the Hawthorne work—that paying atten-
tion to workers matters more than conditions—seems reasonable, but is not
as firmly accepted anymore due to revised thinking about the economic
times when the research itself was conducted. 
The Hierarchy of Needs 
In the early 1940s, an experimental psychologist, Abraham H. Maslow, pro-
pounded a theory that grasped the imaginations of many management
thinkers because it recognizes that a variety of interwoven needs motivates
human behavior.18 These needs reflect a variety of motivators and are
believed by Maslow to be unchanged and instinctual. Maslow identified five
interrelated need categories: 
• Physiological. The fundamental needs of individuals relate to
physiological concerns (the need for food, shelter, sex, air, and
sleep).
• Security. Once basic physiological needs are satisfied, security
necessities emerge. The dominant security needs are for reasonable
order and stability and the freedom from being anxious and inse-
cure.19 Safety considerations also must be satisfied. 
• Belongingness (Social). With personal protection needs fulfilled,
social needs occur. These reflect the need to affiliate with others
and to be accepted by peers and supervisors in the organization. 
• Esteem. Beyond the meeting of social needs, individuals require
an opportunity to achieve self-esteem. This includes indepen-
dence, freedom, recognition, prestige, status, and reputation. 
• Self-actualization. Finally, Maslow coined the term self-actualiza-
tion to point out that with esteem achieved, “what man can be, he
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must be.” That is, self-actualized individuals, not blocked by unful-
filled concerns of self-esteem, concentrate on assuming responsi-
bility and involvement fully and at a creative level. 
These needs are sometimes represented as a pyramid, a ladder, or as a
series of steps, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
What does this mean in relation to the management of security work
units? First, compensation has to be adequate to meet physiological needs.
No matter how personally satisfying, a job may be abandoned eventually if
basic living needs cannot be met by compensation. Next, security is an
essential factor. A worker who is not safe on the way to or from work or who
Figure 5.2. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
Source: A.H. Maslow (1943). “A Theory of Human Motivation.” Psychological Review, 50:370. 
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faces safety risks at work may leave regardless of the compensation offered.
Then again, if positive socialization is not part of the workplace, the environ-
ment seems unattractive for the worker and the job can lead to a low self-
image. Next, self-esteem needs can be provided by management through
various types of recognition in order to enhance feelings of worthiness and
self-confidence. Finally, if all these needs are satisfied, the individual may
become a fully creative and a wholly involved member of the workplace.  
Maslow saw these needs as overlapping and believed that the average
person was not fully satisfied in every category. Such completeness varies
from 85 percent for physiological needs to 10 percent in self-actualization
needs for the average person, he argued. Yet Maslow’s needs hierarchy
encourages managers to think of the many needs within the workplace. Thus,
higher-order needs become motivators once lower-level needs are satisfied.
Maslow arrived at this thesis by studying factory workers; however, the same
points can be relevant to the service function of a protection program. 
Motivational-Hygiene Factors 
Another influential theory evaluated job satisfaction and the workplace. Fre-
derick Herzberg and associates conducted semi-structured interviews with
200 accountants and engineers concerning what they wanted from their
employment.20 The researchers also reviewed 155 studies that addressed the
same question. Although they noted that results differ widely according to
the research design, the Herzberg team found that motivational and growth
factors determined job satisfaction. These factors included achievement,
advancement, recognition, responsibility, and the work itself. The other
aspects of the Herzberg study were found to be unrelated to the actual
accomplishment of work. These aspects were referred to as “hygiene” fac-
tors because they were conceptually related to concepts of medical and men-
tal hygiene. These factors included politics and administration; salary;
supervision; interpersonal relations; benefits; working conditions; and
workplace policies and procedures. 
Both motivators and hygiene factors affect employees, but motivators
strongly influence job satisfaction. Herzberg provided statistical weights for
job satisfiers (generally motivators) and dissatisfiers (generally hygiene fac-
tors), both of which exist concurrently. The dissatisfiers do not increase job
satisfaction, but only affect the quantity of job dissatisfaction. 
Money as a Motivator 
The classical management strategist Frederick W. Taylor believed that people
are highly motivated when their rewards are linked directly to performance.
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Later research showed limitation of this view. Indeed, money provides its
possessor with a degree of control over life’s circumstances. Yet since the
early 20th century, this power of money as a sole motivator has diminished
in the workplace, while other motivators have become more appreciated. 
Workers need money to meet their physiological needs, but security
managers know that even a small pay increment is appreciated more for its
psychological symbolism. Increases in compensation signify progress in the
job at the same time as they help to meet material and social goals. 
In an article in Fortune that dissected “the money society,” a financial
executive says: “It’s not that people value money more, but they value
everything else so much less—not that they are more greedy, but that they
have no other values to keep greed in check. They don’t know what else to
value.”22 Managers constantly struggle to adjust motivators—including
money—to achieve optimal staff satisfaction and program objectives. 
Manipulated Self-Motivation: The Pygmalion Effect 
In George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, a cockney flower girl named Eliza
Doolittle comes under the persuasive admonitions of Professor Henry Hig-
gins, a savvy elocutionist. Professor Higgins transforms the vulgar street girl
into a poised, articulate, refined young woman with aristocratic pretensions.
The much beloved play was made into a Broadway musical and later the
motion picture My Fair Lady. The concept of Pygmalion change derived from
the sculptor in Greek mythology who carved a statue of a beautiful woman
who then became real. Whether in mythology or in the movies, the concept
of radical human change is a powerful one. 
The Pygmalion effect is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, according to
sociologist Robert K. Merton, who coined the term in 1948. Self-fulfilling
prophecy is a three-stage process beginning with a person’s belief—false at
the time it is held—that a certain event will occur in the future.21 Next, this
expectation or “prophecy” leads to behavioral change that would not have
occurred if it were not for this false expectation. Finally, the expected event
occurs and the prophecy is fulfilled, as shown in Figure 5.3. 
The experimental consequences of the self-fulfilling prophecy were
first explored by Robert Rosenthal in his doctoral research in clinical psy-
chology at the University of California at Los Angeles in the mid 1950s.23
Rosenthal divided 108 subjects into three experimental groups: “success,”
“neutral,” and “failure.” The subjects selected for the experiment were ran-
domly assigned to these categories, but were told the category to which they
were assigned, and were made aware of its significance. Aware of their rank-
ing, subjects participated in a cognitive exercise and then later were re-tested
to discern any differences. The researcher predicted that the experiment
would show that “failures” would do worse on post-tests, “neutrals” about
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the same, and the “success” designees would do better than expected. In
fact, this very prediction held true. The only difference among the subjects
was the expectation implanted into their minds that they were expected to
perform according to their (falsely) pre-judged ability. 
Rosenthal was approached by the principal of an elementary school,
Lenore Jacobson, who invited him to conduct a teacher-expectation experi-
ment in her school.24 Near the end of the school year, Flanagan’s Tests of
Figure 5.3. Pygmalion in Management: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
Robert K. Merton proposed the notion that expectations can produce results
and coined this process. In the first step, a false belief is held. This is the
“prophecy.” Arrow 1 shows the influence on new behavior. As a result, the
prophecy results—Arrow 2—in fulfillment. Finally, the prophecy is justified
since the original expectation comes true. The original expectancy is further
supported—Arrow 3—after the prophecy is fulfilled, continuing the cycle. 
Source: Dov Eden (1990). Pygmalion in Management. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, p. 2. 
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General Ability (ToGA) was administered to all pupils from kindergarten to
fifth grade. ToGA, a non-verbal intelligence test, was described to the teach-
ers as the “Harvard Test of Inflected Acquisition.” It was meant to identify
“later bloomers,” those who have not fully used their native abilities up to
that point, but who were about to bloom. 
The next academic year, the experimenters identified 20 percent of
each teacher’s incoming students as “later bloomers.” However, they actu-
ally were randomly selected. No further interventions occurred during the
school year to influence teacher behavior. When ToGA was administered at
the end of the school year, pupils who had been designated as late bloomers
had gained four more points in IQ testing than had their controlled class-
mates. Presumably, the teachers had provided an exceptional level of atten-
tion to the “bloomers” and the results were positive and measurable. 
In the workplace, the Pygmalion effect can have a powerful influence
on job performance and career development.25 If supervisors are told that
newly completed trainees are “among the best” at the time they join their
team, this belief will likely have a Pygmalion effect, and the supervisors will
tend to believe that the workers perform better on the job than those for
whom no special designation was given. Likewise, negative connotations
about a class of workers are likely to affect the way in which employees are
regarded by their supervisors. They may be appraised as not performing to
standards if that is the expectation. 
The Pygmalion effect is logical, once understood, and concludes that
expectations alone can raise performance above—or plunge it below—estab-
lished performance levels. This effect has been supported by many studies.
However, the process seems calculating and manipulative and also prone to
create circumstances that produce ambiguous results. Consider the individ-
ual who is designated as being exceptionally promising but who fails,
despite his or her best efforts. Such a person is bound to feel rejected and
bewildered by the process. Similarly, others are informed that not much is
expected of them and become determined to show otherwise, and do.
THE LIMITATIONS OF MOTIVATION RESEARCH 
To many managers, motivation seems like a quick fix to overcome inherent
obstacles to success. To other managers, motivation research presents a cyni-
cal view of rational behavior, promising more than it can produce. Thomas
H. Fitzgerald, a personnel research director at General Motors, believes that
motivation theory does not work: “When transported from the laboratory,
the language of motivation may become subtly elitist by suggesting that the
employee resembles a captive rodent in a training box equipped with levers,
trick doors, food pellets, and electric grids.”26 Fitzgerald argues that many
of the assumptions of motivation theory are untestable. Praise and approval
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can produce temporary improvement of individual effort, while inexpensive
measures for employees “seem to have a positive effect on some of the peo-
ple part of the time.” Fitzgerald suggests managers put aside some of the
notions of motivation “and start to think seriously about how to go about
becoming a society of persons.” 
SUMMARY
Supervisors, or first-level managers, are critical in helping an organization
achieve its goals. From routine service to new policy implementation, super-
visors are often the main catalysts for action—or the main barriers to goal
achievement. Supervisors are responsible for the reasonable safety and secu-
rity of their employees. Motivational research over most of the past century
has concluded that emphasizing the positive produces better results in
terms of forming behavior than does negative enforcement. 
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. What role might a supervisor have in connection with others in the
placement of staffers into the organization? 
2. Upon meeting new workers assigned to the unit, what topics would
the supervisor discuss first? Why? 
3. What special concerns would a supervisor have if the new worker
was being assigned temporarily to someone with no previous expe-
rience as a mentor? 
4. What significance does the job description have for both the supervi-
sor and the persons being supervised? What are pitfalls in writing
job descriptions? 
5. What is the usual and preferred strategy for a supervisor to recog-
nize good work in a subordinate? 
6. What responsibility does a supervisor have for the workplace safety
of subordinates? How do the risks of security employment compare
with those in other vocations? 
7. Compare the ABC technique and the Pareto principle. How does
each theory aid management in managing time more effectively? 
8. In your opinion, does Mayo’s research at the Western Electric plant
have any relevance to the management of a security program?
Explain.
9. In your opinion, is the Pygmalion effect harmful or beneficial to
management? Explain. 
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6
APPRAISING AND 
PROMOTING PEOPLE IN 
SECURITY PROGRAMS 
The secret of success in business of all kinds . . . is
a liberal division of profits among the men who
make them, and the wider distribution the better. 
—Andrew Carnegie 
People are an organization’s most important assets. Managing them success-
fully means providing opportunities for growth, including promotion to
greater responsibilities. Promotions in formal organizations normally occur
after work has been appraised over time as exceeding minimum expecta-
tions. Appraisal is the process of evaluating individual performance on the
job and assessing it relative to goals and objectives. Appraisal not only is a
measure of individual performance, but also identifies potential for future
performance and capability. When employees can be evaluated and com-
pared with reliability and fairness, the workplace and workers gain from the
process. 
THE DIFFICULTIES OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL 
The organizational process of personal appraisal fits into the context of other
aspects of management development: forecasting, recruiting, training, com-
pensation and conditions of service, deployment, and management review
or audit. Yet many security operations do not provide formal appraisal of
workers. This may be because the process is time-consuming, demands
judgment, and requires confronting individuals in what can be awkward sit-
uations. Some employers feel that statements made at such times can lead to
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litigation if the individual is terminated subsequent to an unfavorable evalu-
ation. Litigation is more likely if the employee is terminated shortly after a
favorable appraisal has been issued. 
Such reservations about formal appraisal processes are understand-
able. However, appraisals’ advantages outweigh their disadvantages. A
well-conceived and conscientiously operated appraisal program can lead to
motivation and growth of individuals, and produce higher performance.
With such a process, justifiable criteria must be identified as the basis of pro-
motions. No manager can be guaranteed that certain procedures will pre-
vent the employer from being sued for failing to promote someone.
However, the existence of a well-conceived employee appraisal system
serves as a deflective shield against spurious civil litigation from employees
passed-over for promotion. Beyond the uncommon likelihood of such litiga-
tion is the larger issue that all employees will observe that management has
sought to establish reasonable, though imperfect, standards of promotion.
Instead of encouraging litigation, such programs mitigate it. 
Rapidly growing organizations sometimes feel they cannot spare time
for appraisals. Yet this process helps identify individuals within the organi-
zation who are capable of assuming new responsibilities. In addition,
appraisals are important in determining merit increases, special training,
and layoffs. 
WHO SHOULD BE APPRAISED AND WHEN? 
In well-structured organizations, all employees deserve appraisal. Due to
the time-consuming nature of the process, appraisals are generally con-
ducted on an annual basis. However, some organizations will conduct
appraisals on a semi-annual or more frequent basis. Organizations should
schedule appraisals at times that will interfere least with critical activity. In
retail organizations, for example, it would not be logical to schedule
appraisals in November and December, as workers are busy with the holi-
day season. However, January and February are good months for retailers to
schedule appraisals. Other workplaces will have different operating
rhythms that will indicate when the most logical time for formal appraisal
should be. 
Many organizations schedule appraisals at least one year after the indi-
vidual has begun a position and at each annual anniversary. However, as
this chapter observes, employers frequently appraise workers during proba-
tionary periods, which are often particular to that organization or industry
and should be mentioned specifically in the employee’s manual. The annual
review might occur approximately six months to a year after the probation-
ary appraisal has been successfully completed by the new hire, and on an
annual basis subsequently.  
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APPRAISAL FOR ALL LEVELS AND BY ALL LEVELS
How the appraisal will be designed and who may do the appraising differs
from organization to organization and within an organization. The appraisal
process should be flexible enough so that it produces the best returns for the
time required. The following are a number of methods of appraising work-
ers:
• Top-down. Appraisals are traditionally considered top-down; that
is, a supervisor appraises his or her subordinates. In a hierarchical
organization, this will be the expected and usual method of evalu-
ation, and perhaps the only one normally scheduled. The advan-
tage of top-down appraisals is that the more experienced
supervisor understands the needs of the workplace clearly and is
the best judge of how the subordinates have achieved workplace
standards over the previous appraisal period. Also the appraiser
knows how that performance can be raised to higher level. The
disadvantage of this process is that it is a reflection of an autocratic
style of management, especially when other forms of appraisal are
not taken into consideration. 
• Bottom-up. In this circumstance, subordinates evaluate their
supervisors. The results of the appraisal document are received by
a Human Resources manager, who analyzes the results and shares
them with the supervisors involved. The advantage is that this
process helps reveal strengths and weaknesses to the supervisor in
a way that might otherwise not be discovered by upper manage-
ment or the individual supervisor. Often, what the supervisor
believes is a personal strength—for example, a string of delightful
witticisms during the workday—is regarded quite differently by
those who are targeted for such remarks on a regular basis. The
reverse may also be the case. A weakness that the supervisor
believes he or she possesses may be interpreted differently by sub-
ordinates, enabling the supervisor to reassess his or her manage-
ment traits. Many managers find it hard to accept criticisms from
subordinates and may ignore their appraisals.1
• Peer review. This is a situation in which peers evaluate each other.
Typically, the results of the questionnaire used in such a process
are seen only by a Human Resources manager, who then distills
and shares the information with the persons involved. Peer
reviews also help identify to management strengths and weak-
nesses of team members. The drawback is that such a process
makes many participants uncomfortable. The process forces co-
workers to raise unpleasant issues that possibly could be traced
back to them and lead to disharmony. 
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• Customer or client reviews. Often, contract workers are part of the
work environment for extended periods, sometimes for years.
These individuals should be assessed annually by the contractor
who assigns them to the work location. In the event the worker is a
sole contractor on an extended assignment, that person may be
reviewed much the same way proprietary employees are. Reviews
by customers or clients of contract personnel provide the contrac-
tor with tangible evidence of worker qualities. They are the per-
sons most in a position to evaluate performance under daily
circumstances. In situations where contract workers are employed
for extended service to the organization, the appraisal should
involve collaboration between both the contractor and manage-
ment of the contractee. Similarly, security service employees may
be appraised by their “customers” within or outside of the organi-
zation. A security department within an organization serves the
organization as a whole, and individuals who provide those ser-
vices may be spot-checked periodically by a simplified evaluative
document. Generally, senior managers do not opt for this type of
evaluation unless criticisms have been raised and need to be sub-
stantiated or unless a new program requires evaluation. 
WHAT TYPES OF EVALUATION DO WORKERS PREFER? 
People being appraised are seldom questioned as to which types of perfor-
mance appraisal they prefer. Some managers believe that such a preference
is irrelevant, while other researchers of appraisal instruments conclude that
such an inquiry may be “valuable."2 In one study, 52 full-time registered
nurses were asked how they preferred to be rated, by whom, and for what
reasons. The nurses displayed a marked preference for specific methods of
appraisal. They also preferred performance appraisal that had certain objec-
tives, such as determining promotion or an adjustment in compensation. By
contrast, they were less positive about appraisals that compared themselves
to others, that did not include scales, and that were completed by subordi-
nates. (These techniques are discussed later in this chapter.) 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE EVALUATED? 
If performance appraisal is important, what is evaluated must be of signifi-
cance to the employer. This issue requires thought; not every trait of an
employee should be subject to the appraisal process. Relevancy to the orga-
nization’s goals is a basis for evaluative activity. The following are examples
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of goals and skills that may be subject to performance assessment at differ-
ent levels of the workplace: 
1. Success performing functionally assigned tasks. The employer
may identify a series of activities routinely performed by the worker
and specifically linked to performance standards. For this type of
top-down appraisal, management would have identified the specific
tasks required for the position and would have related them to stan-
dards the worker may be expected to fulfill regularly. These tasks
flow from the job description originally written for the individual,
spelling out in greater detail the nature of the duties undertaken and
their appropriate standards. (Examples of this process are found in
the following section.) 
2. Trait analysis. This determines how a worker performs in a specific
activity, such as clarity in dealing with the public, efficiency, and reli-
ability. Raters are asked to appraise workers on different scales. Cer-
tain scales use such words as “outstanding” (top 2 percent);
“excellent” or “superior” (top 20 percent); “above average"; “aver-
age"; and “below average” or “needs improvement” to rate the
worker. Trait analysis tends to be focused on narrow qualities con-
sidered important to management for specific positions. Supervisors
who review specific traits of subordinates often have difficulties in
providing unfavorable assessments. This characteristic limits, but
does not negate, the use of such measurement. 
3. Critical incidents methods. Performance appraisers using the criti-
cal incident process note specific positive and negative actions taken
by the worker during the evaluation period of complex actions vital
to the job description. Such measurements have been identified pre-
viously by management as significant with regards to job function.3
An example would be the technique by which a protective employee
handled an untoward event that resulted in the completion of an
incident report. 
4. Behavioral measurement. One type of behaviorally oriented evalua-
tion is the Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale (BARS). This scale
identifies a number of possible actions by workers and then assesses
performance based on a scale from very desirable to very undesir-
able.4 BARS graphically rates behavior with specific behavioral
descriptions using a numerical scale. Since its introduction in 1963,
BARS and its numerous variants have been widely used to evaluate
the performance of law enforcement and, to a lesser degree, private
security personnel. 
5. Mixed-Standard Scales (MSS). Another method of performance
review, used in policing and security, are Mixed-Standard Scales
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(MSS). Such scales describe high, medium, and low performance and
force raters to make a choice: 
• High performance: Takes numerous steps in the patrol area both
to prevent and to control crime; educates citizens in prevention
techniques; has comprehensive knowledge of preventive equip-
ment.
• Average performance: Makes some efforts to emphasize crime
prevention in patrol district and has an adequate knowledge of
preventive equipment. 
• Low performance: Has little or no contact with district citizens
to inform them of methods of improving their property for crime
prevention. 
What each standard represents to the rater is not always obvious. The rater
indicates only that the worker’s performance is “better than,” “as good as,”
or “worse than” the behavior described.5 However, many appraisal-instru-
ment developers believe that MSS decrease rater leniency. In assessing
“crime prevention” qualities of patrol officers, for example, items were
included that identified specific dimensions of performance.6 These
included judgment, communications skills, job knowledge, demeanor, toler-
ance, cooperation, and human relations skills (see Box 6.1). 
Box 6.1. A Mixed-Standard Scale (MSS) for Patrol Performance 
The following 13 items are used to assess performance in different facets of a
patrol officer’s job. The appraiser is asked whether an item is an accurate
description of the patrol officer’s typical performance in that area of work. If
so, the appraiser places (0) in the space provided for the worker. If the patrol
officer’s typical performance is better than the item description, then a (+) is
placed in the space. If the patrol officer’s typical performance is worse than
the item description, then a (–) is placed in the space. Appraisers rank offic-
ers on code sheets that can later be analyzed. 
1. Behavior sometimes shows the effects of a stressful situation, but it
does not tend to interfere with the performance of duties. 
2. Looks neat most of the time, although uniform occasionally reflects a
busy schedule. 
3. Reports are good, but occasionally need elaboration or clarification.
Sometimes has difficulty communicating. 
4. Takes numerous steps in patrol area both to prevent and to control
crime; educates citizens in prevention techniques and has compre-
hensive knowledge of preventive equipment. 
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Box 6.1. (Continued)
5. Has little or no contact with citizens to inform them of methods of
improving their property for crime prevention. 
6. Performance reflects the proper judgment necessary to anticipate,
select, and perform the appropriate behaviors in almost all circum-
stances.
7. Is quite emphatic about the types of people he or she can and cannot
work with. Has difficulty getting along with many officers. 
8. Shows maximum effort and enthusiasm almost all the time and in
almost all circumstances. 
9. Carries out assignments and responsibilities with satisfactory stan-
dards of performance. Rarely cuts corners or bends the rules. 
10. Behavior with others is insightful and skillful, often preventing as
well as ending conflicts. 
11. Performance must be closely supervised, or it may slip to less-than-ade-
quate standards. Behavior is often designed to find shortcuts in duties. 
12. Appearance displays a careless attitude toward the job and the
impression conveyed to the public. 
13. Works adequately with most people, but has difficulty with some
types of personalities. Although willing to break in new personnel,
would prefer not to. 
Source: H.J. Bernardin, L. Eliott, and J.J. Carlyle (1980). “A Critical Assessment of Mixed Stan-
dard Rating Scales,” Proceedings of the Academy of Management, Athens, GA: Academy of Man-
agement, pp. 308–12.
USING A FORMAL APPRAISAL DOCUMENT 
A formal employee performance evaluation compares the employee’s per-
formance to a set of standards. A series of ratings used by one formal system
allows reviewers the opportunity to provide specific assessments for each
task, as shown in Figure 6.1. The form illustrated, used by a security pro-
gram employing over 200 security officers, begins with the noting of direc-
tory-type information: 
• Section I clearly indicates to the employee that a performance eval-
uation is part of the expectation and notifies the officer of the
extent of the evaluation period. 
• Section II identifies the tasks and standards deemed critical by
management. During the training process, the new employee
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would have become aware of these tasks and the nature of the
standards expected by management to be met. This would serve as
the guideline for the worker during the time allocated for the eval-
uation. The employee signs the list of functionally assigned tasks,
often in the presence of the supervisor. In a sense, this is a contract
between the employee and employer and it is an explicit under-
standing that the worker is to be judged predominantly on the
functionally assigned tasks. Figure 6.1 only provides space for five
functionally assigned tasks and standards. These should be the
critical broad workplace achievements that management expects
from the employee at that particular title, level, and unit. These can
be expanded according to the requirements of the position. Man-
agement then prepares a master list of tasks to be performed by the
category of security personnel, as shown in Table 6.1. Standards of
satisfactory performance accompany the master list and are
entered into the employee performance evaluation form. 
• Section III is completed when the evaluation period has reached an
end and the supervisor makes ratings appropriate to the worker’s
actual performance compared to the standards. The supervisor
will use comments and examples to justify the ratings. Failure to
include these can lead to the sense that the supervisor has made a
decision without proper reference to actual performance on the
part of the employee.
• Section IV provides an overall rating after individual tasks are con-
sidered. The overall rating takes into consideration the totality of
the employee’s work performance during the previous period of
time. Again, comments and examples are needed to justify the
overall rating. 
• Section V is where the supervisor provides his or her recommen-
dation for the employee in a probationary period. 
• Section VI provides space for specific plans for improvement dis-
cussed in the evaluation interview. This section identifies an area
or areas in which employee performance improvement is required.
Further, the specific means by which such improvement may be
achieved is identified. Frequently, the behavior to be corrected can
be altered by nothing more than additional personal effort follow-
ing a discussion with the supervisor. In other cases, additional
training may be needed to achieve the desired performance. 
• Section VII provides the employee with an opportunity to add writ-
ten comments to the evaluation. Such comments may be made on a
separate sheet of paper and attached to the appraisal evaluation form
if necessary. The date of the evaluation interview is also indicated. 
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Figure 6.1. Non-Managerial Employee Performance Evaluation Form 
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Figure 6.1. (Continued)
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• Section VIII concludes the evaluation process with the supervi-
sor’s signature. The employee generally signs the statement at this
point indicating that he or she does not necessarily agree with the
contents of the statement, but acknowledges that the document is
complete. At a later date, a reviewer will add a signature indicat-
ing that the employee performance evaluation form has been
reviewed by the next level of management. Alternatively, the
reviewer may be an independent Human Resources officer. Gener-
ally, reviewers are directly superior to the supervisor completing
the evaluation form. 
JOB PERFORMANCE RATING 
In some organizations, job performance evaluations are required during the
probationary period, which usually lasts three to six months. A monthly per-
formance rating evaluating new security officers is presented in Figure 6.2.
Table 6.1 . Examples of Master List Tasks and Standards for Security 
Officers 
Master List Task Number Standards
1. Patrols designated areas of public 
buildings, reports in uniform, 
makes rounds, checks that the pub-
lic and staff are following rules and 
regulations to prevent crime, van-
dalism, disturbances, and are safe-
guarding life and property.
Reports for patrol in uniform and at 
the designated time. Observation is 
acute and comprehensive. Makes 
complete rounds. Follows rules and 
regulations closely. 
2. Reprimands and ejects loiterers and 
disorderly persons by checking 
restrooms, stairways, halls, other 
areas, and advising persons to leave. 
Uses persuasion to obtain results. 
Follows rules and regulations to 
remove unauthorized persons and 
quiet disturbances.
Areas checked frequently. Persons 
asked to leave correctly, firmly, and 
courteously. Force used appropri-
ately and only when necessary. 
Appropriate rules and regulations 
followed closely. 
3. Guards department’s personnel and 
property. Restricts persons from 
entering unauthorized areas. Noti-
fies supervisor of damaged and 
inoperative equipment. Patrols effi-
ciently to prevent personal injury or 
property damage.
Unauthorized persons barred from 
restricted areas. Supervisor notified 
promptly and clearly of damaged 
and inoperative equipment. Patrols 
effectively. Removes disorderly per-
sons promptly and properly. 
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Following the conclusion of a successful probationary period, performance
ratings and evaluations can be conducted at the same frequency as with all
other employees in that job category. Use of the form acts as an incentive both
for the supervisor to note performance on a daily basis and for the subordi-
Figure 6.2. Security Officer Job Performance Evaluation Form 
Adapted from: E.T. Guy, J.J. Merrigan, Jr., and J.A. Wanat (1981). Forms for Safety and Security 
Management, Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
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nate to be aware that the probationary period entails written performance ver-
ification on topics important to the work function. 
Evaluation of contract employees may be aided by the use of a form
designed for this purpose, as shown in Figure 6.3. This document may be
Adapted from: E.T. Guy, J.J. Merrigan, Jr., and J.A. Wanat (1981). Forms for Safety and Security 
Management. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Figure 6.3. Officer Performance Evaluation Form 
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completed by the client on a monthly or semi-annual basis and forwarded to
the contract company as part of ongoing evaluation. The “Remarks” section
provides an opportunity for management of the contract firm to take appro-
priate action. Of course, any substantive unsatisfactory job trait or behav-
ioral quality should be transmitted to the security services contact
supervisor quickly to result in corrective attention. A telephone call to the
contractor as soon as such unacceptable conduct is observed may suffice.  
Peer reviews may also be considered as part of the strategy to deter-
mine job performance, cooperation, and teamwork characteristics. A Col-
league Confidential Evaluation form is used for co-workers to evaluate each
other’s performance, as shown in Figure 6.4. The evaluation director distrib-
utes and later discretely collects completed forms from evaluators. The eval-
uation director looks for strengths, weaknesses, and cooperative patterns in
workplace performance where close teamwork is required. These forms are
then assessed and transmitted to the workers being evaluated. Organiza-
tions tend to use peer-review when mutual cooperation is essential and can-
not be evaluated fully by a supervisor due to the complex nature of the work
performed by the teammates. The evaluation director must be discrete when
sharing results so as not to reveal the identities of the evaluators who have
prepared the evaluations, as this could cause friction in the workplace.
These documents should be stored separately from other records in the
worker’s employment file. 
THE NEED FOR APPRAISAL DOCUMENTATION 
Employees sometimes sue their employers for failure to be promoted, for
disciplinary action, or for termination. In such actions, written performance
appraisals are likely to become critical evidence. In appraising subordinates,
supervisors have to find a balance between encouraging desirable behavior
while also identifying non-productive behavior. A pattern of substandard
performance could lead to termination that conceivably could be the basis of
a civil action by an employee. Many supervisors emphasize the positive and
ignore the negative in subordinates. However, such relevant negative fea-
tures could become worse subsequent to their initial identification in the
written performance appraisal. Therefore, the supervisor needs to document
any negative behavior, potentially serious enough to be the basis of disci-
pline or discharge, at the earliest opportunity. 
Regrettably, many evaluators see only the positive in those whom they
evaluate (see Box 6.2). Failing to be observant of a worker’s shortcomings is
just as harmful as being excessively lenient or strict in judging workers as a
group. Other evaluators who judge most or all of their subordinates as
“average” may lack discernment and judgment expected of those with
supervisory responsibilities. The appraiser needs to include specific,
detailed observations, with the time and date noted, of notable workplace
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performance. This rigorous method of identifying both desirable and unde-
sirable performance characteristics supports the overall objectives of opera-
tions management. 
Figure 6.4. Colleague Confidential Evaluation Form 
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Box 6.2. Rating Workers Objectively in Appraisals 
The process of using written appraisals can be counterproductive if the rater
is not objective about the person being judged. Raters can improve the accu-
racy of their ratings by recognizing the following factors that subvert evalu-
ations:
1. The halo effect. The tendency of an evaluator to rate a person good
on all characteristics based on an experience or knowledge involving
only one dimension. 
2. Leniency tendency. A tendency toward evaluating all persons as
outstanding or above average and to provide inflated ratings rather
than true assessments of performance. 
3. Strictness tendency. The opposite of the leniency tendency, this is a
bias toward rating all persons at the low end of the quality scale and
a tendency to be overly demanding or critical. 
4. Average tendency. This is the tendency to evaluate every person as
average regardless of major differences in performance. 
Source: Effective Phrases for Performance Appraisals (1994). Perrysburg, OH: Neal Publications. 
OTHER WRITTEN APPRAISAL TECHNIQUES 
Performance evaluation may involve extended documentation. Prior to
evaluation, the standards should have been made clear to everyone
involved. They should be realistic, objective, and comprehensible to all secu-
rity workers in the job category. However, more than one rating category can
and should be used. The following are some options: 
• Ranking. In this type of measurement, the supervisor is asked to
simply rank all subordinate workers in the group on a numerical
basis from best to worst. This may create a bias against the most
recently hired and, therefore, less experienced worker. 
• Paired comparison. In this circumstance, the supervisor compares
subordinates to specific tasks ranking them in order from best to
worst according to each criterion. In this situation, the overall
highest ranking can be determined from an aggregate of different
factors. A negative feature of this process is that those most
recently hired—regardless of their level of training—are likely to
perform less well than experienced work unit members. 
• Narrative form. In this rating method, the supervisor writes a dis-
cursive passage on each worker to summarize individual strengths
Appraising and Promoting People in Security Programs 175
and weaknesses. This helps to provide a human dimension to the
worker’s performance during the evaluation period. 
• Forced-choice method. In this measurement, the supervisor selects
from a set of statements involving the subordinates in the work
unit. The rater selects two items from a group of four descriptive
items, one that emphasizes the most characteristic of the worker
and another that emphasizes the least characteristic. Perhaps 10 or
12 sets of four characteristics are presented and then subsequently
analyzed for each worker. The report is tedious to create and
requires construction by a technical specialist, but it provides a
portrait of the worker unattainable by other written appraisal tech-
niques. One problem with this measurement is that the sets may be
widely different in terms of their significance, and the appraiser
may not understand which employee characteristics are deemed
most significant.7 For example: 
1. A. Problems need not be stated in detail for him or her. 
B. Double checks work others do for him or her. 
2. A. Does more than his or her share of the work. 
B. Works to improve his or her main weaknesses. 
THE APPRAISAL INTERVIEW 
The preceding section discussed written, documented appraisal forms.
These are prepared prior to sharing the results with the employee or have
been used as part of the evaluation process. If and when transmitted to a
subordinate worker, the results must be communicated with tact and clarity.
The supervisor who conducts the appraisal interview needs training on how
to conduct such interviews. Initially, many supervisors are uncomfortable
with the prospect of appearing to judge a subordinate, perhaps saying or
doing something that will be counterproductive and could create an
unpleasant environment within the workplace. This usually occurs subse-
quent to an unfavorable rating. The cooperative basis between the supervi-
sor and subordinate could be tainted by the experience and a previously
friendly environment may become soured. 
These are fears many supervisors possess when they approach
appraisal interviews for the first time. In the days and weeks prior to a for-
mal appraisal interview, stress among those involved is common, and is
not necessarily harmful. Yet for the vast majority of appraisal interviews,
the process is positive and ultimately even enjoyable for both parties.
High-performing workers leave the interview enthusiastic to do better
work. Substandard workers realize they have a sympathetic supervisor
and another opportunity to do better; often, they too feel relieved by the
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process. The following are guidelines for letting workers know how they
are doing:8
• Select a quiet, comfortable, and appropriate location for the inter-
view, such as the supervisor’s office, if private, or a conference
room. 
• Plan to avoid interruptions. The process has been on the minds of
the interviewees for weeks. They deserve the supervisor’s undi-
vided attention during the interview. The supervisor also should
allow extra time for the subordinate to discuss workplace-related
matters. Such discussions, however, should not serve as a general
sounding board for excessive gripes that are far afield of the main
purpose of the meeting. 
• Put the person at ease. Humor and informality can help reduce
tension before substantive issues are considered. 
• Conduct the interview in a positive manner. Even if the subordi-
nate requires further training for a skill not fully mastered, the
supervisor should emphasize positive job accomplishments, while
not minimizing any failings that require correction. 
• Review the ratings by category. The categories for security workers
can include decision making, dependability, development, inter-
personal skills, leadership, learning ability, management ability,
motivation, personal qualities, professionalism, quality conscious-
ness, and report writing (see Box 6.3). Not all qualities can or
should be covered in the time allocated for such interviews. The
review should limit ratings to those considered most central to the
tasks of the workplace. 
• Keep the interview performance-oriented. The supervisor may
wish to avoid the accusatory use of “you” in speaking with the
worker and instead emphasize the way certain tasks were com-
pleted and their quality. 
• Encourage the subordinate to talk. Often, supervisors and subordi-
nates have little opportunity to discuss job performance in a quiet
environment. At the interview, the subordinate has an opportunity
to state whatever he or she thinks is pertinent to the review. Fol-
lowing the interview, the supervisor may wish to take notes of
such statements. 
• Respond to objections, problems, and disagreements. The supervi-
sor should calmly accept criticism from the subordinate. Appropri-
ate objections, problems, and disagreements should be resolved by
the supervisor within a reasonable period of time after the meet-
ing. (Often simply relating a vexing incident to the supervisor
relieves the stress felt by the subordinate.) 
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• Concentrate on facts. The truth must guide the supervisor in such
appraisal interviews at all times. 
• Be a coach, not a judge. The objective is to improve performance,
not to pass judgment that, although possibly accurate, will not
lead to employee improvement. 
• End the interview on a positive and supportive note. 
Box 6.3. Qualities Evaluated in Performance Appraisals 
Managers may need to evaluate particular qualities among security work-
ers. Those qualities differ according to job title and level, and often overlap.
The following are some categories by which workplace achievement or defi-
ciency can be measured: 
Accuracy Mental capacity and application 
Achievement Motivation
Administration Organization 
Analytical skills Performance qualities (general) 
Communicative skills Performance qualities (specific) 
Competency Personal qualities 
Computer skills Planning skills 
Cost management skills Potential
Creativity Problem-solving skills 
Decision-making skills Productivity 
Dependability Professionalism 
Development Quality
Evaluation skills Report writing skills 
Goals and objectives Resourcefulness 
Improvement Responsibility
Initiative Selling skills 
Interpersonal skills Stress 
Judgment Supervisory skills 
Knowledge Tact and diplomacy 
Leadership Team skills 
Learning ability Time management skills 
Loyalty and dedication Versatility 
Management ability 
Source: Effective Phrases for Performance Appraisals (1994). Perrysburg, OH: Neal Publications. 
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The interview process might seem tedious from the above description.
Yet the interview itself, properly planned and executed, takes only a few
minutes. At its conclusion, the supervisor may note critical results from the
interview and plan any follow-up actions indicated by the information pro-
vided by the subordinate. The observer is likely to use this occasion to iden-
tify plans to ensure employee growth. After a series of appraisal interviews,
the supervisor may analyze teamwork performance and identify technical
or behavioral issues requiring improvement. 
With the conclusion of the appraisal interview process, the supervisor
transmits reports to his or her supervisor for review. This process informs
middle management about the advancements being made by operational
employees and also by the supervisor responsible for success within a unit.
Senior management uses this method, among others, to evaluate the capaci-
ties of work units and their managers. 
The appraisal interview is a confrontation between a superior person
in the management hierarchy and a subordinate one. Like any confronta-
tion, the process can be difficult. Yet the lack of such an encounter can leave
superior performance unacknowledged. Equally, unsatisfactory perfor-
mance may remain uncorrected. Unsatisfactory workplace performance that
goes unevaluated and uncorrected is not likely to improve on its own. The
appraisal process—from planning through written reports to oral inter-
views—is an obligation of high-performing management. The process has
too many potential benefits relative to risks to be ignored. 
ASSESSING PERFORMANCE AMONG DIFFERENT 
EMPLOYMENT LEVELS
Much of what has been discussed so far is written with the supervisor and
subordinate at operations level in mind. These points also are applicable
among members of middle and upper management throughout the organi-
zation. Assessment for these persons is directed at the different nature of
work performed by employees with different levels of responsibilities. 
The workplace demands activity that may be divided into three cate-
gories: conceptual (analyzing, directing, planning), human relations, and
technical skills and operational services. While the proportion of these com-
ponents differ according to the level of employment, all three are present for
all employees, as shown in Figure 6.5. 
REVIEWING MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
Middle and upper managers deserve appraisal just as the operational staff
and their supervisors do. This section concentrates on the nature of manage-
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ment plans and how they are created and evaluated. The nature of manage-
ment review focuses more on programs and their success over the previous
work period than on human relations or technical service skills. All compo-
nents are significant. Any one of these aspects cannot be significantly defi-
cient for the manager to retain standing. 
All work within organizations contains a combination of three types of abilities
shown above. The proportions of each can vary widely according to the job position
and employer. Performance evaluation can be directed to each of these categories
weighted according to individual employment responsibilities. 
A trained entry-level employee on the job for the first time, without a supervi-
sor or co-worker nearby, may be called on to make an on-the-spot decision of impor-
tance to the organization. This certainly is conceivable for security employees with
extensive public contact. For this reason, even this operational neophyte must pos-
sess some conceptual skills to tackle such a situation. 
Nonetheless, the nature of management moves from being less operational to
more conceptual depending on the worker’s position on the workplace hierarchy.
Therefore, middle and upper managers tend to be judged more on analytical, plan-
ning, and implementing skills than on technical and operational abilities. Note also
that human relations skills remain a significant concern throughout the workplace,
regardless of one’s position. 
Figure 6.5. Performance Evaluation Related to Different Levels of Work-
place Responsibilities 
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A few strategies have had wide influence on organizations for getting
work done and adjusting to changing circumstances. The next section dis-
cusses some of these techniques. 
Management by Objectives (MBO) 
This concept was introduced by Peter Drucker and Douglas McGregor in
the 1950s and was widely accepted in management circles about a decade
later.9 The success of the MBO model has been embraced by private indus-
try, institutions, and the government. At the core are four principles: 
1. The employee and her or his superior jointly set goals. 
2. The employee endeavors to meet the goals. 
3. Performance is evaluated against the goals. 
4. The employee and superior jointly set new goals for the next mea-
surement period. 
MBO is a cooperative process, yet for it to succeed, both the goal and
the means of achieving that goal must be understood by all parties con-
cerned.
MBO was created with profit-making organizations in mind. It soon
became apparent, however, that substantial applicability of MBO to non-
profit organizations and government existed. In order to use the model, the
organization must affirmatively answer the following questions:10
• Does the organization have a mission to perform? Is there a valid
reason for it to exist? 
• Does management have assets (money, people, a plant, and equip-
ment) entrusted to it? 
• Is management accountable to some persons or authority for a
return on the assets? 
• Can priorities be established for accomplishing the mission? 
• Can the operation be planned? 
• Does management believe it must manage effectively even when
the organization is a non-profit one? 
• Can accountabilities of key personnel be pinpointed? 
• Can the efforts of all key personnel be coordinated into a whole? 
• Can necessary controls and feedback be established? 
• Is it possible to evaluate the performance of key personnel? 
• Is a system of positive and negative rewards possible? 
• Are the main functions of a manager (planning, organizing, direct-
ing, evaluating) the same regardless of the type of organization? 
• Is management receptive to improving methods of operations? 
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These questions are geared towards nonprofit organizations, although
the same qualities can appear in any bureaucracy. Those who plan opera-
tions strategically often choose to design systems in which management has
authority but not responsibility. Managers or entire work units normally
have authority to conduct activities, and may take credit for any success. But
in the event that the desired goals are not achieved, the same individuals or
entities can argue that they are not responsible for the results. They may
claim they did not have control over all circumstances and resources. Who
does? Persons who work in such an environment are “never wrong”
because they always take credit for success but shun responsibility for any
failure (see Box 6.4). This kind of situation is the target of MBO strategy.
MBO makes individual managers or groups conceptually responsible for
defining objectives that can be independently verified and justified.
Box 6.4. Linking Management to Authority and Responsibility
One of the circumstances in which management under-performs occurs
when a manager or a group of managers have authority but not responsibil-
ity. This is the situation that MBO strategy seeks to make less possible. MBO
links authority and the right to take credit for success directly to others, but
holds the same manager responsible in case of failure. It might seem aston-
ishing that organizations can have active units of authority without responsi-
bility, yet it has been known to occur. The following are just a few examples: 
• Organizational design. The Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey is a giant bureaucratic conglomerate that owns bridges, tun-
nels, airports, and office buildings in the New York City area. The
Port Authority employs thousands and has revenues in the bil-
lions. But who is responsible when things go wrong? Technically,
the governors of New York and New Jersey have the responsibility.
But it is hard to pin responsibility on two persons in different
states who often have divergent and competing interests and pri-
orities. In such situations, if results are unsatisfactory, no single
authority answers for them. 
• Programmatic design. Consider a security program in which the
director has the authority to hire or fire personnel, to contract or
terminate a contract of a security service provider, and to take
other relevant actions. Yet in some circumstances, such a manager
may claim to take little or no responsibility unless results are tied
to the job. For example, such a manager could claim that insuffi-
cient resources, too little time, and changing circumstances were
responsible for unsatisfactory results. 
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MBO brings managers, supervisors, and workers together to share
authority for setting objectives and holds them responsible if those goals are
not met. MBO can be structured for a particular work group or for a larger
organization. The MBO team allocates and distributes personnel, identifies
what resources are available, and determines what is needed. This increases
the opportunity for involvement by all personnel, provides specialized
resources as needed, and uses varying management concepts as appropriate
to achieve results. In the end, responsibility and authority, success and fail-
ure, rewards and penalties are all linked. 
Examples of MBO in Security Applications 
In the following sections, we will look at various examples of MBO in action. 
Example 1. In this example, the organization is a regional distributor of
brand-name gasoline and owns refining, storage, and transportation facili-
ties as well as several filling stations, many with convenience stores
attached. Additionally, the company has franchise relationships with many
independent operators. The parent company has designed and installed an
advanced proprietary central monitoring system and has connected its
offices, processing, and retail facilities to it. Soon after installation, two needs
emerge concerning the new system. 
Objective: More efficient use of proprietary alarm monitoring resources. 
Goal No. 1: To reduce the number of false alarms received by the depart-
ment’s proprietary alarm system by 20 percent over a six-month period
without losing quality of response. 
Program:
1. Re-educate all internal users about the use of the alarm system,
focusing on factors that frequently cause false alarms. 
2. Designate an employee to review all false alarms within one day of
occurrence and determine what actions could be taken to reduce
such alarms. 
3. Institute measures to verify alarms before calling police, for example,
by using closed circuit television with interactive audio capacity to
verify a possible alarm condition after receiving the initial alarm sig-
nal.
4. Provide management with written reports of alarm activity as they
occur. The reports compare incidents on a year-to-date basis to docu-
ment the trend. 
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Goal No. 2: Expand use of the alarm system to the organization’s customers
and franchisees. 
Program:
1. Prepare literature on cooperative use of the proprietary system and
distribute to all prospects emphasizing technological advancement.
Mail a second time two months later to non-respondents. 
2. Schedule an open house so prospects can visit the alarm monitoring
station and learn of its capacities. Demonstrate its surveillance and
two-way communications features. 
3. Designate a program manager to call prospects subsequently to
determine interest. The program manager should work from a care-
fully prepared script and should emphasize benefits to being pro-
tected within the company’s alarm system, though the commitment
is optional. 
4. Train alarm installers to deal with the company’s franchisee’s special
requirements and concerns. 
5. Facilitate insurance savings for participants who contract for the ser-
vice by providing details to the franchisee’s insurance broker or car-
rier. 
Example 2. In the second example, a large urban medical center operates
several of its own parking garages combined with nearby open parking lots.
Due to the nature of the 24-hour service provided by the facility, a pattern of
thefts from cars, vandalism, and occasional car theft has emerged over the
previous year, and the problem is increasing. Management is concerned that
employees and visitors who use the parking facility are becoming fearful.
Victimized employees and visitors have pressured the hospital administra-
tion and security director. Perimeter control and other measures are needed
to reduce incidents. 
Objective: Reduce theft from and of vehicles. Reduce vandalism. 
Goal No. 1: Reduce chances of unauthorized access to parking areas. 
Program:
1. Seal openings to all the parking garages so that users may not enter
indirectly. (A redundant pedestrian back entrance to one multi-story
parking lot should be sealed permanently.) 
2. Provide additional surveillance at the zone where cars enter and exit.
(An office for the parking garage manager on duty should be relo-
cated with windows open to the entrance.) 
3. Improve lighting throughout. (Newer lights also cut energy costs.) 
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4. Install covert and overt closed circuit television, which collects
images of all vehicles and drivers arriving and departing from the
facility. The videotape recording of the traffic should be located in
the office of the security department in the main hospital building.
Signs should be posted stating “These Premises under 24-Hour
Video Surveillance.” 
5. During hours of little activity (10 P.M. to 7 A.M.) the garage door
should be closed and opened only when traffic is present. Whenever
the doors are open, a security person or garage attendant must be
near and visible at the entrance in addition to the nearby visible
parking garage cashier. 
Goal No. 2: Reduce chances of theft from automobiles and of automobiles
themselves.
Program:
1. Provide a scooter to patrol the lots frequently and randomly. 
2. Install signs to remind drivers not to leave valuables exposed in their
vehicles. If customers make their cars tempting to thieves, provide
extra surveillance and inform the customers when possible to be
more careful. 
3. Establish separate parking areas for regular medical center staff and
visitors.
Goal No. 3: Reduce fear level of nighttime and early morning patrons of the
garages and lots. 
Program:
1. Offer an escort service from the building entrance to vehicles for
those arriving or departing between 11 P.M. and 7 A.M.
2. Install an alarm and communications system at all levels of the park-
ing garage and lot. If someone presses the emergency button, an
audible alarm and a flashing strobe light should be illuminated. An
attendant should have two-way communication with the person
requiring assistance. 
3. Improve housekeeping in the parking garage and lot. Walls should
be painted white and unused utility vehicles previously stored in the
lot should be removed. 
4. Conduct a brief pre- and post-implementation survey of users to
determine success. 
The MBO technique has many advantages. One criticism of MBO,
however, is that it has not been subjected to rigorous analytical standards to
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determine its success. This is true in security applications as well as other
management applications using MBO. Yet this criticism could be raised with
many other personnel tools currently in use as well. Further, one review esti-
mates that MBO successes are about five times greater than its failures.11
However, the benefits of MBO may decline over time, requiring a fresh anal-
ysis of situational circumstances that have changed months or years after
the original objectives were achieved. 
Failure to achieve the desired goals from MBO does not necessarily
mean total failure. Planners and implementers in such situations have
endeavored through numerous means to achieve success. Their lack of suc-
cess may eliminate the value of some measures that have been tried and
may suggest other measures that could take their place or augment them. 
Critical Incident Review 
Another way by which managers may be evaluated is through a case review
of a significant incident or launched program that occurred over the previ-
ous six months or year. The manager for this program might expect to have
all aspects of the incident carefully reviewed, leading to an eventual state-
ment or report of findings. In this sense, the critical incident review is like an
internal audit of an incident or program. 
The reviewers in such a process frequently are assigned from outside
the immediate chain of command. They may or may not have any personal
knowledge of the incident or program, but possess broad experience and
analytical skills sufficient to enable a fair and comprehensive review of the
facts. Critical incident reviews are often preferred by the government for
program evaluation. The reviewers may be investigators, internal auditors,
managers from other operations, or professional consultants. 
Problem-Solving Ability 
A majority of persons who work in security come in contact with the public
as part of their assignments. Security exists partly to provide at strategic
locations competent, trained individuals who can deal with exceptional cir-
cumstances on the spot. This prompt action prevents a simple issue from
becoming a major problem. Management expects security workers to be
problem solvers, not deniers. However, security personnel should not be
expected to receive and resolve untoward events for which they have not
been trained. Security personnel, unlike Human Resources personnel who
usually work from their offices, may be found throughout the organization’s
facilities, dealing with incidents that can be resolved quickly. They are
placed strategically about the operations. This enables security practitioners
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to resolve low-priority incidents so that they will not escalate to significant
issues.
Senior management assesses and rewards subordinate personnel who
assume responsibility for a potential problem and find a solution. Manage-
ment observers also seek to assess such behavior and use it as a basis for
commendation or promotion. Other individuals may initially tend to ignore
the problem, then deny its consequence, and, learning otherwise, tempo-
rarily think that others should be blamed, as shown in Figure 6.6. Instead,
they should be conditioned to pass through these emotional checkpoints
and maturely assume responsibility, which leads toward a solution of the
problem presented. Other individuals accept responsibility and readily seek
to resolve problematic issues. 
Figure 6.6. From Ignoring to Resolving Problems: A Process 
Not all problems presented to security personnel should be solved by them. In many
cases, the problem-presenter should be encouraged to solve the problem himself or
herself. Other issues are reasonably related to the concerns of security services and
the burden for responding belongs to security. When this is the case, security person-
nel should push through any psychological barriers to resist acting, and assume
responsibility for a solution. 
A.S.Grove (1985). High Output Management. New York, NY: Vintage Books, p. 194 
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Field Review 
The term “field review” refers to programs located at distant facilities. It fre-
quently represents a senior manager’s critique of an operational manager’s
program elsewhere. At such times, the senior manager usually arrives at the
distant location, conducts a broad survey of relevant factors, and later reports
to local, regional, and senior management of the circumstances found during
the scheduled field review (see Box 6.5). The field report evaluates local secu-
rity management and programs for their strengths or weaknesses. 
Box 6.5. Avon Calling: Visits for a Field Review 
Field reviews of ongoing security programs give headquarters’ management
an opportunity to assess and respond to local problems and opportunities.
At Avon Products, Inc., Robert F. Littlejohn, vice president for global secu-
rity, visits some 60 Avon locations each year to conduct field reviews. Little-
john’s procedures for conducting the field review are meant to enhance
cooperation and good rapport between global headquarters and the local
operating business. Generally, a routine field visit of an operating facility
can be conducted in one or two days, depending on the complexity of the
facility. The final analysis and report requires hours to compile. 
The following are guidelines used by senior managers on their peri-
odic field visits: 
1. Plan ahead. Schedule the visit weeks in advance so that the occasion
will not be disruptive to local operations. (Obviously, if a pressing
need exists, the review should be expedited.) 
2. Meet with the general manager at the beginning of the fact-finding
visit. Explain that the nature of the visit is largely consultative and
supportive. But also state that if anything of a critical nature for
action is discovered during the visit, this will be shared with the gen-
eral manger by the security evaluator before leaving. Another
advantage of meeting with the general manager before beginning
the inspection and evaluation is that the evaluator has the chance to
learn about any local concerns. 
3. Endeavor to have quantitative data ready to evaluate. Expect to
have incident reports ready for review. Photocopy or download
records for later analysis. 
4. Allow time for local security managers to share concerns. Endeavor
to meet significant new employees who have joined the organization
since the previous visit. 
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PERFORMANCE REVIEWS FOR SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
Appraisals need not be limited to operational staff personnel and lower and
middle management. All employees in an organization committed to sys-
tematic evaluation of individual performance may be involved in the review
process. This includes senior staff officers and the chief executive officer
(CEO). In large complex organizations, the CEO may request that the senior
officer for Human Resources conduct the evaluation of all senior staff offic-
ers, or the CEO might assume this responsibility. In addition, an outside
consultant may be retained for the process. 
Performance evaluations of the CEO and senior staff officers are less
likely than appraisal further down the management hierarchy ladder. This is
because senior staff officers are under scrutiny by a variety of outside
sources. Principal among these is the board of directors, trustees, or an
equivalent governing body. Review of performance of a different sort also
takes place among officers of publicly held companies by stock analysts.
Such analysts may follow the company and regularly ask penetrating ques-
tions about performance goals and results and then publish their findings
and conclusions. Further, senior officials are subject to judgment by the
media and shareholders, particularly when an incident has occurred that
raises doubts about the capability of the team in the executive suite.
Box 6.5. (Continued)
5. Inspect any new security system that has been installed since the
previous visit.
6. Concentrate on the most important security problem concerning
management at that location. Additionally, review security matters
of concern to headquarters and share what the plans are to respond
to them. 
7. Meet with the general manager again before departing. Share what
has been observed and discuss possible problems. If they are of a
minor nature, they may be resolved on the spot and not appear in
the final written report. If they are major, begin dealing with a solu-
tion immediately, following up later until the issue is resolved. 
Final reports contain an executive summary, findings, and recommen-
dations for actions. This plan details what work is needed to be done, who is
responsible, and when the implementations are to be completed. Global
headquarters follows up to make sure that its tasks and those of the local
operating business are both completed in a timely fashion. 
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THE LIMITATIONS OF APPRAISALS 
A case has been made that appraisals of individuals at all levels can help
serve the needs of a dynamic organization. Because of the criticality of loss
prevention in many organizations, performance appraisals may be more
likely to be an integral part of the management strategy in this department
than in others. 
Appraisals do have their limitations. Bias in judgment of one individ-
ual by another may be difficult to eliminate, particularly in the minds of a
subordinate receiving a critical evaluation. A more searching dissatisfaction
with the appraisal system has been raised by psychologist Harry Levinson,
who argues that job descriptions must be behavior- as well as results-ori-
ented.12 Levinson suggests employers create dynamic job descriptions in
which behavior for different positions—particularly management—is iden-
tified in advance. Examples of behavior-oriented questions to be answered
in preparing the dynamic job description are: 
1. How does this job require the incumbent to handle his or her aggres-
sion and attacking capacity? 
2. How does this job require the incumbent to manage affection, the
need to love and be loved? Is the person required to be a socially
friendly leader of a close-knit work group? 
3. How does this job require the incumbent to manage dependency
needs? Will the individual be able to lean on others who have skill
and competencies, or will he or she have to operate alone? 
4. What ego ideal demands does this job fulfill? If one does the job well,
what is the gratification to be gained? Money? Recognition? Eligibil-
ity for promotion? The feelings of great personal achievement? 
THE PROMOTION PROCESS 
Promotions are substantial changes in a job, normally requiring additional
responsibility and entailing greater authority for which increased income,
perquisites, and status are provided. Persons considering the prospect of
being promoted concentrate on these external benefits. Such benefits serve
as important inducements that make promotions attractive for many.
Employers also see promotions as a means to sustain vital programs. Pro-
moting someone offers hope for improvement in the sector for which the
newly promoted person will be responsible. Consequently, to the employer,
the act of promoting someone involves the weighing of numerous factors
before the decision is made. For this reason, organizations consider promo-
tions carefully. 
190 Security and Operations Management
Advancement That Stops Short of Promotion 
Frequently, management cannot promote someone at a particular time to a
new position for various reason. The new position may not be funded at the
time and the supervisor or middle manager needs to await budget approval
to cover the prospective promotion. Or the management may require more
time in order to make a decision because two or more candidates are in com-
petition for the same position and a clear superior choice has not emerged.
Additionally, the organization may be facing a change in senior manage-
ment or in a policy direction that temporarily blocks promotions and other
decisions down the chain of command. Still other reasons can delay an oth-
erwise normal procedure. 
Despite these conditions, the supervisor and middle manager have
several options available to them so that they can provide greater recogni-
tion and challenge to their workers. Supportive managers endeavor to
encourage subordinates, though the measures available fall short of a tradi-
tional promotion. The following are a number of ways in which supervisors
can recognize and challenge their workers: 
• New responsibilities. The supervisor or manager may provide
new duties for persons who are exceeding requirements but for
whom a promotion at the time is not possible. Sometimes, the
assignment of duties to promising candidates can help identify the
best performers in contention for the promotion. 
• Desirable perquisites. If the individual cannot be promoted but
deserves recognition, perquisites may be provided in way avail-
able to management. These include better scheduling, preferred
postings and vacation time, and special training. 
• Special recognition. Ego gratifying measures may be within the
unit’s capacity to fund easily and can satisfy the employee by recog-
nizing his or her achievements. This can involve providing the secu-
rity officer or investigator with a new title—for example, adding
“senior” or “executive” to the title. Providing calling cards with the
individual’s name and position, and changing the person’s uniform
or office location can also serve as welcome perquisites. 
• New duties now; promotion later. Pending the increased funding,
the individual can effectively assume the new position without offi-
cially assuming the new job. When the budget line is approved, the
position becomes available to the person to whom it was promised. 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH PROMOTION? 
Promotions work to advance the needs of the organization. However, sev-
eral factors make promotions difficult decisions for management. 
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The Peter Principle 
In 1969, Lawrence J. Peter and Raymond Hull introduced a facetious concept
of occupational incompetence, named for the principal author. Their proposi-
tion stimulated debate almost immediately and has remained controversial
since then. The Peter Principle states that in a hierarchy, every employee
tends to rise to his or her level of incompetence, or the cream rises until it
sours.13 This notion is best considered a jocular characterization of manage-
ment ascension proposing that people eventually reach a level they should
not occupy. It observes that persons in positions of authority eventually reach
their level of incompetence and are not likely to be promoted in the future. 
The appeal of this notion is that it correctly reflects the experience of
many managers who unflatteringly conclude that their supervisors have
been promoted from a level of competence to one of incompetence. This is
reflected in Peter’s Corollary, which states that in time, every position tends
to be occupied by an employee who is incompetent to carry out its duties.
The assumption is that work is accomplished only because many persons
have yet to attain their level of incompetence. The key to one’s health and
happiness on the job is not to accept the “Final Promotion.” Peter suggests
the key is the condition of “Creative Incompetence” in which the individual
produces superior work while avoiding being promoted. But how can one
ever be sure exactly what that level is? 
The Peter Principle and its analogues have been resilient topics in man-
agement discussions because they reflect the fact that at least some promo-
tions are failures. Most promotions require individuals to grow with their
new positions and possibly make lifestyle changes, such as working differ-
ent hours and physically relocating. These are stress-provoking circum-
stances and some people who are promoted later conclude that the
promotion was not to their satisfaction. Despite the effort that management
has expended to select and promote the right candidate, the process has
failed. The best strategy is to permit the individual to resume his or her pre-
vious post as gracefully as possible. Surely, the individual has performed
optimally in this role previously and can do so again in the future. Numer-
ous security programs over the years have had such experiences and have
made the necessary accommodations to people who chose self-demotion. 
WHY PROMOTIONS ARE IMPORTANT 
Apart from benefiting the individual who is promoted, promotions are good
for the work unit and the larger organization in several ways: 
1. The skills are needed to achieve goals. This is the most obvious rea-
son for promotion: the job has been budgeted for good reason and
the work it represents needs to be done. 
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2. The person promoted may take the program in a new, desirable
direction. Organizations are constantly changing. Sometimes this is
a result of internal forces, such as changes in management strategy;
other times it is a result of external factors, such as modifications in
the marketplace and advances in technology that affect how the job
needs to be done. A newly promoted person may add value in trans-
lating these forces to the workplace relative to the previous manager. 
3. Promotions permit individual growth. Employees at all levels need
to feel as if they are growing, although not all employees want chal-
lenges beyond those presented in their current positions. 
4. Promotions reward good work. Unlike one-time bonuses or lesser
recognition of competence and promise, promotions are enduring
and set a platform to encourage further good work. 
5. Promotions inform all employees that career advancement is pos-
sible. When one person is promoted, other workers are encouraged
that greater opportunity awaits them if they are qualified. 
SUMMARY
Appraising workers’ efforts at all levels is difficult. The resistance to
appraisals takes many forms: dislike of judging others; fear of harming
workplace comity; and concern that litigation will be filed from dissatisfied
workers at some point. Yet the returns are worth the effort. Properly man-
aged appraisal programs can document and correct unproductive behavior
before it becomes unchangeable or causes harm. On the positive side,
appraisals identify and encourage superior performance in the workplace
and help develop talent. There are numerous ways of assessing and ranking
employees, all of which must be measured against the needs of the work-
place. Promotions help the organization reward those best able to maintain
the desired standards of productivity and to bring fresh ideas into the orga-
nization in order to move it forward. 
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. Discuss specific reasons why personnel appraisals serve the interests
of the organization. 
2. How can top-down appraisals be designed to make judgments that
are less likely to be biased by autocratic behavior? 
3. How do appraisal guidelines differ for employees during the proba-
tionary period? 
Appraising and Promoting People in Security Programs 193
4. How can the halo effect be mitigated among managers who must
assess subordinates? 
5. Why should an evaluator look forward to an appraisal interview? 
6. If work can be divided generally into three categories—technical/
service, human relations, and conceptual—how do personnel
appraisals change relative to these characteristics? 
7. What accounts for the popularity and resiliency of MBO? 
8. Why should organizations want to promote employees? 
ENDNOTES
1 L. Reibstein (June 13, 1998). “Firms Ask Workers to Rate Their Bosses,” Wall Street
J., p. 15. 
2 J.L. Jordan and D.B. Nasis (June 1992). “Preference for Performance Appraisal
Based on Method Used, Type of Rater, and Purpose of Evaluation.” Psychological
Reports, 70:963–69. 
3 S.J. Carroll and C.E. Schneier (1982). Performance Appraisal and Review Systems.
Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company; E.R. Moulder (1995). Performance
Appraisal and Compensation Programs in Local Government. Washington, DC: ICMA. 
4 D.P. Schwab et al. (1975). “Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales: A Review of the
Literature.” Personnel Psychology, 28:549–62. 
5 H.J. Bernardin and R.W. Beatty (1984). Performance Appraisal, Assessing Human
Behavior at Work. Kent Human Resources Management Series. Boston, MA: Kent Pub-
lishing Company. 
6 H.J. Bernardin, L. Eliott, and J.J. Carlyle (1980). “A Critical Assessment of Mixed
Standard Rating Scales,” Proceedings of the Academy of Management, pp. 308–12. 
7 R.M. Guion (1986). “Personnel Evaluation.” In Performance Assessment: Methods &
Applications. R.A. Berk, Ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 365. 
8 Effective Phrases for Performance Appraisals (1994). Perrysburg, OH: Neal Publi-
cations.
9 P. Drucker (1954). The Practice Side of Management. New York, NY: John Wiley &
Sons; D. McGregor (1960). The Human Side of Management. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill.
10 D.D. McConkey (January 1973). “Applying MBO to Nonprofit Organization.”
S.A.M. Advanced Management J., p. 12. 
11 J.M. Kondrasuk (1981). “Studies in MBO Effectiveness.” Academy of Management
Review, 6:419–30. 
12 H. Levinson (July–August, 1970). “Management by Whose Objectives?” Harvard
Business Review, 48(4): 125–34. 
13 L.J. Peter and R. Hull (1969). The Peter Principle. New York, NY: William Morrow &
Co.
194 Security and Operations Management
Additional References 
C.D. Fisher, L.F. Schoenfeldt, and J.B. Shaw (1993). Human Resource Management. 2nd
Edition. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
G. Hoover, A. Campbell, and P.J. Spain (Eds.) (1994). Hoover’s Handbook Of American
Business 1995. Austin, TX: Reference Press. 
P. Krass (Ed.) (1998). The Book of Leadership Wisdom. New York, NY: John Wiley &
Sons, p. 375. 
PART 2 
SPECIAL ISSUES IN 
SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
197
7
DISCIPLINE AND 
DISCHARGE
There is occasions and causes why and where-
fore in all things. 
—Shakespeare, King Henry V
The previous chapters discussed management’s role in selecting, training,
and supporting employees successfully. However, some employees do not
meet the expectations of management, despite appropriate interventions by
their supervisors. At such times, supervisors and middle managers must
resort to more strenuous measures in order to promote satisfactory work
performance.
When the performance of employees does not meet minimum expecta-
tions, and a few words by the supervisor have not achieved their objective, a
disciplinary procedure may be considered. The word discipline is derived
from the Latin discipere, meaning to grasp or comprehend, and from discipu-
lus, meaning pupil. The term a “disciplined worker” may be used to refer to
an employee who is reliable and completes required tasks. Yet the word in
contemporary use often is equated with punish (from the Latin punire,
denoting penalty and pain). However, in a workplace context, the two
words should be regarded as distinct concepts. Supervisors use—or should
use—discipline not to penalize subordinates, but rather to improve their
behavior in order to meet objectives of the workplace. As Henri Fayol
observed in his seminal book General and Industrial Management, poor disci-
pline is the result of poor leadership. Good discipline occurs when workers
and managers know and respect the rules governing activities in the organi-
zation.1
This chapter discusses why discipline is necessary, how operating pro-
grams use it, and what its pitfalls are. It also discusses the ultimate break-
down in the employee/employer relationship, namely discharge or removal
from employment. 
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WHY SOME EMPLOYEES FAIL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED 
STANDARDS
In a well-planned and functioning workplace, most workers meet the mini-
mally acceptable standards most of the time. But what of those who do not?
It is useless for security managers to launch into a disciplinary mode before
considering the reasons for poor performance. In fact, many reasons exist for
why subordinates do not perform at a satisfactory level. These possibilities
may be divided roughly into two categories according to their significance
and credibility, as follows. 
Explanations that may satisfactorily explain poor performance: 
1. A process critical to work malfunctioned. For example, utilities and
support mechanisms for security operations sometimes fail. If a
worker monitors alarm signals and the computer crashes, making it
impossible for the worker to respond to the alarm in a timely fash-
ion, the alarm console operator cannot be held responsible for sub-
standard performance. 
2. Contradictory orders are given by another supervisor. The skills
and job understanding of supervisors should be interchangeable. Yet
if the primary supervisor sets the worker on a particular task, leaves
the scene, and another supervisor preempts that original order, the
worker should not be held accountable for not respecting the
requests of the initial supervisor. 
3. The task requested is illegal.
4. The task required is immoral or unethical.
5. The request is unsafe or dangerous. In such cases, the supervisor is
responsible for the subordinate and should not have placed the
worker in a position where safety is an issue. 
6. The worker has an acute health or personal problem. Supervisors
tend to be lenient when an otherwise well-performing worker has an
acute health problem or a personal emergency. But the nature of
much security work requires regularity and reliability, and frequent
performance exceptions are disruptive to its goals. 
7. The worker does not have the capacity to do the job. This suggests
a failure in selection and training. While this is a possible explana-
tion for poor performance or behavior, the situation is unlikely to
occur in carefully managed operations. If it does occur, discharge of
the employee is indicated. Another option is to assign the worker to
a different type of position where he or she may have the capacity to
perform satisfactorily.  
Explanations usually not satisfactory to explain poor performance: 
1. Insufficient supplies or materials are available for the worker. The
absence of objects or substances routinely required at the worksite
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usually should not be an excuse for substandard worker perfor-
mance. Workers generally ought to be able to recognize a situation in
which needed materials are low and when reordering them is appro-
priate. For example, security officers may be expected to complete
incident reports in a timely fashion on a prescribed form. The lack of
availability of such forms should not be used by a security officer as
a reason for not completing a report. Security officers are expected to
be flexible in such situations. In this case, the details of the report
could be written on plain paper, if necessary, and attached to the cor-
rect form when it becomes available. When something critical is
required for worker performance but is not available due to a failure
by management, workers should not be penalized. 
2. The employee has been improperly trained. The corrective in such
cases is to reassess the training process, if the objection seems reason-
able, and re-train the individual. However, training that was care-
fully planned, adequately taught, and certifiably completed by
testing to assure comprehension works against this as an explanation
for poor performance.
3. A co-worker prevents the employee from completing a task.
Employees are responsible for their specified duties. Saying that a
co-worker prevented the task from being completed is not a tenable
excuse. Exceptions exist, for example, if one worker’s behavior
against another was harassing or flagrantly offensive and the worker
could have notified management of this circumstance but did not. 
4. There is insufficient time to complete the task. This explanation
would not be valid if work is assigned with an accurate understand-
ing of how much time is required to complete it. The time required is
generally measured against the performance of established workers
so that a reasonable work objective can be met.  
5. The worker does not like to do a particular task.
6. The employee dislikes the supervisor or vice versa.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
While some reasonable explanations for unsatisfactory workplace behavior are
situational, others are psychological. That is, the worker has a conflict with the
methods prescribed by the supervisor or the workplace itself. Unconsciously,
the worker may resist authority seen in the embodiment of the supervisor. Fail-
ure to respond according to training and directions may be an act of rebellion
that reflects deeper unresolved psychological conflicts on the worker’s part. In
extreme cases, the behavior may mask an adjustment disorder.2
Consider the situation of a new uniformed security officer. The indi-
vidual has been provided with a complete set of clothing, carefully selected
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by the employer. During training sessions, emphasis on the use and care of
the uniform are stressed. Other uniformed security officers seen as role
models by the novice during training are properly dressed. Nonetheless, on
occasion, security officers may not be dressed according to regulations. This
failure to be properly dressed can be explained by the security officer as a
situational exception, a lapse in judgment. This may be possible and excus-
able. However, a repeated pattern may be interpreted as a sign of resis-
tance—even hostility—to managerial requirements. 
The supervisor’s role at such times is not one of psychoanalyst for the
errant subordinate. Workers who do not meet the standards of quality and
behavior generally achieved by their co-workers require discipline. To fail to
do so makes the employer a conspirator to poor performance.
WHY SOME SUPERVISORS DO NOT DISCIPLINE WELL 
A few tasks in the workplace are difficult for novice supervisors. The previ-
ous chapter mentioned appraisal interviews as a possible awkward task for
supervisors. Providing adequate discipline for under-performing workers is
another often onerous task for novice supervisors. But unlike appraisal
interviews, which generally emphasize positive features of performance,
disciplinary contact between the supervisor and subordinate is different. 
The disciplinary process is awkward for both parties. Supervisors in
particular may rationalize their inaction with regards to disciplining fellow
workers (see Box 7.1). Yet like the appraisal interviews, if disciplinary mea-
sures are not taken, work performance could deteriorate. A lack of consis-
tent disciplinary action by a supervisor in the workplace can be the basis of
arbitrators’ or civil court judgment against the employer. Poor performance
without the presence of corrective action trains the worker that such behav-
ior is permissible. The poor performance then is established as a fixed pat-
tern.
Box. 7.1. Why Supervisors Fail to Discipline 
A supervisor asks two workers to perform an unpleasant task, but one that
is included in their job description. A few minutes later, the supervisor notes
the workers taking a break for coffee. It is not their break time and the
employees did not have permission to take a break. The supervisor observes
the situation and leaves the room without making a comment to them. The
workers never perform the requested task and nothing is ever mentioned
again by the supervisor. 
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Box. 7.1. (Continued)
Why do some supervisors fail to address employees’ refusal to per-
form an assigned task? Edward L. Harrison, a professor of management at
the University of South Alabama, surveyed supervisors from several indus-
trial organizations participating in management development seminars.
Based on their responses from his questionnaire, Harrison came up with 14
main reasons why managers fail to discipline workers: 
Source: E.L. Harrison (April 1985). “Why Supervisors Fail to Discipline.” Supervisory Manage-
ment, 30(4): 18–22.
Percentage Reason for Failure to Discipline 
42.9% The supervisor had failed to document earlier actions so that no 
record existed on which to base disciplinary action. 
40.4% The supervisor believed that he or she would receive little or no sup-
port from higher management for the disciplinary action. 
29.2% The supervisor was uncertain of the facts underlying the situation 
requiring disciplinary action. 
20.9% Failure by the supervisor to discipline employees in the past for a 
certain infraction caused the supervisor to forego current disciplin-
ary action in order to appear consistent. 
20.5% The supervisor wanted to be seen as a “good guy.” 
19.5% The employee involved was a close friend of the supervisor. 
14.8% Job demands and conditions made it inconvenient for the supervisor 
to discipline the employee. 
13.9% The supervisor was uncertain of provisions in the labor agreement 
pertaining to the situation involved. 
13.5% The supervisor provoked the employee infraction. 
13.3% The employee problem was one that should be dealt with through the 
employee assistance program rather than through a disciplinary penalty. 
11.9% The supervisor was concerned that a disciplinary penalty might 
result in a charge of racial or sexual discrimination. 
10.9% The supervisor did not want to draw negative attention to his or her 
own operation. 
6.9% The supervisor was reluctant to penalize the employee because the 
employee was a union officer. 
5.9% The supervisor did not want to spend time on the grievance that 
might result from a disciplinary penalty. 
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In effect, the supervisor who fails to appropriately correct the worker
hurts several parties. The deficient worker becomes complacent and may
feel encouraged to flout other rules. Other workers observe the substandard
co-worker and wonder why he or she is permitted to deviate from the orga-
nizational policy. The quality of their work, too, may decline. The organiza-
tion then becomes affected by an insidious decline in quality performance.
Desired production goals or qualities of service are not met as planned.
Finally, the supervisor realizes that by failing to correct subordinates, his or
her job is not being performed as it should be. All of this is moot if the super-
visor identifies errors in performance in a timely fashion, corrects them dis-
cretely and with dignity for the worker, and restores the employee to desired
productive levels or behavior. 
HUMAN RELATIONS–ORIENTED MANAGERS 
In the lore of the workplace, the bosses of yesteryear are remembered as
Simon Lagrees or Ebineezer Scrooges. The characters are harsh, brutish, and
cruel. Lagree remains unrepentant until the end of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, though
Scrooge experiences a personal epiphany resulting in a happy ending for A
Christmas Carol. While the fictional portrait of past employers may have
been stereotyped, it is beyond debate that the contemporary workplace is a
kinder and gentler place for employees than in past generations, even con-
cerning disciplinary matters. 
Abusive bosses are no longer accepted in the workplace. Yet not all
managers have the sensitivity of trained counselors. Why should they?
Managers have strengths and weaknesses like everyone else. Still, the reality
is that contemporary managers are better attuned to and more tolerant of
moods and feelings of workers than in the past. This is due to increased edu-
cation, workplace training, changing workplace ethos, a growing under-
standing of psychological dynamics, changing employment laws, and the
risk of litigation or forced arbitration from complaints about supervisors
from subordinates. 
PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE TO SAVE WEAK WORKERS 
Management expends a great deal of effort on recruiting, selecting, training,
and supporting employees. Considerable investment in the employee has
been made by the time he or she begins productive work. Further, the
employer wants and needs workers to succeed. In such circumstances, the
desirable goal is to turn any substandard behavior into acceptable or supe-
rior behavior with the least amount of stress and strain. Among some super-
visors, the temptation to discharge an errant worker for solid reason often is
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strong and may be justifiable. However, management has a financial incen-
tive in endeavoring to improve substandard performance in lieu of dis-
missal if at all practicable. Therefore, a deficiency in behavior should not
lead directly to a disproportionate response on the part of the supervisor.
The response must be balanced, impartial, and appropriate to the circum-
stance.
Corrective or progressive discipline is an increasingly used disciplin-
ary procedure by unionized and non-unionized employers alike. In union-
ized workplaces, such actions often are mandatory and included in
collective bargaining agreements. These agreements usually state that disci-
pline should be corrective in nature, rather than punitive, but they do not
say that discipline must start with a letter of warning and be increased after
every subsequent behavior. Supervisors may initiate formal disciplinary
action through the issuance of a letter of warning or suspension if an
employee’s actions do not improve after discussion. This process forces the
manager who supervises the under-performing individual to make deci-
sions and be held accountable. Resolution to problems is meant to be
achieved expeditiously. 
The stepwise or progressive disciplinary procedure, shown in Figure
7.1, is used in many formal organizations and is meant to enhance levels of
trust, communication, and dispute resolution. The sequence of events is as
follows:
1. Infractions at work or poor performance. First, a potential disciplin-
ary offense or behavior must come to the attention of a supervisor.
Typically, these include chronic absenteeism, not being present at a
post without leave, the performing of an unsafe act, poor work per-
formance, and failure to follow instructions. When confirmed, the
supervisor evaluates the infraction further before confronting the
errant employee. 
2. Supervisor investigates any significant predisposing factors. The
supervisor determines if any significant predisposing factors might
explain why the worker committed the infraction or performed
poorly. Assuming the worker was tardy or absent from work (poor
performance), was someone sick at home? Or were there extenuating
factors such as inclement weather? Despite being tardy, did the
worker call the supervisor to warn of his or her late arrival or
absence so that scheduling adjustments could be made? Has the
offense occurred previously? With what frequency? After gathering
all related facts, the supervisor is now ready to discuss the perfor-
mance deficiency with the worker. 
3. Supervisor warns the worker. In a calm, non-confrontational man-
ner, the supervisor speaks briefly and quietly to the subordinate
about the undesirable behavior. A supervisor may wish to employ a
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Figure 7.1. The Stepwise Disciplinary Procedure 
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strategy such as the one for correcting behavior discussed in Chapter
5; that is, a gentle, one minute reprimand. Subsequent to the encoun-
ter, many supervisors keep a workplace journal and note in it any
significant worker disciplinary measures taken. 
4. The supervisor issues a written warning to the worker. After an
additional occurrence, the supervisor may “write up” the offense.
The undesirable behavior and the response by the supervisor may be
recorded in any one of several ways. The supervisor may send a
brief, informal memorandum to the worker describing the offense.
The supervisor also may write a longer, more detailed memorandum
of the event, keeping one copy, forwarding a second to the worker,
and providing the third for the employee’s personnel file. The super-
visor may also use a Disciplinary Action Report in which the com-
plaint, the method of reducing the undesirable behavior, and the
corrective action are described, as shown in Figure 7.2. If the work-
place is unionized and disciplinary actions can be the source of a
grievance, the form may be more detailed and composed of multiple
parts: for the employee, the personnel department, the department
head, and the union, as shown in Figure 7.3.  
• The worker is given a short suspension. Written notice of sub-
standard behavior usually results in improved performance.
However, this is not always the case. In such instances, a more
substantive measure is called for: suspension. The suspension
may vary according to the workplace and the nature of the unac-
ceptable behavior. One large security program sends the
employee home for the day the offense occurred without dock-
ing pay. The goal is to dramatically inform the worker that the
employer is dissatisfied with the worker’s behavior, but has faith
that the employee’s behavior can and will improve. 
• The worker is given a longer suspension. Should an additional
offense occur, or should a pattern of documented poor work
behavior continue, the supervisor may double the penalty of
time suspended. The U.S. Postal Service, for example, usually
suspends workers for seven days with loss of pay for the initial
suspension. The duration of the penalty differs somewhat
according to postal service zones and the severity of the offense.3
Seven- and 14-day suspensions usually are without pay. 
• The worker is discharged. With an additional offense, the next
step in the disciplinary process is to dismiss the employee. 
Stepwise disciplinary procedures are appropriate for unacceptable but
correctable behavior. In the event the employee committed a more serious
offense, such as theft or violating serious work rules, the supervisor may
consider preemptory discharge. 
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WHY EMPLOYEES ARE DISCIPLINED
Infractions at work and poor performance represent the two leading causes for
discipline that can lead to discharge. These two categories include many specific
Figure 7.2. Disciplinary Action Report 
Source: E.T. Guy, J.J. Merrigan, Jr., and J.A. Wanat ( 1981). Forms for Safety and Security Manage-
ment. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
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types of offenses. No published data are available on how security programs
discipline and discharge workers. However, the U.S. Postal Service has codified
unacceptable behavior into 26 categories of infractions, as shown in Table 7.1.
Figure 7.3. Employee Misconduct Notice 
Source: E.T. Guy, J.J. Merrigan, Jr., and J.A. Wanat (1981). Forms for Safety and Security Manage-
ment. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
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Formal disciplinary actions include letters of warning, suspensions for varying
lengths, and removals. Of 69,000 disciplinary actions (representing about 9 per-
cent of all employees), close to 60 percent of the disciplinary actions resulted in
Table 7.1. U.S. Postal Service Disciplinary Infractions 
*Failure of the employee to demonstrate knowledge expected of the position. 
Source: U.S. Postal Service Discipline Tracking System, 1987, Summary Report. 
Infractions Number of 
Infractions
 Percent of 
Total
Absenteeism 22,829 33.01
AWOL 10,488 15.17
Failure to follow instructions 8,601 12.44
Unsafe act or work habits 6,217 8.99
Poor work performance 5,010 7.25
Unauthorized absence from assignment 2,443 3.53
Tardiness 1,765 2.55
Delay or failure to deliver mail 1,510 2.18
Failure to protect funds/mail/property 1,170 1.69
Other 1,086 1.57
Disrespect to supervisor/customer 1,073 1.55
Scheme failure* 973 1.41
Insubordination 919 1.33
Altercation/assault/threat 857 1.24
Expansion of office time or street time 791 1.14
Failure to account for funds or accountables 757 1.09
Use/possession of intoxicants/drugs 566 0.82
Machine qualifications/proficiency failure 516 0.75
Falsification of record 363 0.52
Deviation from route 339 0.49
Pilfering/theft of mail or funds/property 294 0.43
Destruction/damage of mail or property 234 0.34
Crime (non-job-related off duty) 168 0.24
Crime (non-job-related on duty) 94 0.14
Falsification of application 56 0.08
Work slowdown/stoppage/strike 29 0.04
Totals 69,148 100.00
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letters of warning, 30 percent were suspensions, and 10 percent resulted in dis-
charge.  
It is impossible to say whether the disciplinary pattern of the U.S.
Postal Service parallels other programs. However, such infractions as absen-
teeism, absence from the post without leave, failure to follow instructions,
the use of unsafe acts or work habits, and poor work performance are the six
main reasons for disciplinary procedures in security programs. 
LEGAL ISSUES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
The vast majority of employees who are discharged leave the workplace
without taking further action against their employers. A few, however, will
not leave quietly. They will make vigorous attempts to retain their jobs
despite extensively documented records that led to the discharge. It is
important for the supervisor to understand what the rights and obligations
are of the employer at such a time. 
At-Will Employment 
For over a century, an employee who did not have an employment contract
could not assume that his or her position was secure. In 1877, Horace G.
Wood wrote A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant, which observed that
such an employee could be fired at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no
cause at all. This influenced decisions in American courts and the “at-will”
concept of employment was broadly adopted. Less than 20 percent of the
U.S. workforce is covered by collective bargaining agreements. Under these
conditions, an employer is often permitted to discharge a worker only for
“good cause.” By contrast, under the at-will-doctrine, employees may be
discharged for whatever reason. (This policy can be superceded by state or
federal statutory restrictions.) 
Collective bargaining agreements began with the recognition of unions
in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. This law signaled that employ-
ees could bargain collectively with employers over a variety of issues,
including discharge from work. The terms of such agreements were also
binding for disciplinary procedures if specifically included in the agree-
ment. Similarly, within government employment, Civil Service procedures
came to govern how such workers could be subjected to disciplinary mea-
sures by supervisors. 
Most for-profit and institutional employers have few, if any, written
employment contracts. The exceptions are senior managers, research and
development engineers and technicians with the care and custody of impor-
tant proprietary information, and managers and others in creative and
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entertainment fields. The presence of such contracts may or may not specify
the basis for dismissal by the employer. Written contracts without a mini-
mum employment term specified are regarded as terminable at will by
either party.4
In the security industry, contracts for personnel are uncommon, but do
exist. One national security services firm requires all new security officers to
sign an employment agreement.5 Others have followed suit, usually for
security workers who have had specialized recruiting and training at the
contractor’s expense. The agreements protect the relationship between the
contractors and their assigned employees. Nonetheless, they recognize the
duration of employment is a variant of an at-will relationship subject to ter-
mination by the employer for defined reasons. 
Currently, three major other “exceptions” to the at-will doctrine exist:
(1) breach of an express or implied promise, including representations made
orally and in employee handbooks; (2) breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; and (3) wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.6 Supervisors concerned with possible legal problems related to dis-
charge may wish to consider each of these issues in light of possible chal-
lenge to discharge. The following pages look at each of these three
exceptions in depth. 
1. Breach of an express or implied promise, including representa-
tions made orally and in employee handbooks. Express or implied
oral representations made during pre-hire interviews and at the time
job offers are being made and accepted can be considered oral con-
tracts. Such contracts may be recognized by the court. Particular pro-
tection of the employment status occurs during times when the
employer is contemplating furloughing or dismissing workers.
However, discharges for violating the rules and regulations of the
employer are not likely to be protected by such an agreement. The
courts tend to recognize the language in employees’ manuals to
reflect a unilateral offer that is accepted by the employee. Once the
employment has begun, “the policies embodied in those pronounce-
ments become legally binding."7 The basis on which employees may
be subject to disciplinary actions, including dismissal, may be con-
tained in a Personal Conduct Policy, as shown in Table 7.2. Such a
policy is likely to change with the times, as employers do not wish to
be burdened with a fixed policy that cannot be flexible to unforeseen
circumstances. Therefore, when new measures are added to the pol-
icy, they should be communicated to all employees and added to the
handbook.
2. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Under certain circumstances, dismissal of an employee is rendered
more difficult. As noted earlier, violation of terms in the employee’s
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Table 7.2. Sample Personal Conduct Policy 
(continues)
The employee’s manual acts like a unilateral contract with the worker. Conditions 
for personal conduct can change over time. The following are the rules and regula-
tions for employees, including protective staff, issued by a hotel chain: 
A. Violations involving any of the following provide grounds for discipline up to and 
including termination:
1. Supplying false or misleading information when applying for employ-
ment, or any time during employment. 
2. Altering or falsifying hotel records, swiping the time clock for another
employee, or having another employee swipe your time card, or other
manipulation of attendance records. 
3. Possessing, using, or being under the influence of illegal drugs or alcoholic
beverages while on duty or in uniform. 
4. Possessing weapons on hotel premises or while off hotel premises in the
performance of hotel duties. 
5. Abusing, defacing, or destroying hotel property or the property of guests
or other employees. 
6. Engaging in any act of violence or disorderly conduct, threatening or using
abusive language or rudeness to a guest, supervisor, or co-worker. 
7. Failure or refusal to follow safety or health rules and regulations or failure
to report an accident which results in injury to any person. 
8. Gross negligence, carelessness, or misconduct. 
9. The conducting of non-company business, such as canvassing, collection of
funds, pledges, circulation of petitions, solicitation of memberships, or any
other similar type of activity during the working time of the employee
doing the soliciting or being solicited. 
10. Theft or unlawful possession of hotel property or the property of a guest,
supervisor, or another employee, including lost and found items. 
11. Immoral or indecent conduct or soliciting persons for immoral reasons. 
12. Refusal or failure to perform assigned work, sub-standard guest relations,
refusal or failure to follow a supervisor’s instructions, or any act of insub-
ordination. 
13. Excessive absenteeism and/or tardiness. Failure to report to work on three
consecutive workdays without proper notification will be interpreted as
voluntary resignation and will result in immediate termination. 
14. Unsatisfactory work performance. 
15. Gambling on hotel premises. 
16. Sleeping while on duty. 
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manual can result in termination for just cause. This is a circum-
stance in which the employer states that the employee will not be
dismissed except on defined grounds. Just cause can be incorporated
into the language of a written contract, oral agreement, and
employee handbook or manual. In such a context, termination of
employment for misconduct is only possible for substantial
breaches.9 A minor neglect of duty, an excusable absence, and a
minor misrepresentation or rudeness have been ruled by the courts
as not meeting the standard for just cause. 
3. Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. A violation of
public policy exists when the employee is threatened with dismissal
while legally protected for such behavior. A dismissal at such a time
could be construed by the courts to be a “mixed-motive termination”
Table 7.2. (Continued)
17. Working overtime without prior approval from a supervisor. 
18. Unauthorized use of hotel facilities, including telephones and computers. 
B. In addition, violations involving any of the following acts will be considered just cause 
for remedial action, which may involve oral or written reprimand, suspension from work 
without pay, or dismissal (especially in the event of repeated violations).
1. Failure to punch or sign in and out as instructed by your supervisor. 
2. Consuming food or beverages in areas other than those designated for use
during breaks. Gum chewing while on duty. Smoking by employees is pro-
hibited in all areas of the hotel. 
3. Failure to maintain a high degree of personal cleanliness at all times. Fail-
ure to wear prescribed clothing in good repair as well as appropriate com-
pany identification. 
4. Failure to perform work assignments satisfactorily. 
5. Failure to notify a supervisor prior to the start of the shift of tardiness or
absence.
6. Being present on hotel property more than 15 minutes prior to the start of a
shift or remaining more than 15 minutes after the end of the shift without
express permission from a department head. 
Employers with progressive disciplinary programs may wish to retain the right to 
terminate employees for particular conduct without the need for prior discipline. 
This policy should be stated expressly in the handbook.8 Due to concerns for work-
place security, an increasing number of employers state that workers who act vio-
lently, threaten others, or who without permission carry a firearm onto the 
employer’s property are subject to immediate termination. 
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if the termination of the employee was motivated by lawful reasons
(just causes) and also by unlawful reasons (violations of public pol-
icy). In such cases, the termination often is considered a violation of
employee rights depending on the seriousness of these just causes.
Regardless of such concerns, “an employer may discharge an
employee if he has a separate, plausible, and legitimate reason for
doing so."10 At such times, the employer may have to demonstrate
that it was not acting discriminatorily in derogation of a statute. This
is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
SPECIAL DEFENSES AGAINST DISCHARGE 
This chapter has focused upon just causes for which employment may be
terminated. Apart for these reasons, it is important to identify areas in which
federal statutes protect workers’ rights in the event of discharge. These
issues often are significant in security programs, which investigate such
charges and may be involved at the moment of separation from employ-
ment.
Generally, employees who are being dismissed from their jobs for
refusing to perform unlawful acts, exercising their rights under state law
(such as pursuing workers’ compensation benefits), and performing a civic
duty (such as jury duty) are protected.11 Another public policy exception to
separation is when an employee is terminated for reporting illegal activity
on the part of the employer. So-called whistleblower laws exist in about 40
states, but are not uniform. For example, in about half the states, only public
employees are protected by these wrongful discharge acts. Public and pri-
vate employees are protected in most of the remaining states. These acts pro-
tect employees from retaliation for reporting violations by the employer of
laws or regulations, neglect of duty, and endangerment of public health and
safety. Generally, such acts do not protect from discharge an employee who
reports alleged violations of company policy, waste, or mismanagement.12
At the time of learning of an employee’s allegedly justified complaint
against the employer, security practitioners and Human Resource managers
generally must respond to such assertions sympathetically and non-judg-
mentally. Employees are less likely to call authorities to complain of sus-
pected violations of public policy at their workplaces if they feel that
management has the internal means for hearing their complaints and
achieving positive change, assuming the complaint is valid.13 Employees
who believe that the workplace is violating public policy may not only have
the moral argument, but they could also pursue financial incentives if the
organization subsequently were fined or paid damages for breaking the law
(see Box 7.2). At such times, representatives of management should express
their organization’s commitment to uphold existing laws and then investi-
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gate the complaint. Whistleblowing actions are generally sustainable by
employees and others who can demonstrate all of the following elements in
their action14:
Box 7.2. Whistleblower Suits Can Pay Off 
Numerous incentives exist for employees to expose dishonest practices com-
mitted by businesses against the U.S. government. In some cases, the alleged
offender can be a business that derives revenues from activities reimbursed
by government. In one example, an accountant for a small hospital turned a
wrongful termination suit into a major federal action against giant health-
care management providers. James F. Alderson was the accountant for
North Valley Hospital in Whitefish, Montana. He had managed the hospi-
tal’s affairs for six years when the board decided to retain Quorum Health
Group to manage the hospital operations, including accounting and financ-
ing. In selecting Quorum to manage the hospital, the board was impressed
with the firm’s cost-reporting system. Two months after Quorum took over,
Alderson was asked by a Quorum manager if the hospital kept two financial
reports. What Quorum meant, it turned out, was that it prepared one report
of actual costs for internal use and a second aggressive cost report that
would be submitted to the government for Medicaid or Medicare charges. In
the event the aggressive claim survived a two-year audit period, the hospital
could book the reserves as revenue. Alderson believed this process to be
fraudulent. Soon after he was fired. He proceeded to institute a wrongful
termination suit. In the discovery process, he collected evidence showing
that the healthcare company systematically misrepresented expenses to the
government, illegally increasing its reimbursement. 
Alderson filed a lawsuit known as a qui tam, or false claims case, on
behalf of the federal government. He notified the U.S. attorney general of
this intention, filed the complaint under seal, and then sought to obtain sup-
port from the Department of Justice in his suit against Quorum and its pre-
vious parent, Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation. The process
required over five years of effort by Alderson before the government lifted
the seal and officially joined the case. In prosecuting the action, Alderson
exhausted his personal funds. He became involved, however, with a law
firm having previous successful experience with qui tam cases. When cases
of this sort are settled in the plaintiff’s favor, the share could amount to
between 10 and 25 percent of any recovery, an amount which could total
many millions. 
Source: K. Eichenwald (October 18, 1998). “He Blew the Whistle, and Health Giants Quaked.” 
New York Times, Sec. 3, p. 1. 
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• The employee has particular expertise regarding the alleged viola-
tion of the law. 
• The employee’s charges relate to federal or state law or regulations
clearly applicable to the employer, or to the code of professional
ethics recognized as equivalent to state law and which code clearly
is applicable to the complainant. 
• A nexus exists between the complainant and the violation. 
• The employee is not a high-ranking executive or manager who
otherwise owes a special degree of loyalty to the company. 
• The employee has a valid complaint. 
LEGAL CASES OF PROPER AND IMPROPER DISCHARGES 
Litigation helps mold the ways in which employers evaluate circumstances
before discharging employees. Appellate level cases are instructive because
they emerge from lower court issues and have been heard by the court of
appeals or the supreme court within a state. They represent carefully consid-
ered arguments, though often on narrowly selected issues. Any decision by
an appeals court becomes the law for similar situations within that state
only. However, appellate decisions in one state often are broadly cited and
affect policies in others. The following are a number of significant appellate
decisions relating to the discharge process: 
• Discharge upheld after drug test dismissal was challenged. A
national hotel chain instituted a drug and alcohol testing program.
All employees signed a consent and release form regarding their
participation. Some time later, an at-will employee was randomly
selected to be tested. According to the analysis, she was positive
for an illegal substance. The employee denied drug use and asked
to be re-tested at a different laboratory of her choosing. The
employer refused, but offered the employee an opportunity to be
re-tested at the original laboratory used by the chain. The
employee refused this offer and was discharged. She subsequently
sued the hotel and her supervisor for wrongful discharge in viola-
tion of public policy and other charges. The state supreme court
rejected the appeal, stating that the plaintiff could not show that
her employer violated a clear mandate of public policy in the dis-
charge by insisting upon its own drug testing laboratory. (Stein v.
Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d714 [Tenn. 1997]15)
• Employee mistakenly fired over theft can sue employer. A house-
keeper in a hotel was arrested for theft for allegedly stealing items
from a guest room. He spent six weeks in jail until his employer
notified police that the missing items had been found. A Louisiana
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appellate court ruled that the exclusive remedy provisions of the
state’s workers’ compensation law did not prevent the house-
keeper’s suit for damages against his former employer. (McGowan
v. Warwick Corp., 691 So.2d 265 [LA. Ct. App. 1997]16)
• Employee may be fired for violation of employee handbook. A
manager of May Department Stores Company, who had been
employed there for 13 years, coordinated jewelry promotions.
While visiting a store, she removed a large box of gold merchan-
dise and took it across the store to lock it in a secured location. In
the process, she left two other boxes unguarded. The store’s jew-
elry manager was nearby at the time, but the promotion coordina-
tor did not ask him to keep an eye on the exposed jewelry. When
she returned after a delay, the two remaining boxes were missing.
The next day she was called to the personnel office and was fired.
Later, she sued for breach of an implied promise of “good faith and
fair dealing.” At trial, May provided a section from their employee
handbook which stated: 
Merchandise valued at $60.00 or more must be housed in showcases
with locked doors. All other merchandise, including all 14K jewelry,
must be kept in locked showcases or locked drawers. All jewelry
showcases must remain locked at all times, unless a sales associate is
attending a customer. 
The employee handbook also stated that failure to follow
operating procedures can result in “corrective action and possible
termination depending on the seriousness of the violation.” The
theft resulted in a loss of over $50,000. At trial, the plaintiff pro-
vided no evidence to suggest that she was being fired for “capri-
cious,” “unrelated to business needs or goals,” or for “pre-textual”
reasons. The court sided with May. (Moore v. May Department Stores
Company, No. B043481, Ct. of Appeals of CA, 2nd dist., Div. 2,
decided July 31, 1990, 271 Cal. Rptr. 84117)
• Fired guard has no claim when employee handbook gives
employer discharge power. At Peninsula Regional Medical Cen-
ter, Maryland, three employees were attempting to secure a patient
with leather straps. In the process, the patient bit a security guard
on the wrist. The guard then struck the patient on top of his head.
He was asked to leave the room and another security officer took
over. In an investigation conducted by the security director and
personnel director, written statements from eyewitnesses stated
that the guard had struck the patient 15 to 30 seconds after he was
bitten. The guard responded that his blow had been reflexive, in an
attempt to prevent the patient from biting him again. 
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The guard was discharged for “committing an unnecessary
act of putative retaliation.” The guard sued for breach of contract,
wrongful discharge, intentional interference with prospective rela-
tions, and other claims. The trial court granted summary judgment
to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, and the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals sustained the discharge stating that the termi-
nation did not violate public policy. The special appeals court said
that the plaintiff also failed to show that he acted in self-defense. 
The plaintiff also charged that two different police depart-
ments declined to employ him after learning why he had been
fired from the medical center. The court of special appeals rejected
this claim noting that the plaintiff had signed a consent form pro-
vided by those departments that also released from liability those
employers, such as the hospital, that provided information to
them. (Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical 655 A.2d 297 [Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1995]18)
• Supervisor’s comments about fired employee not considered
defamatory. An employee was dismissed from a convenience store
and gas station after her supervisor was not satisfied with the
employee’s explanation why scratch lottery tickets repeatedly
were missing during her work shift. The employee denied any
wrongdoing and sued her ex-employer for defamation when other
employees, including her husband, who was a part-time worker
there, learned of the reason for her dismissal. The state Depart-
ment of Labor Unemployment Division later concluded that she
did not steal the tickets. The issue about whether she may have
mismanaged ticket security remained open. 
The South Dakota Supreme Court found no evidence of mal-
ice on the supervisor’s part in revealing to other employees that
she thought that the former employee had stolen the tickets. In a
split decision, the court’s majority held that the employer, through
the supervisor, did not make defamatory comments about the
worker in responding to other employees’ queries about the
departure of their former co-worker. (Petersen v. Dacy, 550 N.W. 2d
91 ([S.D. 1996]19)
INSURANCE AGAINST WRONGFUL TERMINATION 
In the event an employee institutes an action against his or her former
employer for wrongful termination, the employer may expect its general lia-
bility insurance policy to help fund the defense. Such broadly written insur-
ance coverage is likely to cover legal defense costs, related pre-trial
expenses, and judgment against the defendant, if any. However, insurers
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may seek to deny coverage of wrongful termination claims in a standard
form by claiming that the event was a non-occurrence.20
Standard form general liability policies usually pay for occurrence-
type losses. In commercial general liability coverage, an occurrence is called
an “accident,” and includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same
general harmful conditions. For the wrongful termination claim to be denied
because it was not such an accident, the insurer must prove that the policy-
holder had a subjective intent to harm or injure the fired employee. Another
related basis of non-coverage is that the policyholder “willfully” terminated
the employee with a pre-conceived design to inflict injury. If the standard
policy plainly and clearly excludes wrongful termination from coverage, the
insured would have to look elsewhere for expenses related to the litigation.
In conclusion, commercial general liability coverage is likely to support the
insured’s defense in wrongful termination claims. This assumes the insurer
does not have a basis for proving non-occurrence.  
PROCEDURES AT THE TIME OF DISMISSAL 
Organizations differ widely on how discharges should occur. The methods of
terminating unsatisfactory employees also vary widely among nations and
cultures (see Box 7.3). Even in North American workplaces, strategies for deal-
ing with employees who are being dismissed from their positions are diverse.
The conditions can change according to the cause and seriousness of the dis-
missal, the rank of the employees involved, and the particular industry.  
Box 7.3. How to Dismiss an Employee Japanese-Style 
Terminating a worker’s employment differs considerably depending on cul-
ture and laws. In Japan, for example, the concept of lifetime employment
remains a goal of major employers, yet is presently crumbling as a work-
place tradition. Generally, Japanese employers offer a severance package to
individuals whom the company does not wish to retain. But what if the
employee refuses? That’s what Toshiyuki Sakai decided to do when he
rejected a severance package of 2.6 million yen ($23,900) from his employer,
the video-game maker Sega Enterprises Ltd. Sakai was told that his work
was under par. He disagreed with that judgment. When he refused to resign
and accept the severance package, he was transferred to the “Pasona
Room.” This room, named for the English word “personnel,” was empty
except for a desk, three chairs, a bare locker, and a telephone that received
only incoming calls. Mr. Sakai was given no duties and had no personal pos-
sessions in the room. He was instructed in writing to report to the room
from precisely 8:30 a.m. to 5:15 p.m. He was allotted 55 minutes for lunch. 
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Box 7.3. (Continued)
After two months, the personnel department formally recommended
that he resign, and offered him a severance package 9 percent lower than the
original one. About three weeks later, he heard through the union that Sega
was firing him and would offer him a severance package that was 28 percent
more than the original package he was offered. However, he continued to
report each day to the Pasona Room. A month later, he filed suit against
Sega, seeking to have his old job and salary restored. Seven days later, upon
showing up for work, he was stopped by a security guard, who refused to
allow him to enter. Sakai thus pursued his suit against his former employer
from home. Meanwhile, Sega announced a plan to trim its workforce by
one-quarter. Within a few weeks, most accepted Sega’s severance package.
“Everyone’s afraid that they might be the next to be thrown into solitary
confinement,” commented Sakai. The worker elected to remain in the
Pasona Room to protect his job opportunities at Sega or elsewhere. 
Source: P. Landers (September 14, 1999). “Refusing to Move On.” Wall Street J., p. A1. 
In most situations, dismissals are defined as permanent separations
from the current employer. In many other occurrences, however, workers
are placed on furlough—that is, temporary status without duty and pay.
Furloughs occur when there is insufficient work or when other non-disci-
plinary reasons arise. Regardless of the basis for such action, security and
Human Resources managers should anticipate the ways in which redun-
dancy—temporary or permanent—might produce unwanted problems for
management. The grounds for dismissal or furlough can be categorized as
follows:
• Economic downturn; retrenchment. Organizations grow with
actual success or the anticipation of it. Also, they can contract due
to declining sales, decreased funding or support, recurrent finan-
cial losses, mergers that consolidate operations, uninsured or
under-insured disasters, and other reasons. At such times, man-
agement often elects one of the most expedient means of reducing
costs: cutting personnel. When economic factors cause staff reduc-
tions, management might respond to the situation in a variety of
ways. Some employers allow workers to remain on the premises
using their former offices and resources for a reasonable period of
time as the basis of obtaining future employment. This lenient pol-
icy for the worker provides a humane way of helping the
employee segue to the next opportunity. 
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At the time of redundancy, however, most employers would
prefer that such workers leave the premises. This could mean after
one week, two weeks, a longer time, or immediately. In such cases,
employees are expected to leave soon after being informed of their
termination by Human Resources or their supervisors. (Workers
who resign from significant positions in organizations with high-
value intellectual assets may be expected to leave their place of
work shortly after giving notice.) 
Security-minded employers worry about the potential of sab-
otage from discharged workers who remain on the premises prior
to or after official termination. Common sense dictates that such
individuals be treated with respect and dignity as they move their
job search activities off premises. Fearful that such employees may
harm company property, remove valuable assets, or create a con-
frontational situation, some employers expect security personnel
to play coordinated and visible roles at the time of such dismissal.
The use of security personnel to escort workers from their exit
interview to their office to pick up personal effects and then, possi-
bly, to the exit itself needs to be considered carefully before imple-
mentation. The practice can affect remaining employees negatively
if no basis exists for treating the worker like a suspicious person.
At such times, a worker being dismissed is likely to be angry and
capable of irrational action. Security should be alert and respon-
sive when dismissed workers are informed of the employer’s deci-
sion, as attitude on the part of security matters.
For managers and executives it is increasingly common that
outplacement services are provided. These services may include
office space and resources, résumé services, and job counseling
assistance.
• Poor work and misconduct. In cases of just cause for termination, it
is normal for a security officer to escort the employee discretely to
the exit. The security officer also obtains the employee’s keys, iden-
tification, and any other materials belonging to the employer if they
have not previously been collected. In the event that the materials
are not obtained, the employee’s final paycheck is usually held
until the company’s property is returned. The possibility of violent
action from a discharged and disgruntled worker has emerged as a
concern in recent years and is discussed later in the chapter. 
THE EXIT INTERVIEW 
The main purpose of an exit interview is to provide terminated employees
with information on accrued wages and benefits, such as vacation pay.
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Related matters like insurance coverage and pension options also need to be
discussed. Terms of the employer’s healthcare insurance coverage may be
reviewed with options laid out for the employee. Such valuable information
and assistance helps mitigate the shock and loss many newly unemployed
persons feel. 
The exit interviewer uses this opportunity to obtain opinions of com-
pany operations and management. This can also be a time to defuse possible
hostility and correct employee misconceptions about the termination pro-
cess.21 The possibility of a lawsuit and potential claims may be ascertained
and noted by the interviewer. Any angry sentiments or threats expressed by
the employee should be received by the interviewer calmly. The contents of
the unhappy worker’s remarks should be recorded immediately following
the interview. Such threats should be discussed with a security manager
immediately after the exit interview. 
Some issues covered in an exit interview are relevant to security. The
employee is asked to return all property of the employer at the time of the
interview. Thus, the employer’s representative in Human Relations or secu-
rity should be aware of the assets the worker possesses or otherwise has
available. If some assets cannot be collected by management at the exit
meeting, arrangements should be made for their prompt return. Experience
shows that if the employer does not obtain all property under the control of
the departing worker before the last paycheck is delivered, recovery of such
property becomes problematic. This generalization applies to all employees
who possess assets of the employer. For example, if a technical developer
was permitted to work at home with a computer owned by the organization,
a security manager might send a tactful officer—with the employee’s knowl-
edge and permission—to pick it up. 
Unionized employees may have the right to a union representative at
the exit interview. However, if the interview concerns previously discussed
disciplinary or discharge matters, union representation is not required.22
Following the exit interview, most organizations promptly delete the
employee’s access code for physical entrance to the workplace. The former
worker also is blocked from the Local Area Network (LAN) of the work-
place, and telephone privileges cease. Security personnel at entrances and
exits are informed promptly of workers who are discharged or quit. 
DISMISSAL AND THE DISGRUNTLED EMPLOYEE 
An employee of Pacific Southwest Airlines, a unit of USAir, was fired for
stealing $69. His resentment mounted. In December 1987, he purchased a
one-way ticket on a commuter trip from San Francisco to Los Angeles. He
evaded pre-flight security controls in entering the plane. At 22,000 feet, he
entered the cockpit and shot the pilot dead. The four-engine plane crashed,
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killing 43 people aboard, including the gunman and his former employer,
who was a passenger.23 Although this type of incident is exceptional, inci-
dents of violence by terminated and disgruntled employees deserve atten-
tion in protection management programs. 
The issue of workplace violence cannot be ignored by high-perfor-
mance security practitioners or Human Resources managers. Incidents
involving disgruntled employees who act violently are far less common, but
should be considered seriously by security and Human Resources manag-
ers. Data on the frequency of such incidents is unavailable. However, veri-
fied cases appear in the media with frequency, keeping the issue alive. Table
7.3 discusses such incidents in greater detail. 
Michael D. Kelleher, author of New Arenas for Violence: Homicide in the
American Workplace, states: “The act of terminating an employee can be a
dangerous undertaking, even after the actual termination itself has taken
place . . ."24 Predictions of future behavior can never be certain. The employee
who seems calm at the time of dismissal may harbor resentments that build
to a quiet fury over time and that may eventually trigger violent behavior.
The following are guidelines for terminating an employee:25
1. The employee must be treated with respect, sensitivity, and dignity
throughout the termination process. 
2. If the termination involves a performance issue, the organization
must ensure that performance standards are applied to all employ-
ees, without exception. 
3. The timing of the termination process is critical. Most employers
endeavor to avoid terminating the employee when he or she is
undergoing stressful life situations, such as a divorce, illness, or the
recent death of a close friend or family member.  
4. Two members of management should always be present at the termi-
nation meeting, one of whom should be a security or Human
Resources professional. This is particularly important if the depart-
ing employee is known to have a history of aggressive or violent
behavior. 
5. Expect the terminated employee to react emotionally. Try to under-
stand the shock and pain of the process from the employee’s point of
view. Regardless of the emotional nature of the meeting, remain
objective and calm. Try to keep the meeting focused on the issue at
hand, always using a dignified, sensitive approach. 
6. Act professionally in the termination meeting. Confine conversation
about the termination to the business reasons motivating the organi-
zation’s decision. Ensure that the employee understands what is
happening and why it is happening. Do not assess blame or react in
a judgmental manner. 
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Table 7.3. The Violent Disgruntled Worker 
Sources:
1 For Example: Violent Crime Strikes 2 Million People in the American Workplace Each Year”
(1998). Workplace Violence Report, p. 1. 
2 J. Rabinovitz (March 7, 1998). “Connecticut Lottery Worker Kills 4 Bosses, Then Himself.”
New York Times, p. A1. 
3 D. Terry (October 15, 1998). “6 at City Hall are Shot; Ex-Worker is Accused.” New York Times,
p. A18. 
4 "Fired Worker Kills 3, Self in Fla. Bloodbath” (January 28, 1993). New York Post.
5 Murder-Suicide Cited in Town Hall Shooting” (February 14, 1994). New York Times, p. A13.
6 "Gunman Kills 4 Workers at Colorado Restaurant” (December 16, 1993). New York Times, p.
A18.
About two million individuals are victims of violent crime each year in the work-
place. About 75 percent of these incidents are simple assaults, while another 20
percent are aggravated assaults. Incidents of violence towards supervisors, man-
agers, co-workers, and others from disgruntled employees are few and are there-
fore not included in some workplace victimization studies.1 Nevertheless, highly
publicized examples of disgruntled and revengeful employees killing or injuring
former associates and innocent bystanders at the workplace have received
national attention. Theses incidents remind security practitioners and human
resources officials that complacency about the risks can be dangerous. The follow-
ing are some examples of such violent workplace incidents: 
• An accountant for the Connecticut lottery at the state headquarters in New-
ington, Connecticut, failed at his attempts to be promoted and subsequently
filed a grievance. Returning eight days early from a leave of absence for
stress-related problems, he walked into the executive offices and stabbed
one official, shot dead two others, and then chased the president into the
parking lot and fatally injured him. The gunman then killed himself.2
• In Riverside, California, a former parks and recreation department worker
was fired after working five years as a part-time chess coach. He instituted
a wrongful termination suit for age discrimination and other causes. Four
years later, before his claim had been heard, the ex-employee, now work-
ing for the postal service, invaded city hall and shot two city council mem-
bers and two police officers there.3
• In Tampa, Florida, a worker for Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company’s
local office returned eight months after being fired. He roamed the office
building shouting: “This is what you get for firing me!” He killed three
managers with his former firm and injured two more before killing him-
self later in the day.4
• In Walpole, New Hampshire, the former police chief shot to death the
selectman who had forced him to resign and then killed himself.5
• A kitchen worker in the Denver, Colorado, suburb of Aurora returned a
week after being dismissed from the Chuck E Cheese restaurant and killed
four workers, including the night manager. A police investigator remarked
that it appeared the gunman had “held a grudge over his firing."6
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7. Be honest with the employee. Ensure him or her that the matter will
be handled in a confidential manner. Provide straightforward
answers to questions important to the employee. 
8. If a reason exists to suspect a violent reaction from the employee, be
sure to have security personnel present at the termination meeting
and in the presence of the employee when he or she leaves the pre-
mises.
9. Be prepared for the meeting. Have all documents ready for presenta-
tion to the employee. Have all benefit information ready for review
and immediate delivery to the employee. Ensure that arrangements
have been made for the employee to gather personal belongings and
return company property after the meeting. Prepare and rehearse the
meeting in advance so that all points important to the employee are
covered. 
10. Take any follow-up action necessary to ensure the continued security
of the workplace (involving keys, password, and so on) after the
departure of the employee. 
11. Ensure that an effective outplacement program is available to the
employee. A strong outplacement program often makes a significant
difference in the transition process.  
12. Ensure that the physical departure of the employee from the work-
place is handled with dignity and in a confidential manner. No pos-
sibility of embarrassment or undue stress should exist in the
departure process. 
Such situations are difficult for management and employees alike.
Preparation prior to the meeting can be the critical factor in short- and long-
term success in managing the interaction. Further aspects of the process that
may be emphasized include: 
• Timing. According to Sandra L. Heskett, termination should be
conducted late in the business day.26 Many employers choose to
plan such meetings so that they end after most of the employees
have left for the day. Fridays are often, but not invariably, the day
of choice to break the bad news, since they give the worker the
weekend to recover. 
• Surveillance and investigation. In the event of threats from an
employee, the use of covert and overt surveillance may be desir-
able. Richard B. Cole writes: 
This process requires the striking of a fine balance in recognizing
that this individual has previously exhibited irrational and endan-
gering behavior directed against the corporation or its employee(s),
the absence of formal authority to remove the individual from the
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opportunity to further endanger, and the obligation to protect the
employee and the workplace.27
Most protective functions do not have the capability of conducting
such surveillance; therefore, an outside competent service may be retained.
An overt surveillance team approaches the offending individual, advising
him or her that they are present, what they intend to do, and how they
intend to do it. They make it clear that such surveillance is believed to be
allowed within the spirit of the law. 
T.I.M.E. IS NOT ON YOUR SIDE 
Consultant Gavin de Becker has described what he calls the T.I.M.E. syn-
drome, which occurs when management allows a growing situation to
include Threats, Intimidation, Manipulations, and Escalation. De Becker
comments: “When dealing with a difficult and violently inclined employee,
T.I.M.E. is on his side, unless management acts quickly."28
This section began with some facts about a Pacific Southwest Airlines
employee who was fired. Specifically, the reason was for taking $69 of the
airline’s bar cash. The employee’s history was more convoluted. The worker
had been with the airlines for 12 years. During this time, he was a thief, a
drug user, and a drug dealer. He had been warned by his supervisor previ-
ously to shape up or face the consequences. Could this person have been
“screened-out” at the time he was considered for hiring? The question is
impossible to answer for certain. But couldn’t an employee of this sort be
disciplined and terminated much earlier?
Dismissing workers early is easier, with less emotional investment on
the part of all involved, and with less perceived “unfairness” on the part of a
supervisor or a manager. De Becker explains that workers often feel shocked
and sense that they have been treated unfairly when facing dismissal. Sim-
ply put, managers who are reluctant to discipline or to terminate abusive
employees are not astute. Joseph A. Kenney writes: “Employees who get
away with rules violations often will push their luck in the future."29 The
courage to fire some employees early may prevent the supervisor and orga-
nization from remorse later. 
SUMMARY
Fortunately, not all employees require formal discipline. However, some do,
and the supervisor’s task is to lead the worker into better behavior. To disci-
pline effectively requires planning and awareness of the facts and options
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involved. Logical but inexcusable reasons for unacceptable behavior should
not allow an oral admonition to get off track. 
Unfortunately, some supervisors do not discipline, or do so ineffec-
tively. They hurt themselves, the worker involved, and the entire organiza-
tion by such recalcitrance or ineptitude. Supervisors can, however, learn
progressive disciplinary measures to increase their effectiveness. Dismissals
rarely lead to violence, yet the possibility cannot be ruled out. Certain pre-
cautionary measures can decrease the possibility of such violence occurring. 
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. In your opinion, why do some workers not achieve the minimally
acceptable standards most of the time? What role does management
have in dealing with this? What are the limitations? 
2. Why should a supervisor collect all available relevant facts before
approaching a worker to reprimand him or her? 
3. What are the main reasons why supervisors fail to discipline? To
what extent is senior management responsible for supervisors’ fail-
ure to discipline? To what extent are supervisors responsible for their
own lack of action in appropriate disciplining? 
4. Describe the steps in the progressive discipline procedures. 
5. What test must a plaintiff meet in order to have standing in a
whistleblower case? 
6. What role does insurance play against potential wrongful termina-
tion actions? How might an insurer seek to defend itself against such
a suit? 
7. When is an exit interview indicated? What are the gains for manage-
ment? The risks? 
8. What measures may mitigate the unlikely possibility of violent
behavior from a disgruntled terminated employee? 
ENDNOTES
1 H. Fayol (1987). General and Industrial Management. Rev. by I. Gray. Belmont, CA:
David S. Lake Publishers. 
2 The psychiatric diagnosis for such a person may be adjustment disorder. The pre-
dominant manifestation is the inhibition in work or academic functioning, occurring
in an individual whose previous work or academic performance has been adequate.
See: H.I. Kaplan and B.J. Saddock (1981). Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of
Psychiatry/III. Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, Ch. 23. 
Discipline and Discharge 227
3 U.S. Postal Service: Discipline Practices Vary (1989). Washington, DC: U.S. General
Accounting Office. 
4 M.A. Rothstein, C.B. Craver, E.P. Schroeder, and E.W. Shoben (1994). Human
Resources and the Law. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, Ch. 8. 
5 "Guardsmark Continues Fight to Have Employees’ Restrictive Work Covenant
Respected” (January 16, 1995). Security Letter, Part III, p. 1. 
6 M.A. Rothstein, C.B. Craver, E.P. Schroeder, and E.W. Shoben (1994). Human
Resources and the Law. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, p. 422. 
7 Ibid., p. 425. 
8 Ibid., p. 427. 
9 Ibid., p. 437. 
10 J.B. Kauff, A.P. Rosenberg, and H.H. Weintraub (1981). “Terminating the Employ-
ment Relationship—Under Increasing Restraints,” in Employment Law: New Problems
in the Workplace. New York, NY: Practicing Law Institute, p. 162. 
11 M.A. Rothstein, C.B. Craver, E.P. Schroeder, and E.W. Shoben (1994). Human
Resources and the Law. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, pp. 438–47. 
12 Ibid., p. 450. 
13 D.P. Westman (1991). Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge. Washington,
DC: Bureau of National Affairs. 
14 J. Barbash and J.D. Feerick (1981). Employment Law: New Problems in the Workplace.
Litigation and Administrative Practice Series. New York, NY: Practicing Law Insti-
tute, p. 163. 
15 P. Leavitt (Ed.) (1998). Avoiding Liability in Hotel/Motel Security. 2nd Edition.
Atlanta, GA: Strafford Publications, p. 294. 
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, p. 231. 
18 Private Security Case Law Reporter. (March 1996), p. 8. 
19 P. Leavitt (Ed.) (1998). Avoiding Liability in Hotel/Motel Security. 2nd Edition.
Atlanta, GA: Strafford Publications, p. 290. 
20 C.E. Miller (March 20, 1989). “Wrongful Termination.” Business Insurance, p. 27. 
21 J. Barbash and J.D. Feerick (1981). Employment Law: New Problems in the Workplace.
New York, NY: Practicing Law Institute, Litigation and Administrative Practice
Series, pp. 164–65. 
22 Ibid.
23 Security Letter (December 15, 1987). vol-xvii, p. 1. 
24 M.D. Kelleher (1996). New Arenas for Violence: Homicide in the American Workplace.
Westport, CT: Praeger, p. 131. 
25 S.A. Baron (1993). Violence in the Workplace, Ventura, CA: Pathfinder, pp. 103–104. 
26 S.L. Heskett (1996). Workplace Violence: Before, During, and After, Boston, MA: But-
terworth-Heinemann, p. 85. 
228 Security and Operations Management
27 R.B. Cole (1997). Corporate Personnel Protection. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas,
p. 343. 
28 G. de Becker (1995). In The Complete Workplace Violence Protection Manual. J.W.
Mattman and S. Kaufer (Eds.). Costa Mesa, CA: James Publishing, Vol. 2, pp. 8–25. 
29 J.A. Kenney (1995). Violence at Work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 183. 
229
8
ACCOUNTING
CONTROLS AND 
BUDGETING
Money for which no receipt has been taken is not
to be included in the accounts. 
—Hammurabi
Managers monitor and regulate their programs in several ways. This chap-
ter is concerned with one of the most important controls: the use of financial
policies. Controlling purse strings involves numbers. This discussion is
meant for readers who are not particularly numeric and who may never
have taken a course in accounting. The principles involved are simple, but
also fundamental to the success of any organization. Managers of security
programs need to be comfortable with basic accounting processes in order to
speak the language and understand the concepts raised by financial manag-
ers. The discussion thus takes into consideration simple notions a manager
will need to understand in dealing with financially oriented irregularities.
To create a context in which controls needed for security operations can best
be understood, some basic principles of corporate finance will be discussed
first.
FINANCIAL CONTROLS IN THE ORGANIZATION 
All organizations have financial aspects associated with their activities. Guid-
ance is provided by people who are dedicated to the management of money.
The principal senior manager in for-profit and not-for-profit organizations is
the chief financial officer (CFO), who may also have the title of treasurer and,
possibly in small organizations, controller. The CFO’s responsibilities include
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budget analysis and forecasting, monitoring of accounts payable and receiv-
able, salary and compensation projections and recommendations, internal
auditing, investment of excess funds, and compliance with tax and regula-
tory issues. The CFO is also in charge of financial management, which
includes capital raising, determining the mixture of debt and ordinary capi-
tal, helping to decide on investment opportunities, valuing businesses that
might be acquired or that might be sold, and recommending dividends or
capital payouts to shareholders. The office of the CFO maintains “books” or
“journals” and financial records that are reviewed by an outside accounting
firm, usually composed of certified public accountants (CPAs). Books or
journals refer to major types of accounts—usually maintained electroni-
cally—which the organization uses for financial activities reporting. 
The finance department is concerned with past, present, and future
monetary issues. In public corporations, certain financial reports are widely
available documents. For example, the finance department prepares an
annual financial picture of operations of the previous 12 months. Quarterly
(or in some cases semi-annual) reports are issued for publicly traded compa-
nies. Such reports are available on a more frequent basis as required by oper-
ations. These financial documents have similarities regardless of the type of
organization involved, be they for-profit corporations, not-for-profit organi-
zations, or government units. Two fundamental documents central to orga-
nizational control functions are the consolidated balance sheets and the
consolidated operating (income) statements. In addition to the two historical
reports, the modern corporation may also produce a consolidated statement
of cash flow and other records as required for operating purposes. 
The Evolution of Financial Controls 
Accounting techniques have been important management tools for centuries,
long before the modern corporation appeared. The Code of Hammurabi rec-
ognizes the significance of accounts. Organizations grew in complexity during
the Renaissance, and with that growth came an increase in the number of per-
sons who handled the organization’s money. As a result, financial controls
evolved to make sure that mistakes were not made or that assets were not
misappropriated. By the 14th century, double-entry bookkeeping was used by
the merchants of Tuscany in Italy. The first treatise on this topic was written by
a friar, Luca Pacioli, and published in Venice in 1494.1 Pacioli wrote in the ver-
nacular of the region rather than in the Latin of the church. Consequently, the
treatise became broadly useful in local commerce. This “Venetian” or “Italian
method” of reporting assets with liabilities soon was translated into English,
Dutch, German, Bohemian, and Russian. Today, this method continues to be
used throughout the industrialized world as the fundamental procedure for
stating the financial position of an organization. 
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The notion of double-entry bookkeeping is that any asset or resource
has two aspects: its monetary value assets and the corresponding monetary
claims on those assets (liabilities) according to who has a legal claim arising
from it either as an owner or as a creditor. In bookkeeping, the duality of the
accounting method is expressed by recording assets in one column and lia-
bilities in another. A monetary value is assigned to all assets and liabilities in
the organization. The balance sheet may be created at any time by totaling
the two columns and subtracting the smaller total from the larger to indicate
either a surplus or deficit; that is, showing either a positive or negative net
worth.
The following are a number of formulas that describe the relationship
between assets and liabilities in an organization: 
Assets = Liabilities + Owners’ Equity 
therefore 
Liabilities = Assets – Owners’ Equity 
or
Owners’ Equity = Assets – Liabilities 
Accounts can be increased or decreased either by credits or debits.
Every credit entry triggers a debit entry; therefore, the terms are neutral in
terms of significance. After a series of credits and debits are entered into the
financial records, credits will equal debits. These are termed the permanent
accounts. However, separate individual accounts with customers or suppli-
ers may have their own debit or credit balances. These are temporary
accounts and are consolidated with permanent accounts during periodic
accounting reporting periods. 
Consolidated (master) accounts represent the combination of constitu-
ent financial records, which are maintained separately. Normal balances of
all accounts are positive, not negative. Total debits (increases) in an asset
account will ordinarily be greater than the total credits (decreases). There-
fore, asset accounts usually have debit balances. When an account that nor-
mally has a debit balance shows a credit balance, or vice versa, it indicates a
probable accounting error or an exceptional circumstance. For example, a
debit balance in an accounts payable account may suggest an overpayment.
The rules of debit and credit balance help to identify irregularities in
accounts, giving management a greater sense of control over operations.
Table 8.1 shows a variety of account types with their normal balances.  
Consolidated Balance Sheets 
All organizations use balance sheets to determine their periodic financial
condition. (Table 8.2 is an example of a consolidated balance sheet.) Assets
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and liabilities are constantly in flux, thus periodic statements allow compar-
isons to be made with earlier times. The term “consolidated” here and else-
where implies that financial reports from separate operating units have been
merged into it, creating a master financial statement for the whole organiza-
Table 8.1. Normal Balance of Accounts 
Account Increase Decrease Normal 
Asset account Debit Credit Debit
Liability account Credit Debit Credit 
Owners’ equity account Credit Debit Credit 
Dividends Debit Credit Debit
Income account Credit Debit Credit 
Expense account Debit Credit Debit
Table 8.2. Example of a Consolidated Balance Sheet  
Current Year Previous Year 
Current Assets 
Cash and Cash Equivalents ––––– –––––
Marketable Securities ––––– –––––
Accounts Receivables ––––– –––––
Inventories at Cost ––––– –––––
Other Current Assets ––––– –––––
Total Current Assets ––––– –––––
Fixed Assets
Property, Plant and Equipment ––––– –––––
Land and Buildings ––––– –––––
Machinery and Equipment ––––– –––––
Less Accumulated Depreciation (–––––) (–––––)
Net Property, Plant and Equipment ––––– –––––
Other Assets ––––– –––––
Payments and Deferred Charges ––––– –––––
Intangibles ––––– –––––
Total Fixed Assets ––––– –––––
Total Assets ––––– –––––
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tion. If the corporation is small and is operating as a single unit, the word
consolidated is superfluous. 
Balance sheets do not establish the value of the organization, as some
assets may be omitted or given an unrealistic value. While balance sheets
may vary in the items they include, generally the information will include
the following components: 
• Current assets. These are the assets on which the organization
could obtain cash immediately or within a few days’ time, if neces-
sary. This is the strongest asset category because of its liquidity.
Cash and highly liquid cash equivalents are the first current asset
listed and are generally an important indication of strength of the
organization. Next, marketable securities at cost, if any, are listed.
(In most cases, the current market value will be different from the
acquisition cost; this may be cited in the balance sheet or through a
Table 8.2. (Continued)
The consolidated balance sheet is a means of determining whether the organization has a posi-
tive or negative net worth, reflected in shareholders’ equity. Comparison with the previous 
reporting period permits the observer to determine the direction of the net worth. 
Current Year Previous Year 
Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses ––––– –––––
Notes Payable ––––– –––––
Total Current Liabilities ––––– –––––
Long-term Liabilities
Long-term Debt ––––– –––––
Other Long-term Liabilities ––––– –––––
Total Liabilities ––––– –––––
Shareholders’ Equity ––––– –––––
Common Stock ––––– –––––
Non-voting Common Stock ––––– –––––
Reserves for Dividends ––––– –––––
Retained Earnings ––––– –––––
Total Shareholders’ Equity ––––– –––––
Total Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity ––––– –––––
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note.) Accounts receivable, representing invoices owned by cus-
tomers, are also current assets. The allowance for any bad debt will
be indicated. Finally, inventories at cost will be stated, assuming
that they have a market value, as will any other current assets. 
• Fixed assets. Most organizations will have invested in capital
expenditures to meet their needs. Once acquired, these assets will
appear as fixed assets. Capital expenditures are used for the pur-
chase of assets that increase the utility of operations when the bene-
fit is likely to extend over a number of years. Such expenditures will
be subject to depreciation, which is the assessment of the asset’s
change in value due to use. An estimated expected usefulness of an
asset is determined and then deductions from the original purchase
price are made each year to adjust for this decline in value of the
asset.2 Depreciable assets include land, buildings, machinery, office
equipment, furniture, and fixtures. Fixed assets specific to security
programs include security systems, guardhouses, automobiles, golf
carts, and sometimes security officer uniforms. Fixed assets are
reported less accumulated depreciation. The schedule for deprecia-
tion relates to presumed lifetime use of the asset. 
• Payments and deferred charges, if any. An example would be
advanced payment of taxes and other credits earned. 
• Intangibles. Assets like patents, trademarks, salesmarks, and
goodwill are examples of these assets. (Goodwill is the value of a
business that has been acquired that is greater than its asset value.
Goodwill is written off by amortization to the profit and loss
account over its useful life.) 
• Total assets. This figure represents the summation of current,
fixed, and other assets. Other adjustments to assets are possible.
For example, if an operating unit has been discontinued, net assets
remaining may be listed separately under “Other Assets.” 
• Liabilities and shareholders’ equity. The other side of the balance
sheet equation contains two parts: liabilities, which are economic
claims on the organization, and shareholders’ equity, which reflects
ownership interests. Each is composed of several components. 
• Current liabilities. These are liabilities owed by the organiza-
tion either immediately or usually within one year from the
balance sheet date. They include accounts payable to trade
vendors; notes payable to lenders; accrued expenses payable
to employees, vendors, or others; and income taxes payable. 
• Long-term liabilities. These include mortgages, bonds, and
other sums owed that do not need to be repaid within the next
accounting period. 
• Total liabilities. This category summarizes current and long-
term liabilities. 
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• Shareholders’ equity. This section represents a claim by own-
ership to the net worth of the organization. This includes the
value of claims from the capital contributed by shareholders or
stakeholders. Also in this category are reserves from profits or
surplus set aside and available for dividends or other use for
shareholders. Retained reserves and profits are also included
in this category. They represent the remainder after dividends
and taxes have been allocated. 
• Consolidated statement of operations. This important
accounting report provides a picture of income and expenses
over a previous stated period of time. An example of such a
report is shown in Table 8.3. The statement of operations iden-
tifies the main types of expenses and charges against earnings
that the enterprise experiences. 
Table 8.3. Consolidated Statement of Operations 
Current Year Previous Year 
Net Revenues ––––– –––––
Costs of Products and Services ––––– –––––
Gross Profit ––––– –––––
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses ––––– –––––
Depreciation of Intangible Assets ––––– –––––
Other Expenses, Net ––––– –––––
Interest Expense and Finance Charge ––––– –––––
Earnings Before Income Taxes ––––– –––––
Provision for Income Taxes ––––– –––––
Earnings from Continuing Operations ––––– –––––
Gain (Loss) from Discontinued Operations ––––– –––––
Earnings (Loss) from Continuing 
Operations
––––– –––––
Extraordinary Item ––––– –––––
Net Earnings (Loss) ––––– –––––
Earnings (Loss) per Common Share ––––– –––––
Continuing Operations ––––– –––––
Discontinued Operations ––––– –––––
Extraordinary item ––––– –––––
Net Earnings (Loss) per Share ––––– –––––
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• Net revenues. This identifies the sales recorded over the reporting
period for all the goods and services provided by the organization,
both for cash and on credit, minus any discounts taken. A series of
deductions from this gross revenues are made, leaving a final
profit on a per-share basis. The following categories are deducted
from the net service and sales revenues: 
• Cost of products and services. This category includes the total cost
of manufacturing products and providing services. For a product
that is manufactured, the cost of raw materials, employees, equip-
ment and systems (before depreciation is excluded), and related
expenses like transportation and storage are considered. For ser-
vices that are provided, the amount includes salaries, bonuses,
direct benefits of employees providing those services and their
immediate managers, as well as relevant overhead and costs. 
• Gross profit. This profit reflects the remainder after deduction of
the fundamental costs in the operation. It is called “gross"—or
“gross margin"—because numerous other expenses for operations
are yet to be deducted from it, such as finance, administration, and
taxes. The gross profit, however, can be a useful comparative tool
for one year’s performance with another’s. The gross margin ratio
is the gross margin as a percentage of sales. The only way a gross
margin ratio can be increased is by increasing selling prices or
reducing the cost of sales or both. 
• Selling, general, and administrative expenses. Costs relating to
sales and marketing personnel, advertising and public relations,
plus all the general and administrative expenses of operating the
enterprise, are recorded here. They include senior operating staff
costs, legal and accounting costs, subscriptions, fees, donations,
and a host of expenses not previously recorded. Subcategories may
also be reported.  
• Depreciation of intangible assets. This is the dollar value of the
amortization of capital assets recognized in the balance sheet and
deductible for the operating period. Accounting rules allow for the
writing off of the cost of such purchases based on their estimated
average lifetime use. Depreciation reduces the book value of the
asset and is charged against income in the income statement. 
• Other expenses, net. This category recognizes unconventional
costs that the organization experienced for the reporting period.
For example, if the organization had a minority ownership of a
business that was not consolidated with other expenses, the
amount could be indicated here. 
• Interest expense and finance charge. Organizations normally
have a line of credit; that is, funds available on a short-term loan
basis from a bank. This category reflects the interest expense to
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continuing operations. Changes from one year to another could
relate to different debt levels and the variable costs of debt. Some-
times, long-term and short-term debt are indicated separately.
Short-term indicates debt that matures within one year of the date
of the financial statement. 
• Earnings before income taxes. This amount represents the earn-
ings before deductions for federal, state, and local taxes levied
against the net earnings of a business. This may be significant if the
organization has unusual tax consequences that could change from
one year to the next. 
• Provision for income taxes. For-profit corporations pay taxes.
However, these can differ from year to year if the tax rate changes
or if the organization has a loss carried forward from a past year
that could reduce the tax basis. 
• Earnings from continuing operations. Large organizations are
dynamic, often selling or closing significant business units within
a single financial reporting period. To aid comparison with ongo-
ing operations, accountants distinguish continuing from discontin-
ued operations for which there may be a gain or loss reported. 
• Extraordinary item. This assumes that an exceptional event is
being recorded, and presumably not likely to recur. For example, it
could be due to the loss or gain from the early redemption of long-
term liabilities, the settling of a significant lawsuit, the write-off of
certain assets or costs, or other factors. 
• Net earnings (loss). This figure indicates the post-tax earnings of
operations for the year. However, the consequences for sharehold-
ers are not apparent from this amount and must be determined
from the earnings (loss) per share. 
• Earnings (loss) per share (EPS). As an example, a company that
earned $10 million after tax and had 10 million shares outstanding
would realize earnings of $1 per share. A note will indicate
whether the number of shares has changed from one reporting
period to another so that the consequences for the owner of a sin-
gle share will be apparent. The company could have increased or
decreased revenues substantially in a particular year with little dif-
ference in EPS. This can be because shareholder equity was
reduced proportionately to the value of the new acquisitions, or
the reverse in the case of divestitures. 
Notes to the Consolidated Balance Sheet and Statement of 
Operations
All consolidated statements include a number of explanations about the
organization that are relevant in the opinion of the independent accountant.
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To become aware of fundamental and structural financial changes in the
organization, perusal of these notes is vital (see Box 8.1). Such notes include
a summary of significant accounting policies. This section describes impor-
tant policies, including any changes made from the previous year. Other
notes provide specific information on investment in affiliates, discontinued
operations, valuation of types of financing held, leasing commitments, con-
tingent liabilities (for example, significant possible losses or gains), retire-
ment benefits commitments, and stock options. The notes to the
consolidated financial statements also provide business segment informa-
tion (assuming the corporation has different lines of business), income tax
information (both domestic and foreign), a review of quarterly financial
information, notes on major acquisitions, and information concerning capi-
tal stock and earnings per share. Revenues also may be reported separately
for international and domestic activities. 
Box 8.1. In Financial Statements, Notes Tell a Story 
The main financial information in a corporation’s annual report might seem
encouraging, but in some cases, notes in the report reveal a serious problem
that will affect the ability of the organization to operate. Only by reading
and understanding the consequences of these notes may an investor or
employee be alerted to impending disaster. 
An example of a company that was able to “hide” certain accounting
practices in its annual report is Crime Control, Inc. This Indianapolis-based
business was incorporated in 1977, and was composed of small alarm com-
panies owned by its two founders. In 1978, operating revenues were
$685,000, with a pro forma (estimated) profit of 14%. Two years later, operat-
ing revenues had grown to $5,800,000, with a pro forma profit of 16%. Busi-
ness grew steadily as the firm purchased accounts from other alarm
businesses. This growth, up to that point, was made possible mostly by bank
financing based on the positive sales and profit trend. In 1982, Crime Con-
trol issued an initial public offering, selling about 27% of equity, while the
founding shareholders retained the remainder. The public market for Crime
Control’s common stock grew, enabling the alarm business to continue
aggressively on its acquisition path. 
This alarm monitoring business soared in sales and profits compared
to the major businesses of the industry. Why? The answer relates to Crime
Control’s accounting policies. Alarm businesses generate income in two
ways: from leases or sales of systems and from ongoing revenues derived
from monitoring alarm signals. Both forms of income usually are reported in
the year in which they occur. However, if security system leases are
accounted for as sales-type leases under the provisions of the Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 13, a more aggressive account-
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ing method may be used. This is what Crime Control elected to do. It
accounted for future anticipated years of revenues the first year the alarm
contract was signed with a customer. 
The company offered incentives to renew the rental rate at the expira-
tion of the original lease with a savings of 10%. The company assumed that
the bargain lease term would keep the customer for at least eight years.
These sales-type leases were then accounted under SFAS since the eight-year
lease term exceeded 75% of the estimated economic life of the equipment (10
years). Crime Control, with the approval of its accountants, Coopers &
Lybrand, was able to report exceptional revenues and profits relative to
other peer companies that used conservative reporting methods. 
Due to the accounting assumptions and policies, the company grew
quickly. The rapidly increasing “revenues” were booked. But they were not
received, since they would not actually be paid by customers for years into
the future. To keep the accounting game going as long as possible, Crime
Control vigorously sought acquisitions, for which it paid generous amounts
in stock or cash. Jealous competitors and astute investors could not under-
stand how this alarm business was able to flourish compared with others in
the industry possessing far greater experience. The answer was explained in
the notes of Crime Control’s annual reports. Few people bothered to read
them and understand the consequences until it was too late. 
Despite strong apparent revenues and profits, the company kept run-
ning out of money because actual revenues were weak. When investors
finally realized the scheme, it was too late for most. Crime Control was liqui-
dated and the remnants were purchased at a diminished value. 
Source: Security Letter (February 1, April 1, August 1, September 4, November 15, 1984; July 1, 
1985; July 1, 1986; April 15, 1987). 
Statement from the Independent Auditor 
All corporations are audited by independent accountants for tax purposes
and to assure stakeholders and the public that the accounts and the process by
which they have been created have been verified. Along with the annual
financial statement, the accountants provide a statement usually stating: “In
our opinion, such consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all mate-
rial respects, the financial position” of the corporation being audited. In earlier
years the auditor’s report could provide a clue to any poor performance or
potential trouble in the organization from the accountants’ perspective. This
brief statement generally does not serve that purpose any longer. However,
independent accountants are likely to insist that any critical issue relative to
Box 8.1. (Continued)
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the corporation’s activity be mentioned, probably in the notes to the 10K form
or annual report and in other publicly available documents. But such warn-
ings may or not appear in the corporation’s annual report. 
The Significance of Change in Auditors 
In publicly held corporations, auditors theoretically have a fiduciary respon-
sibility, not to the corporate executives who hire them, but to the ownership
of the organization. Failure of the independent auditors to identify to the
shareholders and the public at large any substantial irregularity or fiduciary
urgency, in the case of publicly held companies, can lead to civil action
against the entire audit firm.3 It is because of this fiduciary responsibility
that the change in auditors for a publicly held corporation is normally a mat-
ter of public record. Shareholders vote annually on the appointment or re-
appointment of independent audit firms included as part of the annual
proxy statement. The changing of one audit firm for another may be a nor-
mal and healthy development in which the corporation seeks fresh profes-
sionals to review their account. The change can also be one that reflects
unwillingness to pay the fees requested by the existing audit firm; such a
change thus represents significant cost savings. 
Occasionally, the replacement of one audit firm for another signals the fact
that the outgoing independent audit firm refused to report financial statements
the way management wanted. The accountants may have wished to attach
qualifications, or potential warnings, to their statements that would reflect unfa-
vorably on the activities or prospects of their client. Should the audit firm refuse
to back down, the client firm may opt to change its audit service. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
In the 1920s and earlier, institutions and individuals who invested in stocks
and bonds were frequently victimized by fraudsters who manipulated the
market for their own benefit. Unfounded rumors—often fanned by schem-
ing corporation officers themselves—might drive up the market price for
stock long enough for insiders to liquidate their holdings before the market
price crashed. To protect the public, the Securities Act of 1933 (15 USC 77a)
required issuers of securities, and their controlling persons making public
offerings of securities in interstate commerce, to file with an agency created
to receive such information. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
was established under authority of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
USC 78a-78jj). The SEC was designed to receive registration statements con-
cerning financial and other pertinent data about the issuers and the securi-
ties being offered. In the U.S., it is unlawful to sell such securities unless a
registration statement has been filed with the SEC and is in effect. Registra-
tion with the SEC does not suggest approval of the registration disclosure,
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nor is it taken to be as accurate. Further, investors are not insured against
loss of their investments in common stock by any federal agency. 
However, registration serves to provide information upon which
investors may make informed and realistic evaluations of the worth of such
securities. Today, about 10,000 public corporations are registered with the
SEC, which provides a variety of timely information filed by the registered
entities. Table 8.4 presents a guide to the filings of public corporations. To
the general manager or security practitioner, this information represents
readily available, accurate, and valuable information about corporations. 
Table 8.4. Guide to Filings of Public Corporations 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires issuers of securities and their control-
ling persons making public offerings of securities in interstate commerce to file registration and 
issue periodic activity statements. These provide the public with presumably accurate informa-
tion on operations, including problems and opportunities. Filings may be examined at most 
SEC offices of at www.sec.gov. 
SEC Form # Descriptions
8-K Report of Unscheduled Material Events 
10-K A detailed annual accounting including comparison with previous 
years. It may be included optionally in the annual report to share-
holders; otherwise, it is available to shareholders on request and 
from the SEC as mentioned below. 
10-K405/A Amended Annual Report 
10-Q Quarterly Report 
10-SB12G/A Amended Small Business Issuer Registration Statement 
15-12B Certification of No Change in Definitive Materials 
DEF 14A Proxy Statement 
S-1 Initial Registration Statement. Includes Risk Factors. 
S-3 Prospectus Filed for Secondary Offerings 
S-4/A Amended Business Combination Transaction Registration Statement 
SC-8 Employee Benefit Plan Registration Statement 
SC 13D Ownership Statement 
SC 13D/A Amended Ownership Statement 
SC 13G Ownership Statement 
SC 13G/A Amended Ownership Statement 
SC 14D1 Tender Offer Statement 
SC 14D1/A Amended Tender Offer Statement 
SC 14D9 Tender Offer Statement 
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Manipulation of Financial Statements 
For-profit corporations have some leeway regarding the means by which
some expenses may be reported. Corporate treasurers and independent out-
side auditors are bound by generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), the accounting industry’s body of widely recognized concepts and
guidelines. Nonetheless, in the goal of managing earnings or hiding prob-
lems, many organizations use methods that do not violate the GAAP norms
if reported to the public, but that suggest adverse circumstances. Sometimes,
these reports go unnoticed. The following are some financial actions corpo-
rations may take to manipulate their official financial records:4
• Writing off exceptional expenses. The company decides to write
off one or more failed activities, restructuring expenses, and other
unusual costs. By eliminating excess expenses, future profits look
better. Yet some companies have frequent restructuring write-off
costs, suggesting an inability to produce a steady stream of earn-
ings.
• Smoothing quarterly profits. Some companies experience a wind-
fall, for example, from the sale of a major asset. But instead of
reporting it in the quarter when the sale was achieved, the money
is stored, typically in special reserves. Then when some bad news
comes along, the company reports the special reserves as income
to offset the loss. 
• Deferring costs. Consider a company investing in a major new
product. The expenses may last for several years before income is
generated. Should management recognize the development
expenses as they are incurred, or defer some of them until reve-
nues start rolling in? The difference can have a substantial effect on
profits. 
• Reporting revenues variably. The most common way of account-
ing for long-term contracts is a method called percentage of comple-
tion. Management determines how much of the contract work has
been completed, and recognizes the income and expenses related
to that portion, even though a major part of the payment might not
be received until the contract is completed. 
• Hiding inventory. Businesses can make a quarter look good by
shipping inventory to some customers even if they do not order it.
(On a smaller scale, this same irregularity is committed by sales
persons seeking to obtain a higher bonus during the sale period.)
True, they may have to take some merchandise back later, but in
the meantime, the report for the quarter will be better than it other-
wise would have been. Such a manipulation of reality is most com-
mon in the month prior to the end of the financial year. 
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• Dabbling with depreciation. The useful life of assets can be
depreciated over a different time period. For example, capital costs
entailed for a new alarm monitoring account customer are
expensed by some companies the year they occur. Other alarm
companies, however, assume that the account has a lifetime of 2 to
13 years. The longer the write-off, the higher reported profits may
be.
• Combining one-time gains. A company that buys and sells assets,
separate from its major business, normally reports one-time gains
or losses carefully segregated from normal operating income. But
some companies argue that such regular gains should be included
with normal income. This can distort the perception of whether the
corporation is actually prospering. 
Not-for-Profit (NFP) Organizations 
The preceding discussion concerned corporations that are established with
the intention of making a profit. However, an important portion of the econ-
omy is composed of NPF organizations, including charities, educational insti-
tutions, many healthcare and medical research facilities, religious
organizations, and trade and research groups. Over one million such organi-
zations are incorporated in the U.S. alone. These organizations have enjoyed
federal tax exemptions since the passage of the first income tax law in 1894.
Prior to that, such organizations were exempted from state property tax laws. 
Despite such NFP status, most of the accounting and audit concerns of
such organizations are identical to those of for-profit corporations. Similarly,
the security risks to such organizations are largely equivalent. 
BUDGETING FOR A SECURITY DEPARTMENT 
Up to this point in the chapter, a macro view of financial activities in an
organization has been presented. The next part of this discussion concerns
programmatic details incorporated in the cost of doing business. The total
cost of operations includes numerous departmental and programmatic
activities that are intended to achieve the overall goals of the organization.
One of these is security. Therefore, security activities require budgets in
order to operate. Indeed, the importance of this topic is reflected in that
many security directors find that they spend about one-quarter to one-half
of their time on budget-related activities. 
A budget is a statement of estimated revenues and expenses for a spec-
ified period of time. It is usually an annual plan of action, but it can also be
set at quarterly or semi-annual periods. Budgets can extend for several years
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in the case of multi-year projects. A budget also refers to a sum of money
allocated to a particular purpose or project for a specific period of time. Bud-
geting is inextricably involved with good planning, as it seeks to coordinate
resources and expenditures. 
The purposes of budgets are to:  
1. Support planned operational activities with necessary financial
resources. 
2. Commit money to complete planned programs and projects. 
3. Control allocated money. 
4. Evaluate management effectiveness by noting how well resources
are managed within previously set guidelines. 
Annual budgeting is a process that extends over many months in large
organizations. Throughout the process, planning and collaboration are vital
between the security director, who is preparing the budget, and subordi-
nates, who manage budget sub-sets. A security director with budget respon-
sibility also will interact with senior managers, who will provide guidelines,
raise questions about plans and proposals, and perhaps present obstacles in
the annual budget approval process that must resolved. For organizations
operating on a calendar-year basis, the following is a sequence common to
the budget approval process: 
Spring or summer: The finance department issues budget request
instructions.  
Two weeks later: Director consults with subordinates on next year’s
plans.
Two months later: Security director submits budget to finance depart-
ment.
One month later: Budget is reviewed. Changes or explanations are
requested. 
One month later: Revised budget is approved. Consolidated budgets
of all departments are presented to the board of directors for approval. 
One month later: Budget approved, subject to minor revisions. 
One month later: Final revised budget approved. 
The budget process requires looking into the future to identify a vari-
ety of financial needs that conceivably could be growing while others are
contacting and still others are being reorganized. Budgets must have details
to show how money is to be allocated and spent. They also must be flexible
enough to adapt to the dynamic contingencies that could arise in security
programs. Some common types of budgets include: 
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1. Revenue and expense budgets. These indicate the revenues that a
department might generate, if any, and the projected operating
expenses for the budget period. If security operations generate
income (see discussion later in the chapter), the estimate for such
income appears. Each item on the expense portion of the budget
reflects a particular monetary outlay calculated in advance. This type
of budgeting, commonly called incremental budgeting, takes the
expenses of the previous year as a baseline and uses them as the
basis of proposed increments to represent programmatic changes,
inflation, and merit pay increases. 
2. Capital expenditure budgets. In this category, the department iden-
tifies capital costs for systems, equipment, vehicles, furniture, and
fixtures. These capital costs are amortized (depreciated) over time. In
contrast, supplies—and often security guard uniforms—are
“expensed"; that is, written off the year they are purchased as
expense items. 
3. Variable budgets. These budgets identify fixed costs as well as
expenses that may vary with needs. For example, if a program can-
not be budgeted precisely because of factors that cannot be fully esti-
mated in advance, a variable budget may be approved. This type of
budget might be considered for a program not fully planned at the
time an annual budget must be submitted. 
4. Zero-based budgets (ZBB). This concept was developed by Texas
Instruments in the 1970s, and was proposed as an alternative to the
incremental budget process. ZBB questions all costs by setting the
new year’s budget at zero and forcing all operating managers to jus-
tify their expense requests.5 ZBB forces managers to scrutinize all
costs, rather then assuming that a little bit more each year—incre-
mental budgeting—will satisfy the needs of the organization under
constantly changing circumstances. ZBB requires that the security
program “sell” its security services each year to the budget approval
committee, as it assumes initially that no commitment exists to
spend money on any activity unless adequate reasons justify it. 
The Process of Budget Creation 
Budget preparation and modification have changed drastically since the
availability of software spreadsheets and specialized programs useful for
the process. Gone are the days when budgets were created on accountant-
type paper and items would be written across broad columns reflecting var-
ious payments or disbursements over a year’s periods. These would then be
totaled for each payment or disbursement category and then for the year as
a whole. If the allocated budget equaled the total on the bottom right-hand
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corner, the process was considered a success. If not, the manager and staff
had to review and revise projections to see where alterations could be made. 
The same process still occurs, though procedures are greatly eased by
software programs that produce running totals of the budget, instantly
adjusting with each change. Each significant expenditure constitutes a line
in the personnel and expense portion of the budget, as shown in Table 8.5.
The manager reflects the budget changes that occur during the process. For
example, if employees are granted pay increases at specific times, these are
taken into account in the year’s total plan by inserting the increase at the
projected time. 
Table 8.5. Security Program Line-Item Budget Example 
Budget Line Item Quarters
First Second Third Fourth 
Personnel Costs Including Benefits 
Director –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Assistant Directors –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Managers –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Supervisors –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Support Staff –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Expenses
Other Employees (Contractual) –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Travel –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Office Supplies –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Uniforms and Laundry –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Telephone –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Training Expenses –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Educational Costs –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Insurance –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Automobile Leasing –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Automobile Repair and Maintenance –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Consultant Services –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Memberships –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Miscellaneous –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Total Expense Budget –––– –––– –––– –––– 
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Budget planners allocate expenses for people, supplies, and major purchases over the length of 
the budget period. Numerous variations are possible to suit the recording and operating poli-
cies of particular organizations. The overhead charge, used in some organizations, is a charge 
management may impose on different departments reflecting a portion of the shared services 
provided by the organization to the department. A line-item budget of this sort is best loaded 
onto a computer program so that cost items may be changed at any time, with budgetary conse-
quences being instantly reflected. Security services may also be included in the organizational 
overhead, which is charged to other departments. 
Security program line-item budgets usually are completed on spread-
sheets, which allows for specific indication of fund allocations. Personnel
budgets frequently are expressed as line-item expenses in that each position
is considered permanent, and funds are allocated for an entire period. The
spreadsheet allows numerous adjustments to occur over time. When a user
changes a figure, the program immediately updates the figures in all col-
umns. The following are factors that effect change in a line-item budget: 
• Personnel costs. Table 8.5 divides security program costs into four
quarters. However, most programs allocate personnel expendi-
tures according to pay periods; that is, weekly, biweekly, semi-
monthly, or monthly. 
• Expenses. These predictable costs can be planned over an exten-
sive period of time based on previous experience. They also repre-
sent variable expenditures. For example, plans for employees to
attend conventions can be curtailed if projected costs get out of
hand. In previous years, the “miscellaneous” category allowed
Capital Budget
Security Systems –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Automobile Purchases –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Guard Structures –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Two-Way Radios –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Office Furniture –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Other –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Total Capital Budget –––– –––– –––– –––– 
Corporate Overhead Charge –––– –––– –––– ––––
Total Budget Request –––– –––– –––– ––––
Budget Line Item Quarters
First Second Third Fourth 
Table 8.5. (Continued)
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managers a safety valve for adjusting their budget according to
contingencies. Today, the category is small or is eliminated entirely
in many reports. 
• Capital budget. This represents spending for purchases that have
a lifetime of many years. 
• Budget emergencies and contingencies. As one budget is being
planned, a budget for the current year is operating. Further, the
implementation of unexpected plans will cause budget changes
that will have to be taken into consideration. Senior management
expects operating managers to stay within their budgets without
substantial deviation. Senior managers also may ask departmental
managers to reduce their budgets on short notice. A reason for this
could be to respond to an unexpected earnings shortfall or other
reversal. 
Managing the budget can be a challenge to security practitioners, who
sometimes deal with emergencies that create budget overruns. At such
times, the manager is nonetheless expected to “find the money” within the
budget. This means that managers need to have the capacity to meet a con-
tingency by cutting previously planned and allocated expenditures. Manag-
ers with budget responsibilities constantly analyze what cuts in programs or
purchases could be made if they had to be made. Similarly, they consider
how they would expand programs if additional resources were made avail-
able. At all times, it is vital for the protection manager to understand and
communicate to senior management how the security function is contribut-
ing to the ultimate goals of the operations. 
THE GOALS OF THE CORPORATION: PROFITS 
For-profit organizations exist in order to make a profit. If a corporation does
not achieve consistent profits, it will eventually face bankruptcy. If a corpo-
ration does not achieve sustained and adequate profitability, the providers
of capital (shareholders, bond holders, lenders) will remove their money
and use it where the return appears to be better and the prospects are safer.
To achieve profit, the organization first must sustain fixed costs. These
include overhead, such as space, utilities, and other startup costs. Such over-
head costs exist whether the organization is just beginning, operating at a
loss, or operating at a profitable level. In reality, overhead costs increase
slightly as sales rise, but other factors—such as incremental production and
service expenses—grow faster and in relation to increased production or ser-
vice provided. Thus, considerable business must be generated before a
breakeven point is achieved; only beyond that is a profit possible. Figure 8.1
illustrates the ways in which fixed costs and variable costs relate to profit. 
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Achievement of a profit within an organization cannot be taken for
granted. Considerable effort is required to earn a profit. Competition and
changing market conditions invariably threaten a profitable operation. To
sustain growth, corporations use money from profitable operations to fund
new products or services. These might one day become profitable and offset
Figure 8.1. Fixed and Variable Costs Related to Profit 
Profit is the objective of for-profit corporations, but it cannot be achieved
until fixed and variable costs are met. These are not permanent, but vary
constantly. As a corporation becomes more profitable, other organizations
are attracted to compete to win a share of the profitable endeavor. 
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earlier products or services that might decline in their financial return. How-
ever, some new products or ventures will not succeed, resulting in a loss of
capital. The corporation must be managed so that such failures will not put
the whole enterprise at risk. 
New corporations and new ventures within a larger entity are not
expected to make a profit initially. Developmental expenses are projected,
followed by costs to produce the goods or offer the services. For example, in
the pharmaceutical industry, a new patented proprietary drug may take 10
to 12 years to receive approval to enter the market. Then, only five to seven
years remain in the life of a patent, during which the extensive investments
in development can be recovered. After patent expiration, other firms can
market and sell exactly the same product under their own name. Thus, the
patience of investors is required for profit goals to be realized from any new
product. 
Security programs must operate with the same level of objectivity as
any program in an organization. Every department considers itself to be crit-
ical to operations. It is more helpful to see each operating unit as a link in a
chain. Any weak link threatens the entire structure. Directors of security
programs need to understand the biases of financial directors toward the use
of money for different segments of the operation. Programs are funded
because they are critical, or at least desirable, to the goals of the operation.
The security director needs to communicate how loss reduction programs
contribute positively to the profit interests of an organization. This is possi-
ble when the manager understands the nature of the business and how an
intelligently conceived program is justifiable and necessary to the organiza-
tion’s success. The following sections discuss concepts that are important in
explaining or justifying the necessity for security spending.6
Return-on-Equity (ROE) 
Return-on-Equity (ROE) measures the return on shareholders’ equity and
gives a measure of the company’s return relative to equity; that is, share-
holders’ paid-in capital and retained earnings. This can be represented as
follows:
Return-on-Investment (ROI) 
Financially oriented managers often put any use of capital to the test to
determine what it represents to the organization. This is done using the
ROE Net Income
Equity
------------------------------=
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Return-on-Investment (ROI) measurement, which can be represented as fol-
lows:
ROI is similar to ROE except that ROI includes debt. Both of these
terms are used to estimate the performance of the organization as a whole,
and both are used to indicate the payback of a capital expense, such as the
purchase of a security system. Assume that a security director wishes to pur-
chase a security system. Will the cost of the capital commitment pay back
the investment required to obtain it, including debt costs, in a satisfactory
period? Or is the investment unlikely to be a good use of capital? 
Consider a facility with a $1 million per year budget for security, fire
watch, and maintenance operations administration. Assume further that a
new comprehensive security system costing $1 million can reduce personnel
cost by 25%. Therefore, the facility could save $250,000 per year. Would the
introduction of an electronic security-safety-fire communications system
pay off sufficiently to pay for the cost of the system? An approximation of
the value of such system could be calculated as follows: 
This would be calculated: 
Therefore, in this crude assessment, the investment would pay for
itself in four years, with 25% being returned for each of the four years. Since
the system would continue to be useful for several years longer, the loss pre-
vention manager likely would have a fair to strong argument that the ROI is
attractive to the company, and the purchase should be supported by senior
management.7 Other factors, such as the necessity of bringing the facility
into code or linking the system installation with a wider capital improve-
ment project, might tip the balance to a favorable vote to provide the financ-
ing. In many cases, a more detailed evaluation of the use of money for
capital expenditure will be indicated. 
A more detailed ROI scenario is provided by Walter E. Palmer, who
proposes that the value of a security system—such as an electronic article
surveillance (EAS) system for a retail store—be determined by first estimat-
ing the incremental cash flow.8
In this example, let’s say that sales are at $10 million and are growing
at an annual rate of 2 percent. The baseline shrinkage rate is set at 3 percent.
The assumption is that the shrinkage reduction from the new system would
be 25 percent of the baseline shrinkage rate, resulting in a savings of $75,000
ROI Net Income
Equity Debt+
------------------------------------=
ROI Savings in Personnel Costs
Cost of System and Finance Charges
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------=
ROI 250,000
1,000,000
----------------------- 0.25= =
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the first year, as shown in Table 8.6. Because shrinkage is considered a cost,
savings at retail must be calculated by the cost/retail ratio. In this example,
the average cost of merchandise is considered to be 57% of the selling price,
0.57, and producing a savings at cost of $42,750. It is assumed that the man-
agement of the system will require expenses of $10,000, which are now
added in. 
Table 8.6. Cash Flow Statement to Assess a Capital Investment 
This illustration shows the payback on an electronic article surveillance (EAS) system that 
reduces shrinkage from 3% to 2.25%. Adjusting for sales growth of 2% per year and accounting 
for wholesale costs, expenses, and other factors, the payback cost of the system can be evalu-
ated.
Source: W.E. Palmer (January 1998). “Return on Investment: Beyond the Conceptual.” Pinkerton
Solutions.
Cost of 
Asset = $75,000
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 
Sales
(+2% Each Year)
10,000,000 10,200,000 10,404,000 10,612,080 10,824,322
Baseline Shrinkage 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Baseline Shrink $ 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000
Shrink Reduction % 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
New Shrink $ 225,000 229,500 234,090 238,772 243,547
Savings (at Retail) 75,000 76,500 78,030 79,591 81,182
Cost/Retail Ratio 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
Savings (at Cost) 42,750 43,605 44,477 45,367 46,274
Less: Expenses 10,000 10,200 10,404 10,612 10,824
Less: Depreciation 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000
Savings Before 
Taxes (SBT)
17,750 18,405 19,073 19,755 20,450
Tax (34%) 6,035 6,258 6,485 6,717 6,953
Net Savings 11,715 12,147 12,588 13,038 13,497
Plus: Depreciation 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000
Cash Flow 
Investment
26,715 27,147 27,588 28,038 28,497
Cost of Investment 75,000
Cumulative
Cash Flow
(48, 285) (21,138) 6,450 34,488 62,985
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Depreciation of the value of the cost of the asset is determined as a
straight-line write-off over five years, or $15,000. Expenses and depreciation
are subtracted from the net savings. 
The next step is to determine savings before taxes. Assuming that the tax
rate is 34%, the net savings would be $11,715. But depreciation is added back in
since it is an accounting device and does not generate an actual cash amount. 
Finally, the addition of net savings and depreciation produces cash
flow. This now allows the advisability of the project to be assessed from
three types of analysis: payback period, net present value (NPV), and inter-
nal rate of return (IRR). 
• Payback period. As noted earlier, the formula is: 
If the system costs $75,000 and was expected to return
$20,000 annually, the payback period would be $75,000/$20,000 =
3.75 years. Using the cash flow example, the project cost would be
completely paid for in about two years and nine months, because
$75,000 is equal to the first two years’ revenues, plus $21,138. That
remainder is equal to about .76 of the third year’s revenues. The
payback method of analysis may rank projects with shorter pay-
back periods higher than those with longer paybacks. The disad-
vantage is that the straight payback method ignores the time value
of money. 
• Net present value (NPV). This method considers future cash flows
of a project. Assume the company desires a 12% return on its
investments. Using a financial calculator, the appropriate discount
factor (DF) for the project was determined. Applying a 12% dis-
count rate and multiplying cash flow by the discount factor, the
present value of the future cash flow is identified, as shown in
Table 8.7. The sum of the cash flows is $137,986. When discounted
by 12%, they total $99,120. By substituting the original $75,000
investment, the NPV is $24,120. This assumes that all assumptions
and projections are correct. 
• Internal rate of return (IRR). The IRR is the cost of capital that
would make the NPV for the project equal to zero. (The calculation
of the IRR is complex and will not be discussed here.) If the IRR
exceeds the cost of capital, the project is attractive. If the IRR is less
than the cost of capital, the project is likely to be rejected. 
The three methods each have their advantages. The payback method is
easiest to compute. NPV and IRR require financial calculators, but these
Cost of Project
Annual Cash Flow
------------------------------------------------- Payback=
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methods are more accurate in identifying the time value of money. Typically,
managers will consider different methods in making a decision. These issues
are discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
Capital Budgeting for Security Programs 
Assume that a security program determines that it requires a computerized
controls systems for a new facility. The security director would begin by pre-
paring a written summary detailing the benefits and costs over the life of the
system. The manager also will prepare a capital budget that will allow the
parties involved to evaluate the proposal. They can then decide whether the
capital proposal is attractive relative to competing uses of funds. Various
ways of considering the value of the budget exist. 
An important factor at the time such a decision is being made is the
cost of capital. How it is determined can differ, and no single accounting
method is used uniformly. In addition, the security director may face com-
petition from other managers with their own capital requests. The attractive-
ness of capital expenditures for new systems, therefore, in part is that such
systems may reduce ongoing costs over what is currently being paid. These
benefits are calculated in order to identify factors related to savings through
efficiencies. The following sections discuss widely used capital budgeting
methods.
Payback Method. The payback method is the simplest and most widely
used technique. It determines the earnings required by an investment in
Table 8.7. Discount Factor (DF) for Calculating Present Value (PV) 
This is another way to determine whether the system is a good buy. This calculation takes into 
account the “present value of money.” Cash flow is adjusted by a discount factor reflecting the 
cost of money. The present value of the money would decline each year. The EAS system is still 
an attractive project, but less attractive than it was under the payback period calculation. 
Source: W.E. Palmer (January 1998). “Return on Investment: Beyond the Conceptual.” Pinkerton
Solutions.
Year Cash Flow DF (12%) PV
1 26,715 0.8929 23, 854
2 27,147 0.7972 21,642
3 27,588 0.7118 19,637
4 28,038 0.6355 17,818
5 28,497 0.5674 16,169
TOTAL 137,985 99,120
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order to pay back the initial capital outlay. As seen in the previous example,
this method is popular because it usually demonstrates a rapid repayment
of capital, allowing management to reinvest the savings. However, this
method does not consider the time value of money. In times of high or rising
interest rates, this issue gains in importance. 
Money invested earns interest, while money borrowed costs interest.
Therefore, the money to be used for the capital budget has to be considered
in terms of compounding and discounting. These terms are the opposite of
each other. Compounding asks, “If money is invested at the current interest
rate, what will it be worth in a certain number of years?” Discounting asks,
“How much money should be invested at a given interest rate in order to
achieve a particular amount at a defined period in the future?” 
The payback method fails to consider the significance of compounding
or discounting required for purchase of the capital asset. The longer time
required for a capital investment to be paid back, the less interest senior
management is likely to have in authorizing it. If the payback is less than the
goal set by management, then the project has a good opportunity of being
approved. 
Initial-Investment Rate-of-Return (IIRR) Method. This method also over-
looks the time value of money, creating a bias in favor of investments that
yield a return quickly. The IIRR method considers the effects that taxes and
depreciation have on the investment, a consideration overlooked in most
payback method computations. However, the method does not identify
operating cash flows that can be significant considerations. Senior manage-
ment is more likely to approve a project if the IIRR is greater than the cost of
capital to the organization. 
Time-Adjusted Rate-of-Return (TARR) Method. This method considers dis-
counted cash flow. TARR provides the interest yield predicted by the invest-
ment over its projected useful life. It is also called the internal rate of return
(IRR) method. TARR is calculated using a personal computer with a spread-
sheet program. If future cash flows are the same for each period, the calcula-
tions are performed easily. If the cash flows are uneven, then a trial-and-
error process is necessary to arrive at the net present value. If the TARR is
greater than the organization’s cost of capital, senior management is more
likely to approve the project. 
Other Managerial Options. What if the savings projected from the capital
expenditure are not sufficiently attractive to senior management to approve
a capital purchase? In this situation, other measures may be available to the
security planner. Assume that the security director advocated a new system
but that a capital commitment is not available. One possibility would be to
lease the system from the supplier or a leasing facility provided by the sup-
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plier. In this case, the system would not belong to the user. One advantage of
this arrangement is that service of the system might remain the responsibil-
ity of the lessor. Another advantage is that the cost of the lease would be
expensed each year, which could produce a tax advantage to the organiza-
tion. The vendor may also offer flexible payment options to make the pur-
chase attractive to the customer. 
Another possibility, though one less frequently available, is that the
vendor will provide the system free under certain conditions. The system
must produce definable, certain savings. If the vendor can share in the sav-
ings, the vendor may be willing to “split the savings” with the customer; in
effect, providing the system without cost but actually paying for it through
cost reductions. 
For example, an organization may desire a system to automatically turn
off lighting, heat, and air conditioning if no individuals are in the area. The
cost for such an energy management system including installation could be
paid by the systems company. The customer then splits the energy savings
with the systems company above the previous base level costs of power. 
BUDGET DOWNFALLS 
Budgets are often management’s main way to gauge performance, but they
can also block managers from shifting resources to take advantage of oppor-
tunities and can distort long-term planning.9 Budgets also concentrate on
spending, but may fail to identify what is really important to the customer. 
Security services, like research and development, accounting, and
Human Resources, are sometimes regarded as expense centers, not profit
centers, by persons who fail to grasp the interrelatedness of organizational
units. This mentality puts security at a disadvantage if measures are not
found to identify value for the whole organization and communicate it effec-
tively. Well-designed, relevant security measurements can be translated into
value-added services that are critical to the entire operation. This can be
achieved, for example, by demonstrating savings gained by the lack of
costly problems that beset other organizations with inferior security pro-
grams. Lower turnover, fewer costly litigations, employee and customer sat-
isfaction, and attractive insurance premiums are other signs of value
provided by high-performance security programs.  
SECURITY AS A PROFIT CENTER 
If organizations seek to create profits, how can proprietary security services
be crafted into a profit center? In many cases, security programs have no
options to create profits in the same way the principle business of the orga-
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nization does. It would be unwise for some organizations to attempt to
develop new sources of income from security programs. However, in other
situations, such possibilities exist. The following are a number of such ser-
vices:
• Alarm services. A technology firm was required by federal con-
tract to maintain an advanced proprietary security system. The
firm was able to provide services to nearby non-competitive corpo-
rations that were attracted by the advanced standards of the sys-
tem. These corporations preferred to contract with a well-regarded
neighbor than with a distant security alarm service business or to
provide the service for themselves. 
• Investigative services. A clothing manufacturing concern devel-
oped a team of highly proficient investigators to solve a series of
complex internal loss problems. When the initial issues they were
hired to resolve were brought under control, they had less work to
do. The security director then made their services available at pro-
fessional fees to vendors and customers who had become aware of
the industry-specific knowledge and expertise of the investigators.
A profit center was created. 
• Parking revenues. The security department of a healthcare facility
took responsibility for the management of parking garages and
lots. The program was able to keep a portion of revenues for dis-
cretionary purposes. This led to improving and expanding parking
use, which produced further revenues. 
FORENSIC SAFEGUARDS TO INTERNAL FRAUD 
The cost of fraud and abuse in the workplace is undoubtedly high. In fact,
the Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse estimates this loss
level at 6% of the monetary value of all goods and services.10 This totals over
$400 billion annually if extrapolated into the U.S. gross national product. 
Richard C. Hollinger and John P. Clark conducted an important study
of workplace deviance in 1983,11 which included surveys of 47 corporations
in three communities; 9,431 employees; 247 top executives; 30 labor unions
and employee organizations; and a variety of other organizations interested
in business-related crime. One-third of all employees self-reported that they
had taken property from the workplace. White-collar crime is a far greater
financial burden on companies than robbery, larcenies, and auto theft com-
bined. Crime that occurs by manipulating financial assets in publicly held
corporations as well as not-for-profit institutions is a major issue throughout
the world. Security management should thus establish controls that seek to
mitigate it. 
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
All corporations have financial records audited by independent auditors.
The purpose of this practice is to ascertain that the financial practices and
records of the organization follow conventionally established accounting
concepts and principles. The outside independent auditor (normally, a certi-
fied public accountant) works with the CFO and designated personnel, such
as controllers and internal auditors, to review financial procedures. Inde-
pendent accountants insist that their tasks do not go beyond verifying the
accounting methods and providing related counsel to their clients. They
maintain that the audit process is not intended to detect fraud and embez-
zlement, though auditors frequently do uncover serious defalcations from
their efforts. Yet the failure of regularly conducted audits to identify a pat-
tern of financial deviance or irregularity can lead to legal action against the
accounting firm in the event an undetected or unreported embezzlement
takes place despite regular audits (see Box 8.2). 
Box 8.2. Limitations to Independent Auditors 
Most examples of fraud and embezzlement in operations are not encoun-
tered by independent auditors. They are discovered by accident or are
brought to the attention of management by whistleblowers. Forensic investi-
gators and fact-finders may then confirm the assertions of improprieties. 
Audit firms maintain that it is the responsibility of management to
establish financial controls. Supreme Court decisions have supported this
view and the number of lawsuits that auditors have been forced to defend
decreased in the 1990s. Nonetheless, numerous celebrated cases of accounting
improprieties attest to the fact that auditors can be negligent. Jack Bologna
and Paul Shaw present a list of some of the companies cited in these cases: 
American International North American Acceptance 
American Biomaterials Corp. OPM Leasing 
Cenco, Inc. Penn Square Bank 
Coated Sales Pepsico
Crazy Eddie PharMor
Datapoint Regina Vacuum Cleaners 
Equity Funding Rocky Mountain Undergarment Co. 
ESM Government Securities Sahlen Associates 
Four Seasons Nursing Homes Saxon Industries 
Gucci American, Inc. Stauffer Chemical 
H.J. Heinz Stirling Homex 
Leslie Fay J. Walter Thompson 
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Box 8.2. (Continued)
Mattel, Inc. U.S. Financial 
McCormick Spices U.S. Surgical 
Miniscribe ZZZZ Best
This list does not take into consideration “regulated” industries like bank-
ing, brokerage, and defense contracting. The causes for these accounting impro-
prieties are numerous: pressure for performance; industry competition; quality
and integrity of management; and the goal-setting process. In most cases, the
quality of auditing and the ethics of those involved allowed the improprieties to
continue longer than what otherwise could have been the case. 
Source: J. Bologna and P. Shaw (1997). Corporate Crime Investigation. Boston, MA: Butterworth-
Heinemann; C.J. Loomis (August 2, 1999). “Lies, Damned Lies, and Managed Earnings.” For-
tune, p. 75. 
The financial information presented in the periodic statements is pre-
pared according to widely respected principles of accounting to assure that
individuals external to the enterprise—such as shareholders, creditors, gov-
ernment agencies, and the general public—have accurate, relevant informa-
tion. The same information is useful to management in directing the
organization. In planning any future activity, management evaluates past
financial statements for relevant past activities. 
Fraud, Embezzlement, and Security 
Within an organization, internal auditors are charged with monitoring the
controls and checking systems. They are created to assure that fraud (the
conversion or obtaining of money or other assets by false pretenses) and
embezzlement (misappropriation of entrusted assets with the intention to
defraud the legal owner) are detected early. Accountants and financial inves-
tigators are involved in the specialized process of investigating potential or
actual financial dishonesty. This type of activity is carried out by forensic
accountants or investigators who often have specialized training in conduct-
ing such investigations, collecting relevant facts, and preparing an action for
criminal or civil prosecution. 
Security directors are frequently involved with the financial functions of
the organization. This can include creating or consulting on the establishment
of checks and controls within the operations, testing such controls, and inves-
tigating any financial crime. Should a crime occur, the security director with
forensic expertise will interface with financial management on aspects of the
investigation. In some cases, the security director will retain and supervise
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forensic investigators in their fact-finding. The internal financial officer most
often concerned with possible fraud or embezzlement is the chief internal
auditor. By contrast, the controller is the chief accounting officer of an organi-
zation involved with financial reporting, taxation, and possibly auditing. 
Separating Tasks: A Powerful Tool Against Fraud 
One of the most fundamental controls created by security practitioners and
internal auditors is to separate functions within the organization, as shown in
Table 8.8. By separating functions, a potential offender finds it difficult to com-
mit fraud or embezzlement alone. Such crimes may still occur, but they require
the compliance of abettors to succeed. This type of offense is called collusion
and is much more difficult to control than a single rogue acting alone. How-
ever, even a single individual acting alone can cause huge losses to the organi-
zation over extended periods of time. It is for this reason that security-
conscious managers seek to minimize the possibilities of such crimes occurring
by separating routine functions. While this principle is particular relevant for
financial controls, it has significance in other managerial venues as well. 
Table 8.8. Separating Functions to Improve Security 
Separation of duties is a powerful security safeguard against internal theft and fraud and 
embezzlement. To prevent collusion further, management institutes a third activity: verification 
of the process by an independent third party. 
Function A is separated from . . . Function B 
Financial examples 
Accounts payable Accounts receivable 
Payroll preparation Payroll reconciliation 
Records custody Use of records 
General
Authorizing Transaction processing 
Receiving Sending
Purchasing Approval of purchases 
Ordering Verification of order 
Custody Accounting
Vendor proposal Vendor approval 
Computer programming Computer operations 
Library management Use of library materials 
Employee employment offer Independent review before final offer 
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A typical financial control separates check preparation from check
authorization. But a third step—independent verification of the process—
makes the likelihood of financial fraud less possible. Security practitioners
are involved in the creation of controls that make financial deviance more
difficult and that review and modify such measures regularly to reduce risks
from changing vulnerabilities. 
SUMMARY
Accounting controls and budgeting are among the most potent measures
used to direct the operations of entire organizations as well as individual pro-
grams. Often, the accounting mentality focuses on “making the numbers”
rather than achieving long-term goals of the organization. Understanding the
nature of such controls, nonetheless, is vital to interpreting the value of secu-
rity operations for the entire organization. Measures should be identified so
that security can be judged according to important organizational goals and
values. In some situations, security programs can create fresh revenues for an
organization. However, such measures should not divert security manage-
ment from its principal tasks for its own organization.  
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. How have accounting techniques changed in recent years? How do
they resemble practices in Italy during the Renaissance? 
2. Explain why the concept of debits and credits equaling each other is
a useful bookkeeping control.  
3. Discuss the importance of notes to consolidated balance sheets and
statements of operations. 
4. How has the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) improved
reporting measures for publicly held companies? What are the weak-
nesses in SEC procedures? 
5. What are the merits of zero-based budgeting compared with incre-
mental methods? 
6. Why is a series of break-even reports unsatisfactory for a corporation
in the long run? 
7. Compare and contrast three ways of determining the value of a capi-
tal investment that produces reduced losses or costs for operations. 
8. Cite examples of separation of controls in addition to those dis-
cussed in the text. 
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OPERATING PERSONNEL-
INTENSIVE PROGRAMS 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes (Who will guard
the guards themselves?) 
—Juvenal, Satires
Security programs concern themselves with people, technology, and proce-
dures. Earlier chapters considered theories of workplace productivity and
particular strategies of selecting, training, motivating, and generally manag-
ing employees in security functions. This chapter considers the macro level
of managing people in functioning programs. It looks at two significant cat-
egories of security employment—security officers and investigators—and
the programs that make them productive and efficient.  
Like all aspects of protective management, personnel use has experi-
enced considerable change in the past years, and continues to experience
change today. Contemporary security officers are more likely to be contract
workers than permanent proprietary employees relative to past decades.
Similarly, investigative resources in industry and government have
increased, and both contract and proprietary investigative services have
expanded to fit these new workplace needs. Moreover, the scope of investi-
gative tasks has broadened considerably. 
THE PROPRIETARY/CONTRACT EMPLOYEE DEBATE 
For most of the 20th century, security workers were permanent proprietary
employees with the same expectations and corporate relationships as any
other employee. Beginning early in the century, and most notably since the
early 1950s, security guard positions have increasingly been provided by
contract services. In fact, by the year 2000, about 60 percent of all security
officers were provided by contract services, and this trend continues to
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grow. Although proprietary and contract personnel both have their own dis-
tinct advantages, it is important that all factors be weighed in making this
decision, as shown in Table 9.1. 
The main reasons cited for contracting-out security employees are as
follows:
• Less total cost. Employers generally believe that it costs less to
contract-out for services than it does to employ a full-time staff. In
determining the level of savings, management must be certain to
include in-house costs for acquiring, monitoring, and administer-
ing such services. Savings for liability insurance may also be fac-
tored in since the contract firm will provide its own coverage. (This
does not mean, however, that all liability for negligent guard ser-
vices passes to the contract service.) Nevertheless, taking such
costly factors into consideration, management typically expects a
net savings of 5 to 20 percent from the previous cost level. 
Rather than focus solely on economic benefits, however,
employers considering converting from proprietary to contract
services should perform a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis to
determine whether the advantages are significant. In doing so, it is
important to remember that fringe benefits are the responsibility of
the service provider, as are benefits to attract and retain staff. 
Table 9.1. Contract or Proprietary Security: Weighing Factors 
Factors Favoring Contract 
Security
Factors Favoring Proprietary 
Security
Less Total Cost Personnel Retention 
Administrative Ease Perception of Greater Quality of Employee 
Criminal Records Screening Greater Site Knowledge 
Recruiting and Vetting Transferred More Flexible Controls 
Training Transferred Greater Loyalty to the Employer 
Supervision Transferred Reliability of Service 
Specialized Liability Insurance Cost Savings 
Specialized Protective Experience 
Personnel Scheduling Flexibility 
Less Likelihood of Collusion and 
Fraternization
Emergency Staff Available 
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In some cases, management will have other compelling rea-
sons for deciding to contract-out or not to contract-out that are
more significant than cost savings. Dennis Dalton, a consultant
experienced in security services conversions from proprietary to
contract, says: “All too often executives make the decision to con-
vert based solely on the economic gain. What they fail to consider
are the dynamics involved in displacing long-term, loyal employ-
ees."1
• Administrative ease. The contract firm is responsible for recruit-
ing and vetting security employees. They should be highly profi-
cient at this task. The security services firm handles routine details
for contract security employees, similar to those for proprietary
workers. Nonetheless, the security services firm’s client generally
maintains a residual duty to review personnel files and conduct
interviews of workers who will be assigned positions of responsi-
bility within the workplace. Taxes and benefits are the responsibil-
ity of the service provider. 
• Criminal records screening. In some states and geographic areas,
the law dictates that security personnel be screened through crimi-
nal justice databases for the presence of convictions that would bar
them from working in the field. Such databases are not always
available to private sector employers. Many services providers are
thus able to assure employers that security workers have no evi-
dence of significant criminal records in the jurisdictions where
such information is checked. 
• Recruiting and vetting transferred. The process of recruiting and
vetting new security personnel is the responsibility of the services
provider. This relieves the client from the primary responsibility
for this process. 
• Training transferred. The security vendor is expected to have the
commitment and expertise to train security personnel to the level
required for the contractor’s needs. Additionally, the contractor
may provide specific additional training to meet the needs of the
assignment.
• Supervision transferred. Security officers usually are supervised
by the services provider. 
• Specialized liability insurance. Security services providers nor-
mally should possess comprehensive liability insurance as a safe-
guard against potential lawsuits. Even in the event that the
contractor has some liability in a judgment, the amount is likely to
be divided between two parties, lessening the burden on each. 
• Specialized protective experience. The security services provider
should serve as a general resource, as needed, in security matters.
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Security services firms may share their practices and resources,
acting as informal consultants on procedures and policies. 
• Personnel scheduling flexibility. When the contractor requires
additional personnel for special purposes, such as a meeting or an
untoward event, the services contractor can add employees on
short notice. Similarly, if an employee fails to meet the needs of the
contractor, the employee often may be replaced rapidly. 
• Less likelihood of collusion and fraternization. Contract security
personnel are hired and managed by a separate organization from
the clients they serve. This managerial separation makes collusion
less likely than if security workers were proprietary staff members.
Similarly, the likelihood of fraternization—extensive socialization
between security and non-security personnel—is reduced. This
principle is codified in Section 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, which gives employers the right to terminate voluntary
recognition of a non-guard union. That is, the employer of a union-
ized workforce may require that security officers be members of a
different union than the primary union. 
• Emergency staff available. If the client requires additional secu-
rity personnel for brief assignments, security services may provide
extra officers as needed. This could be less burdensome than hiring
additional personnel on a temporary basis. 
Now that we have discussed the main reasons why organizations con-
tract-out for security services, let’s look at the factors cited by organizations
that have instead elected to retain a proprietary security service: 
• Personnel retention. Security directors generally prefer to have
low employee turnover. This is due to many reasons, including the
time and cost of recruiting, training, and guiding workers. Propri-
etary employees are more likely to remain on the job longer. How-
ever, this is not guaranteed, and some security services providers
also can point to extensive longevity with some of their employees. 
• Perception of greater quality of employee. Many employers
believe that proprietary workers, in general, are superior workers
because they are attracted to the normally better compensation
and career opportunities within a proprietary organization. How-
ever, some employers ascertain that the quality argument is rela-
tive to the circumstances and that, given attractive inducements by
a security services provider, the quality of service is not likely to be
substantially different over time. 
• Greater site knowledge. An aspect of greater worker retention is
that such employees are likely to know people, procedures, and
principles better than those with a shorter tenure do. Logically, this
produces more reliable service. 
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• More flexible controls. In proprietary programs, personnel usually
may be transferred from one location to another as a condition of
employment. Contract employees also may be shifted with ease
from one site to another. However, some security directors believe
that this process is easier for employees who are permanent workers. 
• Greater loyalty to the employer. Many directors of proprietary
programs believe that staff workers are more loyal than contract
workers are. This view, which they support with anecdotal evi-
dence, cannot be quantified, though the argument is appealing on
its surface. It implies that proprietary employees make extra efforts
to provide quality service. However, it can be argued that contract
workers have reason to be loyal to the place where they are
assigned as well. 
• Reliability of service. A few contract security firms prove to be
disappointing after an initial period of meeting standards. Accord-
ing to Randolph D. Brock, a security director and former principal
of a security services firm, “Contractors tell clients what clients
want to hear and believe, and say they do but they really don’t,
opting instead to maintain control of the relationship and dictate
terms and conditions."2
• Cost savings. Normally, managers expect to achieve significant
savings from contracting out for security guard and patrol services
relative to their in-house equivalents. However, in some cases—
particularly with smaller programs—savings will not be achieved,
and the organization would save money by staffing its own pro-
gram internally. 
As indicated in this discussion, there tend to be more reasons for con-
tracting-out security services than for retaining them as proprietary services.
Indeed, the direction has favored growth of the contract sector for several
decades. Yet many organizations have retained proprietary security because
they conclude that it is the best policy for their organization. The decision to
convert from proprietary to contract or vice versa should only be made after
careful consideration of all the factors involved.  
Combined Proprietary and Contract Staffs 
Many security directors conclude that proprietary and contract services
have complimentary benefits. Therefore, they include both types of services
in their operations strategy. Similarly, some analytical directors will contract
with more than one outside service. This permits qualities to be compared
with different service vendors. It also serves as a means of an ongoing
assessment of performance of each type of service unit. 
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The search for enduring, cost-effective, reliable security services chal-
lenges managers. Consultant Dennis Dalton notes that seven out of ten secu-
rity directors for the largest companies in America identified “finding and
retaining a really quality-driven contract security agency” as one of the three
critical factors in their programs.3 There are, therefore, many reasons why
organizations seek to obtain the perceived quality of a proprietary staff with
the flexibility and depth provided by the contract sector. 
CORE EXPECTATIONS OF SECURITY OFFICERS 
Security officers have numerous obligations to their employers, each of which is
of critical importance. The following are the security officer’s main obligations: 
• Deter. The presence of adequately trained security personnel
deters crime. The vast majority of potential offenders restrain
themselves from disorderly or criminal conduct in the presence
of security personnel. This is because the opportunities for iden-
tification, arrest, conviction, and civil suits are too high for the
crime to be attractive to a potential offender. In deterring illegal
and disruptive behavior, security personnel provide visible
security that makes the public feel safer and more confident
about being where they are. This function may be the most
important quality provided by security personnel in most cir-
cumstances.
• Delay. In the event that offenders commit a crime, security person-
nel may delay their successful flight, leading to apprehension. 
• Detect. When an incident occurs or when procedures are not fol-
lowed properly, security officers can ascertain the violation
quickly, mitigating or reducing the chances of loss. 
• Respond. Security personnel are trained to respond to detected
incidents or calls for service while on duty. They are expected to
take action at such times to protect people and property and to
make the public feel safer. 
• Report. In the event of an incident, a report from an independent
observer, like a security officer, provides important information for
management. The report serves as a possible factor in changing
internal procedures, a basis for an insurance claim, or as possible
evidence in an arrest or lawsuit. Reporting normally is completed
as soon as possible following a response. Supplementary reports
may be prepared as additional pertinent details concerning the
incident are discovered. 
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Other Important Expectations 
The security officer is expected to maintain a suitable appearance, as this
reflects positively on his or her employer. Also, personnel who make good
impressions are likely to have more positive experiences with the public, thus
improving their own self-esteem at work. Security workers often are the first
individuals the public meets in the workplace. They often serve as providers
of general information to the public and are in a position to enhance the pub-
lic’s impression and regard for the organization in the process. 
Protective personnel who have contact with the public need to be sen-
sitive to individuals who may be impatient, angry, confused, incoherent,
and possibly mentally ill. While encounters with such people are excep-
tional, they do occur. Dealing with an unpredictable public must be antici-
pated in training. For the most part, security personnel best serve
themselves and the public by being friendly, sincere, and having relevant
knowledge about their workplace. All security employees—proprietary and
contract alike—need to make an ongoing commitment to advance the inter-
ests of the employer while protecting people, property, information, and
other assets. 
Finally, the honesty and integrity of security personnel are of utmost
importance. Juvenal’s query, “Who will guard the guards themselves?”
appears facetiously in his Satires. But a serious implication is clear: Protec-
tion personnel should be above ethical reproach. 
Non-expectations of Security Officers 
Regardless of proprietary or contract status, security officers should not be
expected to perform tasks that are not part of their job descriptions. Unless
required by an emergency or specifically requested by a supervisor, or both,
the security person is not expected to undertake duties normally performed
by other employees. This is in part because such diversionary activity pre-
vents the security officer from performing his or her intended functions—
that is, deterring, delaying, detecting, responding, and reporting security-
related incidents. 
Additionally, security personnel are not expected to take unreasonable
risks in their tasks or to take on potentially hazardous tasks. Further, secu-
rity personnel must not usurp the duties of sworn public law enforcement
officers. (The exception is a security worker who is also an off-duty sworn
law enforcement officer who must take such action in the context of official
requirements.) However, in all case, if a simple, brief action by a security
officer can correct, improve, or facilitate a situation, such action should be
taken. This is preferred even if the task would normally be performed by
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another worker or at times even if the action appears to be against written
policies and procedures (see Box 9.1). 
Box 9.1. Fire and Smoke in an Emergency Response 
The Emergency: A contract security officer was performing a nighttime
patrol of a new high-rise luxury office building, soon to be ready for use. On
one floor, the security officer smelled what he thought was smoke coming
from under locked doors. The floor was not occupied at the time as the space
was being prepared for tenants. The security officer quickly returned to the
base and obtained the key for the floor, which had been left with the security
officer by decorating contractors who were preparing the new space. 
When the officer returned, he entered the floor and found the source of
the smoke. Decorators had been staining the new wood panel walls of a con-
ference room. Inexplicably, they had left a heaping pile of used, soaked rags
on the floor. The rags were smoking and would have combusted. The secu-
rity officer found a portable fire extinguisher and applied the contents of the
extinguisher to the pile. He then called the fire department, which arrived
eight minutes later. Firefighters further spread and doused the rags and ven-
tilated the area. 
The next day, the agent for the building’s owner called the contract
guard firm to commend the firm for the officer’s action. However, the secu-
rity company manager was less than enthusiastic. Written policy directs
security personnel to call the fire department first when discovering a fire
condition. Then the security officer may return to the location and see what
prudent measures could be taken. (Of course, if an actual fire was encoun-
tered, the security officer is expected to send an alarm, retreat safely, and
then stay available to direct firefighters to the source of the problem.) The
contract security manager felt conflicted: Should the security officer be
rewarded, or disciplined, or both? 
The Resolution: The contract security manager discussed the situation with
the building owner’s agent and a fire inspector. All agreed that the stated
written policy was correct: that is, security personnel should call the fire
department first when a fire condition is encountered. However, they also
agreed that exceptions do exist. In this case, a trained security officer with
good common sense determined that personal risk was acceptable in attack-
ing the potentially dangerous situation immediately. The few additional
minutes saved by not contacting the fire department immediately were bet-
ter used in attacking the fire risk immediately. However, praise for the guard
was subdued by the conflict between a sensible written policy and the
equally reasonable action taken by an alert security officer. 
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Expectations of Investigators 
Also called detectives and fact-finders, investigators are persons who sys-
tematically and thoroughly examine and make inquiries into an event.
According to J.J. Fay, an investigative survey is “an in-depth probe or test
check of a specific operation or activity, usually conducted on a pro-
grammed basis, to detect the existence of crime or significant administrative
irregularities."4 Investigators or fact-finders undertake a wide variety of
inquiries. Most organizational investigations deal with business or civil
issues, but the private sector may conduct criminal investigations on behalf
of itself or at the request of the public sector. A clear understanding between
the two is imperative, and is explained in Table 9.2. 
Most private sector investigations concern specific incidents. A loss of
assets, contract dispute, or crime may have occurred and facts need to be
collected to stop the loss, resolve the contract issue, and, conceivably, con-
duct a portion of the criminal investigation. Most investigations for security
operations, however, involve civil and contractual issues and are not crimi-
nal in nature. Retailing is an exception. Such investigations cover a huge
range of possible topics, which grow as the nature of commerce evolves. An
example is investigation for diversion fraud. This type of loss is a major
activity, but scarcely existed a generation ago (see Box 9.2). 
Table 9.2. Criminal versus Civil Investigations 
Fundamental differences exist between criminal and civil litigation. A defendant may be sued 
criminally, civilly, or both, in which case different plaintiffs will bring charges. Private sector 
investigations normally serve the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. However, private 
investigators may be hired by the government, when indicated, to collect evidence on behalf of 
the public sector in criminal cases and administrative issues. 
Factor Criminal Civil
Plaintiff The State (public sector) Private and Non-profit interests 
Prosecutor The People The Victim 
Main purpose Punishment of the Guilty Redress of Injury 
Investigations By or on Behalf of the State By the Victim 
Sanctions Jail, Prison Damages to Victims 
Fines Corrective Action or Behavior
Specific Corrective Activity 
Conviction Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Preponderance of Evidence 
Appeals Possible by Defendant Possible by Either Party 
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Box 9.2. Investigating for Diversionary Fraud: A Pharmaceutical Case
History
Often, manufacturers have price agreements that differ for various members
of the distribution chain. As part of the agreement to distribute a product, an
organization agrees to specific terms with the manufacturer or distributor
that usually limit the area into which certain products can be marketed and
sold. When such an agreement is broken, the manufacturer is deprived of
rightful profits. Similarly, distributors in the areas undersold by rogue dis-
tributors lose profits and goodwill. Investigations often identify the source
of such illegal practices and stop them. 
The pharmaceutical industry frequently is victimized by diversionary
fraud. (Similar examples could be cited from numerous other types of man-
ufacturers including software vendors.) Here is how it works: A pharmaceu-
tical company may charge distributors in the U.S. a particular price for its
products. The price of the identical drug may be considerably less for distri-
bution, say, in Central or South America or Africa. This is due to competi-
tive, governmental, and humanitarian reasons. A foreign distributor may
order the product from the manufacturer in the U.S. at the favorable foreign
price and then scheme to divert the product back into distribution channels
within the U.S. This undercuts profits to both the manufacturer and Ameri-
can distributors of pharmaceutical products. 
When the U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturer discovers price undercut-
ting in its normal distribution channels, an investigation is in order. Fact-
finding is needed to ascertain the losses and identify the likely source of the
product diversion. Investigators must become familiar with manufacturing
codes and packaging variations in order to identify diverted products. They
must gain access to pharmaceutical buyers in hospitals, drug chains, and
other distributors in order to develop leads. Often, they must seize the back-
channeled merchandise. At other times, they purchase products that do not
belong on the premises of the organization they are visiting and hold such
materials as evidence against the offender. 
By collecting all the facts possible in a case, the investigators, in coop-
eration with management, are able to quantify the extent of the diversionary
fraud. This may be the basis for a civil action against the offenders. When
the facts are indisputable, the chances for a resolution favorable to the vic-
timized manufacturer are good to excellent. Yet no recovery would be possi-
ble without the creative and persistent efforts of investigators—proprietary
or contract—evaluating the problem and collecting facts. 
Source: Security Letter (July 16, 1984). Part I, pp. 2–3. 
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Investigations can extends into personal concerns as well as civil and
contractual issues.5 The following are types of investigations undertaken in
the private sector: 
• Accidents (aircraft, vehicular, industrial, construction, personal) 
• Adjustments (in the case of claims for liability) 
• Antitrust activity 
• Asset location 
• Breach of contract (to determine facts and possible damages) 
• Competitive information 
• Consulting 
• Conversion (controlling another’s property) 
• Copyright and trademark violations 
• Cyber-crime 
• Electronic countermeasures 
• Employee background (also called vetting) 
• Espionage 
• Fire incidents 
• Fraud 
• Injunctions 
• Insurance claims or counterclaims 
• Inventory shortages and shrinkage 
• Locating lost individuals 
• Marine investigations 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
• Negligence 
• Personal injury 
• Patent infringements 
• Polygraph examinations 
• Product liability 
• Property and equity claims 
• Public records searches (vital statistics, assets, credit, crime, debit,
education)
• Security surveys 
• Sexual harassment 
• Surveillance 
• Trial preparation 
• Undercover operations 
• Workers’ compensation 
• Workplace violence 
Investigations can occur for any reason that seems to make economic
or strategic sense for an organization. However, investigative work depends
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upon the experience, training, and abilities of persons available. In many
cases, a business or institution anticipates its needs and is staffed with a
large cadre of competent investigators. This is the case, for example, in the
financial and insurance industries, which face many repetitive types of
investigative activities. Most organizations will not possess such depth of
available investigators. In addition, the varied nature of the types of busi-
ness, contract, and institutional problems makes keeping a staff of suitable
investigators more difficult. Therefore, organizations frequently turn to
independent investigators who specialize in certain types of investigations. 
Investigations by the private sector sometimes are an important part of
criminal prosecution. While it is the duty of the state to prosecute alleged
offenders, it is frequently in the interest of private or not-for-profit organiza-
tions to conduct at least part of the criminal investigation. Often, a public
prosecutor will not accept a case on behalf of the state unless the evidence is
sufficiently compelling. Specifically, the state wishes to ensure that an
offense has in fact occurred, that the offender has been identified, and that
evidence collected for use at court is strong. A private investigator normally
does not act as an agent of the state and must not imply this. However, he or
she may develop the case substantially and turn it over to the police and
public prosecutors. 
The following are criminal cases in which the private sector plays an
active role in the investigation prior to arrest, arraignment, and trial: 
• Arson 
• Bomb threats 
• Burglary 
• Cargo thefts 
• Computer crimes 
• Conspiracy to commit crime 
• Criminal defense 
• Cyber-crime 
• Embezzlement 
• Employee dishonesty 
• Extortion 
• Fencing 
• Forgery 
• Fraud 
• Insurance fraud 
• Kidnap and ransom cases 
• Motor vehicle thefts 
• Narcotics/drugs violations 
• Organized crime 
• Shoplifting 
• Substance abuse 
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• Terrorism 
• Theft (personal, commercial, institutional) 
• White-collar crimes 
• Workplace violence 
The Importance of Investigations in IT Crimes 
Protection-related issues constantly evolve. In the 21st century, risks associ-
ated with information technology (IT), including communications, have
taken on great significance. Chapman and Zwicky note: “The Internet is a
marvelous technological advance that provides access to information, and
the ability to publish information, in revolutionary ways. But it’s also a
major danger that provides the ability to pollute and destroy information in
revolutionary ways."6
The IT revolution has produced a new category of deviance called
“cyber-crime."7 Such crimes include extortion, boiler-room investment and
gambling fraud, credit card fraud, pyramid schemes, fraudulent transfer of
funds, telephone fraud, and sex crimes. Additionally, denial of service, pri-
vacy invasions, attacks by high-energy radio frequency guns, commercial
software piracy, and attacks by computer viruses all require systematic
investigation to identify offenders and reduce chances of future recurrence.
The alleged inadequacy of IT security can result in civil litigation. In one
case, Schalk v. Texas, the defense argued successfully that the plaintiff had
not taken sufficient due care to protect information that was stolen from a
computer system.8 As with other types of offenses, IT crimes and attacks
require post-incident and pre-trial investigations. Generally, computer crime
investigators and auditors specialize in this area. 
Non-expectations of Investigators 
While exceptions exist, the investigator generally is not expected to arrive at
a final conclusion relative to the point of the investigation. Rather, the super-
visor of the investigation, or another person for whom the investigation is
being performed, should review the facts and all other pertinent informa-
tion and then make a conclusion about the central question. For example, an
investigator may collect extensive information, both positive and negative,
relative to an applicant in a background investigation. But the final decision
on extending or not extending an employment offer is best left to others. The
opinion of a seasoned investigator generally is welcome, but the hiring deci-
sion is ultimately the responsibility of a person who considers more factors
than those unearthed by the investigation alone. 
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An investigator also has ethical and legal obligations in providing ser-
vices to the employer, which also extend to individuals who may be subject
to the investigation. For example, federal rules of entrapment apply to pri-
vate security agents.9 In particular, it is unethical and illegal for an under-
cover security agent to originate the idea of committing a crime. Such
felonious notions should originate solely with suspects. An undercover
agent can appear to be a willing participant in a criminal or improper act,
but he or she must not step over the line and actually initiate a crime. 
Trends in Proprietary and Contract Security 
The necessity for security in the workplace has grown for several reasons, as
discussed earlier in this book. In the year 2000, the aggregate employment of
security personnel in the U.S. reached an estimated 2.1 million persons. This
compares to about 700,000 employees in law enforcement at the local, state,
and federal levels. This trend represents a long period of growth in private
security in absolute terms and also relative to law enforcement. Meanwhile,
the structure by which those security services are being provided has also
changed.
PROPRIETARY SECURITY STRATEGY 
Private guards employed to protect individuals and private property have
been used at least since the time of the Egyptians, when guards protected
tombs and tomb sites.10 In Psalm 127, Solomon observes the importance of
security in urban life: “Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it
labor in vain. Unless the Lord watches over the city, the watchman stay
awake in vain.” 
With the arrival of the Industrial Revolution, the scope of private pro-
tection grew enormously.11 Security personnel were needed because indus-
trial operations had increased beyond small, discrete businesses into those
involving hundreds of workers, sometimes working round-the-clock shifts.
Further, as industrial production increased in scope, work became more spe-
cialized. Whereas the protective function initially was generalized, it later
became the task of individuals assigned to that particular process. Agents
were hired to protect people and assets when risks were greatest. 
Proprietary security began in the early 19th century in the U.S. as a
means of general deterrence against crime, vandalism, and fire. In the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, security agents protected industrial facilities
against threats like external and internal theft, vandalism, and sabotage,
especially during times of labor unrest. During World Wars I and II, private
security was responsible for heightened property vital information control,
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both as an anti-espionage measure and as a means of protecting industrial
know-how. In the last thirty years of the 20th century, physical protection
remained an important facet of the security industry, while new concerns
about IT-oriented risks and threats to intellectual assets shaped the way in
which proprietary security is structured in the workplace. 
Several aspects of monitoring a proprietary security program have
been covered in previous chapters. The following section will consider fur-
ther operational management aspects of security personnel activity. 
Scheduling Requirements 
In the process of analyzing security tasks to be performed, security manag-
ers must determine the number of personnel required. The complexity of
this issue is based on the size of the program, its geography, and the level of
training required. In earlier years, security directors faced the tedious task of
preparing scheduling plans on paper forms or chalkboards. The scheduling
information was constantly being changed; therefore, the information had to
be erasable to accommodate the new changes. Security directors frequently
delegated the scheduling details to clerks who kept master records and dis-
tributed them to supervisors and area managers on a periodic basis. Deriva-
tive reports dealing with shift rotations, work locations, and event
scheduling were made from the master schedule. 
In recent years, software has become available that is written specifi-
cally to help schedule security personnel.12 Scheduling time has been cut,
saving considerable clerical costs in the process; schedules can be displayed
graphically and changed with ease; and relevant information on security
personnel can be instantly available. Management may review assignment
plans over the Internet, while information can be linked to other manage-
ment and financial controls software packages, further reducing time and
costs. Figure 9.1 shows an example of such a software package. These soft-
ware packages can be learned in a short time. Managers and supervisors
can create useful supportive reports such as those indicating guard avail-
ability and unavailability; scheduling conflicts; and assignment or cus-
tomer work history data. They can also create “barred-from-customer”
conflict lists and seniority lists. Automated officer check-in systems allow
managers the opportunity to check that security personnel are at their
posts.
Management’s support for such software packages is enhanced by
their additional features. Costs are saved because the schedules are prepared
much faster than the previous manual process. However, further cost sav-
ings result from the reduction of overtime by better monitoring of hours and
separate links to payroll, invoice creation, accounts payable, accounts receiv-
able, and general ledger software programs.13
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Determining Personnel Needs for Posts 
As a rule of thumb, managers require the equivalent of 4.2 to 4.5 persons to
be available to staff each post on a 24-hour 365-day basis, assuming a 40-
hour workweek. Complications in planning occur because of vacations and
other schedule changes, such as illness or personal time off. Consequently,
an adequate pool of full- and part-time security personnel needs to be avail-
able to fill the requirements of large security programs with 24-hour posts. 
Salary and Compensation 
Money is not the only motivator, but it is the most important one. Managers
have to keep within their allocated budget guidelines, constantly improve
Figure 9.1. Software Programs Specifically Written for Security Opera-
tions Facilitate Operations and Control. 
This program shows how officers may be scheduled over different times at
various locations. 
Source: InTime Solutions.
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services, and control payroll costs. The average (median) hourly pay for
security guards varies widely based on geography alone. In some programs,
average pay for security personnel will be consistently below average. In
others, it will be within the mid-range, and in still others, average compen-
sation will be above average. 
Managers can determine the average hourly pay for security officer
services from data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S.
Department of Labor.14 These reports are prepared by the Office of Compen-
sation and Working Conditions in cooperation with the Office of Field Oper-
ations and the Office of Technology and Survey Processing. The data may be
months old when a manager accesses the latest report for a particular region
and therefore the rates need to be adjusted for any circumstances that may
have changed. The information is national in scope and covers private and
public positions. Scores of employers provide reasonably accurate base sal-
ary data to the survey, thus revealing the normal hourly compensation for
150,000 to 250,000 security officers. Managers can turn to this source to judge
their own compensation programs relative to other employers in varying
regions. 
Compensation ranges for security supervisors, investigators, special-
ists, managers, and executives are equally important in determining the
costs of operating a department. Such information can be obtained from
compensation studies specializing in the security, protective services, and
law enforcement categories.15
Managers can reduce operational costs for salary and benefits process-
ing by using software dedicated to the tasks. Alternatively, the activity can
be turned over to an outside service bureau. 
Insurance
The actions of security officers, investigators, and other protective personnel
are covered under the organization’s comprehensive insurance. The risk of
errors and omissions from security performance normally is defended by
the insurer on behalf of the insured. In the event that security services are
contracted-out, savings on liability coverage should be realized. 
CONTRACT SECURITY SERVICES 
As previously discussed, the trend in recent decades has been for operating
entities to contract-out numerous types of services. The scope of such ser-
vices is broad and includes diverse temporary help, technical services, enter-
tainers, drivers, hospitality industry workers, janitorial workers, home
healthcare workers, agricultural workers, and property managers. However,
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one of the largest contract services is security personnel. In fact, it may also
be the earliest organized service industry. The Pinkerton Agency contracted-
out armed security guards to packing plants and commercial houses begin-
ning in 1858.16 By the end of the 19th century, scores of security services
businesses could be found in urban America. 
The concept of “employee leasing” has many attractive features in that
the leasing firm must undertake numerous accounting and administrative
duties on behalf of the workers.17 Requirements for the administration of
records and benefits is regarded as particularly burdensome to small busi-
nesses or those with temporary operations. The employer might have to: 
• Maintain tax deduction records 
• Compute tax liabilities and make timely bank deposits 
• Respond to garnishment from the court or other taxing bodies 
• Conduct audits for workers’ compensation benefits 
• Conduct audits for unemployment claims 
• Comply with COBRA legislation (1986) requiring employers with
more than 20 employees to offer continuation of healthcare cover-
age in the event that an employee is terminated or experiences
another qualifying life event 
• Reconcile employee paychecks 
• Post records for state and federal taxing agencies 
• Prepare workers’ year-end W-2 filings 
• Maintain vacation and other authorized leave benefits 
• Maintain payroll and tax changes 
• Answer questions from workers on regulatory, pay, and benefits
issues
The employer must provide such services to proprietary workers as a
matter-of-course, and this includes security personnel. However, when such
duties are transferred to an outside organization, the primary organization
is relieved of these duties and related costs. Yet contract security programs
are differentiated from proprietary ones on more substantive issues than
who will be responsible for routine administrative issues. These issues were
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
SELECTING CONTRACT SECURITY SERVICES 
The process of selecting a contract security service may be uncomplicated
for small and simple organizations. However, it can be a formal and exten-
sive process for large, complex organizations. The following sections discuss
these two scenarios. 
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Small, Simple Programs 
Employers requiring one or more security officer for an assignment that
involves visible patrol begin the process by preparing a report or memoran-
dum in which the specific tasks of the required security personnel are out-
lined. This need be only two or three pages long, but it should provide the
basic vital information required by a contract security firm to make an
informed proposal. This report should include the number of security per-
sonnel required; the type of vetting to be performed; the training to be com-
pleted prior to assignment; the duties to be performed; the nature of
experience desired; the hours to be worked (including any exceptional cir-
cumstances); the type of uniform desired (military style or blazer and
slacks); the insurance to be provided; and the field supervision to be offered. 
Additionally, the prospective employer should consider the level of
pay desired for the security personnel, including projected increases over
the length of the contract. This information will be sufficient for the prospec-
tive bidders for the contract to prepare a proposal. Many other nuances to
the selection process may come up later, but the basic material just described
will start the process for the contract proposal for a protective program
requiring contract security officers. 
The next step is to interview three to five security guard firms. Typi-
cally, a client wanting security officer services will seek to meet with one to
three national security services firms and one to three local, independent
security services providers. In some areas, the number of choices will be lim-
ited. In addition, many established security firms may not choose to pursue
the business of an operation that offers little opportunity for growth and
that does not provide the contract firm with its gross profit target. 
The proposed service providers may be selected by references from
colleagues who manage existing locally respected programs and from local
membership lists of professional organizations like the American Society for
Industrial Security and the National Association of Security Companies. It is
also advisable to peruse relevant business directories or source books for
names of service providers. An initial letter to the identified companies can
provide details on the security services required and invite an expression of
interest by a particular date. In some cases, security services firms will learn
of the search on their own and ask management for the opportunity to be
considered. 
The next step will be to meet with the prospective bidders and provide
them with full details on the assignment. For a new security services
requirement, it is probably best to meet individually with the prospective
bidders. The security firms—individually or as a group—should be able to
see the exact area where the security personnel will work as part of a site
visit. The prospective security services firms should have time to complete
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their surveys and have equal access to all relevant details. A date for the
completed proposals must be set. 
When all the proposals have been received, the client compares and
contrasts the various submissions. Sometimes, a modified comparative scale
is used to judge the security firm by various objective and subjective criteria.
The client may briefly visit the office and training facility of the prospective
services provider, and may wish to check any references. Often, consider-
able negotiations occur on finer points of the agreement before both parties
agree to the terms. When the winner is selected, a contract is signed. The
contract is usually drafted by the client, but may be provided by the security
services firm and must be carefully reviewed by the client, possibly with a
lawyer or industry consultant. 
Large, Complex Security Programs 
Large organizations with formal structures require a much more detailed
process to identify and award a contract for security services than the one
just described. This is particularly true for institutions and the government,
which often issue a request for proposal (RFP) when making selections for
security services providers. (Corporations also use RFPs, or modifications of
them, when selecting security venders.) Larger government or institutional
contracts usually attract numerous hopeful bidders. Thus, RFPs are used
both to ensure fairness and to defend against claims of unfair awards. The
process is invariably structured with firm dates and specific demands for
replying to the RFP. An outline for a formal RFP follows. It provides insight
into the types of issues that have occurred in the past when organizations
have contracted for protective officer services, experienced difficulties, and
wrote specific demands into a formal agreement. 
RFPs require effort and expense to prepare. The questions and con-
cerns of bidders should be anticipated in advance, thereby facilitating the
selection process. Often, the document begins with a Solicitation Summary,
which provides proposed instructions, submission requirements, and condi-
tions. These include such factors as: 
1. Statement of purpose. This states what the task would be for the
required security personnel. 
2. Client contact person. Usually, a single individual is identified for all
written or telephone inquiries or contacts. If a potential vendor
requests interpretation of the RFP, this request should be placed in writ-
ing. The client reserves the right to respond to any and all such
requests, sharing answers with all responders, usually via fax or e-mail. 
3. Submission. The final proposal usually is sent to a different office
and contract officer than the client contact person identified to han-
dle inquiries. 
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4. Proposer conference. A proposer’s conference is set for a particular
date, usually in a conference room where all representatives can be
accommodated. Proposers may be requested to notify the agency at
least five days in advance if they plan to attend. Proposed vendors
are under no obligation to attend such a conference, but normally
they do. Attendance is usually taken at such times. 
5. Letters of intent. Proposed vendors interested in submitting a pro-
posal are requested to submit a letter of intent to the agency. 
6. Submission requirements. This section summarizes what the pro-
spective vendors must prepare and submit in order to be considered.
The number of copies of the proposal and the date and hour on
which the sealed proposal package must be received by the client is
stated.
7. Modification or withdrawal of proposals. The costs in the proposal
are deemed to be irrevocable until the contract award, unless the
proposal is withdrawn or modified prior to the time or date set as
the due date for the proposal and in accordance with the RFP. 
8. Post-opening withdrawals. The client may allow a potential vendor
to withdraw its bid only after the expiration of a stated number of
days after the opening of the proposals. Such a withdrawal must be
in writing and in advance of the actual award. 
9. Late proposals, withdrawals, or modifications. To prevent charges
of unfairness, clients generally do not make exceptions for late pro-
posals, withdrawals, or modifications. An exception is when any
modification of a successful proposal makes the terms more favor-
able to the client than those initially presented. Occasionally, a client
may allow a vendor to join the process after it has begun. Such a ven-
dor would be expected to meet all stated submission deadlines and
requirements pertaining to other vendors. 
10. Proposers’ right of appeal. The process whereby proposers may pro-
test and appeal decisions regarding the solicitation and award of a
contract is identified. 
11. Payment policy. The agency states when it expects to pay proper
invoices, which set forth the description, price, and quantity of ser-
vices rendered with the appropriate documentation appended. (A
generation ago, some security service providers billed clients
monthly, in effect giving the client improved cash flow. In recent
years, weekly or bi-weekly billing has become the norm.) 
12. Amendments to the RFP. If amendments to the RFP occur, all pro-
posers will receive such notifications and must verify that they have
received all addenda issued. 
13. Discussion with proposers. The client may wish to conduct discus-
sions with proposers who have provided the most responsive pro-
posals. However, this discussion is not necessarily required prior to a
contract award. 
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14. Procurement policy rules. The RFP may be subject to the rules of
procurement by the government agency involved in the bid. In the
case of a private organization, it may be stated that the decision to
award is left solely to the discretion of the client. 
15. Fairness and ethics. If any potential vendor feels that unfairness,
favoritism, or ethical improprieties have occurred in the proposal
process, the vendor may contact the client’s attorney designated by
name to receive such information. 
Element of a Comprehensive RFP 
Following the Solicitation Summary, the proposal then provides consider-
able depth on the nature of the work to be accomplished by the proposed
contracted services. A table of contents may begin the section, listing
detailed aspects of the proposal covered in the document. The following is
the outline of an expanded RFP, indicating considerations that could be
important in completing a mutually beneficial contracting-out process: 
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Purpose. The name of the proposed client and the nature of the secu-
rity services required is explained. For example, “the client is
requesting proposals from fully licensed firms in the business of pro-
viding trained, uniformed, unarmed male and female security offic-
ers who have had at least five consecutive years of experience in
furnishing such services to large institutions, corporations, or to gov-
ernment units.” The specific nature of the experience expected to be
demonstrated by the security services firm is also mentioned. 
The length of the contract is indicated (for example, three to five
years). The cost proposal must state a rate for each year of the con-
tract. However, the client may wish to retain continuance of the con-
tract for one to three 12-month extensions beyond the initial period
at the client’s discretion. The date at which the contract is to begin is
indicated.
1.2 Background. This section describes the nature of the client’s organi-
zation and states the importance of security in the view of manage-
ment. Further details on the type of work generally provided by the
organization may also appear in this section or be made part of the
RFP packet provided to interested proposers. 
1.3 Specific facilities. Next, the RFP will list all the facilities to be cov-
ered in the contract. It will include address, type of activities, num-
ber of employees working at the location, and any special features of
concern from a security standpoint. If any physical changes in the
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nature of these facilities are anticipated within the life of the contract,
they should be identified. 
1.4 Security issues. A statement or section about the nature of the most
significant security issues requiring management may be included
here. For example, such issues as fire watch, employee theft, outsider
theft, meeting and greeting the public, and emergency response
capabilities are quite distinct activities and require that the security
firm consider them thoughtfully in arriving at a bid proposal that
would provide security officers who had the required skills. 
1.5 Services needed at the facilities. Following from the previous sec-
tion, this section identifies the serious problems that have occurred
in the facilities in the past. There is potential risk if the RFP fails to
identify serious crimes and incidents that have occurred, say, in the
past three to five years that would affect the nature of the staffing
required. Specific details do not need to be presented in the RFP;
however, the document needs to identify the major issues that have
been the focus of security in the past. If the facility is new, the RFP
will identify the nature of the problems management expects the
security services firm to be able to manage. How the client has dealt
with these incidents elsewhere in the past may also be explained. 
2.0 Scope of services. In RFPs for large and complex operations, it is
possible for the organization to organize the work for one contract
firm, several firms, or a combination of contract and proprietary ser-
vices. The way management expects to divide such services may be
identified here. 
2.1 Minimal specific tasks and requirements. The writers of the RFP
are not in the position to instruct the security services firm on how to
do their job. Rather, the RFP writers can describe what the job
involves and ask how the security supplier plans to meet the client’s
security objectives. For example, the RFP may identify specifically
the salient issues of greatest concern to it: 
• Protecting staff, customers/clients, vendors, and visitors against
malicious injury. 
• Protecting the premises against theft, pilferage, vandalism, dam-
age, or destruction. 
• Permitting only authorized persons to enter protected areas. 
• Reporting to the client all violations of regulations that are the
nature of written reports. 
• Operating and monitoring a comprehensive closed-circuit televi-
sion and communications monitoring center. 
• Operating and using X-ray, walk-through, and hand-held metal
detectors at entrances to the facilities. 
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• Patrolling areas of the facilities including perimeter walls and
fences, building exteriors, parking lots, roofs, main floors, corri-
dors, stairwells, restrooms, and basements. 
• Observing and reporting at assigned locations activities that can
lead to improved security performance.  
2.2 Guidelines for guards. In this section, the client indicates the mini-
mum expected guidelines of the services. The following are exam-
ples that may be cited: 
• Contract security personnel must view the safety of all site
employees, visitors, vendors, and others as their main duty.  
• Security officers shall challenge all persons entering protected
premises for proper authorization and identification prior to
entry. 
• X-ray, walk-through, and hand-held metal detectors and other
physical security devices, where provided, may be used to pro-
cess individuals who enter the facility. 
• Doors, windows, and other portals must be secured when required. 
• All incidents must be reported to the local director or site super-
visor. 
• A security log book must be maintained. 
• Contract security personnel must adhere to any site policies as
prescribed by the local manager or other officials in charge. 
• Contract security personnel should safeguard from damage all
equipment, systems, and property on the premises. 
• Contract security personnel must provide only general informa-
tion to the public, such as directions and locations of various
offices. At no time will contractors’ employees be permitted to
discuss with the public operating activities at any of the client’s
sites. Such a discussion may serve as a breach of security of the
site and of the organization. 
2.3 Requirement for incident reports. A policy on incident reports may
be expressed: 
• Unauthorized intrusion, trespassing, or other illegal entry onto
the site. 
• Any criminal or unlawful act which has been committed on the
site.
• Any assault, altercation, or confrontation that results in any
injury. 
• Any emergency responses to the site by fire, police, emergency
medical, or government agencies. 
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• Any safety or health hazards observed by the security officer. 
• Any exceptional incident that could require a claim against man-
agement or that would require further investigation on the part
of the client’s management. 
• No information contained in an incident report or brought to the
attention of the security officer at the site shall be disclosed to
third parties without written consent of site management. 
2.4 Vendor responsibility. The following vendor responsibilities may be
mentioned in this section: 
• Continuity of services. It is vital that security services be pro-
vided without interruption to the client. Accordingly, the secu-
rity services provider must propose how to assure coverage in
the event of strikes, work stoppage or slowdowns, or in other sit-
uations in which services and operations may be disrupted. 
• Provision for female security officers. The security services pro-
vider may be expected to provide a certain minimum number of
female officers depending on the locations and the nature of ser-
vices to be provided. 
• Uniforms and equipment. The following uniform and equip-
ment guidelines may be mentioned in this section: 
a. The contractor must furnish and ensure that each security
officer wears a uniform in compliance with any state and
local regulations. Security personnel should present a neat
and orderly appearance at all times during the performance
of their work. Proposers should identify details of their uni-
form options in the proposal. Alternatively, the client may
prescribe special clothing to be worn by security personnel
and may indicate whether the client will pay for the clothing
or if it is to be included in the proposer’s fee. 
b. At no time shall firearms, knives, or other unauthorized
instruments or tools that might be used as a dangerous
instrument or weapon be carried by security personnel. 
c. Supervisory personnel shall wear a uniform that distin-
guishes them from subordinate security personnel. 
d. Security personnel shall exhibit identification credentials, as
prescribed by the contract, in order to gain access to the facil-
ity for the performance of work. 
e. Each security officer shall be furnished with a two-way
radio, beeper, or cellular phone. Inoperable devices must be
replaced immediately. The equipment shall be in working
order at all times. The provision to safeguard and recharge
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the equipment remains the responsibility of the security ser-
vices provider. 
f. Security personnel responsible for the operation of security
systems shall be held responsible for the systems’ security
and care. Any unreported or unexplained damages to such
systems shall be deemed the service provider’s responsibil-
ity. 
3.0 Guidelines for proposal preparation.
3.1 Proposal content. The proposal specifically must explain how cer-
tain tasks will be handled. This content should include: 
• The specific security tasks that will be performed by security
officers. 
• The monitoring and supervisory control of the workforce. 
• A description of the training program to be provided security
officers and supervisors. 
• A security management assessment for the location—or part of
the location—needed to adequately secure the facility. 
• The internal controls that will be exercised by the security ser-
vices firm over the officers and their supervisors. 
• The security officer standard measures required to provide ade-
quate security. 
• The measures to be taken to protect employees and visitors
against malicious injury and to protect the premises and prop-
erty against theft, pilferage, vandalism, damage, and destruc-
tion.
• The means of securing and safeguarding documents and
records. 
• Procedures for reporting, preparing, and maintaining logbooks,
forms, and records. 
• Procedures and methods for excluding unauthorized persons. 
• Access control and security procedures for storage and equip-
ment.
• Details of uniforms to be furnished to and worn by security officers. 
• Any other security measures appropriate to the client and its
sites.
3.2 General information.
3.2.1 Conflicts. If the proposer feels that any part of the proposal
appears to be in conflict with another part, or if an aspect of
the work to be performed is unclear, the proposer should ask
the potential client for clarification. If relevant, this elucida-
tion will be shared with other proposers. 
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3.2.2 Inspectors and tests. The proposer should be aware that all
personnel and equipment may be subject to inspection, exam-
ination, or test by the client at any time during the course of
the contract. The client shall have the right to reject unquali-
fied personnel who do not comply with the guidelines and
requirements of the contract. Similarly, unsatisfactory equip-
ment or materials may be rejected by the client. 
3.2.3 Supervision by contractor. The proposal shall indicate in
what manner a representative will supervise the work that his
or her staff is performing to ensure the firm’s complete and
satisfactory performance in accordance with the terms of the
contract. The representative shall be authorized to receive and
put into effect promptly all orders, directions, and instruc-
tions from the client. 
3.2.4 Adequate and competent supervision. The proposer shall
provide, as part of its contract and at no additional cost to the
client, a visiting site manager. The site manager should visit
all facilities at least once during an eight-hour tour to assure
that quality security services are being provided. The site
supervisors shall have a minimum of two years experience as
supervisors in security-related or law enforcement positions
prior to being assigned to the client. 
3.3 Additional requirements.
3.3.1 No arrest policy. Security services personnel must not make
any arrests without the expressed consent of the director or
assistant director of security. Security services employees
shall not sign a complaint on behalf of the client or sign any
request to do so by governmental authorities. 
3.3.2 Tour limitation rule. Security services employees should not
be on duty in excess of 16 hours per 24-hour period or in
excess of 60 hours per week. Each security officer shall have a
minimum of 24 consecutive hours off each week. Any hours
in excess of the above-stipulated maximum shall not be billed
to the client. 
3.3.3 Overtime pay policy. In the event of an emergency or other
contingency requiring guard service for a period in excess of
the stipulated shift, payment for such services shall be at the
same rate as the standard contract rate. This provision will not
apply if the contractor has not been notified at least eight
hours prior to the start of the shift, in which case the contrac-
tor shall receive the rate of one-and-one-half times the regular
rate for that shift. If overtime is caused by the security ser-
vices firm and is not attributable to the client, the service firm
shall not be entitled to any overtime rate. 
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3.3.4 Training agreement. The proposer must provide a training
program for its employees at no cost to the client. All employ-
ees must complete the training program prior to assignment.
Such proposed training must consist of [a stated number]
hours of training. The curriculum for the training and the
resources used must be approved by the client prior to begin-
ning such training. The client retains the right to provide part
of the training prior to assignment. 
3.3.5 Right to audit. The client reserves the right to audit relevant
security services providers’ financial records related to the
contract to assure compliance. 
3.4 Standards for workforce.
3.4.1 Education and background requirements. Proposers should
offer security officers and supervisors who meet the following
minimum requirements: at least 21 years of age; high school
diploma or GED; at least three years, alone or in combination,
of (1) satisfactory prior work experience in a security-related
field or human care-related area; (2) military service; or (3)
satisfactory completion of college-level study. Security officers
with records of criminal convictions, other than minor traffic
violations, will not be satisfactory to the client. In fulfilling the
contractor’s obligations under this requirement, the contrac-
tor shall comply fully with all laws of the state and disclose
pertinent information to the client. Security officers shall be in
good general health without abnormalities that would inter-
fere with the performance of security duties, and must be
capable of performing normal and emergency tasks requiring
moderate to arduous physical exertion. Medical fitness is to
be determined by a medical examination conducted and doc-
umented within 90 days prior to entry on assignment. Secu-
rity officers must speak and write English intelligibly. Security
officers must be citizens of the United States or possess
acceptable alien registration documentation. Documented
proof in the form of true certified copies (i.e., birth records,
diplomas, military discharges) and previous employment ver-
ification should be maintained in a permanent personnel
folder for officers. The folder will include training records. 
3.4.2 Hiring and replacing personnel. The contractor shall be
required to provide the client with the names of all newly
hired officers. The contractor shall provide a certification for
each individual officer stating that he or she meets all contract
requirements. The contractor shall provide the certification
with the officers’ folders for review prior to the beginning of
their employment at the client’s site for the first time. 
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3.5 Information on the security services provider. The contractor shall
provide the client with comprehensive information on the fitness of
the contractor to perform the proposed contract. This information
shall include historical information on the contractor; an organiza-
tional chart; résumés of the contractors’ principals and managers in
charge of the contract; a list of the board of directors; a list of current
contracts including a contact name and address and the date on
which service began; and letters of support/recommendation con-
cerning the contractor. 
4.0 General guidelines for submitting proposals.
4.1 Letter of intent. Prospective vendors shall submit a letter indicating
their intent to submit a proposal by the deadline stated in the Solici-
tation Summary at the beginning of the RFP. Letters of intent are not
binding, and proposals received by the stated deadline from propos-
ers who did not file a letter of intent will still be considered. The let-
ter of intent should identify the name of the proposer, plus the name,
location, and telephone number of an authorized representative and
any proposed subcontractor. 
4.2 Application deadline. Proposals should be filed by the close of busi-
ness on the date of the deadline stated in the Solicitation Summary.
Proposers who mail their proposals should allow sufficient mail
delivery time to ensure receipt of their proposals by the deadline.
Delivery is the sole responsibility of the proposer. All appropriately
filed proposals will be acknowledged in writing. 
4.3 Questions. Written questions are to be submitted to the client con-
tact listed in the Solicitation Summary. Answers to all questions, as
well as copies of the questions, will be provided to all proposers
unless, in the opinion of the client, a question is of such a nature that
it is proprietary to the asking proposer. 
4.4 Proposals or declinations. It is requested that the client receive responses,
either proposals or declinations, from all parties receiving the RFP. 
4.5 Restriction on contact with the client’s employees. From the issue
date of the RFP, all contacts with the client’s personnel must be
cleared through the client contact. 
4.6 News release. The proposer shall make no news releases pertaining
to this project without prior client approval. 
4.7 Proprietary information. All proprietary information submitted in
the proposal which the proposer desires to remain confidential shall
be indicated clearly by stamping the word “Confidential” on the top
and bottom of pages on which such information appears. For those
proposals that are unsuccessful, all copies of such confidential infor-
mation shall be returned to the proposer. 
4.8 Contract award. The client reserves the sole rights to judgment and
acceptance of the vendor’s proposal. After the proposal(s) has/have
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being selected, the name(s) of the successful applicant(s) will be dis-
closed. Upon selection, the successful applicant(s) will be required to
execute a contract with the client. In general, contracts will be
awarded to the qualified proposer whose proposal is most advanta-
geous to the client in terms of quality, cost, and other factors. The
contract to be entered into between the client and the successful pro-
poser shall contain negotiated provisions based on the specific
requirements set forth in the RFP, and on the successful proposer’s
treatment thereof, as contained in the proposal. 
4.9 Reservation. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the client
reserves the right to reject any and all proposals received in response
to this RFP; select for contract or for negotiations a proposal other
than that with the lowest net cost; wave or modify any informalities,
irregularities, or inconsistencies in proposals received; negotiate on
any aspect of the proposal with any proposer; negotiate with more
than one proposer at the same time; and terminate negotiations if a
satisfactory agreement is not reached. 
4.10 Site visit. Proposers must inspect the client’s named location(s) prior
to the submission of their proposals. 
4.11 Oral presentation. Proposers may be required to give an oral presen-
tation to accompany their written submission. 
4.12 Incurring costs. The client is not responsible for any pre-contract
activity or costs incurred by applicants in the preparation of their
proposals. 
5.0 Selection of vendor.
5.1 Method of selection. The client will evaluate all proposals and select
the proposal(s) which it deems most beneficial. The quality and appro-
priateness of security operations will be evaluated first. Proposals
meeting minimal acceptable standards will then be considered for
overall costs. The final selection will be based on the combined merits
of both the quality and pertinence of security services and the fee pro-
posal. The evaluation will include the following criteria: 
• Organizational capability and quality (25 points). Prior experi-
ence of the proposer in similar undertakings and the quality of
such work must be demonstrated. Proposers should submit evi-
dence of managerial effectiveness in this field for the previous
five years or more. Proposers also should provide documenta-
tion regarding their proposed team/organizational structure to
oversee the scope of work required in the RFP. 
• Understanding the need of the client (10 points). This criterion
is to be scored based on the proposer’s ability to appropriately
use required staffing, resources, and planning to address the
nature of the client’s unique needs. 
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• Recruitment strategy and planning (10 points). Proposers
should submit a complete plan for the recruitment of qualified
security officers and supervisors for the duration of the contract. 
• Qualifications and experience of the proposer’s personnel (10
points).
• Training plans, curriculum, and training capability (10 points).
• Supervisory control (10 points). Proposers should submit
detailed job descriptions of the supervisory position, including
span of control, and the method of disciplinary action for secu-
rity personnel assigned to them. 
5.2 Rating system. Proposals best meeting the minimal acceptable
requirements on a 75-point scale will then be considered for their
overall cost proposal. 
6.0 Payment. The client agrees to pay the vendor on a timely basis from
weekly invoices, which shall be submitted accompanied by attached
original time sheets signed by the site director or designee. 
7.0 Liquidated damages/adjustments of compensation.
7.1 General provisions. Upon the occurrence of any of the acts or omis-
sions listed below, liquidated damages may be assessed daily against
the contractor in the amounts indicated for each occurrence and for each
day, starting from the day the occurrence commenced until the day the
irregularity is corrected. The amount of assessment will be paid by the
contractor or deducted from the contractor’s invoices. (The dollar
amount is not a standard and is included for reference purposes only.) 
7.2 Liquidated damages: $350 per day. Liquidated damages may be
assessed against the contractor in the sum of $350 per day per occur-
rence for each of the following acts or omissions: 
• Failure to provide a security officer who meets the criteria speci-
fied in the contract. 
• Failure to provide a site supervisor who meets the criteria speci-
fied in the contract. 
• Failure to maintain complete personnel records folders for
employees specified. 
• The contractor’s employees engage in a strike, work stoppage,
or slowdown at the client’s premises (a fee is assessed for each
employee).
7.3 Liquidated damages: $200 per day. Liquidated damages may be
assessed against the contractor in the sum of $200 per day per occur-
rence for each of the following acts or omissions: 
• Failure to provide a visiting site manager who does not visit at
least once during every tour as specified in the contract. 
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• Failure to provide a site supervisor at each client location for
each shift, covering seven days per week. 
• Failure to provide security services in an emergency or other
contingencies for a period in excess of the stipulated shift hours
as specified in the contract. 
• Failure to notify the client of the names of security officers newly
hired and assigned and to provide their personnel folders for
review as specified in the contract. 
• Failure of the contractor’s employees to obtain approval from
the client prior to signing a complaint on behalf of the client. 
7.4 Liquidated damages: $100 per day. Liquidated damages may be
assessed against the contractor in the sum of $100 per day per occur-
rence for each of the following acts or omissions: 
• Failure to train guards required for a post or shift as required by
the contract. 
• Failure to maintain complete records of all hours each security
officer assigned to the client’s premises is engaged in, for which
work is computed on the basis of actual hours worked. 
• Failure to assign a correctly dressed security officer. 
• Failure to replace any security officer within eight hours upon
request by the client. 
• Failure to submit oral or written reports of incidents occurring
on the client’s premises to the client. 
• Failure to provide each security officer with required and work-
ing equipment. 
• Failure to report missing fire extinguishers, smoke detectors, or
hazardous conditions as specified in the contract. 
• Failure to properly maintain the security officer location logbook
as specified. 
7.5 Incomplete shift penalty. Failure to provide a security officer at a
specified client location on time or the early departure of a security
officer from a specified client location will result in an agreed-to
hourly assessment. 
7.6 Improper assignment penalty. If the contractor assigns a security
officer to the client’s premises who, it is later determined, has a crim-
inal record, the total paid to the contractor for the security officer’s
services shall be deducted from the contractor’s invoices. 
7.7 Return of a previously terminated worker. If a security officer is dis-
missed from one client location and shows up for work at another
without the client’s permission, the total amount paid for the
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officer’s services from the date of dismissal will be refunded to the
client plus $100 per day for each infraction. 
7.8 On the job negligence. If the client’s security system or property is
damaged or stolen as a result of misuse or negligence by the contrac-
tor’s employees, the contractor will be held liable for replacement or
repair costs of the items. 
8.0 Notification requirements. Vendors must notify the client and
obtain advanced approval for any change, addition, or termination
of major contract components and any change in the staffing by the
vendor needed to serve the client effectively. 
9.0 General contract provisions. The contract entered into between the
client and the successful proposer(s) shall contain negotiated provi-
sions based on the specific requirements set forth in this RFP and the
successful proposer’s treatment thereof, as contained in its proposal. 
10.0 Submission of Federal Employer Identification Number (EIN).
11.0 Insurance. The contractor must have a minimum of $10 million of
general liability insurance at the time the contract is awarded. The
contractor must provide a certificate of insurance listing the client as
being insured under the vendor’s policy. The contractor’s insurance
policy must be written with an insurance carrier with a rating of at
least “A” from A.M. Best. In the event the insurer is reduced to a
lower rating, the vendor must take timely action to replace the insur-
ance coverage with an insurer rated as at least “A” as judged by
A.M. Best. Additionally, the vendor shall maintain specific adequate
coverage for any vehicles to be used in the function of the contract. 
12.0 Reports. The vendor shall maintain records and make reports as
may be required by the client, including information needed for
computerized data systems. 
13.0 Prime contractor responsibilities. The selected vendor(s) will be
required to assume sole responsibility for the fulfillment of the
resultant contract(s). 
14.0 Sub-contracting. No part of the work covered by this RFP shall be
sub-contracted by the successful applicant(s) without prior approval
from the client. 
15.0 Reservations. As the need requires, the client reserves the right to
increase or decrease the number of personnel to be authorized at the
protected locations subject to the contract without limit. In addition
to furnishing security services at the client’s locations listed in this
RFP, the contractor may be required to provide services at other cli-
ent facilities not stated in the RFP. 
16.0 Length of contract. The contract is for a 36-month period to be extended
for a second 12-month period at the same rate for the initial period (or
for whatever rate and policy the proposer wishes to achieve). 
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17.0 Termination. Either party to the agreement reserves the right to can-
cel any or all sites with 30 days’ written notice. 
18.0 Equal Employment Opportunity. The contract is awarded subject to
applicable provisions of federal, state, and local laws and executive
orders requiring affirmative action and equal employment opportu-
nity. 
Determining Final Costs 
In addition to analyzing quality and competence of service (75 points), the
final contract in this sample RFP is to be awarded based on cost consider-
ations as well (25 points). The client determines the projected number of
hours of coverage for security officer services. In the example of the above
RFP, the client asks that the contractor anticipate a variety of expenses and
incorporate them into the price to be charged for each hour scheduled by a
security officer. In this instance, the vendor must consider a large number of
ancillary costs—officer overhead, profit, selling and proposal preparation
costs, uniform and equipment expenses, supervisory costs, insurance and
other amounts—into the hourly proposed rate. 
In other cases, proposed vendors and clients may identify other factors
that could be expensed separately. For example, if vehicles are required to
patrol the facilities, they may be provided by one party or the other, account-
ing for differences in payment. 
Other Considerations 
The RFP discussed above leaves much to be negotiated between the pro-
spective vendor and the client. To the vendor, successful agreement on
numerous fine points may be the difference between profit and loss on the
actual contract performance. To the client, the difference can be between
projected costs and costs that exceed budgeted targets. Clearly, a spirit of
harmonious goodwill between both parties is needed throughout the life of
the contract to resolve issues that normally occur. The RFP above provides
for “liquidated damages,” or cash penalties, against the vendor for specified
breaches of the contract. Wise clients do not desire a punitive environment
in which such measures occur with any frequency. If the client has screened
the vendors carefully, service will meet expectations without the necessity of
frequent cash penalties. 
The design of the security officer’s job relates to quality of perfor-
mance. A guard who sleeps on a post faces dismissal, yet some jobs are
designed with such little stimulation that it is difficult for someone not to
sleep, especially if the security officer is sitting during an evening shift.
Operating Personnel-Intensive Programs 297
Meaningful tasks, built-in variation, and regular visits by supervisors can
maintain the discharge of duties at an optimal operating level with high
alertness.
Continuous Supervision 
Whether the security contract is small or large, it is incumbent on the client
to maintain an ongoing evaluation of security services. Observations on the
quality of services—good and bad—should be constant. Feedback may be
provided orally, in written form, or both to the contractor. It should be
understood that a satisfactory level of service can lead to a continuing rela-
tionship between the parties. 
RETAINING SERVICES OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS AND 
CONSULTANTS
Over 8,000 private individual investigators and investigative firms are
licensed in the U.S. Countless others work under the supervision of experi-
enced, licensed investigators. Many of these are solo practitioners work only
occasionally as assignments come along. A few are organized, deeply
staffed, and have offices throughout North America and beyond. Some prac-
titioners are generalists; others specialize in a particular field. The Security
Letter Source Book identifies over 35 different categories of investigators and
security consultants; doubtlessly others will emerge as needs occur. 
An employer requiring an investigator for a specific assignment must
identify candidates who appear to have the experience, training, and ability
to undertake the assignment. This is usually achieved by interviewing can-
didates for the assignment and describing in general terms the work needed
to be undertaken. Competent investigators will outline how they would
undertake the process, what resources they would need, the amount of time
required, and the approximate cost for the service.  
Compensation for investigators, consultants, or their agencies can be
structured in different ways. The methods include a per-project basis in
which the fee includes all personnel and out-of-pocket costs; a per-project
basis with ancillary costs billed extra; as well hourly rates plus extra
expenses. The cost of an investigator or a consultant will be marked up
two-and-a-half to four times the actual hourly rate paid to the investiga-
tor. This divergence pays for the overhead and benefits for the investigator
or consultant and provides sufficient extra to subsidize the investigator
during times when assignments are few. Generally, the fee is related to
time, skill, and difficulty for personnel involved in the investigation or
consultation.
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SUMMARY
Personnel represents the largest cost in most security programs. Conse-
quently, the optimally performing manager will seek to assure that security
functions are achieved with the minimum number of people required. Pro-
prietary and contract security services both have advantages; therefore,
managers sometimes plan to employ both in large operations. Software pro-
grams specifically written for security applications have improved account-
ability and decreased costs since their introduction. Investigations are
currently playing an ever-widening role in both civil and criminal processes.
A request for proposal (RFP) is a bureaucratic means of selecting a security
services vendor. However, the process sets out a fair basis for identifying the
best security company for the client and also to determine the most favor-
able arrangements for the client. 
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. What factor is “all too often” not considered by management when
the possibility of converting from proprietary to contract guard ser-
vices is considered? 
2. What is the significance of possible collusion between employees
and security personnel? What do many security directors feel is a
measure that combats collusion? 
3. How important is making people feel safe in security programs? 
4. Outline the critical differences between criminal law and civil or con-
tract law as discussed in the chapter. 
5. What new types of investigation have emerged in recent years? 
6. Security officers who are on “barred-from-customer” lists can be
monitored most easily by what type of management tool? 
7. What are convenient means by which security directors can deter-
mine compensation ranges for security officers in various geo-
graphic areas? 
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OPERATING PHYSICAL- 
AND TECHNOLOGY-
CENTERED PROGRAMS 
The ultimate purpose of any security system is to
counter threats against assets and strengthen
associated vulnerabilities. 
—Joseph Barry and Patrick 
Finnegan
Most of the costs of security operations are personnel costs created by secu-
rity services. But it is the nature of management to drive down costs when-
ever possible. An important means by which security operating dollars can
be made more effective is through the judicious use of physical- and technol-
ogy-centered programs. These are concerned with physical security mea-
sures and electronic technology—often computer based—used to safeguard
people, to reduce chances of theft, to evaluate ongoing operations, and to
safeguard assets against damage or loss. Well designed and executed, such
operations may decrease the number of personnel required to implement
and maintain a high-performance protection program. If conceived and
implemented poorly, however, physical- and technology-centered programs
can produce unsatisfactory results. Further, if badly conceived and imple-
mented, such initiatives can produce a sense among workers that manage-
ment is “putting systems above people.” Clearly, physical- and technology-
based measures should enhance the use of protection personnel and other
resources, not detract from them.  
We begin this chapter by briefly citing the theory of situational crime
prevention concepts first encountered in Chapter 1, and then consider the
use of non-personnel based resources to mitigate the risk. 
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SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: A PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIME REDUCTION
Law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners who create crime pre-
vention programs usually are concerned with a set of defined priorities.
These include community programs, juvenile deviance, coordination with
prosecutors and the courts, as well as police staffing and environmental and
technological strategies. By contrast, persons concerned with security opera-
tions management for a corporation or institution have little short-term con-
trol over such factors as where the facility is located, policies and programs
related to juvenile offenders, the responsiveness and leadership of local
criminal justice programs, and how the police do their job. These differences
have influenced the ways in which law enforcement and private security
firms tend to view the causes of crime and disorder. 
Over the years, legions of criminologists and social critics have written
on supposed “root causes” of crime, and the social disorganization and indi-
vidualism that perpetuates deviance.1 These same writers largely fail to con-
sider why a few individuals in a particular social, ethnic, political, economic,
and even familial situation commit crimes while most do not. In the end, the
manager concerned with reducing losses does not likely speculate on what
is neither quantified nor provable, but rather concentrates on what can be
accomplished in security programs based on the results of accepted research
activities. In part, this means deterring or suppressing crime rather than
focusing on apprehending and prosecuting violators. 
For example, a facility can be designed to make it less amenable to loss.
In many circumstances, however, the manager faces situations in which
changing the facility design—using architecture and engineering methods
to create spaces that are less amenable to crime, loss, or injury—is not an
option. Instead, personnel, procedures, physical measures, and technology
must be altered to prevent or mitigate losses. The good news is that security
managers today are generally involved early in the design considerations of
a new facility so that their insights into loss control can be implemented.
(This process is discussed near the end of this chapter.) Several architectural
and engineering firms have loss-prevention specialists who stay abreast of
protective and life safety measures so that they may be designed into new
facilities. Other specialized consultants offer services that lower property
risks to existing sites through better security planning and design. 
In the 1970s, the architect Oscar Newman studied public housing in
New York City and elsewhere and determined that crime rates vary accord-
ing to territoriality, surveillance, image, and environment.2 “Territoriality”
refers to the sense of possession by residents or workers of an environment
and the tendency of people to defend this territory against those who would
commit criminal within or near the area. “Surveillance” relates to the ability
of people within buildings to view people outside their immediate environ-
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ment. “Image” refers to the general reputation of a place. And finally, “envi-
ronment” refers to the nearby area that renders the zone safe or unsafe. 
Defensible space, therefore, defines an area where surveillance is
extensive, the image is positive, and the nearby environment is safe and pro-
tective of residents and visitors. Newman’s theory produced a design strat-
egy called Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED),
discussed in Table 10.1. Defensible-space theory concludes that crime may
be reduced by improving surveillance of public areas, demarcating private
versus public space, and improving the image and environment of the area. 
Research on defensible space concepts sometimes concludes that the
concepts are not always successful at reducing crime because they fail to
take into consideration the cognitive processes individuals use to adapt to
physical environments.3 Patricia and Paul Brantingham analyzed crime
Table 10.1. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
(continues)
CPTED argues that changing the environment through design can make certain 
types of crimes less likely to occur. Antisocial and criminal behavior will not disap-
pear, but the frequency will decline because the environment is less hospitable to 
potential offenders This is because the area seems better protected by its owners and 
thus the would-be criminal is more likely to be detected and arrested. The principle 
is based on research involving residential buildings, although the same principles 
relate to commercial and institutional property. CPTED is based on four principles: 
Principle Methods of Applications 
Territoriality Property looks cared for; broken windows are repaired; graffiti 
removed. 
Residents are seen making improvements or enhancements to 
their areas. 
Access control discourages unauthorized visitors and deters 
their entry. 
Controlled space is differentiated clearly from nearby transi-
tional zones. 
Surveillance Residents can observe outer areas from within their buildings 
with clear lines-of-sites to call for assistance in the event it is 
needed.
Hallways and public areas are designed to be open and non-
constraining.
Cul-de-sacs and hiding places in public areas are designed-out. 
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) and modern alarm systems 
are likely to be in use. 
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rates by occupation and economic specialization and have determined that
crimes likes murder and assault occur in areas of economic decline and
neglect, whereas white-collar crimes occur in areas in which a high number
of potential victims exist.4 They also found that certain environmental
changes increase public use and decrease fear. 
More recently, CPTED has evolved to include the concept of situational
crime prevention, which argues that crime may be reduced in a particular area
when aspects of the environment are changed, often involving little cost or
effort. For example, making it harder to commit a crime by modifying the envi-
ronment—by installing better lighting, broader surveillance, CCTV, and alarms
that will call police to the scene quickly—can decrease crime in an area.5
THE RISK VERSUS COST RATIO 
The level of security in a given area can depend upon many factors. There-
fore, a range of options should be evaluated for their pertinence to a given
situation. A broad spectrum involving widely varying degrees of risks and
controls exists. At one end, controls are absent and risks for loss are high. At
the other end, the reverse is true. The thesis of this book, indeed the view of
many security practitioners, is that weakness is eventually exploited. There-
fore, lack of adequate security increases the likelihood of losses. Further, as
assets increase in value, the potential for loss also grows, as shown in Figure
10.1. The following sections look at the continuum of security conditions
and their management relevance. 
Table 10.1. (Continued)
Principle Methods of Applications 
Image The property has a favorable image in the area and is looked at 
as being well maintained and cared for. 
Events and activities are programmed to increase use of public 
spaces.
Environment The area immediately beyond the property—nearby buildings, 
streets, retail space and parks—are equally well cared for. 
Communications systems permit persons in both congested 
and isolated areas to call for assistance when needed. 
Conflicting activities—such as a playground for toddlers and a 
basketball court—are separated. 
Street furniture, sitting areas, and fountains are designed to 
serve locals while not attracting vagrants. 
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Figure 10.1. The Risk versus Cost Continuum 
Risk of losses and the cost of security measures have a reciprocal relation-
ship. Low protection has low cost, but invites higher risk of loss. In
response, the cost of security can increase. 
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• Protectionless security. The author’s grandparents lived in a
small, safe community. Their front door was rarely locked. When
they left their house for a trip, they locked it, but left the key in the
front door keyhole “in case someone needed to get in.” This
seemed to make sense to them. Security depended upon the fact
that residential burglary was rare at that time and place. Those
who might be inclined to commit such a crime did not systemati-
cally survey the neighborhood to see what residences were
unlocked and were easy targets. In time, the younger generation
convinced their parents and grandparents that wisdom dictated
that the key should be elsewhere and it was henceforth placed
under a nearby flowerpot. 
Such protectionless behavior still exists in some residential
areas. However, contemporary organizations realize that reason-
able and adequate measures must be taken to protect their opera-
tions. The orderly and lawful behavior of others cannot be
assumed. That means implementing appropriate security mea-
sures to protect the value of the assets located there. 
• Minimum security. With little effort, this type of system impedes
some unauthorized external activity, which is achieved by physical
barriers and locks.6 This level of protection is adequate for some
houses, but not for commercial or institutional activities. 
• Low-level security. This system impedes and detects some unau-
thorized external activity. Doors and windows may be reinforced
and a local alarm system may be installed. 
• Medium security. Here the system impedes, detects, and assesses
most unauthorized external activity and some unauthorized inter-
nal activity. This is achieved by the use of advanced alarm systems
and possibly animals and unarmed security officers. 
• High-level security. Relying on greater capital investment, ade-
quate personnel, and well-considered procedures relative to the
previous category, this system impedes, detects, and assesses most
unauthorized external and internal activity. In addition to features
found in lower levels, this level of security can include CCTV,
advanced perimeter and interior (volumetric) security systems,
highly trained and supported security officers, and management
dedicated to constantly seeking programmatic improvements. 
• Exceptional security. This advanced protective status impedes,
detects, assesses, and neutralizes most unauthorized external and
internal activity. This is achieved by tamper-resistant, complex sys-
tems, and highly trained and vetted personnel capable of respond-
ing promptly to any alarm condition and most threats. 
• Failsafe security. This is a conceptual level of security in which seri-
ous losses over an extended period of time are highly unlikely
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because of the exceptional defenses that prevent such occurrences.
Such a level of security is costly and impractical in most situations
because the controls are deliberately restrictive and time-consuming
to overcome even for those with some authorization over control and
custody of the assets to be protected. Failsafe security is unlikely to
permit losses, but its nature also deters normal economic activity. 
Sales and marketing–oriented managers often battle against measures
that inhibit the development of protective controls. Meanwhile, security direc-
tors face the task of justifying and obtaining the maximum level of protection
reasonable for the situation required. Lack of any security is not an option;
neither is failsafe security. The strategy for security operations is to find the
right level of security measures to satisfy constantly changing requirements. 
Determining the reasonable protection level for an organization
involves evaluating four types of issues: the types of risks faced by the orga-
nization; the likelihood of their occurrence; the impact they would have on
operations; and the resources reasonably available to identify the risks. This
is a topic of considerable importance in justifying security programs and
their expenditures. Some managers prefer to create programs based on their
and their associates’ experienced judgment. Others use a matrix of risk
types, likelihood, and impact, which can lead to an estimate of resources
needed. Other managers use software programs that guide the user into
identifying risks and considering various possibilities of occurrences.7 These
are converted into strategy during the planning period to meet manage-
ment’s objectives. 
WHY PHYSICAL SECURITY IS IMPORTANT 
Physical barriers have been used as a means of protection for centuries. Along
with animals and human sentries, walls, fences, weapons, and locks have
always been important means of protecting people. Early humans chose their
housing with defensive features in mind, and communities were formed to
take advantage of mutual protection. Safes and vaults became important ways
of protecting assets in early market centers when their owners could not be
present and in locations where hiding places were limited. The ancient Egyp-
tians, meanwhile, developed the pin tumbler lock.8 Early and medieval com-
munities protected themselves from foreign armies as well as organized gangs
with walls and fortifications. Such physical security measures had many
advantages: they represented one-time-only costs; they were usually reliable
and worked well for long periods of time; and they achieved their objectives
by deterring or reducing opportunity for unauthorized entry. 
J.J. Fay defines physical security as “that part of security concerned
with physical measures designed to safeguard people, to prevent unautho-
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rized access to equipment, facilities, material and documents, and to safe-
guard them against damage and loss."9 The term encompasses measures
relating to the effective and economic use of a facility’s full resources to meet
anticipated and actual security threats. Concerns of physical security plan-
ners include design, selection, purchase, installation, and use of physical
barriers, locks, safes and vaults, lighting, alarms, CCTV, electronic surveil-
lance, access control, and integrated electronic systems. The term physical
security includes physical barriers, mechanical devices, and electronic mea-
sures. Typically, systems involve a combination of two or more distinct mea-
sures to protect people, physical assets, and intellectual property. 
Security operations planners sometimes think first of physical security
in their protection strategies. Several reasons support this tendency: physi-
cal security substantially requires a one-time cost only; physical measures
are usually clearly visible and deter unlawful or unwanted acts; care and
upkeep are limited; specific standards have been set in many cases to guide
the security planner on decisions; and physical security measures are
uncomplicated to purchase, install, and care for. However, the primary goal
of security measures is to protect people, not physical or intellectual assets. 
Technology can be used as a powerful tool in well-conceived security
programs. It can perform complex monitoring operations and control fea-
tures that individual security personnel cannot control. As a result, contem-
porary high-tech implements permit a higher level of confidence in
protective programs than in the past. Just as changes in communications,
sensing, and computing have affected society at large, these developments
also have re-shaped the means and quality by which security services are
performed. Indeed, a security planner learning of a new technological devel-
opment is likely to wonder how it can be applied to enhance operating secu-
rity programs tomorrow, if not today. 
The following section on security countermeasures to loss is neither
comprehensive in its scope nor detailed in its discussion. The discussion
does, however, serve to provide an overview of physical security measures
to consider when creating or assessing protective programs. A final section
in this chapter offers guidelines for designing and constructing a complex
integrated system with the aid of security engineers or consultants. In addi-
tion, the notes at the end of the chapter provide resources in which to further
pursue individual topics. 
SELECTING SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES TO 
REDUCE LOSS 
The security planner should consider a variety of countermeasures if an
event is likely to produce a significant loss to the organization. No single
Operating Physical- and Technology-Centered Programs 309
measure will be adequate, more than one option should be looked at. The
term “concentric circles of protection” reflects the concept that numerous
protective measures separate the outer environment from the innermost
protected locations. In planning the measures to be taken, thought is always
given to the appropriateness, utility, and cost of the procedures, equipment,
and personnel required to meet the expected objectives. 
Effective countermeasures may serve one or more of the following
objectives: deterrence (that is, preventing or discouraging unwanted action);
delay or denial (that is, impeding or stopping an unwanted action); and
detecting (that is, discovering or ascertaining the significance of a possible
security breach) (see Box 10.1). 
Box 10.1. Physical Security Countermeasures to Loss—Strengths and Rel-
ative Cost 
Source: Introduction to Security for Business Students (1998). Alexandria, VA: ASIS. 
Strengths
Countermeasures Deter  Delay Detect Relative Cost 
Facility Design x x x Low 
Animals x x x Low 
Barriers x x Low
Security Glazing x x ???
Signs
Locks, Keys, Containers x x Low
Lighting Systems x Low
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) x x High 
Intrusion Detection Systems x x Moderate 
Access Control Systems x x x High 
Alarm Systems x x x High 
Robotic Systems x Very High 
Communications x Moderate
Information Security Systems x x Low to High 
Contraband Detection x x Very High 
Fire Detection and Life Safety x High 
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Facility Design: Location, Area, and Architecture 
From earliest known times, humans have improved their safety and security
by considering their location and using its protective environmental advan-
tages. Natural barriers that provide an intrinsic protective value include
bodies of water, marshy areas, deserts, mountains, and hidden areas such as
caves. These naturally occurring physical characteristics were enhanced
with walls, fences, bars, moats, ditches, cleared spaces, and other adapta-
tions. Medieval cities, for example, were often built on hilltops in order to
take advantage of the superior lookout provided there. (Examples of such
hilltop villages include Carcassonne in France and Urbino in Italy.) The lake
dwellers in Switzerland built their towns on stilts for security. Fortified
dwellings expanded over time, eventually becoming castles. These were
developed partially to protect residents from endemic warfare, as well as
organized bands of thieves in Europe threatened the safety and security of
small communities.10
Locations that had natural defense characteristics, often strengthened
by structural barriers, served to define property boundaries; to control
access to restricted or privileged areas; to delay and impede unauthorized
entry; to channel and restrict the flow of traffic; to facilitate the identification
of possible intruders or threats to the area; and to provide for efficient use of
security personnel or other guardians. 
In the contemporary organization, location matters just as much as in
earlier centuries. In crime prevention research, the study of location holds
considerable importance. Areas with high personal and property crime and
urban problems will lose residents, commerce, industry, and institutions.
Further, new organizations will be reluctant to locate to such crime areas
without considerable inducements. Nonetheless, it is possible for an organi-
zation to locate in such areas and thrive with appropriate physical security
measures. Before committing capital investment in a new location, a secu-
rity-conscious manager must carefully consider location and area. This
includes collecting crime data, studying law enforcement resources and cul-
ture, and determining how these factors relate to the security measures that
must be put in place.
Animals
Some of the earliest protective sentries were animal, not human. Livy
describes how geese on one of the hills in ancient Rome sounded an alarm
when Gaullic invaders sought to surprise an army encampment at night
from a steep and unprotected side of the hill.11 In current applications, geese
have been used sometimes to protect NATO facilities.12
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For centuries, dogs have played an important role as guards. Guard
dogs usually patrol inside fenced areas and buildings without a handler,
and are often used in facilities with no evening security personnel or work-
ers, such as at retailers, car dealers, construction yards, and distribution
facilities. In other circumstances, guard dogs work with handlers. Because of
their superior sense of smell and acute hearing, dogs play a large role in
searching for lost or hidden persons, contraband, and explosives.13
Breeds of dogs vary in their ability to be useful for security purposes.
Animals can be categorized as high or low in such diverse characteristics as
reactivity, aggression, trainability, and capacity for investigation. Dogs used in
security and police work for bomb or drug detection are trained by Pavlovian
methods. The handler trains the dog every day to find hidden explosives or
drugs and then feeds and praises the dog with each success. Security planners
interested in using dogs for security tasks must select personnel who will be
trained with the animals and will be committed to their welfare. 
Barriers
Barriers may be constructed to further the protected area. For example, a
body of water or difficult-to-penetrate shrubs may provide psychological
and distance deterrents. Manufactured fences also provide an important
barrier for physical security.14 If a security planner determines that a fence is
desirable, related issues may be raised: Will one fence be enough, or will two
fences with a patrol space between them be better? Will the fence have clear
areas around it so that a good line-of-sight is maintained? What impedi-
ments to climbing will be used? To digging under the fence? 
While fences may be made of many materials, chain-link fence is com-
monly used due to its availability, flexibility, cost, established use, and ease
of installation. In security applications, fences are typically no. 11 American
wire gauge or heavier, with 2-inch mesh openings. They are usually 7 feet
tall and are topped by three strands of barbed wire or razor ribbon evenly
spaced 6 inches apart and angled outward 30 to 45 degrees from the vertical.
Since attackers may pass under the fence, the bottom may be designed so
that penetration is difficult. 
To many security planners, a fence may seem like an attractive security
option: chain-link fencing is a widely used visible deterrent requiring little
maintenance. However, fences do have shortcomings and should be
regarded as being able to provide only temporary deterrence. As Gigliotti
and Jason note:15
Regardless of how elaborate fences may be, they still offer only a modicum of
security. Fences are necessary, but investments in this area should be kept to a
312 Security and Operations Management
minimum as the money can be better used on other components of the total
system.
Consider that someone wanting to pass from one side of a fence to the
other has three options: they can go under the fence, through it, or over it. It
is possible to go under a fence by digging a hole beneath it, though the time
and effort required to successfully accomplish this make this approach oner-
ous. Going through the fence is possible, as wire cutters can cut out an area
for someone to pass through in a few minutes’ time. Finally, someone can go
over the fence. Research at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, for
the Department of Energy, determined that trained individuals with pene-
tration aids like ladders, sheets, carpet fragments, and wood planks can
scale over a fence in 5 to 10 seconds depending on the penetration aid used
and whether someone was assisting in the passage or not.16 The average
untrained individual would not be able to cross a fence so quickly, and the
presence of the fence would discourage many attempts. However, the inher-
ent weaknesses of fences indicate that the security planner must think
beyond this structure to make a facility safe from penetration. In addition,
most fences present an unwelcoming, rigid impression, which may be unac-
ceptable to an organization. Some facilities with medium-to-high security
vulnerabilities have decided not to use fences, but rather to rely on other
means of protecting facilities. 
An alternative to metallic fences is the use of plants such as hedges to
serve as a natural fence. Such measures are limited to facilities in which the
hedge will not be needed for a few years as it grows to the proper height and
depth so that it can serve its intended protective function. Perhaps the most
widely used protective hedge is Trifolium orange, which grows in many types
of soils, putting down deep roots in time so that even a jeep would have
trouble driving through it. 
Security Glazing 
Glass is a transparent and brittle substance composed chiefly of silicates and
an alkali fused at high temperatures. It is manufactured in many types. For
security purposes, glass is often fused with layers of plastic, usually polyvi-
nyl butyral (PVB), although laminates of polycarbonate have a robust pro-
tective value and are also transparent. Thousands of glazing configurations
have been created, but only a few meet security standards. Some products
can withstand bomb blasts, others can withstand burglary attempts and bul-
let discharges. Well-selected security glazing can provide performance, con-
trol, and cost savings. In some cases, a transparent film placed over ordinary
glass can increase bomb blast resistiveness. 
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Signs
Warning signs have an important deterrent effect. Placed at the perimeter of a
protected facility, they discourage would-be offenders from a variety of
unwanted behaviors. The excavated ruins of Pompeii revealed that two mil-
lennia ago, homeowners sought to deter possible predators with prominent
signs, some made of mosaics, warning cave canem (beware of dog). That same
message—but in English—still appears on the fences of construction lots or
the door of garages and distribution facilities where guard dogs are found. 
Much more common are warning signs that indicate that trespassers
will be arrested and prosecuted or that electronic security systems are in use.
Such signs are an indication of guardianship; that is, the owners and opera-
tors of the facility are aware of risks and have taken measures to protect
assets. Such signs should be placed around the perimeter so that potential
perpetrators from any direction will be warned of the protective measures
being taken. 
Signs usually represent a one-time cost. Although they will not stop
determined thieves, they will signal such individuals that they must move
quickly due to the threatened risks of being detected and apprehended. 
Locks, Keys, and Containers 
As mentioned previously, locks were one of the earliest manifestations of
physical security. The art of the locksmith has been respected over the centu-
ries for its beauty, practicality, and necessity. Locks remain an integral part of
contemporary physical security planning. Locks, along with their keys and
the containers of which they may be a part, have many benefits for security
programs. Simple to use, they are complicated to make. Involving a one-
time cost, they may be used repeatedly with reliability over years of service.
Locks and keys may meet different levels of security according to require-
ments of the location. They are easy to employ and can be designed into con-
tainers, furniture, doors, and machines with ease. 
A disadvantage of mechanical locks is that they provide no evidence of
who accessed the lock over its previous uses. This drawback is eliminated
by electronic locking systems now available. These systems may be opened
with cards or tokens that are inserted or brought near (proximity lock) a sen-
sor, which in turn opens the door. 
The security planner should concentrate on a series of easy-to-under-
stand principles in deciding what locks to use and why. 
Key-Operated Locks. Most locks use “tumbler mechanisms” to operate.
That is, the key enters the keyhole and moves the variable tumblers into a
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straight line so that they then can turn the lock cylinder. If the correct key is
not inserted into the keyhole, all of the tumblers will not be in a straight line
(shear line) and the lock cylinder will not be able to rotate around the shell
of the lock. 
The most widely used key-operated mechanism is the pin tumbler, for
which a wide variety of security levels is available. As every observer of
action programs on television or the movies is aware, pin tumbler locks—
despite their ubiquity—may be picked; that is, they may be entered without
a normal key by manipulating the tumblers to the shear line so that rotation
can occur. Picking is one of several ways by which mechanical pin tumbler
locks can be defeated (see Box 10.2). 
In addition to pin tumbler locks, other mechanisms are available,
including magnetic or optical locks. The security planner may wish to evalu-
ate and compare the strengths and weaknesses of these other mechanisms
with pin tumbler locks. 
Box 10.2. Pin Tumbler Lock Security 
Pin tumbler locks are the most widely used mechanical lock type. Despite
their popularity, this type of mechanism may have—depending on the lock
type—inherent weaknesses of which the security planner should be aware. 
Factor Consequence 
Picking Tools Widely available for sale. 
Picking Skills Taught in legitimate locksmith schools, but also in mail-order 
instruction courses. 
Age of Lock With use over time, pins and keys get worn down, making them 
easier to pick. 
Number of Pins A three-pin tumbler has about 130 combinations; a six-pin tum-
blers has about 65,000. However, for technical reasons, the num-
ber of possibilities is actually lower. Yet the principle remains: 
more pins, higher security. 
Angle of Pins Pins that are vertically aligned to the cuts of the key are easiest to 
pick. Those that are aligned on different planes are extremely dif-
ficult or impossible to pick. 
Control of 
Master Key
Pin tumbler locks may be subdivided into master, sub-master, 
and other divisions permitting key control. However, if a master 
key is lost, stolen, or inappropriately copied, all the locks in the 
protective systems may have to be changed at great cost and 
inconvenience.
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Lock Hardware and Mountings. For moderate- to high-security applica-
tions, locks are mortised; that is, they are installed within the core of the
door or locking device rather than on its surface. Mortised locks can be
changed by a locksmith when needed, thus maintaining the level of security
after the previous lock setting has been damaged or compromised and must
be replaced. 
A high-security lock on a low-security door, inserted into a weak door-
frame attached to a plasterboard or glass wall, is poor means of providing
security. The intruder will bypass the lock and instead attack the door,
frame, or adjacent wall. Thus, all of these parts must have comparable resis-
tance to attack; otherwise, the security objective will not be achieved. Bolts
and locks must be inserted so that they do not represent a temptation to the
would-be intruder. 
Vaults and Safes. Vaults are windowless enclosures with the walls, floor,
roof, and one or more doors designed and constructed to delay penetration.
Safes are containers, usually with one or more locks, and are smaller than
vaults. Both vaults and safes are constructed with tool-resistant steel as well
as brick, concrete, stone, tile, or similar masonry. The lock may be either elec-
tric or mechanical, with other locks placed on inside containers. 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) provides standards for the burglary
resistiveness of vault doors. For example, UL808 signifies protection against
expert burglary attacks by cutting torches, fluxing rods, portable electric-
powered and hydraulic tools, and common hand tools. UL also promulgates
standards for safes. A typical standard (UL687) is for Class TL-30X6. This
signifies a combination locked chest or safe designed to offer protection
against entry by common mechanical tools for 30 minutes on all six sides.
The safe weighs at least 750 pounds or is equipped with suitable anchors to
the floor or other surface. 
It is important to note that burglar resistance and fire resistance are not
the same thing. Vaults and safes that are fire resistive demand a minimum
thickness for walls on floors where they may be located. The National Fire
Protection Association establishes minimum standards for the type of mate-
rials required to meet two-, four-, or six-hour protective classifications. 
Lighting Systems 
Violent and property crime, disorder, and accidents occur disproportion-
ately at nighttime or in poorly lighted areas. Good lightning therefore repre-
sents one of the greatest deterrents to crime, disorder, or unauthorized
access after dark. Dark commercial areas that undergo improved lighting
become accessible to more people and stimulate use. The technical quality,
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energy costs, and longevity of different lighting systems vary widely,
although standards exist for minimum-security lighting (see Box 10.3). 
Protective lighting should permit the public—including security offic-
ers on patrol—to easily see physical features in their immediate environ-
ment. Light should be evenly intense along the patrol route. Illumination
may be directed toward the outer area where unauthorized people may seek
to approach a facility. When buildings are to be protected, lighter colors and
unobstructed areas for clear vision are valuable. 
Security planners also are conscious of the need for standby and mov-
able lighting to supplement normal lighting conditions. Emergency lighting
may supplement standby and movable illumination and is used during
times of power failure or other occasions when normal systems are inade-
quate. Normally, local public utilities are the primary sources for power, but
all comprehensive security plans anticipate periodic, unpredictable outages.
In such cases, alternative power may be provided by standby batteries or
gasoline-driven generators. 
Box 10.3. Minimum Security Lighting Standards 
Formal standards specify the minimum lighting required for different secu-
rity applications. The topic can be complicated because of the irregular ways
in which surfaces are illuminated at night. That is, a particular spot may
meet minimum standards in one place, but a few feet away, the light may be
inadequate. Security practitioners take readings with light meters over sev-
eral spots to determine whether illumination is satisfactory. This device
measures illumination in footcandles as a standard, where a footcandle is
defined as the amount of light shining on a square foot of surface from a sin-
gle candle one foot away. Generally, measurements are taken three feet off
the surface or on the surface itself. 
Source: Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (1993). Lighting Handbook, 8th edi-
tion, New York, NY: IES. 
Surface Minimum Security Illumination 
Perimeter Fences 0.5 footcandle on either side of the fence 
Building Exterior 0.5 to 2 footcandles on the surface 
Potential Hazardous Area 1 to 3 footcandles minimum 
Parking Lots (Covered) 5 footcandles at about 6 feet above the surface 
Entrances 10 footcandles on ground level 
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Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) 
Television transmission that does not broadcast TV signals but rather trans-
mits signals over a closed-circuit via an electric wire or fiberoptic cable is
called a closed-circuit Television (CCTV) system.17 These systems are invari-
ably part of integrated security systems, which combine CCTV surveillance
with other countermeasures.
The first generation of CCTV cameras used for security applications
relied upon cathode ray tubes (CRTs). These are vacuum tubes in which
electrons emitted by a heated cathode are transmitted via a beam toward a
phosphor-coated surface, which then becomes luminescent. CRTs have dif-
ferent performance qualities, requiring the systems designer to select differ-
ent types of tubes according to the circumstances encountered. 
Since about 1990, security planners have shown a marked preference
for a new generation of camera: the charge coupled device (CCD). This is a
camera that uses a chip—a solid-state semiconductor imaging device—that
transfers information by digital shift register techniques. Chip cameras have
numerous advantages over CRT technology. As a result of their light weight,
CCDs present less demand on their environmental housing and on motors
that pan-tilt zoom the mechanism. They are smaller in size, lending them-
selves to aesthetic demands of the environment as well as use in covert sur-
veillance. Of greater significance is that picture quality is superior with no
loss of definition at the edges of a visual field. CCDs are also rugged. The
smearing and blooming that plagued tube cameras and created burned
spots do not occur with CCDs. Additionally, chip cameras offer good value
with a lifetime use several times that of a CRT model. 
Monitors. CCTV systems involve more than cameras. Monitors are devices
for viewing a television picture from the output of a camera. The monitor
may display the video signal directly—live from the camera, from videotape
or other stored media, or from special effects generators. CCTV monitors are
designed to work with closed-circuit systems, as shown in Figure 10.2.
Often, but not invariably, they possess better performance characteristics
than those made for consumers, and their price generally reflects this. Digi-
tal monitors are available in standard sizes of 5 inches, 9 inches, 12 inches, 15
inches, and 19 inches, with the 9-inch screen being used most widely.
Larger-size screens are used when the application divides the screen into
multiple images or when a security officer wishes to move an image from a
small screen to a larger one for better visibility. 
The images may be transferred from the camera to the monitor via
coaxial cable (commonly RG59U or RG11U), fiberoptics, and, increasingly,
wireless means such as radio frequency (RF) or microwave transmissions.
Signals can also be transmitted via telephone lines, making it possible to
monitor signals over the Internet. 
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Recording Devices. CCTV images collected for security purposes often are
recorded and archived temporarily. Real-time videocassette recorders
(VCRs) convert the signal from a video camera onto magnetic tape. During
playback, it reconstructs the video signal for viewing on a CCTV monitor or,
if needed, to obtain printed copies of images. VCR videotape has a finite life
depending on the speed with which the image was registered on the tape
and the frequency on which the tape was re-recorded. Tapes that have been
used beyond their normal lifetime may be useless for identification pur-
poses. The advent of new digital storage media may enhance the ability of
an image to be retained for long periods of time, retrieved when needed,
and to do so at low cost. 
VCRs and other storage technology have made immense improve-
ments in the utility of security systems. In particular, countless crimes have
been resolved by the visual evidence collected by image-storage devices.
These are further enhanced since contemporary systems often have built-in
Figure 10.2. Hospital Monitoring Room (Surveying Over 200 Camera
Locations)
Source: Methodist Hospital, Indianapolis. Photo courtesy of Gyyr. 
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time/date/camera number generators. For prosecution purposes, the evi-
dence collected by such images can be persuasive. Similarly, descriptive
inserts on the screen can pinpoint where the images are being recorded. 
CCTV systems can include hundreds of cameras, if needed, within a
single configuration. A video multiplexer allows the same system to encode,
decode, or view live multiple scenes at the same time. 
Technical Features. Selecting the right lenses for CCTV systems is an inte-
gral part of a high-performance system. Most lenses used for security pur-
poses are fixed focal length (FFL) and produce a single focal length. A focal
length (FL) is the distance from the lens center to a location in space where the
image of a distant scene or object is focused. FFL and FL are expressed in mil-
limeters or inches. FFL lenses must be matched with the image sensor size or
with the smaller sensor size. They cannot be used with a larger sensor size
than that for which they are designed. For example, a 1/2-inch sensor format-
ted camera will require a 1/2-inch or larger formatted lens. The image size of
the picture is determined by the FL of the lens and has nothing to do with for-
mat size. Lenses for wide-angle and telephoto viewing may also be selected.
Zoom lenses are variable focal length (VFL) lenses that allow a smooth, con-
tinuous change in the angular field of view so that the view can be made nar-
rower or wider depending on the setting. This is generally accomplished by a
motorized adjustment that can be directed remotely. For covert surveillance or
privacy purposes, pinhole lenses are widely available. 
CCTV is increasingly integrated with other technologically advanced
resources. For example, video motion detection (VMD) is a software-based
hardware device that detects intrusion and generates an alarm condition set
by the parameters of the security system. CCTV images may also be used to
confirm alarms from intruder detection systems, combining the CCTV with
another intruder technology, and using the alarm of this technology to estab-
lish a video link to a remote monitoring center.18
Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection systems deter and detect potential entry to a protected
area by unauthorized means. The security planner has an extensive choice of
sensors that can identify such incursions to a protected location, each of
which has advantages and disadvantages (see Box 10.4). 
Sensors to detect possible intrusion may be used at outer or inner perim-
eters, within interior spaces (volumetric), and for particular objects or at spots
requiring protection. The sensors discussed in this section are electronic. The
principle of all of them is simple: a normal system is disturbed; it then goes
into an alarm state. An audio alarm may be sounded at the site or at a distant
monitoring station where security personnel evaluate the circumstances.
320 Security and Operations Management
Numerous environmental and other factors need to be taken into consider-
ation in order to determine which sensors are to be selected for desired secu-
rity applications. More reliable sensors and systems are constantly being
created. 
Box 10.4. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection systems are desirable for external perimeter and internal detec-
tion. No one system is ideal, and many security planners employ two or more differ-
ent kinds of sensors to protect the same area. Each type of intrusion detection system
listed below has numerous advantages and disadvantages beyond those noted. 
1 Such as buried microphones, underground sensor tubes, and buried seismic sensors. 
2 Such as taut wires, leaky cable, and microphone. Taut wires signal an alarm condition when 
someone places tension on the wire; leaky cable sends and receives an electrical signal, which 
alarms when someone absorbs transmitted energy; and microphones collect audible signals of 
possible intrusion attempts. 
Type Advantage Disadvantage
Underground1 Hard to detect Costly to install 
Fence2 Increases deterrent value of 
fence
Does not detect tunneling 
Photoelectric Indoor, outdoor beams Can be spotted and avoided 
Microwave (Exterior) Cheap, easy to install Requires line of sight 
Microwave (Interior) Detects movement in area Prone to some false alarms 
Passive infrared Reliable; inexpensive Susceptible to defeat by cov-
ering lenses 
Active infrared Can protect oddly shaped 
areas
May require repeated adjust-
ments
Ultrasonic Covers large, diffuse area False alarms from traffic, 
machines
Sound Highest robbery detection Privacy concerns 
Capacitance Triggered by weight Avoidable if known 
Vibration Identifies burglar tool use False alarms from nearby 
motors
Door/window
switches
Widely used, inexpensive Magnets can defeat 
Metallic foil Detects window attacks Cracks with age; unaesthetic 
Glass breakage Identifies breakage sounds False alarms from street noise 
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The workhorse for interior (volumetric) motion detection is the passive
infrared (PIR) sensor. This operates on the principle of heat detection. It is
widely used in non-security applications, such as to open doors in build-
ings. PIRs are sufficiently sensitive so that they do not cause false alarms
from a wide ambient temperature range or from the heat of a small animal.
However, PIRs may cause false alarms from hot spots caused by lights,
reflections, and solar and mechanical heat sources. To overcome the possibil-
ity of false alarms, sensor manufacturers provide dual technology sensors,
incorporating PIR with either microwave or ultrasonic technology. 
Access Control Systems 
Access control systems control persons, vehicles, and materials through
entrances and exits of a protected area. (The term is also used in computer
security where it has a different meaning.) Access control systems use hard-
ware and specialized procedures to control and monitor movements into,
out of, or within a protected area. Access to protected areas may be a func-
tion of authorization time or level, or a combination of both. 
Access control depends upon the authorized person being correctly
identified as part of the approval process. In a simple protective system, on-
the-spot visual recognition of an unauthorized person, vehicle, or materials
may suffice. However, large systems with numerous personnel and individ-
uals with varying levels of authorization are best managed with systems
that identify such persons automatically and with a high degree of certainty.
Such systems typically involve use of three features: 
• Something that the person knows. This can be an access code or
password supposedly known only to the individual. 
• Something that the individual possesses. For example, an
approved identification (ID) card or a token that cannot be easily
counterfeited.
• Something physical and unique about the individual. This could
be a biometric feature such as a fingerprint, iris or retinal signa-
ture, writing dynamics, or a person’s voice. 
These characteristics can be designed into manual, semi-automatic, or
automatic systems. Discriminatory levels can be set depending on the level
of security desired.  
Identification Numbers and Passwords. Individuals may select or be
assigned an ID number for use in access control devices such as keypads. In
higher-level security systems, individuals may gain access by using a key-
board in which letters and symbols can be combined with numbers. Systems
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that use numbers only may be compromised; hence, the ID number or a sup-
posedly private password must be regarded as a minimum effort at system
reliability. A password must be combined with other identifiable means to
achieve a higher level of confidence. 
ID Cards and Tokens. A wide variety of ID cards and tokens are available
that vary regarding ease of use, degree of security, ease of automatic and
personal identification, and cost. Badges may be permanent documents with
a lifetime measured in years or they may be designed intentionally to expire
within a defined period of time. Some disposable self-expiring badges self-
void from ink that migrates from the back of the badge to the front, indicat-
ing that the time for its use has expired. 
Widely used cards and badges may have one or more features, includ-
ing visual images in color or black and white; logotypes; signature panels;
key personal information; encrypted data; magnetic stripes; computer chips;
and redundant features to make counterfeiting difficult or impossible. These
ID cards may be visually identifiable or machine-readable. Each factor
affects use, image, and cost. Security operations planners often seek to com-
mit to systems that may be used for extensive periods of time so that any
capital costs can be amortized. 
While the control of visitors and employees is emphasized, such sys-
tems have numerous capabilities that relate to other management operating
concerns. For example, such systems may be linked to time and attendance
procedures whereby individuals’ payroll data can be created from normal
badge use. Also, some systems indicate where in an organization the indi-
vidual may be found at a particular time. Above all, however, such systems
have remarkable flexibility in allowing or denying personal access to
defined locations. Records of such activities may be easily retained and con-
sulted concerning access patterns. Lost cards may be replaced, while anyone
who finds the lost ID and tries to use it could be shut out and called to the
attention of security personnel. A single card could allow an individual into
numerous facilities, including parking lots and at locations in other parts of
the world if the organization is managed by a single integrated system. 
Biometric Features. A password can be learned by another person who
could misuse it. An ID card, badge, or token may be lost or stolen and used
by another until the card is no longer system-accessible. However, biometric
features, such as fingerprints and iris or retinal information, rarely alter over
a lifetime. Therefore, in theory, systems that use these features have a more
reliable means of identification. 
Biometric systems have been made more user-friendly in recent years.
They are no longer as expensive and now rely on simple hardware inter-
faces. In earlier years, some biometric systems used long data signatures
that organizations had to store and then sort through for identification pur-
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poses. The cost of storing data signatures and searching among an extensive
data file for a match is no longer a significant economic issue. New commer-
cial biometric applications—like facial recognition—have intriguing possi-
ble applications. 
Like any system, biometric systems have limitations. Systems operate
by first enrolling people into the system, often taking several recordings of
the physical feature crucial to the system. This analog information is trans-
ferred by an algorithm into a digital number according to a proprietary algo-
rithm for the system. When a person seeking access presents a physical
feature to be identified, the digital identifier will not be absolute, but will
have some variability. Sensitivity can be adjusted by the systems operator.
Hence, biometric systems usually identify the person with the closest
approximation to that found in the file. 
False-negative (also called Type I or A) errors occur when an unautho-
rized person gains access to a restricted facility when he or she should have
been denied. This is the more serious type of error. Obviously, security plan-
ners want this type of error to be rare or non-existent. False-positive (Type II
or B) errors deny admission to someone who rightfully should be admitted
but is not. This type of denial often occurs because the subject was hasty at
entering his or her physical feature. A repeat attempt often confirms identifi-
cation. In using biometric systems, a tradeoff may exist between ease of use
with faster throughput from the system and a corresponding increase in
false-positive rates. 
Alarm Systems 
Mechanical alarms were first used in the mid-19th century.19 Today, alarm
systems are predominantly electronic, although numerous types of alarms
are available to meet a variety of needs. Alarm systems were created to
deter, delay, and detect burglary, and that remains the main purpose of such
systems. However, these alarm devices can detect and monitor other
actions, including robbery (through a panic switch), smoke and heat signals,
and requests for specific services. Such alarms may sound locally or be mon-
itored by police, a proprietary system, or a commercial central station. 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL), a voluntary non-profit organization,
sets widely accepted and respected standards for alarm systems and vets the
reliability of monitoring stations that receive the signals and act upon them.
UL standards focus on burglary deterrence and detection capabilities. Types
of UL burglar alarm certificates are shown in Table 10.2. Customers with sys-
tems meeting UL standards often receive a certificate from the UL-listed alarm
monitoring service. This certificate may be required for insurance purposes.
The central monitoring service may perform a number of services depending
upon the agreement with the customer and the capacity of the alarm service.
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In addition to receiving and verifying alarm conditions, operators at the mon-
itoring service may call and request that police be dispatched; call designated
persons and inform them of the alarm condition; send security personnel to
the premises; dispatch someone to reset the alarm; call the fire department or
an ambulance; direct maintenance staff to check a machine or process stop-
page or irregularity; and perform other desired actions. 
Table 10.2. Types of UL Burglar Alarm Certificates 
Type of 
Alarm
Operation Maintenance Standard
Local Mercan-
tile Police Con-
nected
Outside sounding 
device.
Grade based on equip-
ment.
Sounding device and 
remote connection to 
police or listed cen-
tral station. 
If called in the A.M.,
same day. 
If called in the P.M.,
next working 
day. 
One annual opera-
tional inspection. 
Local Alarm Units 
UL 609 
Central Sta-
tion Burglary 
Supervision of open-
ings and closings and 
guard investigation 
of alarms. 
Response time and 
equipment used is 
shown on the certifi-
cate. One-hour 
response for trouble 
at closing. 
One annual opera-
tional inspection. 
Central Station 
Alarm Units 
UL 1610 
Limited Mer-
cantile
Supervision of opening 
and closing signals. 
Sounding device 
required. 
Guard response 
optional; 45 minutes 
if provided. 
One-hour response 
for trouble at 
closing.
Same as Central 
Station.
Central Station 
Alarm Units 
UL 1610 
Local Bank 
Police Station 
Bank
Same as Local Mercan-
tile.
Same as Police Con-
nected.
Service no later 
than the second 
day. 
One annual opera-
tional inspection. 
Local Alarm Units 
UL 1610 
Residential BA Sounding device 
required. 
No Grade. 
Same as Local Mer-
cantile.
Household Alarm 
Systems
UL 636 
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Because of the perennial concern with false alarms, alarm installation
and monitoring businesses endeavor to select systems with low likelihood
of inaccurate signals. Training users how to avoid false alarms is empha-
sized. Nonetheless, false alarms remain a problem. Therefore, many systems
will verify the alarm before calling police or taking other action. This may be
accomplished through a telephone call, real-time CCTV, or other means. 
An inherent weakness of most alarm systems is that their signals travel
over wires or cables that can be cut, intentionally or accidentally, leaving the
alarmed premises without services. At the least, a system should identify
that a connection has been broken, possibly informing the customer in the
process. The loss of a primary method of communication may be backed up
with a radio frequency system that does not depend upon wires or cables. 
Robotic Systems 
Security officers frequently patrol offices, making observations and checking
the safety and security of the premises as they do so. The same activity, theo-
retically, could be accomplished by robotics. A robotic device may be
Hold Up 
Alarms
Manual or Semi-Auto-
matic.
Service no later 
than the second 
day. 
One annual opera-
tional inspection. 
Hold Up Alarm 
Units
UL 636 
Central Sta-
tion Propri-
etary
Supervision of open-
ings, closings, and 
alarms by the sub-
scriber UL 1076. 
If called in the A.M.,
same day. 
If called in the P.M.,
next working 
day. 
Proprietary Alarm 
Units
UL 1076 
Defense Indus-
trial Security 
Systems
Supervision of alarms, 
openings, closings 
(alarms only at police 
station).
Remote connection to a 
central station; 
defense contractor 
monitoring station or 
police station. 
Service within four 
hours.
One annual opera-
tional inspection. 
Central Station 
Alarm Units UL 
1610 Proprietary 
Alarm Units
UL 1076 
Type of 
Alarm
Operation Maintenance Standard
Table 10.2. (Continued)
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mounted with a variety of sensors and alarms. CCTV on the mobile device
can observe real-time activities; remote two-way communications can inject
an immediate connection with the scene from a distant monitoring post.
Robots can follow a fixed or random patrol and can climb or descend stairs,
avoid unexpected obstacles, and either confront or retreat from a dangerous
situation. Robotics have an intriguing potential to enhance the efforts of
security personnel. However, the cost versus benefit ratio or using robotics
to replace or supplement security officers has not been attractive to date.
While a robotic system will work 24-hours a day, seven days a week without
complaining, frequent and costly service requirements have further deterred
wide use.20 (In law enforcement, robotics have a secure place in confronta-
tional circumstances such as bomb threat analysis.) 
Communications
Effective security operations must allow seamless communication among
managers, supervisors, staff personnel, and others. This is a requirement
during normal operations. During an emergency, this requirement is even
more important. Because a single system might be compromised or incapac-
itated due to an emergency, security planners think in terms of multiple
means by which personnel can stay in touch during such times. 
Typically, security planners rely on commercial telephone service as
the basis for communications. However, some applications will merit the
use of a dedicated system that only serves a single organization or network.
Dedicated lines to local law enforcement authorities, fire, or ambulance ser-
vices are common features at larger central monitoring stations. In the event
that hard-line communications are down, contact with significant parties by
two-way radio or cellular telephones is important. 
Many security managers have different layers of personal communica-
tions. They will have available ordinary telephone service and, in high-secu-
rity applications, a separate encrypted communications system. They may
also carry with them a two-way radio, personal pagers, and cellular tele-
phones.
Information Security Systems 
Protection of data systems is an important and complex topic. The nature of
cyber-threats continues to grow as networks play a larger role in everyday
operations and as new vulnerabilities from the Internet and e-commerce
emerge. Information security is covered competently in other books;21 for
the sake of this discussion, physical security and systems protection will be
considered. 
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Physical Security for Information Systems. Data facilities are usually con-
sidered one of the most restricted and sensitive areas in an organization.
Unauthorized visitors are not welcome. Extensive measures are taken to
protect hardware and software of the central processor, as well as file storage
areas, other processors, switchers, and communications lines. Many of the
highest applications of access control are applied to the computer environ-
ment. In addition to access restriction, attention is given to fire risks within
such a facility. 
Protection against loss or disturbances in electrical power is generally
a protective activity. An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is one way in
which normal operations can be maintained at least temporarily when
power fails. UPS systems may be provided with batteries and supplemented
with a solid-state rectifier that continually charges a battery bank. Addition-
ally, an emergency alternator, such as a diesel engine or gas turbine, may be
available to drive the alternator. Such UPS systems may provide emergency
power for a few minutes to a few hours. 
A more common problem with computer systems relates to power
irregularities that cause momentarily spikes, surges, and drops in voltage
levels. In the event power loss exceeds the capacity of the UPS system, the
system should be backed up and, if possible, activities transferred to another
facility not likely to be affected by the power failure. Data must be backed
up, preferably on a real-time basis, though batch or computer-run backups
will be adequate for less than critical applications. Backup may be via tele-
ports, physical records archival procedures, and by other means. 
Systems Security. Hardware and software used to protect local area net-
works (LANs) and wide area networks (WANs) are supplemented by
numerous procedural factors to enhance file service security. These mea-
sures concentrate on login, password, trustee, directory, and file attribute
security. Other factors such as directory and user creation must be safe-
guarded from being easily compromised by those outside the system. Fire-
walls, encryption, and traffic management systems also play important roles
in reducing the possibilities of successful attack from those outside the LAN. 
Other Considerations. Preventing sabotage, vandalism, and theft are high
priorities of data security. While a process center may be protected internally
by good physical security, other considerations must be included in plan-
ning. Printed records, diskettes, printer ribbons, and tapes may be destroyed
by a shredder or turned over to a bonded destruction service. Electronic col-
lection of information is also possible. In high-security federal systems,
“Tempest” programs prevent electronic emanations from leaving the imme-
diate environment and being collected and analyzed by a hostile power.
Tempest-enclosed components are more expensive than devices without
such protection and must be certified by the Department of Defense. 
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Contraband Detection 
Any articles or materials that are illegal for the public to possess and carry
into one’s protected area might be screened by specialized processes. A
physical pat-down may identify the presence of the weapon on an individ-
ual carrying one onto a commercially scheduled airline, for example. How-
ever, a pat-down process is slow, uncertain, objectionable to some, and
costly. By contrast, automated systems that screen for such illegal objects are
rapid, more reliable, non-intrusive, and cost-effective when large numbers
of persons must be screened. Like other types of preventative technology,
contraband detection systems are constantly evolving. 
X-ray. Packages, garments, and baggage may be inspected by X-ray tech-
nology for contraband, including explosives and illegal drugs. Computer-
enhanced and analyzed images increase the accuracy of contraband identifi-
cation. Agents must monitor the enhanced images to determine whether a
physical search is indicated. The principle of X-ray technology is that pulsed
energy that penetrates most objects (lead and some alloys are exceptions) is
absorbed by a plate, which then intensifies the image of materials pro-
grammed to be highlighted by intense, distinctive coloring. The images are
projected for analysis on a color monitor. 
X-rays have some disadvantages. Some explosives and bomb-making
materials may mimic items normally found within packages or luggage.
Similarly, some firearms have plastic parts and are not easily identifiable in
enhanced X-ray imaging. Much depends on the skills of the agent who inter-
prets the images. 
Explosive and Drug Detection. While X-rays may detect some explosives
and illegal drugs, other technology may be specifically devoted to such
detection. The physical principle is that explosive compounds and illegal
drugs may be identified by either sniffing for telltale molecules of the con-
traband materials or bombarding a container with energy that will “excite”
materials such that they can be identified automatically. This technology
permits screening packages or luggage without opening the contents. The
accuracy and utility of such systems vary greatly. A bomb-detection system
may be highly reliable, but it could also be stationary, costly to operate, sub-
ject to variable service problems, slow to process items, and expensive to
purchase. Other devices are lighter, portable, and less expensive, but with an
equivalent lower detection rate. 
A drawback is that some materials may be prepared with such aware-
ness of the detection technology and its limitations that their contraband
contents are undetected. 
Metal Detectors. Most metal detectors operate by transmitting a time-
varying magnetic field, which is monitored by a receiver. When a metallic
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object is introduced into the electromagnetic field, reception of the signal is
disturbed; this is then reported by a light, an audio signal, or both. Walk-
through metal detectors may also indicate where on the body metal has
been identified. A security officer may then use a handheld metal detector to
identify precisely where under the clothing the metal is hidden. 
A disadvantage of metal detectors is that they can provide false alarms
from metal within the body, such as from a prosthetic device or from safety
shoes with metal parts. Also, the sensitivity of metal detectors may be
changed at the discretion of the operator. For example, sensitivity can be so
acute that a single coin or a metal button weighing less than one-half an
ounce can be detected. In such cases, however, the throughput is slow. Yet
the same instrument can be set less sensitively so that small weapons will
escape detection. 
Fire Detection and Life Safety 
About 550,000 fires occur in the U.S. each year, producing losses in the range
of $11 to $13 billion.22 Of these, about 150,000 are non-residential structural
fires. Yet the trend for such events has been a steady decline. For example, in
the decade ending in 1998, structural fires declined 26 percent. Tragic multi-
ple-death fires of the past are less likely to occur, particularly in commercial,
industrial, or institutional buildings. Many reasons might be cited to explain
this trend: more extensive use of fire-resistant and noncombustible materi-
als; better design; and more frequent imposition of standards and enforce-
ment over time. One additional factor is that the detection and response to
smoke and fire conditions continues to improve. 
Smoke and heat detectors. Two technologically different smoke detectors
are widely available. The ionization type uses a small amount of two radio-
active materials (usually Americium-241 and Radium-226) to make the air
electrically conductive—or to ionize it. Smoke from flaming fires contains
carbon particles that are electrically conductive. When they enter the ioniza-
tion chamber of the smoke detector, an alarm is activated. Hence, flaming
fires with darker combustion products tend to trigger this type of detector
better than other types of fire.23 This type of smoke detector is susceptible to
low temperature, high humidity, and dirt or dust which may interrupt the
current and cause a false alarm. 
Photoelectric smoke detectors operate on a light principle in which
smoke entering a chamber either obscures the beam’s path to a photocell
receptor or reflects light into a photocell, causing an alarm condition. Visible
particles common in smoldering fires are apt to cause an alarm with such a
detector faster than an ionization type. 
Ionization and photoelectric detectors require some maintenance rela-
tive to heat detectors, but are more sensitive and provide an earlier warning of
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fire. Since the type of fire or fuel that may affect an area often is unknown, the
best strategy may be to use both types of smoke detectors in the same system.
While smoke detectors may be battery operated, such devices are usually
found in residences. Industrial and commercial applications require that
smoke and heat detection systems be hardwired and monitored by a system. 
Another type of fire-detection technology measures heat. These detec-
tors have the lowest false alarm record, but are slow to respond to incipient
fire conditions. One type of sensor is a fixed-temperature detector, which
uses a bimetallic strip thermostat possessing a different coefficient of expan-
sion for two metals. When the detector is heated, the strip bends in one
direction in a way that an electrical circuit is completed, causing an alarm. 
A rate-of-rise detector goes into an alarm state when the temperature
increase exceeds a stated rate, usually 12 to 15 degrees Fahrenheit per
minute. These detectors may trigger a false alarm when temperatures
increase rapidly but not because of a fire. They also may not respond when a
fire propagates slowly with a gradual temperature rise.  
In industrial applications, still other specialized smoke and heat detec-
tors are available. Security planners often elect to use a combination of
detectors to increase the possibility of early detection of fires. 
Life safety considerations are embodied in design and construction
methods. The National Fire Protection Association promulgates the Life
Safety Code (NFPA #101), which is revised every three years. The code con-
tains detailed provisions and requirements relating to structural occupancy;
wall openings and door fire resistance; emergency lighting; smoke and fire
detection; and other topics. 
One life safety trend has been the increased use of automatic sprinkler
systems. A national standard (NFPA #13) relates to the design and installa-
tion of such systems, which mandates that only qualified contractors should
install these systems. Six main types of sprinkler systems exist, and numer-
ous models of sprinkler heads are available for different applications. Sys-
tems currently available break water into a fine mist, thus extinguishing the
fire with greater efficiency and causing less property damage than past
types in which large water droplets were discharged. 
DESIGNING SECURITY SYSTEMS 
Security operations managers tend to follow a formal process when a signif-
icant new security system is required or when an existing system faces an
upgrade. Once management determines that the capital investment for such
a system must be considered, the following steps generally are taken: 
1. Preliminary design. The manager and the project team assume vari-
ous tasks. Necessary physical information is collected, such as exist-
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ing facility drawings and security documents. Often with the help of
an architect, engineer, or consultant, project scheduling and initial
cost estimates are produced relative to the design requirements. 
2. Design approach. After approval of the initial design requirements,
preliminary drawings, including site plans and system block dia-
grams, are produced. A cost analyzer will review the requirements
and produce a cost estimate range. Each component in the system will
be specified. Estimators may use worksheets—paper or electronic—to
determine project costs, an example of which is shown in Figure 10.3.
The cost analyst will identify possible job cost and time-completion
uncertainties at this time. The design will consider such issues as
crime prevention strategy, human factors including ergonomics, and
the rapid change of technology likely to affect the project. Such issues
as operational factors, communications, lighting, power sources, ter-
rain, emergency possibilities, and year-round weather variability will
also be considered. A more detailed cost estimate will be created next,
including design cost, hardware (including some extras), installation,
construction supervision and testing, security during construction,
and other costs such as contractors’ taxes, profit, bonding, and a con-
tingency fee to be held pending completion of the project. 
3. Bidding or negotiation. The project will be placed up for bid for local
and regional contractors. These will be evaluated by management and
its consultant prior to awarding the contract. While management
seeks to achieve the best price, total overall value is the primary objec-
tive, and often the lowest bidder is not awarded the contract. Point
systems are often used to help select the winning contractor. 
4. Construction phase. This is the period and process in which the
materials and services are integrated and the work is undertaken to
construct, assemble, and install the system. 
5. Testing and training phase. Integrated security systems are complex.
As portions of the system are completed, they need to be tested repeat-
edly to make sure they perform as intended. Similarly, operations per-
sonnel may be trained by installers and manufacturers on using the
new systems. Operating manuals, instructional materials, and possibly
graphic user interfaces may be created for use by operating personnel. 
6. Operational phase. The system is fully installed and operational.
Unexpected adjustments are made. The final payments to the engi-
neers and contractors are authorized pending approval and accep-
tance of the work completed. 
SUMMARY
In this time of high-tech innovation, security systems constantly draw upon
new advances, incorporating them into a cohesive, integrated system.
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Increasingly, management seeks technical resources to improve the quality
of protection operations while decreasing operational costs. The Internet
offers management an extraordinary tool for flexibly, reliably, and economi-
cally controlling operations from disparate locations and under different cir-
cumstances.
Figure 10.3. Security Alarm System Planning Estimate Form 
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DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. How does situational crime prevention differ philosophically and
practically from the traditional objectives of policing? 
2. Why must security planners be involved early in facility design?
What is the expected payoff from such involvement? 
3. What is the reasoning behind security signage? What are its draw-
backs?
4. Explain the limitations of cylinder-type locks. 
5. Why have cylinder-type locks been the mainstay for commerce and
industry for almost a century? Why have electronic proximity locks
become preferred for some installations? 
6. Why is CCTV almost invariably an important part of an integrated
security system? 
7. Describe capacities and qualities of a central alarm monitoring sta-
tion.
8. Provide examples of non-invasive technological methods to detect
contraband.
9. What critical stages occur before a security contractor is selected to
undertake a major new installation or retrofit? 
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LEADERSHIP FOR 
OPTIMAL SECURITY 
OPERATIONS
Leadership is a matter of intelligence, trustwor-
thiness, humaneness, courage, and sternness. 
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Organizations require leadership in order to commence, grow, survive
adverse circumstances, and adjust to constant change. Leaders can be entry-
level workers, contract employees, full- or part-time employees, managers,
executives, or members of the board. That is, leadership can come from any-
one with a position to understand and influence organizational outcomes.
Arthur Jago defines leadership as “both a process and a property.” He states: 
The process of leadership is the use of non-coercive influence to direct and
coordinate the activities of the members of an organized group toward the
accomplishment of group objectives. As a property, leadership is the set of
qualities or characters attributed to those who are perceived to successfully
employ such influence.1
This chapter will pursue the topic of leadership from four perspectives.
First, we will look at the aspects of leadership that are supported by wide-
spread experience, empirical research, or both. Next, we will look at distinc-
tive characteristics of security functions and how they differ from other
management disciplines. Third, we will look at the discrete tasks that a 21st-
century leader of security programs may be most fully engaged in. And,
finally, we will look at the future of security operations. 
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LEARNING ABOUT LEADERSHIP 
Many writers on leadership generalize about styles that lead to high perfor-
mance, in which vision, trust, listening, and participatory skills are delin-
eated.2 Positive and effective leadership has always been understood as a
critical component for organizations to succeed. The search for such quali-
ties—particularly at managerial and executive levels—is unyielding. Insight
into the traits of good leaders may come from numerous sources, including
literature.3 Further, looking at past military strategies can provide insight
into the behavior of current organizations.4 Meanwhile, the use of humor to
lead organizations and improve management has received attention, espe-
cially for its ability to overcome personal inhibitions and to improve com-
munications and marketing objectives.5
While books that interpret past behavior and apply it to contemporary
situations are valuable, research on the nature of leadership has also
emerged as a valid topic. For example, researchers on leadership have stud-
ied the lives of elite MBA recipients to understand their personal qualities
and how they relate to the functioning of organizations.6 Until recent years,
most criteria for leadership selection and training have not been adequately
validated by empirical methods. However, leadership has moved from
being anecdotal, personal, and inspirational to being based more on princi-
ples that use scientific methods based on industrial and organizational psy-
chology and sociology. Fred E. Fiedler comments: 
The most important lesson we have learned over the past 40 years is probably
that the leadership of groups and organizations is a highly complex interaction
between an individual and the social and task environment. Leadership is an
ongoing transaction between a person in a position of authority and the social
environment. How well the leader’s particular style, abilities, and background
contribute to performance is largely contingent on the control and influence
the leadership situation provides.7
Leadership is changing because the nature of organizations and their
requirements continue to evolve to create new needs. According to Peter R.
Scholtes, the old competencies needed to survive and excel in the organiza-
tion included:8
1. Forcefulness. Part of a manager’s responsibility was to control the
workforce, making people do what they may be otherwise inclined
to ignore. Good managers could look their people square in the eye
and get them to respond. 
2. Motivating. The “softer” side of forcefulness was the ability to inspire
people to do great work. The judicious combination of carrots and
sticks, of inspiration and exhortation, was the manager’s stock-in-trade. 
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3. Decisiveness. To make quick decisions in the absence of information
was routinely expected of the old-style manager. 
4. Willfulness. Good bosses knew what they wanted and were dogged
in their pursuit of it. 
5. Assertiveness. A good boss was outspoken. Old-style leaders could
not show weakness or ignorance lest their people run all over them. 
6. Results- and bottom-line-oriented. Bosses held people accountable
for meeting quotas and standards and achieving measurable goals.
Maximizing ever-increasing profits each quarter and minimizing
ever-diminishing costs were the manager’s goals. 
7. Task-oriented. Managers kept everyone busy and occupied. There
was no slacking off or socializing. Managers believed that people
don’t really want to work and, left to themselves, they will screw off.
Therefore, it was their job to be their conscience and taskmaster. 
8. Integrity and diplomacy. Good bosses covered toughness with tact
and amiability. They were honest, fair, and respectful while letting
their employees know that they knew what to do when things got
out of hand. 
These competencies are still the prevailing expectations of managers,
Scholtes asserts. However, the changing nature of organizations has affected
management structure. The needs and expectations of contemporary organi-
zational leaders have changed. Newer competencies emphasize collabora-
tion, education, and worker development so goals may be achieved with
less hierarchical intervention than in the past. A newer competency
addresses the importance of understanding systems and how to lead them,
while another concept recognizes the nature in which the traditional rela-
tionships of hierarchy are counterproductive. Some of this thinking stems
from the research and management practices advocated by W. Edwards
Deming, who devised these practices over a career lasting several decades
(see Box 11.1). 
Leadership and Power 
The military or police command-and-control method does not work well, or
for an extended time, in non-military or policing organizations, even those
concerned with security services. The screaming, tyrannical boss of past
generations is gone (mostly). The new generation of leaders, however, has a
different kind of power. According to John Kotter, who created a course on
the topic at the Harvard Business School, five basic types of power exist:9
1. Power to reward by providing a promotion, raise, better working
conditions, or direct approval. 
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2. Power to punish by invoking progressive disciplinary methods or
coercing or terminating the individual’s employment. 
3. Power of authority to approve or reject the quality of work presented
or plans for the future. 
4. Power to assert expertise; the leader insists that she or he really does
know best and makes a particular decision based on personal experi-
ence or knowledge. 
5. "Referent power” is the quality of a leader that leads to admiration
and compliance by others. 
Kotter sees contemporary managerial leaders drawing more from this
last category.
The workforce in the 21st century is highly mobile. Contemporary
leaders endeavor to provide authority when delegating tasks to others.
When leaders give up power to give subordinate workers more authority, it
Box 11.1. W. Edwards Deming and the Quest for Quality Improvement 
In the 20th century, quality control of manufactured products increasingly
came under analysis in a structured way. One pioneer was W. Edward Dem-
ing, who determined that about 85 percent of manufacturing errors were
related to work structure and manufacturing design, not to the performance
of individual workers. Deming created statistical quality control concepts
for Bell Telephone Laboratories in the 1920s. Deming’s precise way of creat-
ing a new philosophy of the workplace was adopted by Japanese manufac-
turers in the years following World War II and helped that nation transform
itself into a quality leader in only a few years time. 
Deming’s philosophy called for teamwork in which small groups of
workers would devote themselves to an assigned task, with all the teams
working as part of a collective effort to achieve quality and productivity tar-
gets. Deming wrote: “Cease dependence on mass inspection to achieve qual-
ity. Eliminate the need for inspection on a mass basis by building quality
into the product in the first place.” 
The concepts of constant product improvement argued by Deming are
mostly thought of in manufacturing terms. However, the same emphasis on
quality over quantity is important to security services as well. Deming’s
concept produced quality circles, which sought to improve quality, enhance
productivity, and encourage employee involvement. Ideally functioning
quality circles provide an enriched job experience, greater customer satisfac-
tion, and bottom-up improvement. 
Source: M. Walton (1986). The Deming Management Method. Putnam, NY: Peregee. 
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may seem as if they are transferring power away from themselves. In effect,
the leader gains by the efficiencies from decentralization and subordinate
empowerment.
Leadership Traits 
Personal qualities, including ethics and psychology, matter enormously in
the success of persons who influence others to achieve a common goal. The
image of a symphony conductor—managing diverse talents to produce a
complete arrangement—is sometimes used to explain such leadership traits.
In other circumstances, the military model of leadership provides guidance
because of its broad relevance. Patrick L. Townsend and Joan E. Gebhardt
have codified leadership traits in Fundamentals of Marine Corps Leadership
(MCI 03.3m), a correspondence course for noncommissioned officers.10 The
following are personality traits which the Marine Corps uses to teach leader-
ship with private security in mind. Although the Marine Corps states that
possession of these traits does not guarantee success, it also says that these
traits “are a good guide for determining the desired personality to be devel-
oped as a leader.” 
1. Integrity. The authors comment: “Attempts to practice integrity
part-time are hypocritical and forfeit any chance of engendering
trust in seniors or subordinates.” Honesty must be practiced with
oneself as well as with others. The manual urges: “Don’t tell your
superiors only what you think they want to hear. Tell it as it is—but
tactfully.” 
2. Knowledge. The leader may be a generalist, but in some aspects, for
example, in investigations or technical security, he or she is likely to
possess a high degree of information and understanding. This
knowledge is retained at an advanced level through reading, attend-
ing conferences, obtaining new experiences, and consulting with
experts in the topics. 
3. Courage. The leader looks for and readily accepts new responsibili-
ties. She or he never blames others for personal mistakes. In some
circumstances, fear is natural and should be recognized, while one’s
emotions meanwhile are to be controlled. 
4. Decisiveness. Good ideas can come from anywhere in an organiza-
tion. The leader should consider all points of view for every prob-
lem, take a stand, and then determine whether the decision is sound. 
5. Dependability. This quality is similar to reliability, which in turn is akin
to professionalism. Dependable leaders tend to be prompt and complete
all tasks to the best of their ability. They are careful about making prom-
ises, but build a reputation for keeping them once they are made. 
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6. Initiative. A leader with initiative looks for tasks to be performed
and then completes them without being asked by a superior. 
7. Tact. In the air force leadership manual, General George C. Marshall
is quoted as saying: “A decent regard for the rights and feelings of
others is essential to leadership.” Tactful leaders are considerate of
others. They are tolerant and patient. Similarly, the Corps manual
urges: “Let no Marine, superior or subordinate, exceed you in cour-
tesy and consideration for the feelings of others.” 
8. Justice. A leader searches his or her mental attitudes to determine
what prejudices may exist and then seeks to rid them from their
thinking and behavior. A leader recognizes those subordinates wor-
thy of praise, not just those who merit punishment. 
9. Enthusiasm. This word is derived from the Greek enthousiamos,
meaning “inspiration” or “to be inspired by a god within one.”
Enthusiastic people believe in what they are doing and what they
can accomplish. Their behavior is contagious. 
10. Bearing. This means both looking good but also conducting oneself
in a positive manner. The Marine Corps manual advises: “Frequent
irritation, loss of temper, and vulgar speech indicate a lack of self-
control or self-discipline and should be avoided.” 
11. Endurance. The Marine Corps manual advises readers to keep fit
physically by exercise and proper diet and to avoid excesses that
lower physical and mental stamina. Security practitioners demand
much the same stamina. Often, the hours are long. Planned days off
or vacations may be jettisoned because of changing circumstances or
an emergency. To accomplish the goal, fatigue must be successfully
fought.
12. Unselfishness. The Marine Corps manual states: “Put the comfort,
pleasures, and recreation of subordinates before your own. In the
field, your Marines eat before you do.” An unselfish leader focuses
on subordinates. The dispatch office of a quality regional security
services business sought to make this emphatic. On the wall, a large
sign was directed to the managers and dispatchers who worked
there. It read: “What have you done to help security officers on their
posts today?” Leaders who care for subordinates retain them in their
service even when tempting opportunities for them elsewhere
beckon.
13. Loyalty. This trait pertains to an ideal or custom, or the feeling of faith-
fulness to a cause or activity. Loyalty today, like yesterday, goes two
ways: employees have a loyalty to the structure of the organization,
and vice versa. Loyalty is interdependent. While the leader is loyal to
the interests of subordinates, he or she expects loyalty in return. 
14. Judgment. Leaders anticipate situations that require decisions. This
helps them be ready when the need for action arises. 
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The manager faces a long list of expectations. To this list is added
another quality: the manager as a coach and as a teacher of coaches. Coach-
ing includes instructing, training, or guiding others in a particular activity or
endeavor. Coaches make their personnel perform better, which translates
into superior productivity and profit (see Box 11.2). The image of the leader
as a coach has taken its place next to the image of the leader as a symphony
conductor or military field commander to stimulate thought about behavior. 
The Importance of Discretion 
The formidable list of personality traits of leaders catalogued by Townsend
and Gebhardt may be supplemented by another trait: discretion. Discretion
is similar to loyalty in that organizational and personal matters are not dis-
cussed with those who do not have a right to such information. While the
leader is discrete, he or she also expects discretion from anyone who has a
right to know proprietary information about the organization. This is cer-
tainly the case among security practitioners and their associations. 
Box 11.2. Should You Be a Coach? Do You Need a Coach? 
Management strategies of the past sought to control others. Management
practices of the present seek to empower others. Coaching is one technique by
which managers can demonstrate a committed partnership to help the
worker exceed previous levels of accomplishment. 
A coach is someone who aids players and performers. A coach may be
retained to help improve individual executive or managerial skills. Coach-
ing is different from other supportive roles, such as instructors or trainers,
because of the high degree of mutual trust required between the coach and
those being coached. Results occur more when there is an interrelated com-
mitment than when a hierarchical authority forces such an arrangement. 
Some managerial coaches may themselves benefit from a coach.
Coaches help high-performance managers achieve even greater results.
Some coaches are independent management consultants who have insight
into an individual’s strengths and weaknesses and guide them to see pat-
terns of behavior differently and to improve upon their current perfor-
mance.
Source: R.D. Evered and J.C. Selman (Autumn 1989). “Coaching and the Art of Management.” 
Organizational Dynamics. pp. 16–32; D. Benton (1999). Secrets of a CEO Coach. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill.
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For example, contract security officers in the leader’s organization may
draw their paychecks from the security services firm that has selected them
for the position. Yet the leader correctly expects these persons not to reveal
proprietary information to anyone without a bona fide need to know. Simi-
larly, when an organization invites architects, engineers, consultants, and
others to bid for a contract, the leader expects that all parties with access to
formal data presented in the RFP—and informal insights obtained during
the process—to respect such information as proprietary, even if they do not
receive a contract assignment. 
The Problems with Leadership 
Leaders are critical for the establishment, growth, and adjustment of an
organization to changing times. The term “leader” is equated with the term
“innovator,” while the term “manager” relates to the term “program opera-
tor.” Clearly, any operation—large or small—requires persons in positions of
responsibility to possess some qualities of leadership. Leaders often reach
heroic status, while managers are considered humdrum drones who don’t
so much lead as they supervise the creation of the innovator-leader. Yet it is
important to note that the visionary leader can also sink an organization.11
Managers often must step in to save the enterprise from the leader’s misdi-
rection or errors. 
According to Jay A. Conger, leaders who have helped their organiza-
tions achieve also may lead these same entities into free-fall. Congers cites
four reasons for this: 
1. The leader’s vision reflects his or her internal needs rather than those
of the market or constituents. 
2. The resources needed to achieve such vision have been seriously
underestimated. 
3. An unrealistic assessment or distorted perception of the market and
constituent needs may hold sway on the leader’s vision. 
4. There has been a failure to recognize environmental changes that
should redirect the vision. 
Conger also notes that leaders may be so absorbed with the big picture that
they fail to understand critical details of operations, except in terms of pet
projects that involve them. Another problem with the true leader is that he
or she often fails to develop an effective successor. Conger also notes:
“(U)nder charismatic leadership, authority may be highly centralized
around the leader—and this is an arrangement that, unfortunately, weakens
the authority structures that are normally disbursed throughout an organi-
zation."12
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WHAT IS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT LEADERSHIP FOR SECURITY 
OPERATIONS?
The essence of security management traditionally relates to the appropriate
creation, imposition, and implementation of controls over personal behav-
ior. Other management disciplines market and sell, finance, make, move,
and administrate products or services. While security management relates
to all of these, the discipline is primarily oriented in manipulating behavior
to reduce or eliminate loss. To accomplish this, the operations security man-
ager considers appropriate controls that can achieve the desired objectives
within the context of the organization’s total operations. 
Security operations managers concentrate on internal and external
controls because such controls are more amenable to change than are other
factors. For example, genetic factors seem to play a role in crime causation.
Men are disproportionately more responsible than women for serious vio-
lent and property crime. Yet some women commit such crimes, and it is not
within the scope of a security manager’s power, say, to urge that mostly
women be hired because they are less likely to be involved in crime. Men
and women both are needed in workplace. Similarly, employers do not
select workers based on any narrow set of environmental preconditions.
Most flourishing workplaces thrive when employees represent diverse
social, ethnic, and national backgrounds. This means that managers must
direct loss prevention while working with all types of people. 
Control theory emanates from the work of Emile Durkheim, a suicidol-
ogist who concluded that the control and discipline of one’s desires and the
subordination of inclinations to the expectations of others stem from group
integration and its intensity of involvement over behavior.13 Those prone to
suicide lose this control. Durkheim’s work influenced Travis Hirschi’s semi-
nal work, Causes of Delinquency, which assumed that antisocial acts occur
when an individual’s bonds to society are weak or broken.14 Hirschi’s work
centered on violence and property crime. Another theorist has concentrated
not on crime in the streets, but in the suites. Edwin H. Sutherland first
named and described “white collar crime,” which is crime of a substantially
different nature than street crime.15
Yet although these prescient observers’ theories added to the under-
standing of deviance in the workplace, they provided little in the way of
guidance to managers who sought to reduce loss. Other researchers would
later fashion practical measures to deal with situational incidents that could
be anticipated and controlled or resolved. 
The security operations manager plans to respond to actual or reason-
ably possible situations by establishing situationally appropriate control
measures. Since such measures generally cannot guaranty certainty of suc-
cess, the manager also must be prepared to respond with alacrity once nor-
mative violations occur in the workplace. 
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CRITICAL LEADERSHIP ISSUES FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS 
MANAGERS
There are many distinct leadership issues facing protective program deci-
sion-makers. The priority of such tasks is as dynamic as the changing nature
of the organization. New significant issues constantly emerge. Meanwhile,
matters which once captured the full attention of a manger decline in impor-
tance as control measures are devised and implemented, reducing their
urgency. 
Critical issues will differ according to the type, size, geographical loca-
tion, and financial resources of the industry. However, a survey of security
executives responding to a Fortune 1000 list, cited earlier in this volume,
identifies 22 issues of highest concern (see Table 2.3). The survey, conducted
by a large security services firm, includes responses from about one-quarter
of the identified security directors among the largest manufacturers, busi-
ness services, and retailers. 
The security operations manager normally oversees a number of ongo-
ing programs and services. These include facilities management, which
requires the services of personnel and technology. Superimposed over the
organizational routine are issues that direct the security executive’s time and
concerns. These complex issues are covered in other books and by specialty
organizations. The discussion below seeks only to explore aspects of the 22
most frequently cited threats in the order in which they are mentioned;
changes in rank of such risks are to be expected. 
Workplace Violence 
This issue has been at or near the top of every survey conducted among
Fortune 1000 security directors. This discussion will concern workplace
violence as it applies to employees in general and to security personnel in
particular. 
General Workplace Violence. The drama and significance of a violent act
in the workplace is undeniable. In the last decade, violence in the workplace
received exceptional attention from a variety of organizations, including the
Office of Safety, Health and Working Conditions of the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, organizations like the
American Society for Industrial Security and the Society for Human
Resource Management have regarded workplace violence as a critical topic
for their membership. Numerous insurance companies, trade organizations,
and other state and local groups also have weighed in on the issue. Audiovi-
sual materials have been produced and numerous books on the topic have
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been published.16 Workplace attacks that result in death or serious injury are
reported in the media often. 
Thus it is no great surprise that security directors organize comprehen-
sive plans to mitigate the chances of fatal or injurious incidents in their orga-
nizations. Workplace violence mitigation involves the consideration of a
broad number of issues, including employee vetting, procedures, technical
measures, and post-incident response. Another aspect of operations man-
agement is to reduce the level of fear among employees by presenting avail-
able facts on workplace violence. The purpose of such information is not to
lull workers into a false sense of security, but rather to counter any fears they
have. Meanwhile, reasonable measures must be taken to reduce risks of
those most vulnerable to an incident. 
An analysis of federal studies concerning occupational injury and
death presents a more nuanced portrait of the workplace violence problem.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) periodically reports data on nonfatal
assaults resulting in lost workdays. Reports on workplace fatalities emanate
from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, BLS, and other sources. 
• Frequency of fatalities. In a period lasting five consecutive years,
occupational fatalities remained constant. The frequency of homi-
cide by shooting, stabbing, and other incidents, including bomb-
ings, claimed over 1,000 lives each year. Substantial as that number
is, a person’s chances of being killed in a transportation accident
are almost two-and-a-half times greater than being a victim of
homicide in the workplace. The number of deaths caused from
being struck, caught, or crashed by equipment or objects is about
the same as those caused by homicides, as shown in Table 11.1. 
• Risks for female workers. Three times as many male workers
were murdered as female workers. However, homicide was the
leading cause of job-related fatalities for women, accounting also
for nearly half of women’s work injuries. 
• Race and ethnicity. Because of their occupations, not race or eth-
nicity per se, homicide was the leading cause of job-related deaths
for blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Pacific Islanders. 
• Risks for the self-employed. Homicide was also the leading cause
of job-related deaths for the self-employed. 
• Circumstances of job-related homicides. In a study of 1,024 job-
related homicides that occurred in a single year, most (71 percent)
of the incidents resulted from robberies or robbery attempts.17
Typically, robbery victims were store personnel, gas station atten-
dants, or taxicab drivers. Several workers were killed during car-
jackings, muggings, and robberies of goods and services. The
frequent targets for robbery in this study are beer truck drivers,
348 Security and Operations Management
store personnel, gas station attendants, and cab drivers who are
killed for their cash receipts. 
• Victimization by work associates. One-tenth of workplace homi-
cide victims were killed by a current or former work associate.
Twenty-five customers or clients were responsible for job-related
homicides. These incidents were most likely to be featured by the
media.
• Personal acquaintance of the victim. Several workers—primarily
women—were killed as a result of domestic disputes that entered
into the workplace. 
• Police and security victimization. Eighty-one police officers were
killed in the line of duty, while 59 security guards were killed. 
In addition to the harshest violence, homicide, other safety issues
occur in the workplace. In 1994, 20,000 incidents involving assaults and
other violent acts by persons that resulted in lost workday injuries and ill-
nesses were reported.18 Women were the victims in almost three-fifths of
these assaults, much higher than their one-third share of lost workday cases
in private industry. This suggests that the level of more serious, nonfatal vio-
lent acts was higher among men than among women (see Table 11.2 for
more statistics). Service workers were at high risk of nonfatal assaults,
accounting for more than two-fifths of the lost workday cases resulting from
assaults. Nursing aides and orderlies accounted for more than half of all
assaulted service workers. The exceptional risk to workers in healthcare pro-
Table 11.1. Fatal Occupational Injuries 
Source: G. Toscano and J. Windau (1996). “National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, 
1995.” Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics, p. 35. 
Event or Exposure Number Percent of Total
Transportation Incidents 2,560 40
Homicides 1,024 17
Struck with Objects and Equipment 915 15
Falls 643 10
Exposure to Harmful Substances/Environments 598 10
Suicides 215 4
Fires and Explosions 208 3
Other Events or Exposures 24 --
Totals 6,187 100
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fessions has resulted in guidelines for these workplaces being published by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.19
The strategy of mitigating possible workplace violence continues to
evolve according to the type of industry. The highest danger of work-related
Table 11.2. Percent Distribution of Nonfatal Assaults Resulting in Inju-
ries and Illnesses with Time Off from Work 
*Does not total 100 due to rounding. 
†Includes health, social, business, and educational services. 
Source: “Characteristics of Injuries and Illnesses Resulting in Absences from Work, 1994” (1996). 
Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Based on 20,438 nonfatal assaults. 
Violent Act Percent Total*
Hitting, Kicking, Beating 43
Squeezing, Pinching, Scratching, Twisting 12
Biting 3
Threat or Verbal Assault 3
Shooting 2
Stabbing 1
Other 37
Sex of Injured Percent Total*
Women 58
Men 41
Industry of Injured Percent Total 
Services† 67
Retail Trade 16
Transportation, Utilities 5
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 4
Manufacturing 4
Other 4
Workdays Lost Percent Total 
1 to 5 days 54
6 to 10 days 14
11 to 20 days 10
21 days or more 22
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homicide is faced by clerks at sales counters; managers and supervisors of
food and lodging establishments; sales personnel and small business propri-
etors; and cashiers. These particular workplaces merit ongoing research and
improved working conditions. 
However, more than half the nation works in offices. The specter of
innocent workers being gunned down in their offices, say, by a disgruntled
current or former employee, is sure to seize the nation’s attention (see Box
11.3). For that reason—in addition to the possibility that such incidents
might produce copycat acts of violence—security operations managers must
seek to improve vetting measures, identify workers who have previously
made harsh or threatening comments about others in the workplace, sup-
port the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) initiatives, improve access
control measures, and generally enhance the feeling of security. 
Violence Against Security Personnel. In a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics
study, security personnel ranked fifth in terms of risk of work-related homi-
cides, as shown in Table 11.3. However, upon further analysis, this ranking
Box 11.3. Workplace Violence: Warning Signs Sometimes Missed 
Often, signs of workplace violence are present before an events occurs. Fre-
quently, these signs are ignored. This was the case in the 1998 killing of four
employees of the Connecticut State Lottery offices in Newington, Connecti-
cut.
Throughout the late 1990s, a frustrated computer worker employed by
the lottery had shown repeated signs of stress. The worker had been trans-
ferred from the accounting department to the data processing department
two years earlier, and, as a result, he filed a grievance to obtain his old job
back and demanded extra pay for doing computer work that, he claimed,
was not part of his job. The worker had given no previous indication that he
could be dangerous to others, although he had attempted to commit suicide
twice, the more recent incident occurring just one year before his homicidal
rampage.
In 1997, the worker was given a five-month medical leave for depres-
sion and stress. On March 6, 1998, just days before he was scheduled to
resume work, he returned to his office. After working calmly at his desk for
about a half-hour, he stormed into the offices of his intended victims. In the
next few minutes, the worker killed the lottery’s chief executive officer, chief
financial officer, a vice president, and the organization’s top computer spe-
cialist. Finally, the gunman ended the bloodbath by taking his own life. 
Source: Security Letter, March 16, 1998, p. 1. 
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fails to make clear that almost half of the work-related homicides occurred
to armored car service personnel and private investigators. These two cate-
gories employ far fewer workers than the watch, guard, and patrol division
of the industry does. Thus, the chances of a security officer being a victim of
homicide—while probably higher than other work categories on average—
is lower than it would appear. At the same time, the risks to armored car ser-
vices personnel and private investigators are higher when the category is
analyzed by constituents.20
Crisis Management/Executive Protection 
This category, ranking second among the 22 most important security threats,
may be criticized because of lack of specificity. The two issues are not neces-
sarily related. Therefore, they will be discussed separately. 
Table 11.3. Top-Ranked Occupations at Risk for Work-Related Homicide 
(Based on 1,063 Incidents) 
1 Experimental measure using Current Population Survey (CPS) employment data. This rate 
represents the number of fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 employed and was calculated 
as follows: N/W x 100,000, where N = number of fatal work injuries and W = employment 
based on the 1993 CPS. 
2 The CPS employment data used to calculate rates are estimates that are based upon a sample 
of persons employed rather than on a complete count. Therefore, the employment estimates 
and fatality rates have sampling errors expressed in percentages; that is, they may differ from 
figures that would have been obtained if it had been possible to take a complete census of 
employed persons. The relative standard error is used to calculate a confidence level of 90 per-
cent.
Source: “Characteristics of Injuries and Illnesses Resulting in Absences from Work, 1994” 
(1996). Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data are for 1993 (see also Table 5.1). 
Occupation Homicides Rate1
Relative Error 
(in Percent)2
Taxi Drivers/Chauffeurs 97 43.1 6.83
Gas Station Attendants 22 11.1 7.28
Sales Counter Clerks 22 11.3 7.34
Police and Law Enforcement 57 11.2 4.53
Security Guards and Officers 54 6.5 3.54
Managers (Food and Lodging) 59 4.9 2.95
Sales, Supervisors, Proprietors 178 4.4 1.60
Cashiers 94 3.5 2.00
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Crisis Management. This is the management process whereby potential
emergencies or disasters are systematically identified and assessed for their
frequency and criticality. Table 11.4 provides an overview of such processes
and their consequences. 
This is a formal process involving a comprehensive search for the
likely crises that an organization actually or probably could experience.21
Management usually seeks to mitigate such vulnerabilities—called risk
reduction—with appropriate measures. Additionally, some small and pre-
dictable losses may be reducible by measures that are far more costly than
the damages to be paid when they do occur. Therefore, management decides
not to take exceptional risk reduction measures and accepts such risks. In
still other cases, some risks are reduced and others are accepted, but an
aggregate risk remains, such as damage from a major fire or natural disaster.
This would be unacceptable should it actually occur. Such risk is transferred
to an insurer. Finally, in some cases, management will conclude that the risk
cannot be accepted and the actual activity is not undertaken or is termi-
nated. This process is termed “risk elimination” because the organization
disassociates itself from the venture or activity. 
Crisis management is an ongoing process in which the security opera-
tions manager is constantly engaged. Despite mitigation efforts, crises will
occur. Emergencies and disasters must be responded to. Operations must
resume as quickly as possible if the untoward event slows or stops the pro-
Table 11.4. The Strategy of Crisis Management 
Process Consequence
Risk Reduction Security managers identify significant risks to the organization 
that can be systematically reduced or eliminated. This may be 
achieved with appropriate programs. Sometimes, the risk can be 
shared with other organizations within the same entity or in the 
same geographic area. For example, an organization that fears a 
computer crash may temporarily move operations to another 
location within the same establishment. 
Risk Acceptance This assumes that some losses will occur as a normal conse-
quence of operations. Management concludes that the projected 
losses are acceptable and will be absorbed as a routine operating 
cost.
Risk Transfer The organization accepts some risk, reduces it by various means, 
but transfers an unacceptable risk level to an insurer. 
Risk Elimination Management determines that the risk is too great to accept and, 
therefore, elects to avoid the activity entirely by not commenc-
ing it, selling it off, or ceasing operations. 
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cess of work. Further, security operations managers generally serve as coor-
dinators of response and recovery activities. Contingency planning aids the
organization to respond quickly to incidents. 
Executive Protection. The safety and security of executives, indeed all
employees, is a major concern for security operations managers. Executive
protection often is related to workplace violence in that risks to the executive
whenever he or she is working or traveling on behalf of the organization
have security implications. However, few workplaces require special protec-
tive means such as employing executive protection personnel. M.J. Braunig
states in the Executive Protection Bible: “Far fewer corporations hire executive
protection agents than you might think, and the corporations who do hire
them generally do so because of reaction to a specific incident, or because of
specific threats, or in some cases simply as a prudent security measure."22
Executive protection involves surveys of broad risk; specific evaluation
of office, hotel, and residence dangers; and training for staff and family
members on what to observe and what to do under threatening circum-
stances.23 The executive protection professional may complete extensive rel-
evant training; possess good interpersonal skills; be physically fit and able to
adapt to a wide variety of circumstances; and has analytical ability to iden-
tify risks and avoid them.24 Risk reduction for the executive might involve
counter-surveillance operations that seek “to identify all possible attack
points where the executive is vulnerable” and to eliminate or reduce expo-
sure to them.25
The consequences of inadequate executive protection can be profound,
leading to liquidation or substantial reorganization of the firm when a sig-
nificant and creative leader is struck down. One example is the gunning
down of fashion mogul Gianni Versace in Miami Beach, Florida. Robert L.
Oatman observes: “Executive protection has little to do with spinning tires
and knocking people over, and everything to do with threat assessment,
intelligence gathering, transportation, choreography, advance work, 10-
minute medicine, resources, technology, and support."26
Fraud/White-Collar Crime 
The mantra among security practitioners is that more losses occur from
fraud and so-called white-collar crime than from conventional internal or
external theft. Fraud is the criminal offense of obtaining money or money
equivalents by false pretenses; that is, the intentional perversion of truth. It
usually does not involve property damage or threatened or actual physical
injury. Fraud is an element in crimes such as forgery, counterfeiting, and
embezzlement, in which cunning and unfairness are used to cheat people or
organizations. The range of fraud is great, from petty cheating to large-scale
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looting of corporate or governmental assets. Frauds often are against indi-
viduals by others. This discussion, however, is limited to circumstances in
which the organization is itself victimized by individuals or entities. 
White-collar crime is fraud committed by persons whose occupational
status is executive, managerial, entrepreneurial, professional, or semi-pro-
fessional. The term, first used by Edwin H. Sutherland, was meant to
encompass such business crimes as embezzlement, kickbacks, price fixing,
antitrust violations, unfair labor practices, and war crimes.27 Sutherland’s
work turned the attention of academics from poverty, class, and caste as fac-
tors that cause crime, to values that lie within the social system and individ-
ual malfeasance as criminogenic element. Some writers conclude that the
level of crime among the wealthy and powerful can have an insidious effect
on government, and vice versa, placing the social structure at risk when
such depredations go unchecked.28
For the security operations manager, dealing with internal and exter-
nal fraud and white-collar crime usually takes the form of a reactive
response, whereas a preventative response would be wiser and more cost
effective. Security practitioners usually are the best—or among the best—
individuals in an organization to sense risks that are greater than their likely
payoff or benefit to the organization. However, the nature of fraud is pro-
tean, and organizations reasonably well prepared to deter fraud may be vic-
timized by the originality and daring of fraudsters. Further, some incidents
involve offenders who appear to be making money for the organization, but
in reality are doing the opposite. In such situations, the inquiring security
practitioner or compliance officer will be rebuffed by managers protecting
the supposed high-income producer because their bonuses and status are
linked to those persons’ success (see Box 11.4). 
Box 11.4. Nick Leeson and the Fall of Barings Bank 
Security practitioners and compliance officers often have the skills to iden-
tify risks that are too great relative to their potential payoff. However,
whether management will listen to their cautionary advice is another matter.
Sometimes, wild risks are taken by people who appear to be making a profit
for the organization, but actually are running it into the ground. An example
of this is the collapse in 1995 of Barings Bank, a London-based international
bank founded in 1762. The cause was a single individual operating without
adequate controls, who was protected by his supervisors and managers. In
this situation, Nicholas Leeson, a 28-year-old rogue trader for Baring
Futures in Singapore, racked up huge unauthorized trading losses, hiding
them in a mislabeled account. 
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Box 11.4. (Continued)
Leeson appeared to be earning enormous profits for his accounts from
buying and selling derivatives—future contracts linked to fluctuations in
Japan’s stock exchange. His reported “profits” earned him and his superiors
substantial bonuses. By the time Leeson’s scheme was discovered, he had
racked up losses of £827 million. This exceeded the resources of the bank,
which was liquidated as a result, ending the glorious history of an institu-
tion that helped finance among other things the expansion of the British
Empire and the Louisiana Purchase by the U.S. in the 19th century. 
Source: J.H. Rawnsley (1995). Total Risk: Nick Leeson and the Fall of Barings Bank. New York, NY: 
HarperBusiness. Also: N. Leeson with E. Whiteley (1996). Rogue Trader: How I Brought Down 
Barings Bank and Shook the Financial World. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company; and Security
Letter (March 15, 1995), p. 1. 
Frequently, security practitioners learn about fraud after the fact and
must move quickly to conduct an internal investigation. Such an investigation
may be begun the moment an indication is received that the organization may
have been victimized by fraudulent means. Before calling federal agents or
local prosecutors, the organization usually seeks to determine whether the
indication of fraud is verifiable and, if so, how substantial the loss is to the
entity.29 In the earliest phase in which fraud is suspected, criminality cannot
be assumed. An internal investigation should collect facts that can be the basis
of ascertaining the truth and facilitating future interaction with the criminal
justice system. Normally, security practitioners confer with internal counsel
before conducting an internal investigation. Staff investigators may be dele-
gated to conduct the interviews needed to evaluate the situation. In the event
that the organization does not have skilled personnel appropriate to the task,
private investigators may be retained on a project basis. 
Once the investigators establish the facts and the case is confirmed by
the security operations head, the internal counsel may take the necessary
steps that can result in arrest and prosecution of the offenders. Security prac-
titioners may continue their efforts even after a case is transferred to federal,
state, or local authorities. In some cases, security can achieve investigative
goals better than government investigators because they understand their
organization better and because incentives to protect the institutional repu-
tation and possibly recover lost assets are present. 
Employee Screening Concerns 
Hiring the wrong employee leads to disappointment, financial loss, missed
opportunity, and a sense of inadequate screening (vetting) measures.
356 Security and Operations Management
When employment is full and the need to fill key positions is high, the
chances of failing to conduct a thorough pre-employment credentials
review increase. 
Employers in high-tech industries may be particularly vulnerable to
theft at the workplace.30 To achieve the desired results of a workforce with
high integrity and reliability, security practitioners and Human Resource
managers must work together, drawing from the skills that protection pro-
fessionals know best regarding screening out candidates with undesirable
prior work records or dishonest representations on résumés or application
forms. (This process of pre-employment verification and selection is dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 3.) 
Computer Crime: Hardware/Software Theft 
The French scholar Blaise Pascal invented the adding machine in 1642, the
first example of a device in which tens were carried to the next column.
This invention created the basis for finding a mechanical way to rapidly
automatic computations. The first electronic computer was called the
“Eniac” (for Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), and was cre-
ated in 1945 at the University of Pennsylvania’s Moore School of Electrical
Engineering. In the subsequent half-century, computers grew from being
esoteric scientific tools to becoming a commonplace, ubiquitous aides to
most human endeavors. 
As computers have grown larger in importance and smaller in physi-
cal size, they have become objects of theft. Further, the input, output, tapes,
and peripheral hardware are also tempting to thieves. Meanwhile, software
programs written for an organization at great cost—both in terms of money
and time invested—and critical databases can be copied in a matter of min-
utes, often with the owner not being aware that its proprietary software or
valuable records have been copied. 
The strategy to protect hardware and software involves a combination
of factors, mainly related to procedures, personnel, and hardware.31 Proce-
dural issues involve identifying what physical and electronic assets are most
valuable and creating means whereby they may be identified and protected.
Personnel issues include policies and procedures for those individuals hav-
ing contact with the central computer facility where computers, peripheral
equipment, processing units, storage units, communications equipment,
and power backup are located. Hardware issues encompass physical secu-
rity measures to restrict access control throughout a facility containing a
computer center, particularly in the computer room itself. The physical secu-
rity involves automatic access control to restricted areas, enforced by the
resources of trained personnel. Software theft can be mitigated by programs
that make copying difficult. 
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General Employee Theft 
This category is presumed to involve theft of assets excluding fraud, intel-
lectual property, and electronic assets. Quantification of employee theft is
difficult since definitions can vary. The cost of employee theft, time theft,
and drug abuse on the job has been estimated at $320 billion.32 The indirect
costs from such losses to the employer, government, and the general public
add to the total risks (see Box 11.5). Employee theft is mitigated by measures
previously discussed, including appropriate vetting (Chapter 3), adequate
supervision (Chapter 5), and discipline up to discharge and prosecution in
the event of dishonesty (Chapter 6). Meanwhile, electronic systems may also
discourage employee theft (Chapter 10). 
Computer Crime: Internet/Intranet Security 
In 1990, the “World,” the first commercial Internet service provider (ISP),
came online. Two years later, the number of computers connected to the Net
exceeded one million. By January 2000, a single ISP boasted over 20 million
customers on the Net, and this supplier had scores of competitors. About
200 million people are online and about half of all American households
have a personal computer. 
The Internet has transformed every aspect of business, and the pace of
change continues unabated. From its onset, the Net was an open system,
designed so that users could enter and leave, read and write, and share and
transmit data with the greatest of ease. For organizations, the Net permitted
the speed of business to soar. The capacity for organizations to communi-
cate with each other and with anyone else achieved runaway growth.
Because it was designed as an open system, the Net has no real policing.
Therefore, chances of a variety of abuses are high and may expose the orga-
nization to a variety of threats never anticipated during the early develop-
ment of the Net. 
In some ways, the security of the Internet and intranets is similar to
conventional physical security. For example, access control to electronic
databases can be divided into different levels of permission. Individuals
may have access to databases under circumstances that can change accord-
ing to the desire of the host system’s management. The same way a cus-
tomer’s check must be trusted by a retailer, those involved in e-commerce
need to be assured that the personal identification of the customer can be
trusted and that the credit authorization for a purchase is genuine. At the
same time, such transactions need to be protected so that unauthorized indi-
viduals will not have access to pertinent details in a transaction. Such trans-
actions must include audit trails so that, should an irregularity occur, an
investigation can determine the culprit and minimize further economic loss. 
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However, computer security is different from physical security in the
way it is largely electronic in nature. Thus, IT security involves a systems
approach that must be comprehensive, dynamic, and flexible and suitable to
the circumstances. Electronic data can be encrypted by an algorithm that
Box 11.5. Indirect Costs of Economic Crime 
Determining economic losses from crime is difficult, as such offenses also
produce indirect costs to the organization, including: 
Increased cost effects on the organization: 
• Increased security 
• Internal audit activities 
• Investigation and prosecution of suspects 
• Reduced profits 
• Increased selling prices and weakened competitive standing 
• Lower employee morale 
• Reduced productivity 
• Damage to business reputation and image 
• Deterioration in quality of service 
• Higher overhead due to theft 
• Lost business opportunity due to lack of needed items 
• Higher insurance 
Cost effects on local and national government: 
• Criminal justice activities (investigating and prosecuting) 
• Correctional programs 
• Crime-prevention measures 
• Policing and community security activities required 
• Loss of tax revenue (e.g., from loss of taxes due to the untaxed
income of the perpetrator and due to deductible business losses
producing less tax income) 
Cost effects on the public: 
• More expensive consumer goods and services to offset crime losses 
• Decreased investor equity 
• Higher taxes to pay for criminal justice costs 
• Reduced employment from business failures 
Source: W.C. Cunningham, J.J. Strauchs, and C.W. Van Meter (1990). Private Security Trends 1970 
to 2000: The Hallcrest Report II. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 32–33. 
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protects it within a communications network from the point of origin to the
final destination. The initial algorithm to protect electronic transmissions
made available by the federal government was the Data Encryption Stan-
dard (DES). With the growth of powerful, cheap computing, DES alone pro-
vides modest security. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) has selected a new cryptology, Rijndael, to replace DES. Many other
broadly available algorithms exist that e-security managers may consider.33
Other means have been created to assure trusted operating systems,
database security, and protection of distributed systems. Attacks on comput-
ers by hackers, crackers, and cyber-terrorists pose a challenge to operating
security practitioners.34 Entire systems—if unprotected by filters and warn-
ing systems—can be crashed by an offender who sends a large number of
messages or queries to a system at the same time. This is called a denial-of-
service attack. The result is that IT security becomes a priority. 
As William C. Boni and Gerald L. Lovacich write: “Ironically, these I-
Way robbers may do more to increase demand for I-Way security than any
other force in the marketplace today."35 Some security operations managers
will feel challenged by the opportunity to respond to security issues raised
by the Net and e-commerce; others will be intimidated by the technical shift
required to establish trusted IT security operations. But the issue cannot be
ignored, due to both the ability of Net applications to enhance commerce
and the vulnerabilities created at the same time. Security operations manag-
ers must move up to the challenge of e-commerce and Net security issues, or
step aside for others with the interest and competence. 
Drugs in the Workplace 
Drug use and abuse in the workplace are issues that predate the Industrial
Revolution. The media often refer to a “war on drugs"; however, alcohol and
tobacco abuse are responsible for more deaths in the U.S. than all illegal
drugs combined.36 Alcohol accounts for about 100,000 premature deaths per
year and tobacco is linked to 400,000, whereas illegal drugs are responsible
for about 30,000 deaths. Excessive alcohol and tobacco use results in produc-
tivity losses, greater employers’ health costs, and workplace accidents. 
Such addictive substances as alcohol and tobacco, however, are not
linked to the same extent to criminal propensities as some illicit drugs. For
this and other reasons, drug use and abuse in the workplace are subject to
federal programs, and policies that lead to a drug-free workplace are pro-
moted.37 Federal employment guidelines test for marijuana, opiates (heroin,
morphine), cocaine, amphetamines and methamphetamines, and phencycli-
dine. Testing for such substances prior to an offer of employment or during
employment was discussed in Chapter 3. 
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In addition to screening for drug use, security operations managers
face different issues concerning workplace drug matters. Initially, a policy
might be created and disseminated concerning a testing process at the work-
place.38 Legal issues, policy promotion strategy, testing methods, sample
security protocols, and laboratory selection need to be considered. In the
event an overt or undercover investigation must be conducted, procedures
and personnel must be directed to collect facts. The investigative team, sup-
ported by protective management, will recommend subsequent actions to be
taken to mitigate future incidents. 
Unethical Business Conduct 
Ethics are rules of conduct. They are practices that are applicable to organi-
zations and members of a profession regarding their moral and professional
obligations. As such, ethics usually have less force than legal requirements,
although the organization must take them seriously. And in some circum-
stances, ethical breaches may overlap with criminal behavior. 
Employers have ethical obligations to employees, vendors, competi-
tors, and society at large. Nearly all organizations have a code of conduct
that delineates the principles of proper behavior. At the same time, organiza-
tions expect ethical behavior from their employees, vendors, competitors,
and others. 
Security practitioners encounter unethical business practices in a vari-
ety of contexts. In addition to domestic issues, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977 requires that U.S.-based for-profit businesses operate ethically
when abroad. Bribes and kickbacks when offered in a seductive way for
“consulting services” are certainly illegal, and possibly criminal. Organiza-
tions may, for example, ethically collect publicly available information about
competitors. Thus, sales literature, Web site information, comments by per-
sonnel made at trade shows, observations offered without prompting by
vendors’ employees when seeking new employment, and technical papers
presented at meetings may be collected, analyzed, and used to enhance an
organization’s marketing and general management strategy. Security per-
sonnel sometimes aid in the creation of such competitive information units.
However, it is unethical for an organization to interview vendors’ employ-
ees solely for the purpose of collecting desirable competitive intelligence
when no job with the interviewing organization is available. It is further
unethical to hire such vendors’ employees as “consultants” on a project
basis when the intention is to obtain critical details about such organizations
rather than the employee’s skills for their own sake. 
Apparent internal or external ethical violations require investigations
to determine their veracity.39 Due diligence may be necessitated before
domestic organizations deal with potential foreign partners. A thorough
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understanding of ethical obligations and risks reduces the possibility of vio-
lating ethics and legal practices in all countries involved. 
Security practitioners frequently are given responsibilities for drafting
and managing ethical policies and programs, and all major security organi-
zations have a code of behavior or ethics. The American Society for Indus-
trial Security has a Council on Business Practices and a Code of Ethics,
which can punish offenders with censure or dismissal from the organization
(see Appendix A). 
Property crime: External Theft 
External theft, damage, vandalism, and sabotage cost organizations billions
of dollars each year. Their prevention depends upon a comprehensive secu-
rity management program. Architectural design and space management
concepts combined with the proper selection of building materials represent
an important initial consideration in reducing property crime losses. This
involves the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(CPTED), which can deter criminal and uncivil behavior (as discussed in
Chapter 10).40 The appropriate use of hardware, software, and procedures
aimed at reducing losses can result in further lowering the likelihood of loss.
In the event that losses do occur, litigation pursuant to an investigation may
recover some lost assets, or reduce the pattern of loss, or both.41
Sexual Harassment/Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC) 
Concerns
Sexual harassment is defined as conduct directed at a specific person, usu-
ally of a different gender, causing substantial emotional distress. In 1994, 44
percent of women and 19 percent of men responding to a survey conducted
by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board said that they had experienced
some form of unwanted sexual attention during the previous two years.
Similar results were seen in a survey conducted seven years earlier.42 The
survey gathered responses from employees in over 24 agencies. Nonethe-
less, few bothered to report the incidents. Only 6 percent of those in the 1994
survey who expressed being the target of sexually harassing behavior indi-
cated that they took formal action in response. The unwanted attention
included pressure for sexual favors; deliberate touching or cornering; sexual
looks or gestures; letters or calls of a sexual nature; pressure for dates; and
sexual teasing including jokes, remarks, or questions. 
Such behavior violates, in part, the federal Equal Employment and
Opportunity Act of 1972, which bars discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. It also prohibits practices caused by
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statistically determined adverse impact, as well as intentional unequal treat-
ment.43 Implications of the act encompass all private employers of 15 or
more persons; educational institutions; government; employment agencies;
labor unions; and joint labor-management committees established for
apprenticeship and training. State regulations may not reduce federal mea-
sures, but may go further in specifically prohibiting behaviors covered in
the act. 
Security practitioners have an obligation to investigate apparent or
actual violations of these measures. If the investigation determines that
offenses have occurred, disciplinary measures, including cautioning, coun-
seling, or dismissal, may be considered, as discussed in Chapter 6. A single
act of sexually oriented harassment does not necessarily meet the definition
of ongoing harassment. The exact circumstances of the case determine
whether a court proceeding will occur. These include how often the conduct
occurs; how serious it is; if the behavior physically threatens the other party;
and if the unwanted behavior interferes with work behavior. Failure of the
employer to investigate and respond to charges in a timely fashion can lead
to costly sanctions (see Box 11.6). 
Box 11.6. Sexual Harassment Sanctions Add Up 
For any organization, having an anti-harassment policy is not enough. Orga-
nizations additionally may require customized training on sexual-harassment
awareness that spells out consequences for policy violations. The complaint
procedure must be made clear. The following are some incidents in which
employers were forced to pay for sexual harassment at the workplace: 
• Mitsubishi Motors agreed to pay $34 million in a sexual-harass-
ment settlement brought by some 300 current and former female
workers at Mitsubishi’s Normal, Illinois, plant. 
• The U.S. unit of Sweden’s Astra Pharmaceuticals agreed to pay
$9.9 million to about 80 workers in a sexual-harassment case. 
• The Ford Motor Company paid $7.5 million in damages and
planned to spend about $10 million more on training after 19
women at two Chicago-area plants complained to the EEOC. The
women claimed that male workers often used sexually degrading
words for them, placed explicit materials in their workplace, and
even groped them. 
Source: J.P. Miller (June 12, 1998). “Mitsubishi Will Pay $34 Million in Sexual-Harassment Set-
tlement.” Wall Street J., p. B4; A. McLaughlin (September 10, 1999). “When Others Harass, Now 
Managers Lose Pay.” Christian Science Monitor, p. 1. 
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Business Espionage/Theft of Trade Secrets 
For many organizations, theft of intellectual property, including know-how
and trade secrets, can far surpass losses from conventional theft. While lar-
cenies can be overt, documented, and related to a monetary loss, the theft of
information can be insidious and lead to the loss of market position and
future opportunity without the victim organization perceiving the cause.
According to an estimate by the American Society for Industrial Security,
espionage by foreign and domestic competitors costs U.S. firms more than
$300 billion a year.44 While most saboteurs are likely to be competitors
within the same industry, a few come from abroad and act with the support
of their governments.45
Security professionals seek to protect their organizations’ inherent
intellectual capital by identifying what is most important and then restrict-
ing access to it. This involves broad information protection policies, requir-
ing employees with need-to-know trade secrets to be aware of their
importance for protection.46 As more know-how becomes accessible over
the Net, protection of such systems becomes a priority, lest organizations
become victims of cyber-theft. A former National Security Agency expert,
Ira Winkler, observes that countermeasures should include holding “fire
drills” to simulate problems and their responses, and the periodic perfor-
mance of vulnerability assessments with attempted penetration of sys-
tems.47 Practitioners remain up to date about such risks by using
independent consultants, surfing the Web, liaising with local sources, and
studying material provided by the U.S. Department of State. 
The management of competitive intelligence is linked to the protection
against business espionage and the implementation of trade secret security
as well as the legitimate collection of market information. The Society of
Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) was founded in 1986 as a non-
profit organization that educates and provides liaison opportunities for
managers of competitive intelligence programs. 
Litigation: “Inadequate Security” 
As described in Chapter 3, litigation may occur if employers or their agents
breach their duty and if such a breach results in direct harm to others. One
question to be settled is how sufficient or proportional the effective protec-
tive measures are relative to the prescribed standards or measures. “Inade-
quate security” covers a wide range of inadvertent, intentional, and
unintentional circumstances that could lead to a civil action in which the
organization is a defendant. In such plaintiffs’ actions, senior executives or
managers, the director of security, and individual security personnel
involved may be listed individually as defendants. While the employer may
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provide legal counsel for any employees, individuals frequently must con-
sult lawyers privately for guidance. 
Many charges of inadequate security relate to the failure of property
owners and managers to adequately protect the public from the foreseeable
criminal actions of others. For example, the appellate court of Pennsylvania
ruled in a case: 
While we do not consider a landlord to be an insurer of its tenants, we hold
that in all areas of the leasehold, particularly in the areas under his control, the
landlord is under a duty to provide adequate security to protect its tenants
from the foreseeable criminal actions of third persons.48
A wide variety of tort actions due to inadequate security are conceiv-
able. A fixed list of such actions cannot be created because of the changing
nature of circumstances and the inventiveness of plaintiffs and their law-
yers. Further, the nature of such charges varies according to the type of orga-
nization. The following are a few general examples of inadequate security
charges brought against organizations: 
• Alarms that are inadequate, missing, or broken 
• Assaults 
• Inadequate background checks (see “Negligent Hiring” below) 
• Failure to prevent a crime 
• Duty to protect not met 
• Emotional distress 
• Failure to make necessary repairs to security hardware
• Failure to anticipate crime 
• Failure to warn 
• Foreseeability of event not anticipated by the defendant 
• Inadequate locks 
• Security company and its personnel fail to protect or are negligent 
Terrorism 
An act of terrorism occurs through the calculated use of violence to obtain
political or social goals to instill fear, intimidation, or coercion. Terrorism
usually involves a criminal deed meant as a symbolic activity to influence
someone unrelated to the immediate victims. The efforts of terrorists are
usually against governments.49 However, private organizations and their
facilities may also be targets of or indirectly affected by a terrorist event (see
Box 11.7). Acts of domestic terrorism are infrequent in the U.S. and Canada.
As a result, security operations managers assess the possibilities of terrorism
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within a wider global context. But complacency on domestic risks is never
appropriate. 
Box 11.7. A Strike at the “Heartland": Terrorism in Oklahoma City 
At 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995, a detonation outside the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, changed the way millions of
Americans thought about terrorism. The event occurred in the “heartland”
of America, creating a sense of disbelief, anger, and fear unlike any other
domestic disaster of its kind in memory. The explosion immediately killed
167 persons, including children attending a nursery in the building. Exten-
sive physical damage was sustained for several blocks from ground zero. 
The explosion reminded security planners of the importance of car
bombs as vehicles of destruction. In Beirut in 1983, an Islamic Jihad terrorist
killed 241 U.S. servicemen in a badly protected Marine barracks. (Moments
later, another bomb in Beirut killed 58 servicemen at a nearby French bar-
racks.) In London in 1982, an IRA car bomb exploded, killing eight and caus-
ing over $1 billion in property damage. In New York City at the World Trade
Center in 1992, a bomb killed six and injured around 1,000. All of these
instances of terrorism involved bombs composed mostly of natural materi-
als or easily available explosives and were created with modest skill and at
little cost. Perimeter control, CPTED, interior changes, and security systems
enhancements are measures taken to deter these threats. 
A survey by the U.S. Marshal Service completed in the late 1990s iden-
tified over 1,300 single or multi-tenant federal office buildings employing
750,000 federal employees. Such buildings, usually under the management
of the General Services Administration, are divided into five categories
according to number of employees, size, and criticality for federal service.
Appropriate security measures are prescribed for buildings in each category.
But some still wonder whether this level of security is sufficient. 
At the same time, the Oklahoma City explosion made clear how
uncommon domestic terrorism is. In the mainland U.S., just two major inci-
dents occurred in the 1990s. Both were targeted against important physical
symbols of capitalism and government. Would these two incidents be excep-
tional historical footnotes? Or would they be events to inspire others to act
similarly in the years ahead? 
Source: D.O. Coulson and E. Shannon (1999). No Heroes. New York, NY: Pocket Books; R.A. Ser-
rano (1998). One of Ours: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing. New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company; M. Dees with J. Corcoran (1998). Gathering Storm: America’s Militia Threat.
New York, NY: HarperCollins; Security Letter (May 1, 1995), Vol. 25, p. 1; and Security Letter
(May 17, 1995), p. 1. 
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Governments prepare for the possibility of terrorism in a variety of
ways. The first step is planning how to prevent or mitigate the effects of a
terrorist act. Physical design, location, and construction methods influence
the possibility of a particular facility or system being a target. Training,
including mock exercises, help organizations respond to the emergency.
Appropriate emergency supplies and continuity resources are identified in
case they should be needed. In 1980, an elite antiterrorist military group was
created, called the Delta Force or Blue Light, and is based in Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. The troops are trained to deal with terrorist incidents on
land, sea, and air. 
Terrorism need not be a dramatic event seeking to bring sweeping
social change. It can be a local event capable of engendering fear or inconve-
nience. The Model Penal Code (Section 211.3) defines terrorism as threaten-
ing “to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to
cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public trans-
portation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless
disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.” Security oper-
ations managers typically prepare for such risks as bomb threats, incidents,
and kidnapping.50 However, other criminal forms of intimidation, such as
cyber-terrorism, can threaten the vitality of an organization and its people. 
Litigation: “Negligent Hiring” 
Employers have an obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation into a
prospective employee’s work experience, background, character, and quali-
fications. As David A. Maxwell states, “The standard of care does not vary.
The greater the risk of harm, the greater degree of care necessary to consti-
tute ordinary care."51 The doctrine of negligent hiring and retention pro-
vides that: 
(A)n employer whose employees are brought into contact with members of the
public in the course of the employer’s business has a duty to exercise reasonable
care in the selection and retention of his employees . . . Negligent retention . . .
occurs when, during the course of employment, the employer becomes aware
or should have become aware of problems with an employee that indicates his
unfitness, and the employer fails to take further action such as investigating,
discharge, or reassignment.52
The protection manager constantly evaluates personnel performance,
asking whether certain behaviors have failed to meet the duty of care stan-
dard. If so, have such workers been counseled, re-trained, reassigned,
placed on temporary leave, or discharged? If appropriate measures are not
taken in a timely fashion, the employer faces the possibility of a difficult
defense in the event a plaintiff commences an action for such negligence. 
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Insurance/Workers’ Compensation Fraud 
Security practitioners sometimes interact with an organization’s risk man-
ager; that is, the individual who directs an organization’s non-health and
benefits insurance coverage. When a security program reduces chances of
loss, this information can be useful to the risk manager in negotiating lower
premiums or improved coverage from the insurance carriers serving the
property, liability, and other risks of the organization. Additionally, security
directors may review or monitor insurance provided by protection-related
vendors (for example, for alarm monitoring, armored car, investigations,
and security patrol services). 
Apart from this interaction, security practitioners frequently are called
to investigate workers’ compensation fraud. Workers’ compensation pro-
vides cash benefits for employees who are injured or otherwise incapaci-
tated during the course of active employment. Also, in the event of a
worker’s death, a surviving spouse and family members may be entitled to
benefits. State workers’ compensation laws dictate the terms and conditions
of benefits to claimants and the obligations to employers. In the event that
an individual is unable to work because of a job-related injury or circum-
stance, benefits may also be awarded. In such cases, the worker may not sue
the employer under the doctrine of negligence unless the court rules other-
wise; that is, the rights and remedies granted an employee arise out of and
in the course of employment. For example, if a third party injures an
employee while on the job, that employee normally may not be able to sue
the employer for negligence, but will likely receive the limited recovery pro-
vided by the workers’ compensation statute.53
Security operations managers often must investigate incidents relative
to routine workers’ compensation claims. In other cases, however, former
employees who are enjoying such benefits may actually no longer be ill or
injured and should return to work and cease receiving such benefits, which
can cost the employer over an extended period. Occasionally, former work-
ers receiving benefits because they were injured on-the-job and can no
longer work may in fact have returned to active health and may be working
elsewhere while continuing to receive full benefits. In such cases, investiga-
tions seek to determine the facts of such incapacitation and to determine
whether the benefits should be eliminated.54
Cargo/Supply-Chain Theft 
The cost of cargo, transportation, and distribution theft is not known with
any degree of precision. Efforts made in Congress since 1970 to require that
cargo theft losses be reported have failed. Many cargo thefts are reported to
police and are included in larceny statistics for the area where the crime
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occurred, but many others are not reported. In 1976, the Office of Transpor-
tation Security of the Department of Transportation estimated that $1.5 bil-
lion per year was stolen from warehouses, shipping and receiving
platforms, storage areas, depots, terminals, and piers. Of the loss, 5 percent
was from highjackings, 10 percent from breaking and entering, and 85 per-
cent from internal theft, collusion, or unexplained shortage.55
Emphasis on recruiting, screening, and training reliable personnel head
the agenda of cargo security practitioners. Technology and containerization
help to cut losses from both internal and external crime.56 Using bar codes,
radio frequency sensors, electronic seals, and asset-tracking technology helps
organizations manage assets better, and also decreases the chances of mer-
chandise being stolen or abused. Arms, cash and money equivalents, jewelry,
pharmaceuticals, and microchips are low-weight/high-value cargo highly
susceptible to theft, and are thus special targets for enhanced security. Cargo
security practitioners learn to work with insurers, claim agents, and law
enforcement—domestically and abroad—as part of their activities. 
Kidnapping/Extortion
People have been seized, borne off, and held for ransom ever since the
beginning of time.57 Greek mythology is full of examples, usually of females
being carried off by males in acts of lust. In fact, familial disputes are still the
causes of scores of kidnappings each year. However, kidnappings-for-profit,
or extortion, infrequently occur in the U.S. and Canada. Security practitio-
ners with executives requiring protection in other nations, however, will
find risks high under some circumstances. Charles P. Nemeth writes: “Kid-
napping and false imprisonment actions are relevant to the security industry
because of their executive protection and counter-terrorism roles."58 Despite
the unlikely event of a kidnapping, organizations rely on executive protec-
tion to make the possibility of such an attempt costly to the attackers, thus
decreasing its likelihood. 
Kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance requires a number of protective
measures to be taken, including the agreement of the insured not to reveal
that the organization has a K&R policy on the lives of its employees. K&R
insurance coverage usually includes specialized services to support family
members during the time a loved one is forcefully held. The same service
interacts with local and national police officials and the kidnappers to negoti-
ate a ransom, if permitted by local laws, and to obtain freedom for the victim. 
Political Unrest/Regional Instability 
Commerce is global. Managing in an international environment demands
sensitivity to issues such as relations with government, especially local
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police; sex roles in the workplace; and relations with customers and ven-
dors. It also demands that management knows how to direct and control
programs from a distance. 
Sometimes, investment in foreign-based operations can be placed at
risk for political or social reasons. In the worst of circumstances, executives
and managers are kidnapped or assets are seized by a vengeful and corrupt
foreign government. Security practitioners in global enterprises where sub-
stantial resources are allocated may be responsible for evaluating and
reporting on changing political and social circumstances that conceivably
could put people and capital at risk. The means by which managers stay
informed of such circumstances include staying in touch with managers in
distant locations; occasionally visiting such facilities and including courtesy
calls to local governmental or police officials; and subscribing to services
that provide information on changing political events around the world. 
Product Diversion/Transshipment 
Manufacturers sometimes have differential pricing policies for products.
That is, the same product can cost different amounts in different countries.
The reasons for this are because some governments set the price of products
to be sold. Further, prices may be different due to local trading conditions.
Companies may manufacture products in one country and export them else-
where, where the price may be lower. An exporter purchases products at the
lower price to market them abroad. Normally, such exporters agree not to
sell products into the markets not covered by the purchase agreement. How-
ever, some exporters or shippers divert the product back to the original
country and sell it into local channels at a discount. This deprives the manu-
facturer of conventional sales and profits. 
The security practitioner learning of such a scam must be able to prove
it. Investigations in the field must be conducted to ascertain whether products
have been diverted from their intended destination. Fact-finders visit retailers,
distributors, shippers, buyers, public markets, and elsewhere to check the reli-
ability of the distribution program. If product diversion is confirmed, the
investigators may seek to prepare an analysis of the profits lost and seek to
receive lost profits from the exporters or distributors who have broken terms
of the contract. Typically, audio products, computer chips and devices, new
fashions, and pharmaceuticals are targets for diversionary fraud. 
Product Tampering/Contamination 
The security and safety of a product are sometimes elusive objectives. Gen-
erally, if a product has been contaminated, it is due to deficient production
370 Security and Operations Management
controls. On rare occasions, however, an empty container of a product may
be used to store a caustic substance, and then instead of being discarded is
re-used in food service. In other cases, consumers can appear to have a reac-
tion to a product for reasons unrelated to its purity. Nonetheless, the result-
ing reports of victimization may draw media attention. In some cases,
however, the contamination is due to deliberate tampering, which can lead
to deaths, injuries, and loss of immediate sales and market share for the
product involved. The stock market valuation of a large, diverse organiza-
tion can be affected by a single criminal case. 
In 1982, capsules of Tylenol, a popular analgesic made by McNeil Lab-
oratories, a division of Johnson & Johnson, were laced with cyanide.59 Seven
persons died. The result was that a massive criminal investigation was
launched, the product was recalled and destroyed, and the organization
sought to make future packaging tamper-resistant. The attack on Tylenol is
the most dramatic case history of medical product contamination, and is
remembered for the way in which the corporation demonstrated its security
and safety measures to the public. Yet other cases of product contamination
occur with less publicity.60 In such circumstances, security practitioners
must engage in supporting investigative efforts, coping with negative pub-
licity, collecting and protecting recalled products, and helping to design pro-
cedures to avoid a recurrence of the incident. 
Organized Crime 
The Federal Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 defines organized crime as
“the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, disciplined
association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but
not limited to gambling, prostitution, loansharking, narcotics, labor racke-
teering, and other unlawful activities of members of such organizations.” In
effect, organized crime is crime that is organized. It should not be associated
with any particular race, ethnicity, or national origin because the types of
organized deviance and their perpetrators shift over time. 
In 1986, the President’s Commission on Organized Crime estimated
that the net income from such activity ranged from between $26.8 billion to
$67.7 billion. Dennis J. Kenney and James O. Finckenauer write: “Organized
crime is not unique to the United States or American society. However, the
wealth, the economic, social, and political structures, and the criminal
opportunities available in the United States present a unique set of circum-
stances that enable organized crime to achieve its highest form here."61
Security practitioners in banking are concerned with the possibility of
organized crime using financial institutions to launder money. In 1989, the
Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) paid a $50 million settle-
ment after pleading guilty to conspiring to launder drug money. The bank
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subsequently ceased operations.62 The U.S. Department of Justice believes
that the vast majority of cargo thefts are the result of organized crime. Busi-
nesses also have suffered from organized crime, from product counterfeit-
ing, product diversion, credit and insurance fraud, and labor racketeering.
Each type of organized crime is somewhat different, as are the means of
attacking it. Security operations managers work with law enforcement and
other victims in quantifying the amount of loss and in qualifying the means
by which such losses occur so that the offenses can be stopped. Despite the
organization and determination of well-financed criminals, the grasp of
organized crime can be loosened by concerted effort.63
THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF SECURITY OPERATIONS 
This book has emphasized origins of various security practices and institu-
tions. It is certain that the pattern of rapid change will continue into the
future, perhaps at a still faster pace. Technologically systems will be able to
provide a higher degree of security, sureness, and safety by enhanced super-
vision, tracking, and reporting. Management styles will continue to change.
Computer systems may lessen the burden of certain procedures and
enhance decision-making. Meanwhile, the role of security operations man-
agers will also evolve. Separate security departments for individual tasks
may be created, such as general patrol, investigations, competitive intelli-
gence, IT protection, and emergency planning, response, and recovery. In
other circumstances, managers may be expected to direct security programs
as well as other activities not currently part of their job description. This
could include human resources, compliance, and risk management. 
Senior management may also seek to eliminate, downsize, or out-
source security programs to contractors and consultants. The likelihood of
this occurring is related to the value perceived and demonstrated by the
security program initiatives. Operating security managers who demonstrate
the ongoing worth of their programs, through efficient operations, measur-
able benefits, and reliable services, will thrive. 
DISCUSSION AND REVIEW 
1. While some people may be better leaders than others, all people can
lead and all people can learn to lead better. Discuss some ideas of
how leadership skills may be improved. 
2. Can leadership exist without power? What kinds of power? 
3. Why do security operations managers tempt to possess—or should
endeavor to possess—exceptional discretion for workplace activi-
ties?
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4. What is the philosophical essence of security as a management prac-
tice?
5. Workplace violence is a major concern among protection profession-
als in large industrial and commercial organizations. Why should
this be so when the workplace—especially an office—is essentially
one of the safest places for people to be? 
6. Why does senior management expect security practitioners to head
the organization’s crisis management and contingency planning
operations?
7. Numerous challenges for security operations at the present involve
the ability to direct and use technology and investigative services. Is
the same person likely to have the skills for both corporate activities?
If not, what are management’s options? 
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Appendix A
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR 
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 
PREAMBLE
Aware that the quality of professional security activity ultimately depends
upon the willingness of practitioners to observe special standards of con-
duct and to manifest good faith in professional relationships, the American
Society for Industrial Security adopts the following Code of Ethics and man-
dates its conscientious observance as a binding condition of membership in
or affiliation with the society: 
CODE OF ETHICS 
I. A member shall perform professional duties in accordance with the
law and the highest moral principles. 
II. A member shall observe the precepts of truthfulness, honesty, and
integrity. 
III. A member shall be faithful and diligent in discharging professional
responsibilities. 
IV. A member shall be competent in discharging professional responsi-
bilities.
V. A member shall safeguard confidential information and exercise due
care to prevent its improper disclosure. 
VI. A member shall not maliciously injure the professional reputation or
practice of colleagues, clients, or employers. 
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ARTICLE I 
A member shall perform professional duties in accordance with the law and
the highest moral principles. 
Ethical Considerations 
I-1 A member shall abide by the law of the land in which the services
are rendered and perform all duties in an honorable manner. 
I-2 A member shall not knowingly become associated in responsibility
for work with colleagues who do not conform to the law and these
ethical standards. 
I-3 A member shall be just and respect the rights of others in performing
professional responsibilities. 
ARTICLE II 
A member shall observe the precepts of truthfulness, honesty, and integrity. 
Ethical Considerations 
II-1 A member shall disclose all relevant information to those having the
right to know. 
II-2 A right to know is a legally and enforcible claim or demand by a per-
son for disclosure of information by a member. Such a right does not
depend upon prior knowledge by the person of the existence of the
information to be disclosed. 
II-3 A member shall not knowingly release misleading information nor
encourage or otherwise participate in the release of such informa-
tion.
ARTICLE III 
A member shall be faithful and diligent in discharging professional respon-
sibilities.
Ethical Considerations 
III-1 A member is faithful when fair and steadfast in adherence to prom-
ises and commitments. 
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III-2 A member is diligent when employing best efforts in an assignment. 
III-3 A member shall not act in matters involving conflicts of interest
without appropriate disclosure and approval. 
III-4 A member shall represent services or products fairly and truthfully. 
ARTICLE IV 
A member shall be competent in discharging professional responsibilities. 
Ethical Considerations 
IV-1 A member is competent who possesses and applies the skills and
knowledge required for the task. 
IV-2 A member shall not accept a task beyond the member’s competence
nor shall competence be claimed when not possessed. 
ARTICLE V 
A member shall safeguard confidential information and exercise due care to
prevent its improper disclosure. 
Ethical Considerations 
V-1 Confidential information is nonpublic information, the disclosure of
which is restricted. 
V-2 Due care requires that the professional must not knowingly reveal
confidential information, or use a confidence to the disadvantage of
the principal or to the advantage of the member or a third person,
unless the principal consents after full disclosure of all the facts. This
confidentiality continues after the business relationship between the
member and his or her principal has terminated. 
V-3 A member who receives information and has not agreed to be bound
by confidentiality is not bound from disclosing it. A member is not
bound by confidential disclosures made of acts or omissions that
constitute a violation of the law. 
V-4 Confidential disclosures made by a principal to a member are not
recognized by law as privileged in a legal proceeding. The member
may be required to testify in a legal proceeding to the information
received in confidence from his principal over the objection of his
principal’s counsel. 
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V-5 A member shall not disclose confidential information for personal
gain without appropriate authorization. 
ARTICLE VI 
A member shall not maliciously injure the professional reputation or prac-
tice of colleagues, clients, or employers. 
Ethical Considerations 
VI-1 A member shall not comment falsely and with malice concerning a
colleague’s competence, performance, or professional capabilities. 
VI-2 A members who knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, that
another member has failed to conform to the Society’s Code of Ethics
shall present such information to the Ethical Standards Committee in
accordance with Article VIII of the Society’s bylaws. 
CENSURE, SUSPENSION, AND EXPULSION 
According to the ASIS bylaws, as revised through June 1999, censure, sus-
pension, or expulsion of a Society member is possible, regardless of when
the alleged offense may have been committed and regardless of when the
alleged offense came to the attention of the Society. Six conditions exist for a
sanction to be imposed. These include (1) violation of the Code of Ethics
established by the Society and (2) any conviction for commission of a felony
or a misdemeanor which has been reduced from a felony. 
If in the opinion of the majority the members of the Ethical Standards
Committee find that a member has engaged in conduct enumerated as a
cause, the Committee shall notify the member by registered mail that
charges will be submitted to a Board of Review for consideration. The mem-
ber is permitted to appear before the Board and defend himself or herself
and have legal counsel or a member of the Society appointed by him also
present. The Chair of the Ethical Standards Committee shall appoint at least
three members including a chair to hold a hearing or take testimony in a
particular case. 
Source: ASIS and J. Kleinig with Y. Zhang (1993). Professional Law Enforcement Codes: A Documen-
tary Collection. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
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Appendix B
REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON PRIVATE 
SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
Private security in the U.S. employed over one million persons in 1976, and
was growing at a rate of over 10 percent per year when the Report on the Task
Force on Private Security was published. Relative to its size, little had been
written about private security on a national level. Yet the report noted,
“There is virtually no aspect of society that is not in one way or another
affected by private security.” The Task Force had the mission of improving
the quality of private security. To do so, the Task Force—made up of 13 per-
sons with a staff of 11 and supplemented by an editorial staff—produced an
extensive report. Over a quarter of a century after its publication, this report
contains reasonable objectives for the interest of the public—not all of which
has been achieved. The following are the standards and goals identified by
the Task Force: 
1. Selection of Personnel 
Goal 1.1: Selection of Qualified Personnel. Primary emphasis in the screen-
ing process should be placed on selecting qualified personnel who will per-
form efficiently and who will preferably make a career of private security. 
Goal 1.2: Commensurate Salaries. In an effort to reduce the attrition rate of
the industry, salaries for private security personnel should be commensurate
with the experience, training and/or education, job responsibilities, and
other criteria related to the job performed. 
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Standard 1.3: Pre-employment Screening. In order to determine whether
prospective personnel are trustworthy and capable, pre-employment screen-
ing should be initiated. Pre-employment screening should include a screen-
ing interview, an honesty test, a background investigation, and other
appropriate job-related tests. 
Standard 1.4: Employer Exchange of Information. Employers should coop-
erate in exchanging information on previous work performance and other
data relating to selection criteria. 
Standard 1.5: Equal Employment Opportunity. Employers should comply
with equal employment opportunity guidelines and other federal, state, or
local guidelines that preclude discrimination based on sex, race, creed, or age. 
Standard 1.6: Application for Employment. An employment application
should be used to provide a basis for the screening process (and should con-
tain comprehensive educational and work histories of the applicant and
other information). 
Standard 1.7: Availability of Criminal History Records. Criminal history
records for offenses, specified by statute or other authority as grounds for
denying employment, should be made available to employers to assist them
in the screening of private security personnel.  
Standard 1.8: Minimum Pre-employment Screening Qualifications. The
following minimum pre-employment screening qualifications should be
established for private security personnel: 
1. Minimum age of 18 
2. High school diploma or equivalent written examination 
3. Written examination to determine the ability to understand and per-
form duties assigned 
4. No record of conviction, as stated in Standard 1.7 
5. Minimum physical standards 
2. Personnel Training 
Goal 2.1: Training in Private Security. The responsibilities assumed by pri-
vate security personnel in the protection of persons and property require
training. Training should be instituted at all levels to ensure that personnel
are fully prepared to exercise their responsibilities effectively and efficiently. 
Goal 2.2: Professional Certification Programs. Professional associations
should study the feasibility of developing voluntary certification programs
for private security managerial personnel. (ASIS established the Certified
Protection Professional program in 1979. Other certification programs,
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including Architectural Hardware Consultant (AHE), Certified Fraud Exam-
iner (CFE), Certified Protection Officer (CPO), and Certified Security Super-
visor (CSS), have also emerged.) 
Standard 2.3: Job Description. Private security employers should develop
job descriptions for each private security position. 
Standard 2.4: Training Related to Job Functions. Private security employers
should ensure that training programs are designed, presented, and evalu-
ated in relation to the job functions to be performed. 
Standard 2.5: Pre-assignment and Basic Training. Any person employed as an
investigator or detective, guard or watchman, armored car personnel or armored
courier, alarm systems installer or servicer, or alarm respondent, including part-
time personnel and those presently employed, should successfully: 
1. Complete a minimum of eight hours formal pre-assignment training 
2. Complete a basic training course of a minimum of 32 hours within
three months of assignment. A maximum of 16 hours can be super-
vised on-the-job training. 
Standard 2.6: Arms Training. All armed private security personnel, includ-
ing part-time personnel and those presently employed, should: 
1. Be required to successfully complete a 24-hour firearms course that
includes legal and policy requirements—or submit evidence of com-
petence and proficiency—prior to assignment to a job that requires a
firearm 
2. Be required to requalify at least once every 12 months with the fire-
arm(s) they carry while performing private security duties. (The
requalification phase should cover legal and policy requirements.) 
Standard 2.7: Ongoing Training. Private security employers should ensure
that private security personnel are given ongoing training by using roll-call
training, training bulletins, and other training media. 
Standard 2.8: Training of Supervisors and Managers. Private security
employers should provide effective job-related training for supervisory and
managerial employees. Appropriate prior training, education, or profes-
sional certification should be accepted to meet this requirement. 
Standard 2.9: State Authority and Responsibility for Training. A state gov-
ernment regulatory agency should have the authority and responsibility to
accredit training schools, approve training curriculums, and certify instruc-
tors for the private security industry. 
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Standard 2.10: State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts. Appropriate
state boards and agencies should coordinate efforts to provide training
opportunities for private security personnel and persons interested in pre-
pared for security employment, through utilization of physical and person-
nel resources of area vocational schools and colleges and universities. 
3. Conduct and Ethics 
Goal 3.1: Code of Ethics. A code of ethics should be adopted and enforced
for private security personnel and employers. 
Standard 3.2: Conduct of Private Security Personnel. Private security per-
sonnel should perform their security functions within generally recognized
guidelines for the protection of individual rights. 
Standard 3.3: Reporting of Criminal Violations. All felonies and serious
misdemeanors discovered by private security personnel should be reported
to appropriate criminal justice agencies. Private security personnel should
cooperate with those criminal justice agencies in all subsequent actions relat-
ing to those crimes. 
Standard 3.4: Employer Responsibilities. Employers should provide a
working environment, including adequate and serviceable equipment, con-
ducive to the efficient performance of security functions assigned. 
Standard 3.5: Maintaining Data on Criminal Activities. The private security
industry has a responsibility to maintain internal data on criminal activities to
develop, improve, and assess effectiveness of crime reduction programs. 
4. Alarm Systems 
Standard 4.1: Alarm Systems Research. Appropriate research should be
conducted to develop new methods and techniques to transmit alarm sig-
nals and enhance alarm systems capabilities. 
Standard 4.2: Backup Power for Alarms. All alarm systems terminating at a
law enforcement agency should be equipped with a standby power source. 
Standard 4.3: Certified Training of Alarm Sales and Service Personnel.
There should be a certified training program for alarm sales personnel and
alarm service technicians. 
Standard 4.4: Compatibility of Sensors. Alarm companies and alarm users
should only use those sensor devices in alarm systems that are operationally
compatible with the area in which the system is located. 
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Standard 4.5: Training and Instruction of Alarm Users by Alarm Compa-
nies. Companies and others installing alarm systems should be required to
instruct or train users and their employees in the proper operation of the
system and to provide continued guidance when needed. 
Standard 4.6 Joint Corporation to Reduce Alarm System Costs. Govern-
mental agencies such as the law enforcement assistance administration; fed-
eral, state, and local regulatory agencies, the alarm industry; law
enforcement agencies; and telephone companies should work together to
reduce the cost of alarm systems and improve the efficiency and the reliabil-
ity of operation and transmission.
Standard 4.7: Special Trunklines into Law Enforcement Facilities and
Automatic Dialers. Consistent with existing technology, automatic tele-
phone dialing services that are connected to alarm systems should not be
keyed or interconnected with emergency law enforcement agencies’ tele-
phone lines. 
Standard 4.8: Annual Alarm Inspection. Local government should require
all alarm systems users whose systems ordinarily result in a law enforce-
ment response to have their systems inspected at least once every year. 
Standard 4.9: Alarm Systems Servicing Capability. Every jurisdiction
should have a disclosure law requiring persons in the business of alarm sys-
tems sales to make known prior to a sale where the alarm system can be ser-
viced or where a service arrangement can be obtained. Proof that a servicing
arrangement, such as a contract or agreement, is in existence should be sub-
mitted to a law enforcement agency by persons desiring to transmit alarm
signals to that agency. 
Standard 4.10: Alarm User Permit Systems and the False Alarm Problem.
Local governments should establish and enforce an alarm user permit sys-
tem to regulate and reduce false alarms. Verified excessive false alarming
ordinarily resulting in a law enforcement response should be grounds for
permit revocation, suspension, and other appropriate penalties. 
Standard 4.11: Ownership and Operation of Alarm Systems. Ownership or
operation of alarm systems should be the province of private enterprise, and
the government ownership or operation of alarm systems should be dis-
couraged, provided, however, that government should not be precluded
from: 
1. Operating such systems in temporary or emergency situations 
2. Owning or operating alarm systems that are located in publicly
owned or leased buildings, annunciate in the same or other govern-
ment buildings, and are responded to by government employees 
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3. Providing private individuals and businesses with funds for the
acquisition of crime prevention devices provided that such devices
are purchased on the open market and remain the property of the
consumer. 
5. Environmental Security 
Standard 5.1: Improvement of Door and Window Security. Governments
should examine those standards developed for protection of doors, win-
dows, and other openings. Those standards that provide the most economi-
cal level of effective protection and deterrence should be considered for
incorporation into building codes. 
Standard 5.2: Adequate Security Lighting. Where appropriate, property
should be adequately lighted to discourage criminal activity and enhance
public safety. 
Standard 5.3: Computer Security. Possessors of computers should have a
comprehensive protection plan for both physical site and data, regardless of
whether the computer is used solely for their own needs or for providing
computer services to others. 
Standard 5.4: Crime Prevention in Design. Architects, builders, and/or
their professional societies should continue to develop performance stan-
dards of crime prevention in design with advice from law enforcement
agencies and the private security industry. 
Standard 5.5: Development of Environmental Security Expertise. Those
companies selling security services should develop the expertise necessary
to offer environmental security planning services. 
Standard 5.6: Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning. Envi-
ronmental security should be a part of comprehensive planning from the
design phase to the completion of construction projects. 
Standard 5.7: Crime Prevention Courses in School of Architecture and Urban
Planning. Schools offering courses in architecture or urban planning should
include in the curricula courses on architectural design for crime prevention. 
Standard 5.8: Inclusion of Crime Prevention Measures in Existing Codes
and the Consideration of Building Security Codes. Crime prevention mea-
sures should be an identifiable part of assisting all proposed regulatory
codes. Building, fire, and safety codes should be reviewed by regulatory
bodies and private security representatives to avoid conflicting with imple-
mentation of effective crime prevention measures. 
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Standard 5.9: Crime Impact Forecast. Crime impact statements should be
included in the planning phase of all new public and private building and
development projects. 
Standard 5.10: Crime Prevention Courses as a Job Requirement. Architects
and urban planners should be encouraged to attend seminars or classes in
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Proof of suc-
cessful completion of a CPTED seminar or course should then become a nec-
essary prerequisite for employment or the obtaining of a license. 
6. Law Enforcement Agencies 
Goal 6.1: Interactive Policies. Effective interaction between the private secu-
rity industry and the law enforcement agencies is imperative for successful
crime prevention and depends to a large extent on clear and understandable
published policies developed by their administrator. Policies should be
developed to serve as guides for modification by appropriate agencies. 
Standard 6.2: Survey and Liaison with Private Security. Law enforcement
agencies should conduct a survey and maintain a current roster of those pri-
vate security industry components operating in the agencies’ jurisdictions,
and designate at least one staff officer to serve as a liaison with them. 
Standard 6.3: Policies and Procedures. For law enforcement agencies and
the private security industries to most effectively work within the same
jurisdiction, policies and procedures should be developed covering: 
1. The delineation of working roles of law enforcement officers and pri-
vate security personnel 
2. The continuous prompt and responsible interchange of information 
3. Cooperative actions between law enforcement agencies and the pri-
vate security industry 
Standard 6.4: Multilevel Law Enforcement Training in Private Security.
There should be multilevel training programs for public law enforcement
officials, including but not limited to the following topics: 
1. The role and mission of the private security industry 
2. The legal status and types of services provided by private security
companies
3. Interchange of information, crime reporting, and cooperative actions
with the industry 
4. Orientation in technical and operating procedures 
388 Security and Operations Management
Standard 6.5: Mistaking Identity of Private Security Personnel. Title terms,
verbal representations, and visual items that cause the public to mistake pri-
vate security personnel for law enforcement officers should be eliminated;
security employers should be ensured that their personnel and equipment
are easily distinguishable from public law enforcement personnel and
equipment.
Standard 6.6: State Regulation of Private Security Uniforms, Equipment,
and Job Titles. Each state should develop regulation covering the use of pri-
vate security uniforms, equipment, company names, and personnel titles
that do not conflict with those in use by law enforcement agencies within the
state.
Standard 6.7: Law Enforcement Secondary Employment. Law enforcement
administrators should ensure that secondary employment of public law
enforcement personnel in the private security industry does not create a con-
flict of interest, and that the public resources are not used for private pur-
poses.
Standard 6.8: Law Enforcement Officer Employment as a Private Security
Principal or Manager. No law enforcement officer should be a principal or
manager of a private security operation where such association creates a
conflict of interest. 
Standard 6.9: Private Investigative Work. Law enforcement officers should
be strictly forbidden from performing any private investigative work. 
7. Consumers of Security Services 
Goal 7.1: Consumer Responsibility for Selection of Security Services. The
consumer of private security services has a responsibility to evaluate sys-
tems and services prior to acquisition in order to ensure the best crime-
reduction results for himself or herself and other members of the public
affected by those systems and services. 
Standard 7.2: Consumer Assistance Committees. Private security profes-
sional associates and organizations should form permanent committees to
develop useful guides for the evaluation and acquisition of goods and ser-
vices and to provide clearinghouses for professional response to consumer
inquiries.
Standard 7.3: Development of Expertise by Private and Governmental
Consumer Agencies. Government consumer protection bureaus, better
business associations, and private consumer groups should develop suffi-
cient knowledge of the private security industry to enable them to intelli-
gently evaluate complaints and advise consumers. 
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Standard 7.4: Private Security Advertising Standards. The private security
industry should adhere to advertising standards that accurately portray to
the public the nature and quality of the service to be provided. 
8. Higher Education and Research 
Standard 8.1: State Review of Private Security Task Force Report. Each
state should provide a mechanism to review and recommend implementa-
tion, as appropriate, of the standards and goals contained in this report. 
Standard 8.2: National Private Security Resource and Research Institute.
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration should encourage the
development of a national private security resource and research institute.
In addition, all universities, companies, organizations, associations, and
individuals concerned with private security should increase their efforts in
private security research. 
Standard 8.3: Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses. Colleges and
universities should develop and offer noncredit and credit seminars and
courses to meet the needs of private security personnel. 
Standard 8.4: Degree Programs for Private Security. The private security
industry and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration should coop-
erate in the encouragement and development of: 
1. Certificate, Associate of Arts, or Associate of Science degree pro-
grams designed to meet local industry needs 
2. Undergraduate and graduate programs designed to meet private
security needs 
9. Regulatory Board 
Standard 9.1: State Regulation. Regulation of the private security industry
should be performed at the state level with consideration for uniformity and
reciprocity among all the states. 
Standard 9.2: Regulatory Board for Private Security. State-level regulation
should be through a regulatory board and staff responsible for the regula-
tion of private security activities within that state. This board should have
sufficient personnel to perform adequately and promptly their tasks of
screening and investigating. 
Standard 9.3: State Regulatory Board Membership. The state regulatory
board should include, as a minimum, representatives of licensed security
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service businesses; businesses using proprietary security; local police
departments; consumers of security services; members of the general public;
and individuals who are registered with the board and are presently
employed in the private security field. 
Standard 9.4: Regulatory Board Hearing Procedure. The state regulatory
board should establish a hearing procedure for consideration and resolution
of the complaints of applicants, licensees, registrants, consumers, and the
public. To assist in the implementation of this role, the board should be
granted the means necessary to require appearance of witnesses and pro-
duction of documents. 
Standard 9.5: Regulatory Board Funding. The state regulatory board
should be funded by non-confiscatory license and registration fees and such
general revenue funds as may be necessary for the effective operation of the
board. 
Standard 9.6: Regulatory Board Access to Criminal Record Information.
The State regulatory board should be granted statutory authority for access
to all criminal history record information so that it can conduct the neces-
sary criminal history record check of all applicants for licenses and registra-
tion.
10. Licensing 
Standard 10.1: Licensing of Security Businesses. Appropriate licensing
should be required for any person or legal entity engaged in the business of: 
1. Selling, installing, or servicing alarm systems 
2. Providing respondents to alarm signal devices 
3. Providing secured transportation and protection of valuables from
one place to anther under armed guard 
4. Providing guard or patrol services 
5. Providing investigative services 
6. Providing detection-of-deception services for the benefit of others 
Standard 10.2: License Applications. License applications should include
sufficient information about the applicant to enable the regulatory agency to
determine if ethical, competent, and responsible services can be provided.
(The Standard proposes a verified statement of the qualifying agent’s experi-
ence qualifications, form of business, and information on the applicant, each
director, and shareholders holding 10 percent of equity or more equity than
the qualifying agent. The information should include directory-type data
and two classifiable sets of fingerprints.) 
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Standard 10.3: Qualifying Agents. License applicants should be required to
name one individual who will act as the licensee’s qualifying agent. The
qualifying agent should meet the following qualifications: 
1. Be at least 18 years of age 
2. Be an active participant in the business of the licensee 
3. Not have been convicted of any felony or crime involving moral tur-
pitude or have any criminal charges and/or indictments pending,
unless pardoned or granted a special exemption by the regulatory
agency
4. Not be under any present adjudication of incompetency 
5. Be experienced in some area of security relevant to the license being
sought
Standard 10.4: Notification of Changes in Status of Licensee. The licensee
should be required to notify the regulatory board within 14 days of any
change in the status of the licensee previously reported in the licensee appli-
cation.
Standard 10.5: License Renewal. The license to engage in a security service
business should be renewed every year. 
Standard 10.6: Display of License Certificate. The licensee should be
required to display the license certificate in public view in the licensee’s
principal place of business as well as display a copy of the certificate in each
branch office. 
Standard 10.7: Bonding and Insurance. When appropriate, due to the
nature of the work, the applicant should file a surety bond and proof of pub-
lic liability insurance with the regulatory agency before a license is issued. 
Standard 10.8: License Denial, Revocation, or Suspension. A license may
be denied, revoked, or suspended if the licensee, its qualifying agent, resi-
dent manager, or any officer, director or shareholder owning a 10 percent or
greater interest in the licensee (provided the licensee is not listed on a
national securities exchange or registered under section 12 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) does the following: 
1. Violates any provisions of the regulatory act or of the rules and regu-
lations promulgated under the act 
2. Commits an act resulting in the conviction of a felony or a crime
involving moral turpitude, where such conviction reflects unfavor-
ably on fitness to engage in a security service business 
3. Practices fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
4. Makes a material misstatement in the application for or renewal of
the license 
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5. Demonstrates incompetence or untrustworthiness in actions affect-
ing the conduct of the security services business 
11. Registration 
Standard 11.1: Registration of Private Security Personnel. Every person
who is employed to perform the functions of an investigator or detective,
guard or watchman, armored car personnel or armed courier, alarm systems
installer or servicer, or alarm respondent should be registered with the pri-
vate security regulatory board. 
Standard 11.2: Registration Qualifications. Every applicant seeking regis-
tration to perform a specific security function in an unarmed capacity
should meet the following minimum qualifications: 
1. Be at least 18 years of age 
2. Be physically and mentally competent and capable of performing the
specific job function being registered for 
3. Be morally responsible in the judgment of the regulatory board 
4. Have successfully completed the training requirements set forth in
Standard 2.5 
Standard 11.3: Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel. Every appli-
cant who seeks registration to perform a specific security function in an
armed capacity should meet the following minimum qualifications: 
1. Be at least 18 years of age 
2. Have a high school diploma or pass an equivalent written examina-
tion
3. Be mentally competent and capable of performing in an armed
capacity
4. Be morally responsible in the judgment of the regulatory board 
5. Have no felony convictions involving the use of a weapon 
6. Have no felony or misdemeanor convictions that reflect upon the
applicant’s ability to perform a security function in an armed capac-
ity
7. Have no physical defects that would hinder job performance 
8. Have successfully completed the training requirements for armed
personnel set forth in Standards 2.5 and 2.6 
Standard 11.4: Permanent Registration Card. So that employers, consumers
of security services, and the public know that an individual is registered to
perform specific security job functions, armed or unarmed, a permanent reg-
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istration card should be issued and strictly controlled by the regulatory
board. This card should not be issued until the applicant has met the mini-
mum qualifications for registration in an armed or unarmed capacity. 
Standard 11.5: Temporary Permit. Pending the issuance of the permanent
registration card, provision should be made for the issuance of a nonrenew-
able temporary permit to allow an applicant to perform a specific security
job function, in an unarmed capacity only, for a maximum of 30 days. This
permit should be issued immediately upon completion of a favorable pre-
liminary check of the applicant with the local law enforcement agency and
other available sources. 
Standard 11.6: Registration Renewal. Individuals who are registered as
armed security personnel should be required to renew their registrations
annually. All other registrants should be required to file for renewal of regis-
tration every five years. 
Standard 11.7: Suspension and Revocation. Registration cards and tempo-
rary permits may be suspended or revoked for good cause, after a hearing,
when a registrant: 
1. Is convicted of a misdemeanor or felony that reflects unfavorably on
his or her fitness to perform a security function 
2. Has been formally charged with a criminal offense, the nature of
which may make him or her unable to meet the minimum qualifica-
tions of registration 
3. Fires a weapon without justification 
4. Engages in conduct detrimental to the public safety or welfare 
5. No longer meets the requirements of registration or violates any pro-
visions of the act 
Standard 11.8: Sanctions. Non-registered persons who perform a security
function requiring registration should be subject to criminal penalties. Any
person authorizing or permitting a non-registered person to perform a secu-
rity function requiring registration should be subject to criminal penalties. 
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GLOSSARY
ABC technique: A time management concept in which the adherent cate-
gorizes items to be done according to their vital importance, nominal
importance, and unimportance. 
Acceptance theory: A concept advanced by Chester Barnard holding that
subordinates will cooperate in the goals of the organization and assent
to authority when certain conditions were met. 
Adverse impact: Having an opposed or contrary effect on members of the
public who are protected by legislation. For example, an individual
with a physical disability may be able to perform all the duties of a
security receptionist or alarm monitoring agent except that the com-
puter keyboard is difficult to reach, creating an adverse impact. Cut-
ting a semi-circular area from the counter would be an appropriate
accommodation.
Amortization: The allocation and charge to expense of the cost or other
basis of an intangible asset over its estimated useful life. Intangible
assets like goodwill are not amortizable. Examples of amortizable
intangibles include capital costs, leasehold improvements and inter-
ests, patents, and copyrights. 
Analysis: The process of separating a problem into its constituent parts or
basic principles so as to determine the nature of the whole and to
examine it methodically. Related to planning. 
At-will employment: The concept that an employee may be fired at any
time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. Originated by
Horace G. Wood in 1877. The at-will concept of employment was less
common in the second half of the 20th century, but still is the basis of
employment for most private sector and institutional employees. 
Auditor: See independent auditor. 
Baseline: Readings on a polygraph chart that form a point of comparison
for the psychological responses to polygraph questions. 
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale (BARS): A behaviorally oriented
scale sometimes used to assess performance. 
Biometric: A security identification system that uses a physical feature
and measures it automatically. The information from the physical fea-
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ture is translated into a digital register, which is then compared with
the values found in the approved database list. 
Break-even: The point at which fixed costs and variable costs equate with
sales or revenues volume. 
Budget: A financial statement prepared prior to an accounting period con-
taining the financial plans to be achieved during that period. 
Bureaucracy: An organization with the following traits: a chain of com-
mand with fewer people at the top than at the bottom; well-defined
positions and responsibilities; generally inflexible rules and proce-
dures; and delegation of authority from the top down. Considered the
most rational form of organization by Max Weber. 
Capital expenditures: The cost of purchasing or improving a fixed asset,
which will be depreciated over the estimated useful life of that asset. 
Cash flow: A measurement of the inflow and outflow of cash and cash
equivalents over a financial period. 
Certificate of good conduct: A written document that determines whether
a person is law-abiding at that time in the area in which the document
is produced. 
Certificate of relief: An order by a civilian or military judge in which an
offender’s criminal record may be sealed from public scrutiny or con-
sideration in employment circumstances. It may be lifted in cases of
employment consideration by government. 
Charge coupled device: A camera that uses a semiconductor microchip as
the imaging device. 
Chief financial officer (CFO): The senior official in an organization
responsible for financial activities. 
Collusion: A conspiracy between two or more persons to defraud a person
or persons of their rights by fraudulent means. When one fraudster is
an employee and another is outside the organization, the effects from
the secret combination can be deep and costly. 
Concentric circles of protection: The notion that all countermeasures to
crime and disorder have their limitations; therefore, numerous coun-
termeasures need to be designed and implemented to protect a facility
or program. Also called layered security. 
Contingency: Something that may or may not happen; a possibility. In
emergency planning, the term refers to an emergency or casualty. 
Contingency management: See crisis management. 
Contracting-out: The process of transferring responsibility for certain
tasks or duties to another party or organization. 
Crisis management: The process of dealing with an event or set of circum-
stances that can lead to loss to persons or an organization; a critical
point that demands resolute action. 
Cross-training: When an employee in one primary job task is trained in
another or other tasks. 
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Cyber-crime: A variety of offenses related to information technology. They
include extortion, boiler-room investment and gambling fraud, and
fraudulent transfers of funds. The term was coined by Donn B. Parker. 
Delegation: The giving of authority by one person to another; for exam-
ple, a manager delegates responsibility to employees. 
Denial-of-service attack: An attack on a Web site that usually crashes the
system. The attacker arranges to trigger a large number of simulta-
neous demands on a system that crashes as a consequence. 
Depreciation: The cost of the economic benefits of a tangible fixed asset
that has been consumed over a financial period. 
Deputizing: The process of selecting a personnel to manage or direct an
operational plan. 
Diligence: A measure of prudence or activity that is to be expected from a
reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances; it
is not measured by an absolute standard, but is dependent upon cir-
cumstances of a particular case. Also referred to as due diligence. 
Director: A person appointed or elected according to law and authorized
to manage and direct the affairs of a corporation or company. Inside
directors are employees, like the CEO or CFO; outside directors are not
employees, but may be officers of other corporations and possess skills
and experience believed to be valuable in directing the affairs of the
corporation.
Discipline: The process of controlling behavior (for example, in a work-
place).
Disguised purpose test: A test instrument that seeks to determine charac-
teristics of deviance or unreliability without asking direct questions.
Also called a covert test instrument. 
Dividends: The distribution of current or accumulated earnings to the
shareholders of a corporation pro-rata based on the number of shares
owned.
Embezzlement: The willful taking or converting to one’s own use the
assets of another which the wrongdoer acquired possession of lawfully
during the course of office, employment, or reasons of trust. Embezzle-
ment differs from larceny in that the original taking of property was
lawful or with the consent of the owner; in larceny, the felonious intent
must have existed at the time of the initial taking. 
Equity: The extent of a stockholder’s proportionate ownership interest in
the corporation’s capital stock and surplus; the extent of ownership
interest in a venture. Also refers to injustice as a concept of fairness as
contrasted with strictly formulated rules of common law. 
Ethics: Relating to moral action, conduct, motive or character; profession-
ally right or befitting conduct, conforming to professional standards of
conduct.
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False negative: An erroneous decision that a person is not deceptive when
she or he actually is deceptive. Also called Type I or A. 
False positive: An erroneous decision that a person is being deceptive
when she or he actually is being truthful. Also called Type II or B. 
Firewalls: A network security system used to monitor and restrict external
and internal traffic. 
Fraud: The criminal offense of intentionally deceiving another person or
persons to obtain financial or monetary gains. Fraud usually does not
involve property damage or threatened or actual physical injury to
another. 
Functional foremanship: A concept introduced by Frederick W. Taylor
that when different responsibilities are understood, managerial or
supervisory employees can change without affecting production by
workers.
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP): Standards and con-
cepts followed by accountants in measuring, recording, and reporting
transactions.
Graphic user interface (GUI): A system whereby a user may direct a com-
puter program by touching or clicking on symbols located on the mon-
itor screen. 
Grievance: A complaint filed by an employee, or by his or her union repre-
sentative, regarding working conditions to seek resolution for which
procedural measures are available in the union agreement. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The economic activity of a country dur-
ing a particular calendar year; an international convention aggregating
economic activity. 
Gross National Product (GNP): GNP includes the GDP plus net income
transfer from international economic activity. 
Halo effect: The tendency of some evaluators to judge workplace perfor-
mance of subordinates as consistently superior, despite evidence to the
contrary in some situations. 
Hawthorne investigations: Investigations conducted by Elton T. Mayo
and others at the Western Electric company’s plant in Hawthorne, Illi-
nois. The research seemed to establish that paying attention to workers
affected production output more than extrinsic factors did. 
Hierarchy of human needs: Proposed by Abraham Maslow, this hierarchy
identifies five levels of needs, with a lower one having to be satisfied
before the next higher one can become important. Also called
Maslow’s pyramid or ladder. 
Independent auditor: Usually a firm or corporation retained by a corpora-
tion to check and attest to the accuracy, fairness, and general accept-
ability of accounting records and statements. Usually performed by a
certified public accountant. 
Glossary 399
Informed consent: A person agrees in writing to allow something to hap-
pen (such as a check of credit records) based on disclosure of relevant
facts relating to the procedure. 
Inspector-general: Government personnel whose primary function is to
conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to programs
and operations of the particular agency. May investigate allegations by
whistler-blowers. 
Job description: A statement of facts about a particular job that can be
used to determine job requirements (skill, knowledge, physical and
mental efforts), responsibility, and working conditions. It sets out the
requirements that applicants should be able to meet. 
Knowledge workers: A term coined by Peter F. Drucker referring to exec-
utives, managers, and individual professionals who, through their
knowledge or positions, make decisions that have a significant impact
on the performance and results of the whole group or organization. 
Local area network (LAN): A collection of computing resources (such as
PCs, printers, mini-computers, and mainframes) linked by a common
transmission medium such as a coaxial cable. 
Larceny: The unlawful taking and removal of another’s property with the
intent to convert it or deprive the owner of its use. 
Liabilities: An obligation to transfer economic benefit as a result of a
passed transaction. 
Likert scale: The scale used in certain tests that ask test-takers to judge a
question on a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1 and 7 represent the extremes
and 4 represents the midpoint, and the numbers between the extremes
represent degrees of difference. 
Line-item: An expense planned on an ongoing basis, such as a position. 
Management by Objectives (MBO): A popular management strategy in
which employees and supervisors set mutually agreed-upon goals and
endeavor to reach them. Proposed by Peter F. Drucker and Douglas
McGregor in the 1950s. 
Middle management: Managers who supervise first-line managers and
some non-management personnel. They coordinate tasks and do some
planning to achieve organizational goals. 
Model penal code: A codification of the principles of criminal law pub-
lished by the American Law Institute in 1962. It served to unify state
codes following its publication. 
Moonlighting: Working at a second job after regular working hours. Some
police officers moonlight as private security officers. 
National Labor Relations Act: This 1935 law requires organizations to rec-
ognize and bargain with the union if that union has been legally estab-
lished by the organization’s employees. Section 9(b)(3) permits
employers the right to terminate voluntary recognition of non-guard
unions to perform security services. Also called the Wagner Act. 
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Negligence: The failure to do something that a reasonable person, guided
by ordinary considerations, would do; the failure to use such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar cir-
cumstances. The opposite of diligence. Negligence varies in signifi-
cance from slight negligence—a failure to exercise great care—to gross
negligence—the intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reck-
less disregard of consequences affecting the life or property of others. 
Organizing: The process of amassing critical resources needed in a plan so
that the action aspect of the plan may get under way. 
Outsourcing: See contracting-out. 
Overt integrity test: An employment test that raises specific questions
about the test-taker’s past deviant behavior as well as attitudes toward
such behavior in others. See Disguised-purpose test.
Pareto principle: A rule that posit that 80 percent of business activity
comes from about 20 percent of the customers or clients. Named for
Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist. 
Peace Officer Standards of Training (POST): Training requirements whereby
someone is trained following the statute of a particular state in the
legal basis of making arrests. Some security officers are trained as
peace officers with supplemental training that requires an average of
40 hours of classroom instruction. 
Performance standards: These standards compare the actual work of an
employee with a standard rate of work. 
Peter principle: This idea stipulates, semi-seriously, that employees rise to
the level of their incompetence. Proposed by Lawrence J. Peter and
Raymond Hull. 
Piece-rate: A form of financial incentive, proposed by Frederick W. Taylor,
that provided for higher compensation to workers who produced at
rates above the expected level. 
Plaintiff’s action: Such cases are usually in civil cases in which a com-
plainant seeks redress for alleged grievances and harms. Negligent hir-
ing and retention may be the basis for such a case. 
Planning: The process of determining how a problem or opportunity may
be responded to. Involves identifying problems or opportunities, ana-
lyzing relevant characteristics of the circumstances, organizing the for-
mal response, deputizing a leader to head the response effort, and
supervising the person(s) selected. 
Privatization: The process whereby a public entity, usually a government,
contracts-out for services or materials to the private sector that the
public sector might formally have managed for itself. 
Profit: A reward to that factor of production known as enterprise; the
residual figure in payment for risk-bearing; the money remaining after
all expenses, amortization, taxes, and other charges have been sub-
tracted.
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Proprietary: Refers to property ownership; possessorship of assets or
opportunity. In a proprietary security department, all employees are
normally full-time, not contract, employees. 
Proximate cause: A natural and continuous sequence that produces a
direct result. 
Publicly-held corporations: Corporations whose stock is held by and
available to the public. Such shares are usually traded on a securities
exchange or over-the-counter. 
Pygmalion effect: Named for the George Bernard Shaw play in which a
simple flower girl was transformed into a refined socialite; a kind of
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Quality circles: Employees’ committees that analyze and solve quality
problems. An outgrowth of the work conducted by W. Edwards Sem-
ing.
Relevant/irrelevant technique: An examination technique that uses two
types of questions—relevant questions and neutral questions—to
assess the subject’s baseline response. 
Relevant questions: Polygraph text questions about the topic or topics
under investigation. 
Reliability (in pre-employment tests): Implies that the same test will pro-
duce about the same results if administered at a later time. 
Request for Proposal (RFP): The process by which an organization for-
mally requests that bidders indicate how they will provide the services
required by a client and their proposed fee. 
Respondeat superior: The doctrine that states that the master (employer)
is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of servants (employees)
and is a principal for these agents. 
Return on equity (ROE): An accounting ratio in which the net income is
expressed as a percentage of capital employed. 
Return on investment (ROI): An accounting ratio in which the net income
is expressed as a percentage of capital employed plus cost of capital. 
Risk management: The process of identifying hazards of property
insured; the casualty contemplated in a specific contract of insurance;
the degree of hazard; a specific contingency or peril. Generally not the
same as security management, but may be related in concerns and
activities. Work is done by a risk manager. 
Security design: The process by which a new facility or retrofit is designed
and engineered with protective principles considered, usually from the
earliest stages of planning. 
Senior management: Usually refers to headquarters staff officers. 
Shareholder: A person who owns shares or stocks in a corporation or
joint-stock company. Also called stakeholder, stockholder, or stock-
owner. 
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Shareholders’ equity: The asset value in the organization belonging to
shareholders, plus any reserves. 
Supervising: The process whereby a manager responsible for an operation
ascertains the progress of the intended plan, including ongoing evalua-
tion of the persons specifically responsible for carrying out the plan.
See deputizing. 
Tempest: The technology and processes of illuminating undesirable elec-
tronic emanations. 
Theory X and Theory Y: Two management theories described by Douglas
McGregor that reflect opposite ways management has of viewing the
workforce. The Theory X manager favors authoritarian leadership
with centralized decision-making and close supervision of work activi-
ties. The Theory Y manager favors participatory decision-making, a
decentralized authority structure, and less emphasis on coercion as a
motivator. 
Theory Z: Proposed by William Ouchi at a time when market share in
some industries was lost to Japanese competitors. Theory Z incorpo-
rates aspects of American and Japanese styles of management. 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR): A national report of “serious crime,” or
Type I incidents, compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Includes four violent incidents (non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assaults) and four property crimes (burglary, larceny,
vehicular theft, and arson). 
Uninterrupted power supply (UPS): A device that stores energy during
normal operations so that it can provide backup energy if power fails. 
Validity (in pre-employment test): Implies that the test measures what it
is supposed to. 
Vetting: The process of ascertaining the accuracy and completeness of
information. Often refers to pre-employment screening. 
Whistle-blower: An individual who informs on an employee’s or
employer’s misconduct. In federal and state statutes, public employees
are protected from retaliation for such disclosures. Some states also
protect private sector whistler-blowers. 
White-collar crime: Unlawful, nonviolent conduct by corporations and
individuals, including theft or fraud and other violations of trust
occurring during the time of the offender’s occupation. White-collar
crime is a frequent focus of internal investigations within the organiza-
tion. A term devised by the sociologist Edwin Sutherland. See also
Embezzlement.
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A
ABC technique, 143 
Access control systems, 321–23 
Accounting controls and budgeting, 
229–62
Accounts
consolidated, 231 
master, 231 
ACLs (Access Control Lists), 110 
ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990), 71–72 
Advancement that stops short of pro-
motion, 190 
Alarm systems, 323–25 
Allied Security, 16 
Aldrich Ames Case, 81 
American Psychological Association 
(APA), 80 
American Society for Industrial Security 
(ASIS), 15, 27, 40, 115–16, 281, 346, 
361, 377 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA), 71–72 
Animals, 310–11 
APA (American Psychological Associa-
tion), 80 
Applications, 70–73 
Appraisal
for all levels and by all levels, 161–62 
difficulties of performance, 159–60 
interviews, 175–78 
Appraisal documentation, need for, 
172–74
Appraisal documents, formal, 165–69 
Appraisal techniques, miscellaneous 
written, 174–75 
Appraisals
limitations of, 189 
who and when, 160 
ASIS; See American Society for Indus-
trial Security 
At-will employment, 209–13 
ATMs (automated teller machines), 46 
Audit committees, 20 
Auditors
limitations of independent, 258–59 
significance of change in, 240 
statements from independent, 239–40 
Authority and responsibility, linking 
management to, 181–82 
Automated teller machines (ATMs), 46 
AV (audio-visual), materials, 111 
Avon Products, 187 
B
Balance sheets 
consolidated, 231–37 
notes to consolidated, 237–39 
Bank Security Act, 39, 41 
Barefoot, J. Kirk, 15 
Barnard, Chester, 12–13 
Barings Bank, 354 
Barriers, 311–12 
BARS (Behaviorally Anchored Rating 
Scale), 163 
BCCI (Bank of Commerce and Credit 
International), 370–71 
Best, A.M., 295 
Biometric systems, 322–23 
Blanchard, Kenneth, 132–33, 136 
Boards of directors, 18, 20 
Bologna, Jack, 258–59 
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Boni, William C., 359 
Bookkeeping, double-entry, 231 
Brantingham, Patricia and Paul, 303–4 
Braunig, M.J., 353 
Budget creation, process of, 245–48 
Budget downfalls, 256 
Budget examples, security program 
line-item, 246–47 
Budgeting
and accounting controls, 229–62 
capital, 254–56 
for security departments, 243–48 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 346–47 
Business conduct, unethical, 360–61 
Business espionage, 363 
Business services, 52 
C
Candidates, assessing, 90 
Capital budgeting for security pro-
grams, 254–56 
Capital investment, assessing, 252 
Cargo/supply-chain theft, 367–68 
Case history, pharmaceutical, 272 
Cash flow statement, 252 
Cathode ray tubes (CRTs), 317 
CCDs (charge coupled devices), 317 
CCTV (Closed-Circuit Television), 47, 
309, 317–19 
monitors, 317–18 
recording devices, 318–19 
technical features, 319 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 81 
CEOs (chief executive officers), 18, 23, 
26
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), 116 
Certified Protection Professional (CPP), 
116 
Certified public accountants (CPAs), 230 
CFE (Certified Fraud Examiner), 116 
CFOs (chief financial officers), 229–30, 
258
Charge coupled devices (CCDs), 317 
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 81 
Civil investigations, criminal versus, 
271
Civil records searches, 76 
Clarke, John P., 26, 257 
Clarke, Ronald V., 15 
Classroom instruction, 107–8 
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), 47, 
309, 317–19 
monitors, 317–18 
recording devices, 318–19 
technical features, 319 
Coaching, 343 
Code of Ethics, 27 
Cole, Richard B., 224 
Committees, audit, 20 
Communications, 326 
Compensation, and salary, 278–79 
Compensation, Workers’, 367 
Completion, percentage of, 242 
Computer-aided instruction, 108–10 
Computer crime, 356–57 
Conger, Jay A., 344 
Consolidated accounts, 231 
Consolidated balance sheets, 231–37 
notes to, 237–39 
Consolidated statement of operations, 
235
Consultants, retaining services of, 297 
Containers, 313–15 
Contamination, product tampering, 
369–70
Contraband detection, 328–29 
Contract employee debate, 263–68 
Contract security services, 279–80 
Contract security services, selecting, 
280–97
continuous supervision, 297 
determining final costs, 296 
elements of comprehensive RFPs, 
284–96
large, complex security programs, 
282–84
miscellaneous considerations, 296–97 
small, simple programs, 281–82 
Contract security, trends in proprietary 
and, 276 
Contract staffs, combined proprietary 
and, 267–68 
Contracting, sub, 15, 295 
Control systems, access, 321–23 
Controls 
accounting, 229–62 
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evolution of financial, 230–31 
financial, 229–43 
COOs (chief operating officers), 18 
Core competencies, 31–56 
of security operations, 31–34 
Corporate organizational chart, 19 
Corporate staff relating to operating 
units, 22 
Corporations
for-profit, 17–23 
goals of, 248–56 
guide to filings of public, 241 
not-for-profit, 23 
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